

Σ -protocols and Commitment Schemes

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Abstract

We use CryptHOL [2] to formalise commitment schemes and Σ -protocols. Both are widely used fundamental two party cryptographic primitives. Security for commitment schemes is considered using game-based definitions whereas the security of Σ -protocols is considered using both the game-based and simulation-based security paradigms. In this work we first define security for both primitives and then prove secure multiple examples namely; the Schnorr, Chaum-Pedersen and Okamoto Σ -protocols as well as a construction that allows for compound (AND and OR) Σ -protocols and the Pedersen and Rivest commitment schemes. We also prove that commitment schemes can be constructed from Σ -protocols. We formalise this proof at an abstract level, only assuming the existence of a Σ -protocol, consequently the instantiations of this result for the concrete Σ -protocols we consider come for free.

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1 Commitment Schemes

A commitment scheme is a two party Cryptographic protocol run between a committer and a verifier. They allow the committer to commit to a chosen value while at a later time reveal the value. A commitment scheme is composed of three algorithms, the key generation, the commitment and the verification algorithms.

The two main properties of commitment schemes are hiding and binding.

Hiding is the property that the commitment leaks no information about the committed value, and binding is the property that the committer cannot reveal their a different message to the one they committed to; that is they are bound to their commitment. We follow the game based approach [12] to define security. A game is played between an adversary and a challenger.

```
theory Commitment-Schemes imports  
  CryptHOL.CryptHOL  
begin
```

1.1 Defining security

Here we define the hiding, binding and correctness properties of commitment schemes.

We provide the types of the adversaries that take part in the hiding and binding games. We consider two variants of the hiding property, one stronger than the other — thus we provide two hiding adversaries. The first hiding property we consider is analogous to the IND-CPA property for encryption schemes, the second, weaker notion, does not allow the adversary to choose the messages used in the game, instead they are sampled from a set distribution.

```
type-synonym ('vk', 'plain', 'commit', 'state') hid-adv =  
  ('vk'  $\Rightarrow$  (('plain'  $\times$  'plain')  $\times$  'state') spmf)  
   $\times$  ('commit'  $\Rightarrow$  'state'  $\Rightarrow$  bool spmf)
```

```
type-synonym 'commit' hid = 'commit'  $\Rightarrow$  bool spmf
```

```
type-synonym ('ck', 'plain', 'commit', 'opening') bind-adversary =  
  'ck'  $\Rightarrow$  ('commit'  $\times$  'plain'  $\times$  'opening'  $\times$  'plain'  $\times$  'opening') spmf
```

We fix the algorithms that make up a commitment scheme in the locale.

```
locale abstract-commitment =  
  fixes key-gen :: ('ck'  $\times$  'vk') spmf — outputs the keys received by the two parties  
  and commit :: 'ck'  $\Rightarrow$  'plain'  $\Rightarrow$  ('commit'  $\times$  'opening') spmf — outputs the  
  commitment as well as the opening values sent by the committer in the reveal  
  phase  
  and verify :: 'vk'  $\Rightarrow$  'plain'  $\Rightarrow$  'commit'  $\Rightarrow$  'opening'  $\Rightarrow$  bool
```

and $\text{valid-msg} :: 'plain \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ — checks whether a message is valid, used in the hiding game
begin

definition $\text{valid-msg-set} = \{m. \text{valid-msg } m\}$

definition $\text{lossless} :: ('pub\text{-}key, 'plain, 'commit, 'state) \text{hid-adv} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$
where $\text{lossless } \mathcal{A} \longleftrightarrow$
 $((\forall pk. \text{lossless-spmf } (\text{fst } \mathcal{A} \text{ } pk)) \wedge$
 $(\forall \text{commit } \sigma. \text{lossless-spmf } (\text{snd } \mathcal{A} \text{ } \text{commit } \sigma)))$

The correct game runs the three algorithms that make up commitment schemes and outputs the output of the verification algorithm.

definition $\text{correct-game} :: 'plain \Rightarrow \text{bool spmf}$
where $\text{correct-game } m = \text{do } \{$
 $(ck, vk) \leftarrow \text{key-gen};$
 $(c, d) \leftarrow \text{commit } ck \text{ } m;$
 $\text{return-spmf } (\text{verify } vk \text{ } m \text{ } c \text{ } d)\}$

lemma $\llbracket \text{lossless-spmf } \text{key-gen}; \text{lossless-spmf } TI;$
 $\bigwedge pk \text{ } m. \text{valid-msg } m \Longrightarrow \text{lossless-spmf } (\text{commit } pk \text{ } m) \rrbracket$
 $\Longrightarrow \text{valid-msg } m \Longrightarrow \text{lossless-spmf } (\text{correct-game } m)$
by ($\text{simp add: lossless-def correct-game-def split-def Let-def}$)

definition correct **where** $\text{correct} \equiv (\forall m. \text{valid-msg } m \longrightarrow \text{spmof } (\text{correct-game } m)$
 $\text{True} = 1)$

The hiding property is defined using the hiding game. Here the adversary is asked to output two messages, the challenger flips a coin to decide which message to commit and hand to the adversary. The adversary's challenge is to guess which commitment it was handed. Note we must check the two messages outputted by the adversary are valid.

primrec $\text{hiding-game-ind-cpa} :: ('vk, 'plain, 'commit, 'state) \text{hid-adv} \Rightarrow \text{bool spmf}$
where $\text{hiding-game-ind-cpa } (\mathcal{A}1, \mathcal{A}2) = \text{TRY do } \{$
 $(ck, vk) \leftarrow \text{key-gen};$
 $((m0, m1), \sigma) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}1 \text{ } vk;$
 $- :: \text{unit} \leftarrow \text{assert-spmf } (\text{valid-msg } m0 \wedge \text{valid-msg } m1);$
 $b \leftarrow \text{coin-spmf};$
 $(c, d) \leftarrow \text{commit } ck \text{ } (\text{if } b \text{ then } m0 \text{ else } m1);$
 $b' :: \text{bool} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}2 \text{ } c \text{ } \sigma;$
 $\text{return-spmf } (b' = b)\}$ **ELSE** coin-spmf

The adversary wins the game if $b = b'$.

lemma $\text{lossless-hiding-game:}$
 $\llbracket \text{lossless } \mathcal{A}; \text{lossless-spmf } \text{key-gen};$
 $\bigwedge pk \text{ } \text{plain}. \text{valid-msg } \text{plain} \Longrightarrow \text{lossless-spmf } (\text{commit } pk \text{ } \text{plain}) \rrbracket$
 $\Longrightarrow \text{lossless-spmf } (\text{hiding-game-ind-cpa } \mathcal{A})$
by ($\text{auto simp add: lossless-def hiding-game-ind-cpa-def split-def Let-def}$)

To define security we consider the advantage an adversary has of winning the game over a tossing a coin to determine their output.

definition *hiding-advantage-ind-cpa* :: ('vk, 'plain, 'commit, 'state) *hid-adv* $\Rightarrow$ *real*
where *hiding-advantage-ind-cpa* $\mathcal{A} \equiv | \text{spmf } (\text{hiding-game-ind-cpa } \mathcal{A}) \text{ True} - 1/2 |$

definition *perfect-hiding-ind-cpa* :: ('vk, 'plain, 'commit, 'state) *hid-adv* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where *perfect-hiding-ind-cpa* $\mathcal{A} \equiv (\text{hiding-advantage-ind-cpa } \mathcal{A} = 0)$

