An Isabelle/HOL formalization of Strong Security

Sylvia Grewe, Alexander Lux, Heiko Mantel, Jens Sauer

July 20, 2018

Abstract

Research in information-flow security aims at developing methods to identify undesired information leaks within programs from private sources to public sinks. Noninterference captures this intuition. Strong security from [2] formalizes noninterference for concurrent systems.

We present an Isabelle/HOL formalization of strong security for arbitrary security lattices ([2] uses a two-element security lattice). The formalization includes compositionality proofs for strong security and a soundness proof for a security type system that checks strong security for programs in a simple while language with dynamic thread creation.

Our formalization of the security type system is abstract in the language for expressions and in the semantic side conditions for expressions. It can easily be instantiated with different syntactic approximations for these side conditions. The soundness proof of such an instantiation boils down to showing that these syntactic approximations imply the semantic side conditions.

Contents

1 Preliminary definitions

1.1 Type synonyms

The formalization is parametric in different aspects. Notably, it is parametric in the security lattice it supports.

For better readability, we use the following type synonyms in our formalization:

theory *Types*
imports *Main*
begin

— type parameters:
— 'exp: expressions (arithmetic, boolean...)
— 'val: values
— 'id: identifier names
— 'com: commands
— 'd: domains

This is a collection of type synonyms. Note that not all of these type synonyms are used within Strong-Security - some are used in WHATandWHERE-Security.

— type for memory states - map ids to values
type-synonym $('id, 'val)\ State = 'id \Rightarrow 'val$

— type for evaluation functions mapping expressions to a values depending on a state
type-synonym $('exp, 'id, 'val)\ Evalfunction =$
$'exp \Rightarrow ('id, 'val)\ State \Rightarrow 'val$

— define configurations with threads as pair of commands and states
type-synonym $('id, 'val, 'com)\ TConfig = 'com \times ('id, 'val)\ State$

— define configurations with thread pools as pair of command lists (thread pool) and states
type-synonym $('id, 'val, 'com)\ TPConfig =$
$('com\ list) \times ('id, 'val)\ State$

— type for program states (including the set of commands and a symbol for terminating - None)
type-synonym $'com\ ProgramState = 'com\ option$

— type for configurations with program states
type-synonym (*'id*, *'val*, *'com*) *PSConfig* =
'com ProgramState × (*'id*, *'val*) *State*

— type for labels with a list of spawned threads
type-synonym *'com Label* = *'com list*

— type for step relations from single commands to a program state, with a label
type-synonym (*'exp*, *'id*, *'val*, *'com*) *TLSteps* =
((*'id*, *'val*, *'com*) *TConfig* × *'com Label*
× (*'id*, *'val*, *'com*) *PSConfig*) *set*

— curried version of previously defined type
type-synonym (*'exp*, *'id*, *'val*, *'com*) *TLSteps-curry* =
'com ⇒ (*'id*, *'val*) *State* ⇒ *'com Label* ⇒ *'com ProgramState*
⇒ (*'id*, *'val*) *State* ⇒ *bool*

— type for step relations from thread pools to thread pools
type-synonym (*'exp*, *'id*, *'val*, *'com*) *TPSteps* =
((*'id*, *'val*, *'com*) *TPConfig* × (*'id*, *'val*, *'com*) *TPConfig*) *set*

— curried version of previously defined type
type-synonym (*'exp*, *'id*, *'val*, *'com*) *TPSteps-curry* =
'com list ⇒ (*'id*, *'val*) *State* ⇒ *'com list* ⇒ (*'id*, *'val*) *State* ⇒ *bool*

— define type of step relations for single threads to thread pools
type-synonym (*'exp*, *'id*, *'val*, *'com*) *TSteps* =
((*'id*, *'val*, *'com*) *TConfig* × (*'id*, *'val*, *'com*) *TPConfig*) *set*

