Theory Crypto_Scheme

theory Crypto_Scheme

imports Kyber_spec
        Compress
        Abs_Qr

begin
section ‹$(1-\delta)$-Correctness Proof of the Kyber Crypto Scheme›
context kyber_spec
begin

text ‹In the following the key generation, encryption and decryption algorithms 
  of Kyber are stated. Here, the variables have the meaning:
  \begin{itemize}
    \item $A$: matrix, part of Alices public key
    \item $s$: vector, Alices secret key
    \item $t$: is the key generated by Alice qrom $A$ and $s$ in key_gen›
    \item $r$: Bobs "secret" key, randomly picked vector
    \item $m$: message bits, $m\in \{0,1\}^{256}$
    \item $(u,v)$: encrypted message
    \item $dt$, $du$, $dv$: the compression parameters for $t$, $u$ and $v$ respectively. 
      Notice that 0 < d < ⌈log_2 q⌉›. The $d$ values are public knowledge.
    \item $e$, $e1$ and $e2$: error parameters to obscure the message. 
      We need to make certain that an eavesdropper cannot distinguish 
      the encrypted message qrom uniformly random input.
      Notice that $e$ and $e1$ are vectors while $e2$ is a mere element in ℤ_q[X]/(X^n+1).›
  \end{itemize}
›


definition key_gen :: 
  "nat  (('a qr, 'k) vec, 'k) vec  ('a qr, 'k) vec  
   ('a qr, 'k) vec  ('a qr, 'k) vec" where 
"key_gen dt A s e = compress_vec dt (A *v s + e)"

definition encrypt :: 
  "('a qr, 'k) vec  (('a qr, 'k) vec, 'k) vec  
   ('a qr, 'k) vec  ('a qr, 'k) vec  ('a qr)  
    nat  nat  nat  'a qr  
   (('a qr, 'k) vec) * ('a qr)" where
"encrypt t A r e1 e2 dt du dv m = 
  (compress_vec du ((transpose A) *v r + e1),  
   compress_poly dv (scalar_product (decompress_vec dt t) r +
    e2 + to_module (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * m)) "


definition decrypt :: 
  "('a qr, 'k) vec  ('a qr)  ('a qr, 'k) vec  
  nat  nat  'a qr" where
"decrypt u v s du dv = compress_poly 1 ((decompress_poly dv v) - 
  scalar_product s (decompress_vec du u))"



text ‹Lifting a function to the quotient ring›
fun f_int_to_poly :: "(int  int)  ('a qr)  ('a qr)" where
  "f_int_to_poly f = 
        to_qr 
        Poly 
        (map of_int_mod_ring) 
        (map f) 
        (map to_int_mod_ring) 
        coeffs 
        of_qr"


text ‹Error of compression and decompression.›
definition compress_error_poly :: 
  "nat  'a qr  'a qr" where
"compress_error_poly d y = 
  decompress_poly d (compress_poly d y) - y"

definition compress_error_vec :: 
  "nat  ('a qr, 'k) vec  ('a qr, 'k) vec" where
"compress_error_vec d y = 
  decompress_vec d (compress_vec d y) - y"


text ‹Lemmas for scalar product›
lemma scalar_product_linear_left:
  "scalar_product (a+b) c = 
   scalar_product a c + scalar_product b (c :: ('a qr, 'k) vec)"
unfolding scalar_product_def
by auto (metis (no_types, lifting) distrib_right sum.cong sum.distrib)

lemma scalar_product_linear_right:
  "scalar_product a (b+c) = 
   scalar_product a b + scalar_product a (c :: ('a qr, 'k) vec)"
unfolding scalar_product_def
by auto (metis (no_types, lifting) distrib_left sum.cong sum.distrib)

lemma scalar_product_assoc:
  "scalar_product (A *v s) (r :: ('a qr, 'k) vec ) = 
   scalar_product s (r v* A)"
unfolding scalar_product_def matrix_vector_mult_def 
  vector_matrix_mult_def
proof auto
  have "(iUNIV. (jUNIV. (vec_nth (vec_nth A i) j) * 
      (vec_nth s j)) * (vec_nth r i)) = 
    (iUNIV. (jUNIV. (vec_nth (vec_nth A i) j) * 
      (vec_nth s j) * (vec_nth r i)))"
    by (simp add: sum_distrib_right)
  also have " = (jUNIV. (iUNIV. (vec_nth (vec_nth A i) j) * 
    (vec_nth s j) * (vec_nth r i)))"
    using sum.swap .
  also have " = (jUNIV. (iUNIV. (vec_nth s j) * 
    (vec_nth (vec_nth A i) j) * (vec_nth r i)))"
    by (metis (no_types, lifting) mult_commute_abs sum.cong)
  also have " = (jUNIV. (vec_nth s j) * 
    (iUNIV. (vec_nth (vec_nth A i) j) * (vec_nth r i)))"
    by (metis (no_types, lifting) mult.assoc sum.cong sum_distrib_left)
  finally show "(iUNIV. (jUNIV. (vec_nth (vec_nth A i) j) * 
    (vec_nth s j)) * (vec_nth r i)) = (jUNIV. (vec_nth s j) * 
    (iUNIV. (vec_nth r i) *  (vec_nth (vec_nth A i) j)))"
    by (simp add: mult.commute)
qed