The binding game challenges an adversary to bind two messages to the same committed value. Both opening values and messages are verified with respect to the same committed value, the adversary wins if the game outputs true. We must check some conditions of the adversaries output are met; we will always require that $m \neq m'$, other conditions will be dependent on the protocol for example we may require group or field membership.

definition *bind-game* :: ('ck, 'plain, 'commit, 'opening) *bind-adversary* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
spmf
where *bind-game* $\mathcal{A} = \text{TRY do } \{$
 $(ck, vk) \leftarrow \text{key-gen};$
 $(c, m, d, m', d') \leftarrow \mathcal{A} \text{ } ck;$
 $- :: \text{unit} \leftarrow \text{assert-spmf } (m \neq m' \wedge \text{valid-msg } m \wedge \text{valid-msg } m');$
 $\text{let } b = \text{verify } vk \text{ } m \text{ } c \text{ } d;$
 $\text{let } b' = \text{verify } vk \text{ } m' \text{ } c \text{ } d';$
 $\text{return-spmf } (b \wedge b') \}$ *ELSE return-spmf False*

We proof the binding game is equivalent to the following game which is easier to work with. In particular we assert b and b' in the game and return True.

lemma *bind-game-alt-def*:
 $\text{bind-game } \mathcal{A} = \text{TRY do } \{$
 $(ck, vk) \leftarrow \text{key-gen};$
 $(c, m, d, m', d') \leftarrow \mathcal{A} \text{ } ck;$
 $- :: \text{unit} \leftarrow \text{assert-spmf } (m \neq m' \wedge \text{valid-msg } m \wedge \text{valid-msg } m');$
 $\text{let } b = \text{verify } vk \text{ } m \text{ } c \text{ } d;$
 $\text{let } b' = \text{verify } vk \text{ } m' \text{ } c \text{ } d';$
 $- :: \text{unit} \leftarrow \text{assert-spmf } (b \wedge b');$
 $\text{return-spmf True} \}$ *ELSE return-spmf False*
(is ?lhs = ?rhs)

proof –

have $?lhs = \text{TRY do } \{$
 $(ck, vk) \leftarrow \text{key-gen};$
 $\text{TRY do } \{$
 $(c, m, d, m', d') \leftarrow \mathcal{A} \text{ } ck;$
 $\text{TRY do } \{$
 $- :: \text{unit} \leftarrow \text{assert-spmf } (m \neq m' \wedge \text{valid-msg } m \wedge \text{valid-msg } m');$
 $\text{TRY return-spmf } (\text{verify } vk \text{ } m \text{ } c \text{ } d \wedge \text{verify } vk \text{ } m' \text{ } c \text{ } d') \text{ ELSE return-spmf False}$
 $\}$ *ELSE return-spmf False*

```

    } ELSE return-spmf False
  } ELSE return-spmf False
  unfolding split-def bind-game-def
  by(fold try-bind-spmf-lossless2[OF lossless-return-spmf]) simp
  also have ... = TRY do {
    (ck, vk) ← key-gen;
    TRY do {
      (c, m, d, m', d') ← A ck;
      TRY do {
        - :: unit ← assert-spmf (m ≠ m' ∧ valid-msg m ∧ valid-msg m');
        TRY do {
          - :: unit ← assert-spmf (verify vk m c d ∧ verify vk m' c d');
          return-spmf True
        } ELSE return-spmf False
      } ELSE return-spmf False
    } ELSE return-spmf False
  } ELSE return-spmf False
  by(auto simp add: try-bind-assert-spmf try-spmf-return-spmf1 intro!: try-spmf-cong
bind-spmf-cong)
  also have ... = ?rhs
  unfolding split-def Let-def
  by(fold try-bind-spmf-lossless2[OF lossless-return-spmf]) simp
  finally show ?thesis .
qed

```

lemma *lossless-binding-game*: *lossless-spmf* (*bind-game* A)
 by (*simp* add: *bind-game-def*)

definition *bind-advantage* :: ('ck, 'plain, 'commit, 'opening) *bind-adversary* ⇒ *real*
 where *bind-advantage* A ≡ *spm*f (*bind-game* A) *True*

end

end

theory *Cyclic-Group-Ext* **imports**

CryptHOL.CryptHOL

HOL-Number-Theory.Cong

begin

context *cyclic-group* **begin**

lemma *generator-pow-order*: *g* [⌈ order *G* = 1

proof(*cases* order *G* > 0)

case *True*

hence *fin*: *finite* (*carrier* *G*) **by**(*simp* add: *order-gt-0-iff-finite*)

then have [*symmetric*]: (λ*x*. *x* ⊗ *g*) ' *carrier* *G* = *carrier* *G*

by(*rule* *endo-inj-surj*)(*auto* *simp* add: *inj-on-multc*)

then have *carrier* *G* = (λ *n*. *g* [⌈ *Suc* *n*) ' {..*order* *G*} **using** *fin*

by(*simp* add: *carrier-conv-generator image-image*)

then obtain n **where** $n: 1 = g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} \text{ Suc } n \text{ } n < \text{order } G$ **by** *auto*
have $n = \text{order } G - 1$ **using** $n \text{ inj-onD}[OF \text{ inj-on-generator, of } 0 \text{ Suc } n]$ **by**
fastforce
with *True* n **show** *?thesis* **by** *auto*
qed *simp*

lemma *generator-pow-mult-order*: $g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} (\text{order } G * \text{order } G) = 1$
using *generator-pow-order*
by (*metis generator-closed nat-pow-one nat-pow-pow*)

lemma *pow-generator-mod*: $g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} (k \bmod \text{order } G) = g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} k$
proof(*cases order G > 0*)
case *True*
obtain n **where** $n: k = n * \text{order } G + k \bmod \text{order } G$ **by** (*metis div-mult-mod-eq*)
have $g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} k = (g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} \text{order } G) \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} n \otimes g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} (k \bmod \text{order } G)$
by(*subst n*)(*simp add: nat-pow-mult nat-pow-pow mult-ac*)
then show *?thesis* **by**(*simp add: generator-pow-order*)
qed *simp*

lemma *pow-carrier-mod*:
assumes $g \in \text{carrier } G$
shows $g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} (k \bmod \text{order } G) = g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} k$
using *assms pow-generator-mod*
by (*metis generatorE generator-closed mod-mult-right-eq nat-pow-pow*)

lemma *pow-generator-mod-int*: $g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} ((k::\text{int}) \bmod \text{order } G) = g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} k$
proof(*cases order G > 0*)
case *True*
obtain $n :: \text{int}$ **where** $n: k = n * \text{order } G + k \bmod \text{order } G$
by (*metis div-mult-mod-eq*)
have $g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} k = (g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} \text{order } G) \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} n \otimes g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} (k \bmod \text{order } G)$
apply(*subst n*)(*apply*(*simp add: int-pow-mult int-pow-pow mult-ac*)
by (*metis generator-closed int-pow-int int-pow-pow mult.commute*)
then show *?thesis* **by**(*simp add: generator-pow-order*)
qed *simp*