— define the same type as TSteps, but in a curried version (allowing syntax abbreviations)
type-synonym (*'exp*, *'id*, *'val*, *'com*) *TSteps-curry* =
'com ⇒ (*'id*, *'val*) *State* ⇒ *'com list* ⇒ (*'id*, *'val*) *State* ⇒ *bool*

— type for simple domain assignments; 'd has to be an instance of order (partial order
type-synonym (*'id*, *'d*) *DomainAssignment* = *'id* ⇒ *'d*::*order*

type-synonym *'com Bisimulation-type* = ((*'com list*) × (*'com list*)) *set*

— type for escape hatches
type-synonym (*'d*, *'exp*) *Hatch* = *'d* × *'exp*

— type for sets of escape hatches
type-synonym (*'d*, *'exp*) *Hatches* = ((*'d*, *'exp*) *Hatch*) *set*

— type for local escape hatches
type-synonym (*'d*, *'exp*) *lHatch* = *'d* × *'exp* × *nat*

— type for sets of local escape hatches
type-synonym $('d, 'exp)\ lHatches = (('d, 'exp)\ lHatch)\ set$

end

2 Strong security

2.1 Definition of strong security

We define strong security such that it is parametric in a security lattice (*'d*). The definition of strong security by itself is language-independent, therefore the definition is parametric in a programming language (*'com*) in addition.

theory *Strong-Security*
imports *Types*
begin

locale *Strong-Security* =
fixes $SR :: ('exp, 'id, 'val, 'com)\ TSteps$
and $DA :: ('id, 'd{::}order)\ DomainAssignment$

begin

— define when two states are indistinguishable for an observer on domain d
definition $d\text{-}equal :: 'd{::}order \Rightarrow ('id, 'val)\ State$
$\Rightarrow ('id, 'val)\ State \Rightarrow bool$
where
$d\text{-}equal\ d\ m\ m' \equiv \forall x.\ ((DA\ x) \leq d \longrightarrow (m\ x) = (m'\ x))$

abbreviation $d\text{-}equal' :: ('id, 'val)\ State$
$\Rightarrow 'd{::}order \Rightarrow ('id, 'val)\ State \Rightarrow bool$
((- =- -))
where
$m =_d m' \equiv d\text{-}equal\ d\ m\ m'$

— transitivity of d-equality
lemma *d-equal-trans*:
$[\![\ m =_d m';\ m' =_d m''\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow m =_d m''$
⟨*proof*⟩

abbreviation $SRabbr :: ('exp, 'id, 'val, 'com)\ TSteps\text{-}curry$
$((1\langle\text{-},/\text{-}\rangle) \rightarrow/\ (1\langle\text{-},/\text{-}\rangle)\ [0,0,0,0]\ 81)$
where
$\langle c,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle c',m'\rangle \equiv ((c,m),(c',m')) \in SR$

— predicate for strong d-bisimulation
definition *Strong-d-Bisimulation* :: *'d ⇒ 'com Bisimulation-type ⇒ bool*
where
Strong-d-Bisimulation d R ≡
(*sym R*) ∧
(∀ (*V*,*V'*) ∈ *R*. *length V* = *length V'*) ∧
(∀ (*V*,*V'*) ∈ *R*. ∀ *i* < *length V*. ∀ *m1 m1' m2 W*.
⟨*V*!*i*,*m1*⟩ → ⟨*W*,*m2*⟩ ∧ *m1* =$_d$ *m1'*
⟶ (∃ *W' m2'*. ⟨*V'*!*i*,*m1'*⟩ → ⟨*W'*,*m2'*⟩ ∧ (*W*,*W'*) ∈ *R* ∧ *m2* =$_d$ *m2'*))

— union of all strong d-bisimulations
definition *USdB* :: *'d ⇒ 'com Bisimulation-type*
(≈$_-$ *65*)
where
≈$_d$ ≡ ⋃{*r*. (*Strong-d-Bisimulation d r*)}

abbreviation *relatedbyUSdB* :: *'com list ⇒ 'd ⇒ 'com list ⇒ bool*
((- ≈$_-$ -) [*66*,*66*] *65*)
where *V* ≈$_d$ *V'* ≡ (*V*,*V'*) ∈ *USdB d*

