Abstract
We provide in this AFP entry several relative soundness results for
security protocols. In particular, we prove typing and
compositionality results for stateful protocols (i.e., protocols with
mutable state that may span several sessions), and that focuses on
reachability properties. Such results are useful to simplify protocol
verification by reducing it to a simpler problem: Typing results give
conditions under which it is safe to verify a protocol in a typed
model where only "well-typed" attacks can occur whereas
compositionality results allow us to verify a composed protocol by
only verifying the component protocols in isolation. The conditions on
the protocols under which the results hold are furthermore syntactic
in nature allowing for full automation. The foundation presented here
is used in another entry to provide fully automated and formalized
security proofs of stateful protocols.
License
Topics
Session Stateful_Protocol_Composition_and_Typing
- Miscellaneous
- Messages
- More_Unification
- Intruder_Deduction
- Strands_and_Constraints
- Lazy_Intruder
- Typed_Model
- Typing_Result
- Stateful_Strands
- Stateful_Typing
- Labeled_Strands
- Parallel_Compositionality
- Labeled_Stateful_Strands
- Stateful_Compositionality
- Example_Keyserver
- Example_TLS
- Examples