lemma *pow-generator-eq-iff-cong*:
 $\text{finite } (\text{carrier } G) \implies g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} x = g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} y \iff [x = y] \text{ (mod order } G)$
apply(*subst (1 2) pow-generator-mod[symmetric]*)
by(*auto simp add: cong-def order-gt-0-iff-finite intro: inj-onD[OF inj-on-generator]*)

lemma *power-distrib*:
assumes $h \in \text{carrier } G$
shows $g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} (e :: \text{nat}) \otimes h \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} e = (g \otimes h) \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} e$
(is ?lhs = ?rhs)
proof–
obtain $x :: \text{nat}$ **where** $x: h = g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} x$
using *assms generatorE* **by** *blast*
hence *?lhs* $= g \text{ [}\ulcorner\text{]} (e * (1 + x))$

by (simp add: nat-pow-mult mult.commute nat-pow-pow)
 also have ... = (g [⌈ (1 + x)) [⌈ e
 by (metis generator-closed mult.commute nat-pow-pow)
 ultimately show ?thesis
 by (metis x One-nat-def generator-closed l-one monoid.nat-pow-Suc monoid-axioms
 nat-pow-0 nat-pow-mult)
 qed

lemma neg-power-inverse:

assumes $g \in \text{carrier } G$
 and $x < \text{order } G$
 shows $g \lceil (\text{order } G - (x :: \text{nat})) = \text{inv } (g \lceil x)$
 proof -
 have $\text{inv } (g \lceil x) = g \lceil (- \text{int } x)$
 by (simp add: int-pow-int int-pow-neg assms)
 moreover have $g \lceil (\text{order } G - (x :: \text{nat})) = g \lceil (- \text{int } x)$
 proof -
 have $g \lceil ((\text{order } G - (x :: \text{nat})) \bmod (\text{order } G)) = g \lceil ((- \text{int } x) \bmod (\text{order } G))$
 proof -
 have $(\text{order } G - (x :: \text{nat})) \bmod (\text{order } G) = (- \text{int } x) \bmod (\text{order } G)$
 using assms(2) zmod-zminus1-eq-if by auto
 thus ?thesis
 by (metis int-pow-int)
 qed
 qed
 thus ?thesis
 proof -
 have $f1: \forall a. a \lceil \text{int } 0 = 1$
 by simp
 have $f2: \forall n \text{ na}. ((\text{na} :: \text{nat}) + n) \bmod \text{na} = n \bmod \text{na}$
 by simp
 have $f3: \forall a \text{ aa}. \text{aa} \otimes a \lceil \text{int } 0 = \text{aa} \vee \text{aa} \notin \text{carrier } G$
 by force
 have $f4: \forall i a \text{ aa}. a \lceil \text{int } 0 \otimes \text{aa} \lceil i = \text{aa} \lceil (\text{int } 0 + i) \vee \text{aa} \notin \text{carrier } G$
 by force
 have $\forall n a. a \lceil \text{int } (n * 0) = a \lceil (\text{int } 0 + \text{int } 0) \vee a \notin \text{carrier } G$
 by simp
 then have $f5: \forall a \text{ aa}. \text{aa} \lceil \text{int } (\text{order } G) = a \lceil \text{int } 0 \vee \text{aa} \notin \text{carrier } G$
 using $f4 \ f3 \ f2 \ f1$ by (metis int-pow-closed int-pow-int mod-mult-self2
 pow-carrier-mod)
 have $\forall n \text{ na}. \text{int } (n - \text{na}) = - \text{int } \text{na} + \text{int } n \vee \neg \text{na} \leq n$
 by auto
 then show ?thesis
 using $f5 \ f3$ by (metis assms(1) assms(2) int-pow-closed int-pow-int
 int-pow-mult less-imp-le-nat)
 qed
 qed
 ultimately show ?thesis by simp

qed

lemma *int-nat-pow*: **assumes** $a \geq 0$ **shows** $(g \text{ [}\text{]} (int (a :: nat))) \text{ [}\text{]} (b :: int) = g \text{ [}\text{]} (a * b)$
using *assms*
proof(*cases a > 0*)
 case *True*
 show *?thesis*
 using *int-pow-pow* **by** *blast*
next case *False*
 have $(g \text{ [}\text{]} (int (a :: nat))) \text{ [}\text{]} (b :: int) = 1$ **using** *False* **by** *simp*
 also have $g \text{ [}\text{]} (a * b) = 1$ **using** *False* **by** *simp*
 ultimately show *?thesis* **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *pow-gen-mod-mult*:
shows $(g \text{ [}\text{]} (a :: nat) \otimes g \text{ [}\text{]} (b :: nat)) \text{ [}\text{]} ((c :: int) * int (d :: nat)) = (g \text{ [}\text{]} a \otimes g \text{ [}\text{]} b) \text{ [}\text{]} ((c * int d) \bmod (order G))$
proof–
 have $(g \text{ [}\text{]} (a :: nat) \otimes g \text{ [}\text{]} (b :: nat)) \in carrier G$ **by** *simp*
 then obtain $n :: nat$ **where** $n: g \text{ [}\text{]} n = (g \text{ [}\text{]} (a :: nat) \otimes g \text{ [}\text{]} (b :: nat))$
 by (*simp add: monoid.nat-pow-mult*)
 also obtain r **where** $r: r = c * int d$ **by** *simp*
 have $1: (g \text{ [}\text{]} (a :: nat) \otimes g \text{ [}\text{]} (b :: nat)) \text{ [}\text{]} ((c :: int) * int (d :: nat)) = (g \text{ [}\text{]} n) \text{ [}\text{]} r$ **using** $n \ r$ **by** *simp*
 also have $2: \dots = (g \text{ [}\text{]} n) \text{ [}\text{]} (r \bmod (order G))$ **using** *pow-generator-mod-int pow-generator-mod*
 by (*metis int-nat-pow int-pow-int mod-mult-right-eq zero-le*)
 also have $3: \dots = (g \text{ [}\text{]} a \otimes g \text{ [}\text{]} b) \text{ [}\text{]} ((c * int d) \bmod (order G))$ **using** $r \ n$ **by** *simp*
 ultimately show *?thesis* **using** $1 \ 2 \ 3$ **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *cyclic-group-commute*: **assumes** $a \in carrier G$ $b \in carrier G$ **shows** $a \otimes b = b \otimes a$
(is ?lhs = ?rhs)
proof–
 obtain $n :: nat$ **where** $n: a = g \text{ [}\text{]} n$ **using** *generatorE assms* **by** *auto*
 also obtain $k :: nat$ **where** $k: b = g \text{ [}\text{]} k$ **using** *generatorE assms* **by** *auto*
 ultimately have $?lhs = g \text{ [}\text{]} n \otimes g \text{ [}\text{]} k$ **by** *simp*
 then have $\dots = g \text{ [}\text{]} (n + k)$ **by** (*simp add: nat-pow-mult*)
 then have $\dots = g \text{ [}\text{]} (k + n)$ **by** (*simp add: add.commute*)
 then show *?thesis* **by** (*simp add: nat-pow-mult n k*)
qed

lemma *cyclic-group-assoc*:
assumes $a \in carrier G$ $b \in carrier G$ $c \in carrier G$
shows $(a \otimes b) \otimes c = a \otimes (b \otimes c)$
(is ?lhs = ?rhs)