— predicate to define when a program is strongly secure
definition *Strongly-Secure* :: *'com list ⇒ bool*
where
Strongly-Secure V ≡ (∀ *d*. *V* ≈$_d$ *V*)

— auxiliary lemma to obtain central strong d-Bisimulation property as Lemma in meta logic (allows instantiating all the variables manually if necessary)
lemma *strongdB-aux*: ⋀*V V' m1 m1' m2 W i*. ⟦ *Strong-d-Bisimulation d R*;
i < *length V* ; (*V*,*V'*) ∈ *R*; ⟨*V*!*i*,*m1*⟩ → ⟨*W*,*m2*⟩; *m1* =$_d$ *m1'* ⟧
⟹ (∃ *W' m2'*. ⟨*V'*!*i*,*m1'*⟩ → ⟨*W'*,*m2'*⟩ ∧ (*W*,*W'*) ∈ *R* ∧ *m2* =$_d$ *m2'*)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *trivialpair-in-USdB*:
[] ≈$_d$ []
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *USdBsym*: *sym* (≈$_d$)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *USdBeqlen*:
V ≈$_d$ *V'* ⟹ *length V* = *length V'*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *USdB-Strong-d-Bisimulation*:
Strong-d-Bisimulation d (≈$_d$)
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *USdBtrans*: *trans* $(\approx_d)$
⟨*proof*⟩

end

end

2.2 Proof technique for compositionality results

For proving compositionality results for strong security, we formalize the following "up-to technique" and prove it sound:

theory *Up-To-Technique*
imports *Strong-Security*
begin

context *Strong-Security*
begin

— define d-bisimulation 'up to' union of strong d-Bisimulations
definition *d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB* ::
$'d \Rightarrow 'com\ Bisimulation\text{-}type \Rightarrow bool$
where
d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB d R ≡
(*sym R*) ∧ (∀(*V*,*V'*) ∈ *R*. *length V* = *length V'*) ∧
(∀(*V*,*V'*) ∈ *R*. ∀ *i* < *length V*. ∀ *m1 m1' W m2*.
⟨*V*!*i*,*m1*⟩ → ⟨*W*,*m2*⟩ ∧ (*m1* $=_d$ *m1'*)
⟶ (∃ *W' m2'*. ⟨*V'*!*i*,*m1'*⟩ → ⟨*W'*,*m2'*⟩
∧ (*W*,*W'*) ∈ (*R* ∪ $(\approx_d)$) ∧ (*m2* $=_d$ *m2'*)))

lemma *UpTo-aux*: ⋀*V V' m1 m1' m2 W i*. ⟦ *d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB d R*;
i < *length V*; (*V*,*V'*) ∈ *R*; ⟨*V*!*i*,*m1*⟩ → ⟨*W*,*m2*⟩; *m1* $=_d$ *m1'* ⟧
⟹ (∃ *W' m2'*. ⟨*V'*!*i*,*m1'*⟩ → ⟨*W'*,*m2'*⟩
∧ (*W*,*W'*) ∈ (*R* ∪ $(\approx_d)$) ∧ (*m2* $=_d$ *m2'*))
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *RuUSdBeqlen*:
⟦ *d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB d R*;
(*V*,*V'*) ∈ (*R* ∪ $(\approx_d)$) ⟧
⟹ *length V* = *length V'*
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *Up-To-Technique*:
assumes *upToR*: *d-Bisimulation-Up-To-USdB d R*
shows *R* ⊆ $\approx_d$
⟨*proof*⟩

end

end

2.3 Proof of parallel compositionality

We prove that strong security is preserved under composition of strongly secure threads.