text ‹Lemma about coeff Poly›

lemma coeffs_in_coeff:
  assumes "i. poly.coeff x i  A"
  shows "set (coeffs x)  A"
by (simp add: assms coeffs_def image_subsetI)

lemma set_coeff_Poly: "set ((coeffs  Poly) xs)  set xs"
proof -
  have "x  set (strip_while ((=) 0) xs)  x  set xs" 
    for x 
    by (metis append.assoc append_Cons in_set_conv_decomp 
      split_strip_while_append) 
  then show ?thesis by auto
qed

text ‹We now want to show the deterministic correctness of the algorithm. 
  That means, after choosing the variables correctly, generating the public key, encrypting 
  and decrypting, we get back the original message.›

lemma kyber_correct:
  fixes A s r e e1 e2 dt du dv ct cu cv t u v
  assumes 
      t_def:   "t = key_gen dt A s e"
  and u_v_def: "(u,v) = encrypt t A r e1 e2 dt du dv m"
  and ct_def:  "ct = compress_error_vec dt (A *v s + e)"
  and cu_def:  "cu = compress_error_vec du 
                ((transpose A) *v r + e1)"
  and cv_def:  "cv = compress_error_poly dv 
                (scalar_product (decompress_vec dt t) r + e2 + 
                 to_module (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * m)"
  and delta:   "abs_infty_poly (scalar_product e r + e2 + cv - 
                scalar_product s e1 + scalar_product ct r - 
                scalar_product s cu) < round (real_of_int q / 4)"
  and m01:     "set ((coeffs  of_qr) m)  {0,1}"
  shows "decrypt u v s du dv = m"
proof -
  text ‹First, show that the calculations are performed correctly.›
  have t_correct: "decompress_vec dt t = A *v s + e + ct " 
    using t_def ct_def unfolding compress_error_vec_def 
    key_gen_def by simp
  have u_correct: "decompress_vec du u = 
    (transpose A) *v r + e1 + cu" 
    using u_v_def cu_def unfolding encrypt_def 
    compress_error_vec_def by simp
  have v_correct: "decompress_poly dv v = 
    scalar_product (decompress_vec dt t) r + e2 + 
    to_module (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * m + cv"
    using u_v_def cv_def unfolding encrypt_def 
    compress_error_poly_def by simp
  have v_correct': "decompress_poly dv v = 
    scalar_product (A *v s + e) r + e2 + 
    to_module (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * m + cv + 
    scalar_product ct r"
   using t_correct v_correct 
    by (auto simp add: scalar_product_linear_left)
  let ?t = "decompress_vec dt t"
  let ?u = "decompress_vec du u"
  let ?v = "decompress_poly dv v"
  text ‹Define w as the error term of the message encoding. 
    Have $\|w\|_{\infty ,q} < \lceil q/4 \rfloor$›
  define w where "w = scalar_product e r + e2 + cv - 
    scalar_product s e1 + scalar_product ct r - 
    scalar_product s cu"
  have w_length: "abs_infty_poly w < round (real_of_int q / 4)" 
    unfolding w_def using delta by auto
  moreover have "abs_infty_poly w = abs_infty_poly (-w)" 
    unfolding abs_infty_poly_def 
    using neg_mod_plus_minus[OF q_odd q_gt_zero] 
    using abs_infty_q_def abs_infty_q_minus by auto
  ultimately have minus_w_length: 
    "abs_infty_poly (-w) < round (real_of_int q / 4)" 
    by auto
  have vsu: "?v - scalar_product s ?u = 
        w + to_module (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * m" 
    unfolding w_def by (auto simp add: u_correct v_correct' 
    scalar_product_linear_left scalar_product_linear_right 
    scalar_product_assoc)
  text ‹Set m' as the actual result of the decryption. 
    It remains to show that $m' = m$.›
  define m' where "m' = decrypt u v s du dv"
  have coeffs_m': "i. poly.coeff (of_qr m') i  {0,1}" 
    unfolding m'_def decrypt_def using compress_poly_1 by auto
  text ‹Show $\| v - s^Tu - \lceil q/2 \rfloor m' \|_{\infty, q} 
    \leq \lceil q/4 \rfloor$›
  have "abs_infty_poly (?v - scalar_product s ?u - 
    to_module (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * m')
  = abs_infty_poly (?v - scalar_product s ?u - 
    decompress_poly 1 (compress_poly 1 (?v - scalar_product s ?u)))"