proof–

obtain $n :: \text{nat}$ where $n: a = g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} n$ using *generatorE assms* by *auto*
obtain $k :: \text{nat}$ where $k: b = g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} k$ using *generatorE assms* by *auto*
obtain $j :: \text{nat}$ where $j: c = g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} j$ using *generatorE assms* by *auto*
have $?lhs = (g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} n \otimes g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} k) \otimes g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} j$ using $n \ k \ j$ by *simp*
then have $\dots = g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} (n + (k + j))$ by(*simp add: nat-pow-mult add.assoc*)
then show $?thesis$ by(*simp add: nat-pow-mult n k j*)

qed

lemma *l-cancel-inv*:

assumes $h \in \text{carrier } G$
shows $(g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} (a :: \text{nat}) \otimes \text{inv } (g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} a)) \otimes h = h$
(is $?lhs = ?rhs$)

proof–

have $?lhs = (g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} \text{int } a \otimes \text{inv } (g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} \text{int } a)) \otimes h$ by *simp*
then have $\dots = (g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} \text{int } a \otimes (g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} (- a))) \otimes h$ using *int-pow-neg[symmetric]*
by *simp*
then have $\dots = g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} (\text{int } a - a) \otimes h$ by(*simp add: int-pow-mult*)
then have $\dots = g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} ((0 :: \text{int})) \otimes h$ by *simp*
then show $?thesis$ by (*simp add: assms*)

qed

lemma *inverse-split*:

assumes $a \in \text{carrier } G$ and $b \in \text{carrier } G$
shows $\text{inv } (a \otimes b) = \text{inv } a \otimes \text{inv } b$
by (*simp add: assms comm-group.inv-mult cyclic-group-commute group-comm-groupI*)

lemma *inverse-pow-pow*:

assumes $a \in \text{carrier } G$
shows $\text{inv } (a \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} (r :: \text{nat})) = (\text{inv } a) \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} r$

proof –

have $a \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} r \in \text{carrier } G$
using *assms* by *blast*
then show $?thesis$
by (*simp add: assms nat-pow-inv*)

qed

lemma *l-neq-1-exp-neq-0*:

assumes $l \in \text{carrier } G$
and $l \neq 1$
and $l = g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} (t :: \text{nat})$
shows $t \neq 0$

proof(*rule ccontr*)

assume $\neg (t \neq 0)$
hence $t = 0$ by *simp*
hence $g \text{ [}\wedge\text{]} t = 1$ by *simp*
then show *False* using *assms* by *simp*

qed

```

lemma order-gt-1-gen-not-1:
  assumes order  $G > 1$ 
  shows  $g \neq 1$ 
proof(rule ccontr)
  assume  $\neg g \neq 1$ 
  hence  $g = 1$  by simp
  hence g-pow-eq-1:  $g [\wedge] n = 1$  for  $n :: nat$  by simp
  hence range  $(\lambda n :: nat. g [\wedge] n) = \{1\}$  by auto
  hence carrier  $G \subseteq \{1\}$  using generator by auto
  hence order  $G < 1$ 
    by (metis inj-onD inj-on-generator lessThan-iff g-pow-eq-1 assms less-one
neg0-conv)
  with assms show False by simp
qed

lemma power-swap:  $((g [\wedge] (\alpha 0 :: nat)) [\wedge] (r :: nat)) = ((g [\wedge] r) [\wedge] \alpha 0)$ 
(is ?lhs = ?rhs)
proof-
  have ?lhs =  $g [\wedge] (\alpha 0 * r)$  using nat-pow-pow mult commute by auto
  hence ... =  $g [\wedge] (r * \alpha 0)$  by (metis mult commute)
  thus ?thesis using nat-pow-pow by auto
qed

lemma gen-power-0:
  fixes  $r :: nat$ 
  assumes  $g [\wedge] r = 1$ 
    and  $r < order\ G$ 
  shows  $r = 0$ 
  using assms inj-onD inj-on-generator by fastforce

lemma group-eq-pow-eq-mod:
  fixes  $a\ b :: nat$ 
  assumes  $g [\wedge] a = g [\wedge] b$ 
    and  $order\ G > 0$ 
  shows  $[a = b] \text{ (mod } order\ G)$ 
proof(cases  $a > b$ )
  case True
  have  $g [\wedge] a \otimes inv\ (g [\wedge] b) = 1$ 
    using assms by simp
  hence  $g [\wedge] (a - b) = 1$ 
    by (smt True add-Suc-right assms diff-add-inverse generator-closed group.l-cancel-one'
group-l-invI l-inv-ex less-imp-Suc-add nat-pow-closed nat-pow-mult)
  hence  $g [\wedge] ((a - b) \text{ mod } (order\ G)) = 1$  using pow-generator-mod by auto
  thus ?thesis using gen-power-0
    using assms(1) assms(2) order-gt-0-iff-finite pow-generator-eq-iff-cong by blast
next
  case False
  have  $g [\wedge] a \otimes inv\ (g [\wedge] b) = 1$ 
    using assms by simp

```

```

  hence g [⌈] (b - a) = 1
  by (metis (no-types, lifting) False Group.group.axioms(1) Units-eq add-diff-inverse-nat
    assms(1) generator-closed group-l-invI l-inv-ex l-neq-1-exp-neq-0 monoid.Units-l-cancel
    nat-pow-closed nat-pow-mult r-one)
  hence g [⌈] ((b - a) mod (order G)) = 1 using pow-generator-mod by simp
  thus ?thesis using gen-power-0
    using assms(1) assms(2) order-gt-0-iff-finite pow-generator-eq-iff-cong by blast
qed

```

end

end

theory *Discrete-Log* **imports**

CryptHOL.CryptHOL

Cyclic-Group-Ext

begin

locale *dis-log* =

fixes $\mathcal{G} :: 'grp$ *cyclic-group* (**structure**)

assumes *order-gt-0* [*simp*]: $order\ \mathcal{G} > 0$

begin

type-synonym *'grp'* *dislog-adv* = *'grp'* $\Rightarrow$ *nat* *spmf*

type-synonym *'grp'* *dislog-adv'* = *'grp'* $\Rightarrow$ (*nat* $\times$ *nat*) *spmf*

type-synonym *'grp'* *dislog-adv2* = *'grp'* $\times$ *'grp'* $\Rightarrow$ *nat* *spmf*

definition *dis-log* :: *'grp* *dislog-adv* $\Rightarrow$ *bool* *spmf*

where *dis-log* $\mathcal{A} = TRY$ *do* {

$x \leftarrow sample-uniform\ (order\ \mathcal{G});$

$let\ h = g\ [\lceil]\ x;$

$x' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}\ h;$

$return-spmf\ ([x = x']\ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G}))\} ELSE\ return-spmf\ False$

definition *advantage* :: *'grp* *dislog-adv* $\Rightarrow$ *real*

where *advantage* $\mathcal{A} \equiv spmf\ (dis-log\ \mathcal{A})\ True$

lemma *lossless-dis-log*: $\llbracket 0 < order\ \mathcal{G}; \forall\ h. lossless-spmf\ (\mathcal{A}\ h) \rrbracket \implies lossless-spmf\ (dis-log\ \mathcal{A})$

by(*auto simp add: dis-log-def*)