theory *Parallel-Composition*
imports *Up-To-Technique*
begin

context *Strong-Security*
begin

theorem *parallel-composition*:
  assumes *eqlen*: *length* V = *length* V'
  assumes *partsrelated*: $\forall\, i <$ *length* V. $[V!i] \approx_d [V'!i]$
  shows $V \approx_d V'$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *parallel-decomposition*:
  assumes *related*: $V \approx_d V'$
  shows $\forall\, i <$ *length* V. $[V!i] \approx_d [V'!i]$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *USdB-comp-head-tail*:
  assumes *relatedhead*: $[c] \approx_d [c']$
  assumes *relatedtail*: $V \approx_d V'$
  shows $(c\#V) \approx_d (c'\#V')$
⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *USdB-decomp-head-tail*:
  assumes *relatedlist*: $(c\#V) \approx_d (c'\#V')$
  shows $[c] \approx_d [c'] \wedge V \approx_d V'$
⟨*proof*⟩

end

end

3 Example language and compositionality proofs

3.1 Example language with dynamic thread creation

As in [2], we instantiate the language with a simple while language that supports dynamic thread creation via a fork command (Multi-threaded While Language with fork, MWLf). Note that the language is still parametric in the language used for Boolean and arithmetic expressions (*'exp*).

theory *MWLf*
imports *Types*
begin

— SYNTAX

— Commands for the multi-threaded while language with fork (to instantiate 'com)
datatype (*'exp*, *'id*) *MWLfCom*
= *Skip* (*skip*)
| *Assign 'id 'exp*
(-:=- [*70*,*70*] *70*)

| *Seq* (*'exp*, *'id*) *MWLfCom* (*'exp*, *'id*) *MWLfCom*
(-;- [*61*,*60*] *60*)

| *If-Else 'exp* (*'exp*, *'id*) *MWLfCom* (*'exp*, *'id*) *MWLfCom*
(*if* - *then* - *else* - *fi* [*80*,*79*,*79*] *70*)

| *While-Do 'exp* (*'exp*, *'id*) *MWLfCom*
(*while* - *do* - *od* [*80*,*79*] *70*)

| *Fork* (*'exp*, *'id*) *MWLfCom* ((*'exp*, *'id*) *MWLfCom*) *list*
(*fork* - - [*70*,*70*] *70*)

— SEMANTICS

locale *MWLf-semantics* =
fixes *E* :: (*'exp*, *'id*, *'val*) *Evalfunction*
and *BMap* :: *'val* ⇒ *bool*
begin

— steps semantics, set of deterministic steps from single threads to either single threads or thread pools
inductive-set
MWLfSteps-det :: (*'exp*, *'id*, *'val*, (*'exp*, *'id*) *MWLfCom*) *TSteps*
and *MWLfSteps-det'* :: (*'exp*, *'id*, *'val*, (*'exp*, *'id*) *MWLfCom*) *TSteps-curry*
((*1*⟨-,/-⟩) →/ (*1*⟨-,/-⟩) [*0*,*0*,*0*,*0*] *81*)
where
⟨*c1*,*m1*⟩ → ⟨*c2*,*m2*⟩ ≡ ((*c1*,*m1*),(*c2*,*m2*)) ∈ *MWLfSteps-det* |
skip: ⟨*skip*,*m*⟩ → ⟨[],*m*⟩ |

assign: $(E\ e\ m) = v \Longrightarrow \langle x := e,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle[],m(x := v)\rangle$ |
seq1: $\langle c1,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle[],m'\rangle \Longrightarrow \langle c1;c2,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle[c2],m'\rangle$ |
seq2: $\langle c1,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle c1'\#V,m'\rangle \Longrightarrow \langle c1;c2,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle(c1';c2)\#V,m'\rangle$ |
iftrue: $BMap\ (E\ b\ m) = True \Longrightarrow$
$\langle$*if b then c1 else c2 fi*$,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle[c1],m\rangle$ |
iffalse: $BMap\ (E\ b\ m) = False \Longrightarrow$
$\langle$*if b then c1 else c2 fi*$,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle[c2],m\rangle$ |
whiletrue: $BMap\ (E\ b\ m) = True \Longrightarrow$
$\langle$*while b do c od*$,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle[c;($*while b do c od*$)],m\rangle$ |
whilefalse: $BMap\ (E\ b\ m) = False \Longrightarrow$
$\langle$*while b do c od*$,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle[],m\rangle$ |
fork: $\langle$*fork c V*$,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle c\#V,m\rangle$