    by (auto simp flip: decompress_poly_1[of m', OF coeffs_m'])
       (simp add:m'_def decrypt_def)
  also have "  round (real_of_int q / 4)" 
    using decompress_compress_poly[of 1 "?v - scalar_product s ?u"] 
      q_gt_two by fastforce
  finally have "abs_infty_poly (?v - scalar_product s ?u - 
    to_module (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * m')  
    round (real_of_int q / 4)"
    by auto
  text ‹Show $\| \lceil q/2 \rfloor (m-m')) \|_{\infty, q} < 
    2 \lceil q/4 \rfloor $›
  then have "abs_infty_poly (w + to_module 
    (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * m - to_module 
    (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * m')  round (real_of_int q / 4)" 
    using vsu by auto
  then have w_mm': "abs_infty_poly (w + 
    to_module (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * (m - m'))
     round (real_of_int q / 4)" 
    by (smt (verit) add_uminus_conv_diff is_num_normalize(1) 
      right_diff_distrib')
  have "abs_infty_poly (to_module 
      (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * (m - m')) = 
    abs_infty_poly (w + to_module 
      (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * (m - m') - w)"
    by auto
  also have "  abs_infty_poly 
    (w + to_module (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * (m - m')) 
     + abs_infty_poly (- w)"
    using abs_infty_poly_triangle_ineq[of 
      "w+to_module (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * (m - m')" "-w"] 
    by auto
  also have " < 2 * round (real_of_int q / 4)" 
    using w_mm' minus_w_length by auto
  finally have error_lt: "abs_infty_poly (to_module (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * (m - m')) < 
    2 * round (real_of_int q / 4)" 
    by auto
  text ‹Finally show that $m-m'$ is small enough, ie that it is 
    an integer smaller than one. 
    Here, we need that $q \cong 1\mod 4$.›
  have coeffs_m':"set ((coeffs  of_qr) m')  {0,1}" 
  proof -
    have "compress 1 a  {0,1}" for a 
    unfolding compress_def by auto
    then have "poly.coeff (of_qr (compress_poly 1 a)) i  {0,1}" 
      for a i
      using compress_poly_1 by presburger
    then have "set (coeffs (of_qr (compress_poly 1 a)))  {0,1}" 
      for a 
      using coeffs_in_coeff[of "of_qr (compress_poly 1 a)" "{0,1}"] 
      by simp
    then show ?thesis unfolding m'_def decrypt_def by simp
  qed
  have coeff_0pm1: "set ((coeffs  of_qr) (m-m'))  
    {of_int_mod_ring (-1),0,1}"
  proof -
    have "poly.coeff (of_qr m) i  {0,1}" 
      for i using m01 coeff_in_coeffs
      by (metis comp_def insertCI le_degree subset_iff 
        zero_poly.rep_eq)
    moreover have "poly.coeff (of_qr m') i  {0,1}" for i 
      using coeffs_m' coeff_in_coeffs
      by (metis comp_def insertCI le_degree subset_iff zero_poly.rep_eq)
    ultimately have "poly.coeff (of_qr m - of_qr m') i   {of_int_mod_ring (- 1), 0, 1}" for i
      by (metis (no_types, lifting) coeff_diff diff_zero 
        eq_iff_diff_eq_0 insert_iff of_int_hom.hom_one of_int_minus 
        of_int_of_int_mod_ring singleton_iff verit_minus_simplify(3))
    then have "set (coeffs (of_qr m - of_qr m'))   {of_int_mod_ring (- 1), 0, 1}" 
      by (simp add: coeffs_in_coeff)
    then show ?thesis using m01 of_qr_diff[of m m'] by simp
  qed
  have "set ((coeffs  of_qr) (m-m'))  {0}"
  proof (rule ccontr)
    assume "¬set ((coeffs  of_qr) (m-m'))  {0}"
    then have "i. poly.coeff (of_qr (m-m')) i  
      {of_int_mod_ring (-1),1}" 
      using coeff_0pm1 
      by (smt (z3) coeff_in_coeffs comp_apply insert_iff 
        leading_coeff_0_iff order_refl 
        set_coeffs_subset_singleton_0_iff subsetD)
    then have error_ge: "abs_infty_poly (to_module 
      (round((real_of_int q)/2)) * (m-m'))  
      2 * round (real_of_int q / 4)" 
      using abs_infty_poly_ineq_pm_1 by simp
    show False using error_lt error_ge by simp
  qed
  then show ?thesis by (simp flip: m'_def) (metis to_qr_of_qr)
qed


end

end