end

locale *dis-log-alt* =

fixes $\mathcal{G} :: 'grp$ *cyclic-group* (**structure**)

and $x :: nat$

assumes *order-gt-0* [*simp*]: $order\ \mathcal{G} > 0$

begin

sublocale *dis-log*: *dis-log* $\mathcal{G}$
unfolding *dis-log-def* **by** *simp*

definition $g' = \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ x$

definition *dis-log2* :: '*grp dis-log.dislog-adv*' $\Rightarrow$ *bool* *spmf*
where *dis-log2* $\mathcal{A} = \text{TRY do } \{$
 $w \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$
 $\text{let } h = \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ w;$
 $(w1', w2') \leftarrow \mathcal{A} \ h;$
 $\text{return-spmf } ([w = (w1' + x * w2')] \ (\text{mod } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))) \}$ *ELSE* *return-spmf*
False

definition *advantage2* :: '*grp dis-log.dislog-adv*' $\Rightarrow$ *real*
where *advantage2* $\mathcal{A} \equiv \text{spmf } (\text{dis-log2 } \mathcal{A}) \ \text{True}$

definition *adversary2* :: ('*grp*' $\Rightarrow$ (*nat* $\times$ *nat*) *spmf*) $\Rightarrow$ '*grp*' $\Rightarrow$ *nat* *spmf*
where *adversary2* $\mathcal{A} \ h = \text{do } \{$
 $(w1, w2) \leftarrow \mathcal{A} \ h;$
 $\text{return-spmf } (w1 + x * w2) \}$

definition *dis-log3* :: '*grp dis-log.dislog-adv2*' $\Rightarrow$ *bool* *spmf*
where *dis-log3* $\mathcal{A} = \text{TRY do } \{$
 $w \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$
 $\text{let } (h, w) = ((\mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ w, g' \ [\frown] \ w), w);$
 $w' \leftarrow \mathcal{A} \ h;$
 $\text{return-spmf } ([w = w'] \ (\text{mod } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))) \}$ *ELSE* *return-spmf* *False*

definition *advantage3* :: '*grp dis-log.dislog-adv2*' $\Rightarrow$ *real*
where *advantage3* $\mathcal{A} \equiv \text{spmf } (\text{dis-log3 } \mathcal{A}) \ \text{True}$

definition *adversary3* :: '*grp dis-log.dislog-adv2*' $\Rightarrow$ '*grp*' $\Rightarrow$ *nat* *spmf*
where *adversary3* $\mathcal{A} \ g = \text{do } \{$
 $\mathcal{A} \ (g, g \ [\frown] \ x) \}$

end

locale *dis-log-alt-reductions* = *dis-log-alt* + *cyclic-group* $\mathcal{G}$
begin

lemma *dis-log-adv3*:
shows *advantage3* $\mathcal{A} = \text{dis-log.} \text{advantage } (\text{adversary3 } \mathcal{A})$
unfolding *dis-log-alt.} \text{advantage3-def}*
by (*simp add: advantage3-def dis-log.} \text{advantage-def adversary3-def dis-log.} \text{dis-log-def}*
dis-log3-def Let-def g'-def power-swap)

lemma *dis-log-adv2*:

```

  shows advantage2  $\mathcal{A} = \text{dis-log.} \text{advantage} (\text{adversary2 } \mathcal{A})$ 
  unfolding dis-log-alt.advantage2-def
  by (simp add: advantage2-def dis-log2-def dis-log.advantage-def dis-log.dis-log-def
    adversary2-def split-def)

end

end

theory Number-Theory-Aux imports
  HOL-Number-Theory.Cong
  HOL-Number-Theory.Residues
begin

abbreviation inverse where  $\text{inverse } x \ q \equiv (\text{fst } (\text{bezw } x \ q))$ 

lemma inverse: assumes  $\text{gcd } x \ q = 1$ 
  shows  $[x * \text{inverse } x \ q = 1] \ (\text{mod } q)$ 
proof -
  have 2:  $\text{fst } (\text{bezw } x \ q) * x + \text{snd } (\text{bezw } x \ q) * \text{int } q = 1$ 
    using bezw-aux assms int-minus
    by (metis Num.of-nat-simps(2))
  hence 3:  $(\text{fst } (\text{bezw } x \ q) * x + \text{snd } (\text{bezw } x \ q) * \text{int } q) \bmod q = 1 \bmod q$ 
    by (metis assms bezw-aux of-nat-mod)
  hence 4:  $(\text{fst } (\text{bezw } x \ q) * x) \bmod q = 1 \bmod q$ 
    by simp
  hence 5:  $[(\text{fst } (\text{bezw } x \ q)) * x = 1] \ (\text{mod } q)$ 
    using 2 3 cong-def by force
  then show ?thesis by (simp add: mult.commute)
qed

lemma prod-not-prime:
  assumes prime  $(x::\text{nat})$ 
  and prime  $y$ 
  and  $x > 2$ 
  and  $y > 2$ 
  shows  $\neg \text{prime } ((x-1)*(y-1))$ 
  by (metis assms One-nat-def Suc-diff-1 nat-neq-iff numeral-2-eq-2 prime-gt-0-nat
    prime-product)

lemma ex-inverse:
  assumes coprime: coprime  $(e :: \text{nat}) ((P-1)*(Q-1))$ 
  and prime  $P$ 
  and prime  $Q$ 
  and  $P \neq Q$ 
  shows  $\exists d. [e*d = 1] \ (\text{mod } (P-1)) \wedge d \neq 0$ 
proof -
  have coprime  $e \ (P-1)$ 
    using assms(1) by simp
  then obtain  $d$  where  $d: [e*d = 1] \ (\text{mod } (P-1))$ 

```

using *cong-solve-coprime-nat* **by** *auto*
 then show *?thesis* **by** (*metis cong-0-1-nat cong-1 mult-0-right zero-neq-one*)
qed

lemma *ex-k1-k2*:
 assumes *coprime*: *coprime* (*e* :: *nat*) ((*P*−1)*(*Q*−1))
 and [*e***d* = 1] (*mod* (*P*−1))
 shows $\exists k1\ k2. e*d + k1*(P-1) = 1 + k2*(P-1)$
by (*metis assms(2) cong-iff-lin-nat*)
lemma *a > b $\implies$ int a − int b = int (a − b)*
by *simp*

lemma *ex-k-mod*:
 assumes *coprime*: *coprime* (*e* :: *nat*) ((*P*−1)*(*Q*−1))
 and *P* $\neq$ *Q*
 and *prime* *P*
 and *prime* *Q*
 and *d* $\neq$ 0
 and [*e***d* = 1] (*mod* (*P*−1))
 shows $\exists k. e*d = 1 + k*(P-1)$
proof−
 have *e* > 0
 using *assms(1) assms(2) prime-gt-0-nat* **by** *fastforce*
 then have *e***d* $\geq$ 1 **using** *assms* **by** *simp*
 then obtain *k* **where** *k*: *e***d* = 1 + *k**(*P*−1)
 using *assms(6) cong-to-1'-nat* **by** *auto*
 then show *?thesis*
by *simp*
qed