inductive-cases *MWLfSteps-det-cases*:
$\langle$*skip*$,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle W,m'\rangle$
$\langle x := e,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle W,m'\rangle$
$\langle c1;c2,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle W,m'\rangle$
$\langle$*if b then c1 else c2 fi*$,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle W,m'\rangle$
$\langle$*while b do c od*$,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle W,m'\rangle$
$\langle$*fork c V*$,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle W,m'\rangle$

— non-deterministic, possibilistic system step (added for intuition, not used in the proofs)
inductive-set
MWLfSteps-ndet :: $('exp, 'id, 'val, ('exp,'id)\ MWLfCom)\ TPSteps$
and *MWLfSteps-ndet'* :: $('exp, 'id, 'val, ('exp,'id)\ MWLfCom)\ TPSteps\text{-}curry$
$((1\langle\text{-},\text{-}/\text{-}\rangle) \Rightarrow/\ (1\langle\text{-},\text{-}/\text{-}\rangle)\ [0,0,0,0]\ 81)$
where
$\langle V1,m1\rangle \Rightarrow \langle V2,m2\rangle \equiv ((V1,m1),(V2,m2)) \in MWLfSteps\text{-}ndet$ |
$\langle ci,m\rangle \rightarrow \langle c,m'\rangle \Longrightarrow \langle Vf\ @\ [ci]\ @\ Va,m\rangle \Rightarrow \langle Vf\ @\ c\ @\ Va,m'\rangle$

end

end

3.2 Proofs of atomic compositionality results

We prove for each atomic command of our example programming language (i.e. a command that is not composed out of other commands) that it is strongly secure if the expressions involved are indistinguishable for an observer on security level d.

theory *Strongly-Secure-Skip-Assign*
imports *MWLf Parallel-Composition*
begin

locale *Strongly-Secure-Programs* =

L? : *MWLf-semantics E BMap*
+ *SS?*: *Strong-Security MWLfSteps-det DA*
for *E* :: (*'exp*, *'id*, *'val*) *Evalfunction*
and *BMap* :: *'val* ⇒ *bool*
and *DA* :: (*'id*, *'d*::*order*) *DomainAssignment*
begin

abbreviation *USdBname* ::*'d* ⇒ (*'exp*, *'id*) *MWLfCom Bisimulation-type*
(≈-)
where $\approx_d \equiv$ *USdB d*

abbreviation *relatedbyUSdB* :: (*'exp*,*'id*) *MWLfCom list* ⇒ *'d*
⇒ (*'exp*,*'id*) *MWLfCom list* ⇒ *bool* (**infixr** ≈- *65*)
where $V \approx_d V' \equiv (V, V') \in$ *USdB d*

— define when two expressions are indistinguishable with respect to a domain d
definition *d-indistinguishable* :: *'d*::*order* ⇒ *'exp* ⇒ *'exp* ⇒ *bool*
where
d-indistinguishable d e1 e2 ≡
$\forall m\ m'.\ ((m =_d m') \longrightarrow ((E\ e1\ m) = (E\ e2\ m')))$

abbreviation *d-indistinguishable'* :: *'exp* ⇒ *'d*::*order* ⇒ *'exp* ⇒ *bool*
((- ≡- -))
where
$e1 \equiv_d e2 \equiv$ *d-indistinguishable d e1 e2*