lemma *fermat-little-theorem*:
 assumes *prime* (*P* :: *nat*)
 shows [*x*^{*P*} = *x*] (*mod* *P*)
proof(*cases P dvd x*)
 case *True*
 hence *x mod P* = 0 **by** *simp*
 moreover have *x* ^{*P*} *mod P* = 0
by (*simp add: True assms prime-dvd-power-nat-iff prime-gt-0-nat*)
 ultimately show *?thesis*
by (*simp add: cong-def*)
 next
 case *False*
 hence [*x* ^{*P*} (*P* − 1) = 1] (*mod* *P*) **using** *fermat-theorem assms* **by** *blast*
 then show *?thesis*
by (*metis Suc-diff-1 assms cong-scalar-left nat-mult-1-right not-gr-zero not-prime-0 power-Suc*)
qed

lemma *prime-field*:

```

assumes prime ( $q::nat$ )
  and  $a < q$ 
  and  $a \neq 0$ 
shows coprime  $a\ q$ 
by (meson assms coprime-commute dvd-imp-le linorder-not-le neq0-conv prime-imp-coprime)

end

theory Uniform-Sampling imports
  CryptHOL.CryptHOL
  HOL-Number-Theory.Cong
begin

definition sample-uniform-units ::  $nat \Rightarrow nat\ spmf$ 
  where sample-uniform-units  $q = spmf\text{-of-set } (\{.. $q$ \} - \{0\})$ 

lemma set-spmf-sample-uniform-units [simp]:
  set-spmf (sample-uniform-units  $q$ ) =  $\{.. $q$ \} - \{0\}$ 
  by(simp add: sample-uniform-units-def)

lemma lossless-sample-uniform-units:
  assumes ( $p::nat$ ) > 1
  shows lossless-spmf (sample-uniform-units  $p$ )
  unfolding sample-uniform-units-def
  using assms by auto

lemma weight-sample-uniform-units:
  assumes ( $p::nat$ ) > 1
  shows weight-spmf (sample-uniform-units  $p$ ) = 1
  using assms lossless-sample-uniform-units
  by (simp add: lossless-weight-spmfD)

lemma one-time-pad':
  assumes inj-on: inj-on  $f$  ( $\{.. $q$ \} - \{0\}$ )
    and sur:  $f ' (\{.. $q$ \} - \{0\}) = (\{.. $q$ \} - \{0\})$ 
  shows map-spmf  $f$  (sample-uniform-units  $q$ ) = (sample-uniform-units  $q$ )
  (is ?lhs = ?rhs)
proof –
  have rhs: ?rhs = spmf-of-set ( $(\{.. $q$ \} - \{0\})$ )
    by(auto simp add: sample-uniform-units-def)
  also have map-spmf( $\lambda s. f\ s$ ) (spmf-of-set ( $\{.. $q$ \} - \{0\}$ )) = spmf-of-set ( $(\lambda s. f$ 
 $s) ' (\{.. $q$ \} - \{0\})$ )
    by(simp add: inj-on)
  also have  $f ' (\{.. $q$ \} - \{0\}) = (\{.. $q$ \} - \{0\})$ 
    apply(rule endo-inj-surj) by(simp, simp add: sur, simp add: inj-on)
  ultimately show ?thesis using rhs by simp
qed

```

lemma *one-time-pad*:
assumes *inj-on*: $\text{inj-on } f \ \{..<q\}$
and *sur*: $f \text{ ‘ } \{..<q\} = \{..<q\}$
shows $\text{map-spmf } f \ (\text{sample-uniform } q) = (\text{sample-uniform } q)$
(is ?lhs = ?rhs)
proof–
have *rhs*: $?rhs = \text{spmf-of-set } (\{..<q\})$
by(*auto simp add: sample-uniform-def*)
also have $\text{map-spmf}(\lambda s. f \ s) \ (\text{spmf-of-set } \{..<q\}) = \text{spmf-of-set } ((\lambda s. f \ s) \text{ ‘ } \{..<q\})$
by(*simp add: inj-on*)
also have $f \text{ ‘ } \{..<q\} = \{..<q\}$
apply(*rule endo-inj-surj*) **by**(*simp, simp add: sur, simp add: inj-on*)
ultimately show *?thesis* **using** *rhs* **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *plus-inj-eq*:
assumes *x*: $x < q$
and *x'*: $x' < q$
and *map*: $((y :: \text{nat}) + x) \bmod q = (y + x') \bmod q$
shows $x = x'$
proof–
have $((y :: \text{nat}) + x) \bmod q = (y + x') \bmod q \implies x \bmod q = x' \bmod q$
proof–
have $((y :: \text{nat}) + x) \bmod q = (y + x') \bmod q \implies [((y :: \text{nat}) + x) = (y + x')] \ (\bmod q)$
by(*simp add: cong-def*)
moreover have $[((y :: \text{nat}) + x) = (y + x')] \ (\bmod q) \implies [x = x'] \ (\bmod q)$
by (*simp add: cong-add-lcancel-nat*)
moreover have $[x = x'] \ (\bmod q) \implies x \bmod q = x' \bmod q$
by(*simp add: cong-def*)
ultimately show *?thesis* **by**(*simp add: map*)
qed
moreover have $x \bmod q = x' \bmod q \implies x = x'$
by(*simp add: x x'*)
ultimately show *?thesis* **by**(*simp add: map*)
qed

lemma *inj-uni-samp-plus*: $\text{inj-on } (\lambda(b :: \text{nat}). (y + b) \bmod q) \ \{..<q\}$
by(*simp add: inj-on-def*)(*auto simp only: plus-inj-eq*)

lemma *surj-uni-samp-plus*:
assumes *inj*: $\text{inj-on } (\lambda(b :: \text{nat}). (y + b) \bmod q) \ \{..<q\}$
shows $(\lambda(b :: \text{nat}). (y + b) \bmod q) \text{ ‘ } \{..<q\} = \{..<q\}$
apply(*rule endo-inj-surj*) **using** *inj* **by** *auto*

lemma *samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad*:

shows $\text{map-spmf } (\lambda b. (y + b) \bmod q) (\text{sample-uniform } q) = \text{sample-uniform } q$
using $\text{inj-uni-samp-plus surj-uni-samp-plus one-time-pad}$ **by** simp

lemma mult-inj-eq :

assumes $\text{coprime: coprime } x (q::\text{nat})$
and $y: y < q$
and $y': y' < q$
and $\text{map: } x * y \bmod q = x * y' \bmod q$
shows $y = y'$

proof –

have $x*y \bmod q = x*y' \bmod q \implies y \bmod q = y' \bmod q$

proof –

have $x*y \bmod q = x*y' \bmod q \implies [x*y = x*y'] (\bmod q)$

by($\text{simp add: cong-def}$)

moreover have $[x*y = x*y'] (\bmod q) = [y = y'] (\bmod q)$

by($\text{simp add: cong-mult-lcancel-nat coprime}$)

moreover have $[y = y'] (\bmod q) \implies y \bmod q = y' \bmod q$

by($\text{simp add: cong-def}$)

ultimately show $?thesis$ **by**(simp add: map)

qed

moreover have $y \bmod q = y' \bmod q \implies y = y'$

by(simp add: y y')

ultimately show $?thesis$ **by**(simp add: map)

qed

lemma inj-on-mult :

assumes $\text{coprime: coprime } x (q::\text{nat})$
shows $\text{inj-on } (\lambda b. x*b \bmod q) \{..
apply($\text{auto simp add: inj-on-def}$)
using coprime **by**($\text{simp only: mult-inj-eq}$)$

lemma surj-on-mult :

assumes $\text{coprime: coprime } x (q::\text{nat})$
and $\text{inj: inj-on } (\lambda b. x*b \bmod q) \{..
shows $(\lambda b. x*b \bmod q) ' \{..
apply($\text{rule endo-inj-surj}$) **using** coprime inj **by** $\text{auto}$$$

lemma mult-one-time-pad :

assumes $\text{coprime: coprime } x q$
shows $\text{map-spmf } (\lambda b. x*b \bmod q) (\text{sample-uniform } q) = \text{sample-uniform } q$
using $\text{inj-on-mult surj-on-mult one-time-pad coprime}$ **by** simp

lemma inj-on-mult' :

assumes $\text{coprime: coprime } x (q::\text{nat})$
shows $\text{inj-on } (\lambda b. x*b \bmod q) (\{..
apply($\text{auto simp add: inj-on-def}$)$

using coprime by (simp only: mult-inj-eq)

lemma *surj-on-mult'*:

assumes coprime: coprime x ($q::nat$)

and inj: inj-on ($\lambda b. x*b \bmod q$) ($\{.. q \} - $\{0\}$)$

shows ($\lambda b. x*b \bmod q$) ' ($\{.. q \} - $\{0\}$) = ($\{.. q \} - $\{0\}$)$$

proof (rule endo-inj-surj)

show finite ($\{.. q \} - $\{0\}$) by auto$

show ($\lambda b. x * b \bmod q$) ' ($\{.. q \} - $\{0\}$) $\subseteq$ $\{.. q \} - $\{0\}$$$

proof –

obtain $nn :: nat \text{ set} \Rightarrow (nat \Rightarrow nat) \Rightarrow nat \text{ set} \Rightarrow nat$ **where**

$\forall x0\ x1\ x2. (\exists v3. v3 \in x2 \wedge x1\ v3 \notin x0) = (nn\ x0\ x1\ x2 \in x2 \wedge x1\ (nn\ x0\ x1\ x2) \notin x0)$

by moura

hence 1: $\forall N\ f\ Na. nn\ Na\ f\ N \in N \wedge f\ (nn\ Na\ f\ N) \notin Na \vee f\ ' N \subseteq Na$

by (meson image-subsetI)

have 2: $x * nn\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\})\ (\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\}) \bmod q \notin \{.. q \} \vee x * nn\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\})\ (\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\}) \bmod q \in insert\ 0\ \{.. q \}$

by force

have 3: $(x * nn\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\})\ (\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\}) \bmod q \in insert\ 0\ \{.. q \} - \{0\}) = (x * nn\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\})\ (\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\}) \bmod q \in \{.. q \} - \{0\})$

by simp

{ assume $x * nn\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\})\ (\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\}) \bmod q = x * 0 \bmod q$

hence $(0 \leq q) = (0 = q) \vee (nn\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\})\ (\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\}) \notin \{.. q \} \vee nn\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\})\ (\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\}) \in \{0\}) \vee nn\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\})\ (\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\}) \notin \{.. q \} - \{0\} \vee x * nn\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\})\ (\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\}) \bmod q \in \{.. q \} - \{0\}$

by (metis antisym-conv1 insertCI lessThan-iff local.coprime mult-inj-eq) }

moreover

{ assume $0 \neq x * nn\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\})\ (\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\}) \bmod q$

moreover

{ assume $x * nn\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\})\ (\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\}) \bmod q \in insert\ 0\ \{.. q \} \wedge x * nn\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\})\ (\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\}) \bmod q \notin \{0\}$

hence $(\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)$ ' ($\{.. q \} - \{0\}) $\subseteq$ $\{.. q \} - \{0\}$$

using 3 1 by (meson Diff-iff) }

ultimately have $(\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)$ ' ($\{.. q \} - \{0\}) $\subseteq$ $\{.. q \} - \{0\} \vee (0 \leq q) = (0 = q)$$

using 2 by (metis antisym-conv1 lessThan-iff mod-less-divisor singletonD)

}

ultimately have $(\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)$ ' ($\{.. q \} - \{0\}) $\subseteq$ $\{.. q \} - \{0\} \vee nn\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\})\ (\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\}) \notin \{.. q \} - \{0\} \vee x * nn\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\})\ (\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)\ (\{.. q \} - \{0\}) \bmod q \in \{.. q \} - \{0\}$$

by force

thus $(\lambda n. x * n \bmod q)$ ' ($\{.. q \} - \{0\}) $\subseteq$ $\{.. q \} - \{0\}$$

```

    using 1 by meson
  qed
  show inj-on ( $\lambda b. x * b \bmod q$ ) ( $\{..<q\} - \{0\}$ )
    using inj by blast
  qed

lemma mult-one-time-pad':
  assumes coprime: coprime x q
  shows map-spmf ( $\lambda b. x*b \bmod q$ ) (sample-uniform-units q) = sample-uniform-units
    q
  using inj-on-mult' surj-on-mult' one-time-pad' coprime by simp

lemma samp-uni-add-mult:
  assumes coprime: coprime x (q::nat)
  and x':  $x' < q$ 
  and y':  $y' < q$ 
  and map:  $(y + x * x') \bmod q = (y + x * y') \bmod q$ 
  shows  $x' = y'$ 
proof-
  have  $(y + x * x') \bmod q = (y + x * y') \bmod q \implies x' \bmod q = y' \bmod q$ 
  proof-
    have  $(y + x * x') \bmod q = (y + x * y') \bmod q \implies [y + x*x' = y + x*y'] \pmod{q}$ 
    using cong-def by blast
    moreover have  $[y + x*x' = y + x*y'] \pmod{q} \implies [x' = y'] \pmod{q}$ 
    by(simp add: cong-add-lcancel-nat)(simp add: coprime cong-mult-lcancel-nat)
    ultimately show ?thesis by(simp add: cong-def map)
  qed
  moreover have  $x' \bmod q = y' \bmod q \implies x' = y'$ 
  by(simp add: x' y')
  ultimately show ?thesis by(simp add: map)
qed

lemma inj-on-add-mult:
  assumes coprime: coprime x (q::nat)
  shows inj-on ( $\lambda b. (y + x*b) \bmod q$ )  $\{..<q\}$ 
  apply(auto simp add: inj-on-def)
  using coprime by(simp only: samp-uni-add-mult)

lemma surj-on-add-mult:
  assumes coprime: coprime x (q::nat)
  and inj: inj-on ( $\lambda b. (y + x*b) \bmod q$ )  $\{..<q\}$ 
  shows  $(\lambda b. (y + x*b) \bmod q) ' \{..<q\} = \{..<q\}$ 
  apply(rule endo-inj-surj) using coprime inj by auto

lemma add-mult-one-time-pad:
  assumes coprime: coprime x q