— symmetry of d-indistinguishable
lemma *d-indistinguishable-sym*:
$e \equiv_d e' \Longrightarrow e' \equiv_d e$
⟨*proof*⟩
lemma *d-indistinguishable-trans*:
$[\![\ e \equiv_d e';\ e' \equiv_d e''\ ]\!] \Longrightarrow e \equiv_d e''$
⟨*proof*⟩

theorem *Strongly-Secure-Skip*:
$[skip] \approx_d [skip]$
⟨*proof*⟩

theorem *Strongly-Secure-Assign*:
assumes *d-indistinguishable-exp*: $e \equiv_{DA\ x} e'$
shows $[x := e] \approx_d [x := e']$
⟨*proof*⟩

end

end

3.3 Proofs of non-atomic compositionality results

We prove compositionality results for each non-atomic command of our example programming language (i.e. a command that is composed out of other commands): If the components are strongly secure and the expressions involved indistinguishable for an observer on security level d, then the composed command is also strongly secure.

theory *Language-Composition*
imports *Strongly-Secure-Skip-Assign*
begin

context *Strongly-Secure-Programs*
begin

theorem *Compositionality-Seq*:
  assumes *relatedpart1*: $[c1] \approx_d [c1']$
  assumes *relatedpart2*: $[c2] \approx_d [c2']$
  shows $[c1;c2] \approx_d [c1';c2']$
⟨*proof*⟩

theorem *Compositionality-Fork*:
  fixes V::(*'exp*,*'id*) *MWLfCom list*
  assumes *relatedmain*: $[c] \approx_d [c']$
  assumes *relatedthreads*: $V \approx_d V'$
  shows $[fork\ c\ V] \approx_d [fork\ c'\ V']$
⟨*proof*⟩

theorem *Compositionality-If*:
  assumes *dind-or-branchesrelated*:
  $b \equiv_d b' \vee [c1] \approx_d [c2] \vee [c1'] \approx_d [c2']$
  assumes *branch1related*: $[c1] \approx_d [c1']$
  assumes *branch2related*: $[c2] \approx_d [c2']$
  shows $[if\ b\ then\ c1\ else\ c2\ fi] \approx_d [if\ b'\ then\ c1'\ else\ c2'\ fi]$
⟨*proof*⟩

theorem *Compositionality-While*:
  assumes *dind*: $b \equiv_d b'$
  assumes *bodyrelated*: $[c] \approx_d [c']$
  shows $[while\ b\ do\ c\ od] \approx_d [while\ b'\ do\ c'\ od]$
⟨*proof*⟩

end

end

4 Security type system

4.1 Abstract security type system with soundness proof

We formalize an abstract version of the type system in [2] using locales [1]. Our formalization of the type system is abstract in the sense that the rules specify abstract semantic side conditions on the expressions within a command that satisfy for proving the soundness of the rules. That is, it can be instantiated with different syntactic approximations for these semantic side conditions in order to achieve a type system for a concrete language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions. Obtaining a soundness proof for such a concrete type system then boils down to proving that the concrete type system interprets the abstract type system.

We prove the soundness of the abstract type system by simply applying the compositionality results proven before.

theory *Type-System*
imports *Language-Composition*
begin

locale *Type-System* =
  SSP? : *Strongly-Secure-Programs E BMap DA*
  for *E* :: (*'exp*, *'id*, *'val*) *Evalfunction*
  and *BMap* :: *'val* ⇒ *bool*
  and *DA* :: (*'id*, *'d*::*order*) *DomainAssignment*
+
fixes
AssignSideCondition :: *'id* ⇒ *'exp* ⇒ *bool*
and *WhileSideCondition* :: *'exp* ⇒ *bool*
and *IfSideCondition* ::
  'exp ⇒ (*'exp*,*'id*) *MWLfCom* ⇒ (*'exp*,*'id*) *MWLfCom* ⇒ *bool*
assumes *semAssignSC*: *AssignSideCondition x e* ⟹ *e* ≡$_{DA\ x}$ *e*
and *semWhileSC*: *WhileSideCondition e* ⟹ ∀ *d*. *e* ≡$_d$ *e*
and *semIfSC*: *IfSideCondition e c1 c2* ⟹ ∀ *d*. *e* ≡$_d$ *e* ∨ [*c1*] ≈$_d$ [*c2*]
begin

— Security typing rules for the language commands
inductive
ComSecTyping :: (*'exp*, *'id*) *MWLfCom* ⇒ *bool*
  (⊢$_{\mathcal{C}}$ -)
and *ComSecTypingL* :: (*'exp*,*'id*) *MWLfCom list* ⇒ *bool*
  (⊢$_{\mathcal{V}}$ -)
where
skip: ⊢$_{\mathcal{C}}$ *skip* |
Assign: ⟦ *AssignSideCondition x e* ⟧ ⟹ ⊢$_{\mathcal{C}}$ *x* := *e* |
Fork: ⟦ ⊢$_{\mathcal{C}}$ *c*; ⊢$_{\mathcal{V}}$ *V* ⟧ ⟹ ⊢$_{\mathcal{C}}$ *fork c V* |
Seq: ⟦ ⊢$_{\mathcal{C}}$ *c1*; ⊢$_{\mathcal{C}}$ *c2* ⟧ ⟹ ⊢$_{\mathcal{C}}$ *c1*;*c2* |
While: ⟦ ⊢$_{\mathcal{C}}$ *c*; *WhileSideCondition b* ⟧

$\Longrightarrow \vdash_{\mathcal{C}}$ *while b do c od* |
If: ⟦ $\vdash_{\mathcal{C}}$ *c1*; $\vdash_{\mathcal{C}}$ *c2*; *IfSideCondition b c1 c2* ⟧
$\Longrightarrow \vdash_{\mathcal{C}}$ *if b then c1 else c2 fi* |
Parallel: ⟦ $\forall i <$ *length V*. $\vdash_{\mathcal{C}}$ *V*![*i*] ⟧ $\Longrightarrow \vdash_{\mathcal{V}}$ *V*

inductive-cases *parallel-cases*:
$\vdash_{\mathcal{V}}$ *V*

— soundness proof of abstract type system
theorem *ComSecTyping-single-is-sound*:
$\vdash_{\mathcal{C}}$ *c* $\Longrightarrow$ *Strongly-Secure* [*c*]
⟨*proof*⟩

theorem *ComSecTyping-list-is-sound*:
$\vdash_{\mathcal{V}}$ *V* $\Longrightarrow$ *Strongly-Secure V*
⟨*proof*⟩

end

end

4.2 Example language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions

As and example, we provide a simple example language for instantiating the parameter *'exp* for the language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions.

theory *Expr*
imports *Types*
begin

— type parameters:
— 'val: numbers, boolean constants....
— 'id: identifier names

type-synonym ('*val*) *operation* = *'val list* ⇒ *'val*

datatype (*dead 'id*, *dead 'val*) *Expr* =
Const 'val |
Var 'id |
Op 'val operation (('*id*, '*val*) *Expr*) *list*

— defining a simple recursive evaluation function on this datatype
primrec *ExprEval* :: (('*id*, '*val*) *Expr*, '*id*, '*val*) *Evalfunction*
and *ExprEvalL* :: (('*id*, '*val*) *Expr*) *list* ⇒ ('*id*, '*val*) *State* ⇒ *'val list*
where
ExprEval (*Const v*) *m* = *v* |

ExprEval (*Var x*) *m* = (*m x*) |
ExprEval (*Op f arglist*) *m* = (*f* (*ExprEvalL arglist m*)) |

ExprEvalL [] *m* = [] |
ExprEvalL (*e*#*V*) *m* = (*ExprEval e m*)#(*ExprEvalL V m*)

end

4.3 Example interpretation of abstract security type system

Using the example instantiation of the language for Boolean and arithmetic expressions, we give an example instantiation of our abstract security type system, instantiating the parameter for domains *'d* with a two-level security lattice.

theory *Domain-example*
imports *Expr*
begin

— When interpreting, we have to instantiate the type for domains. As an example, we take a type containing 'low' and 'high' as domains.

datatype *Dom* = *low* | *high*

instantiation *Dom* :: *order*
begin

definition
less-eq-Dom-def: *d1* ≤ *d2* = (*if d1* = *d2 then True*
else (*if d1* = *low then True else False*))

definition
less-Dom-def: *d1* < *d2* = (*if d1* = *d2 then False*
else (*if d1* = *low then True else False*))

instance ⟨*proof*⟩

end

end

theory *Type-System-example*
imports *Type-System Expr Domain-example*
begin

— When interpreting, we have to instantiate the type for domains.
— As an example, we take a type containing 'low' and 'high' as domains.

consts *DA* :: (*'id*,*Dom*) *DomainAssignment*
consts *BMap* :: *'val* ⇒ *bool*

abbreviation *d-indistinguishable'* :: (*'id*,*'val*) *Expr* ⇒ *Dom*
⇒ (*'id*,*'val*) *Expr* ⇒ *bool*
((- ≡- -))
where
e1 ≡$_d$ *e2*
≡ *Strongly-Secure-Programs.d-indistinguishable ExprEval DA d e1 e2*

abbreviation *relatedbyUSdB'* :: ((*'id*,*'val*) *Expr*, *'id*) *MWLfCom list*
⇒ *Dom* ⇒ ((*'id*,*'val*) *Expr*, *'id*) *MWLfCom list* ⇒ *bool* (**infixr** ≈- *65*)
where *V* ≈$_d$ *V'* ≡ (*V*,*V'*) ∈ *Strong-Security.USdB*
(*MWLf-semantics.MWLfSteps-det ExprEval BMap*) *DA d*

— Security typing rules for expressions - will be part of a side condition
inductive
ExprSecTyping :: (*'id*, *'val*) *Expr* ⇒ *Dom set* ⇒ *bool*
(⊢$_{\mathcal{E}}$ - : -)
where
Consts: ⊢$_{\mathcal{E}}$ (*Const v*) : {*d*} |
Vars: ⊢$_{\mathcal{E}}$ (*Var x*) : {*DA x*} |
Ops: ∀ *i* < *length arglist*. ⊢$_{\mathcal{E}}$ (*arglist*!*i*) : (*dl*!*i*)
⟹ ⊢$_{\mathcal{E}}$ (*Op f arglist*) : (⋃{*d*. (∃ *i* < *length arglist*. *d* = (*dl*!*i*))})

definition *synAssignSC* :: *'id* ⇒ (*'id*, *'val*) *Expr* ⇒ *bool*
where
synAssignSC x e ≡ ∃ *D*. (⊢$_{\mathcal{E}}$ *e* : *D* ∧ (∀ *d* ∈ *D*. (*d* ≤ *DA x*)))

definition *synWhileSC* :: (*'id*, *'val*) *Expr* ⇒ *bool*
where
synWhileSC e ≡ ∃ *D*. (⊢$_{\mathcal{E}}$ *e* : *D* ∧ (∀ *d*∈*D*. ∀ *d'*. *d* ≤ *d'*))

definition *synIfSC* :: (*'id*, *'val*) *Expr* ⇒ ((*'id*, *'val*) *Expr*, *'id*) *MWLfCom*
⇒ ((*'id*, *'val*) *Expr*, *'id*) *MWLfCom* ⇒ *bool*
where
synIfSC e c1 c2 ≡
∀ *d*. (¬ (*e* ≡$_d$ *e*) ⟶ [*c1*] ≈$_d$ [*c2*])

lemma *ExprTypable-with-smallerD-implies-d-indistinguishable*:
⟦ ⊢$_{\mathcal{E}}$ *e* : *D'*; ∀ *d'* ∈ *D'*. *d'* ≤ *d* ⟧ ⟹ *e* ≡$_d$ *e*
⟨*proof*⟩

interpretation *Type-System-example*: *Type-System ExprEval BMap DA*
synAssignSC synWhileSC synIfSC
⟨*proof*⟩

end

References

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[2] A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs. In *Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2000. CSFW-13. Proceedings. 13th IEEE*, pages 200–214. IEEE, 2000.