```

shows $\text{map-spmf } (\lambda b. (y + x*b) \bmod q) (\text{sample-uniform } q) = (\text{sample-uniform } q)$

using $\text{inj-on-add-mult surj-on-add-mult one-time-pad coprime}$ **by** simp

lemma $\text{inj-on-minus: inj-on } (\lambda(b :: \text{nat}). (y + (q - b)) \bmod q) \{..<q\}$

proof($\text{unfold inj-on-def; auto}$)

fix $x :: \text{nat}$ **and** $y' :: \text{nat}$

assume $x: x < q$

assume $y': y' < q$

assume $\text{map: } (y + q - x) \bmod q = (y + q - y') \bmod q$

have $\forall n \text{ na } p. \exists nb. \forall nc \text{ nd } pa. (\neg (nc :: \text{nat}) < nd \vee \neg pa (nc - nd) \vee pa \ 0) \wedge (\neg p \ (0 :: \text{nat}) \vee p \ (n - na) \vee na + nb = n)$

by ($\text{metis (no-types) nat-diff-split}$)

hence $\neg y < y' - q \wedge \neg y < x - q$

using $y' \ x$ **by** ($\text{metis add.commute less-diff-conv not-add-less2}$)

hence $\exists n. (y' + n) \bmod q = (n + x) \bmod q$

using $\text{map by (metis add.commute add-diff-inverse-nat less-diff-conv mod-add-left-eq)}$

thus $x = y'$

by ($\text{metis plus-inj-eq } x \ y' \ \text{add.commute}$)

qed

lemma surj-on-minus:

assumes $\text{inj: inj-on } (\lambda(b :: \text{nat}). (y + (q - b)) \bmod q) \{..<q\}$

shows $(\lambda(b :: \text{nat}). (y + (q - b)) \bmod q) ' \{..<q\} = \{..<q\}$

apply($\text{rule endo-inj-surj}$) **using** inj **by** auto

lemma $\text{samp-uni-minus-one-time-pad:}$

shows $\text{map-spmf}(\lambda b. (y + (q - b)) \bmod q) (\text{sample-uniform } q) = \text{sample-uniform } q$

using $\text{inj-on-minus surj-on-minus one-time-pad}$ **by** simp

lemma $\text{not-coin-spmf: map-spmf } (\lambda a. \neg a) \text{ coin-spmf} = \text{coin-spmf}$

proof–

have $\text{inj-on Not } \{True, False\}$

by simp

moreover have $\text{Not } ' \{True, False\} = \{True, False\}$

by auto

ultimately show $?thesis$ **using** one-time-pad

by ($\text{simp add: UNIV-bool}$)

qed

lemma $\text{xor-uni-samp: map-spmf}(\lambda b. y \oplus b) (\text{coin-spmf}) = \text{map-spmf}(\lambda b. b) (\text{coin-spmf})$

($\text{is ?lhs} = ?rhs$)

proof–

have $rhs: ?rhs = \text{spmf-of-set } \{True, False\}$

by ($\text{simp add: UNIV-bool insert-commute}$)

```

    also have map-spmf( $\lambda b. y \oplus b$ ) (spmf-of-set {True, False}) = spmf-of-set(( $\lambda b. y \oplus b$ ) ‘ {True, False})
    by (simp add: xor-def)
    also have ( $\lambda b. xor\ y\ b$ ) ‘ {True, False} = {True, False}
    using xor-def by auto
    finally show ?thesis using rhs by (simp)
qed

lemma ped-inv-mapping:
  assumes ( $a::nat$ ) <  $q$ 
  and [ $m \neq 0$ ] (mod  $q$ )
  shows map-spmf ( $\lambda d. (d + a * (m::nat)) \bmod q$ ) (sample-uniform  $q$ ) = map-spmf
  ( $\lambda d. (d + q * m - a * m) \bmod q$ ) (sample-uniform  $q$ )
  (is ?lhs = ?rhs)
proof -
  have ineq:  $q * m - a * m > 0$ 
  using assms gr0I by force
  have ?lhs = map-spmf ( $\lambda d. (a * m + d) \bmod q$ ) (sample-uniform  $q$ )
  using add.commute by metis
  also have ... = sample-uniform  $q$ 
  using samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad by simp
  also have ... = map-spmf ( $\lambda d. ((q * m - a * m) + d) \bmod q$ ) (sample-uniform
 $q$ )
  using ineq samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad by metis
  ultimately show ?thesis
  using add.commute ineq
  by (simp add: Groups.add-ac(2))
qed

end

```

1.2 Pedersen Commitment Scheme

The Pedersen commitment scheme [8] is a commitment scheme based on a cyclic group. We use the construction of cyclic groups from CryptHOL to formalise the commitment scheme. We prove perfect hiding and computational binding, with a reduction to the discrete log problem. We a proof of the Pedersen commitment scheme is realised in the instantiation of the Schnorr Σ -protocol with the general construction of commitment schemes from Σ -protocols. The commitment scheme that is realised there however take the inverse of the message in the commitment phase due to the construction of the simulator in the Σ -protocol proof. The two schemes are in some way equal however as we do not have a well defined notion of equality for commitment schemes we keep this section of the formalisation. This also serves as reference to the formal proof of the Pedersen commitment scheme we provide in [5].

theory Pedersen imports

```

    Commitment-Schemes
    HOL-Number-Theory.Cong
    Cyclic-Group-Ext
    Discrete-Log
    Number-Theory-Aux
    Uniform-Sampling
begin

locale pedersen-base =
  fixes  $\mathcal{G} :: 'grp$  cyclic-group (structure)
  assumes prime-order: prime (order  $\mathcal{G}$ )
begin

lemma order-gt-0 [simp]: order  $\mathcal{G} > 0$ 
  by (simp add: prime-gt-0-nat prime-order)

type-synonym 'grp' ck = 'grp'
type-synonym 'grp' vk = 'grp'
type-synonym plain = nat
type-synonym 'grp' commit = 'grp'
type-synonym opening = nat

definition key-gen :: ('grp ck  $\times$  'grp vk) spmf
where
  key-gen = do {
     $x :: nat \leftarrow$  sample-uniform (order  $\mathcal{G}$ );
    let  $h = \mathbf{g} [\frown] x$ ;
    return-spmf (h, h)
  }

definition commit :: 'grp ck  $\Rightarrow$  plain  $\Rightarrow$  ('grp commit  $\times$  opening) spmf
where
  commit ck m = do {
     $d :: nat \leftarrow$  sample-uniform (order  $\mathcal{G}$ );
    let  $c = (\mathbf{g} [\frown] d) \otimes (ck [\frown] m)$ ;
    return-spmf (c,d)
  }

definition commit-inv :: 'grp ck  $\Rightarrow$  plain  $\Rightarrow$  ('grp commit  $\times$  opening) spmf
where
  commit-inv ck m = do {
     $d :: nat \leftarrow$  sample-uniform (order  $\mathcal{G}$ );
    let  $c = (\mathbf{g} [\frown] d) \otimes (inv\ ck [\frown] m)$ ;
    return-spmf (c,d)
  }

definition verify :: 'grp vk  $\Rightarrow$  plain  $\Rightarrow$  'grp commit  $\Rightarrow$  opening  $\Rightarrow$  bool
where
  verify v-key m c d = (c = ( $\mathbf{g} [\frown] d \otimes v\text{-key} [\frown] m$ ))

```

definition *valid-msg* :: *plain* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*

where *valid-msg* *msg* $\equiv$ (*msg* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$)

definition *dis-log-A* :: ('grp *ck*, *plain*, 'grp *commit*, *opening*) *bind-adversary* $\Rightarrow$ 'grp *ck* $\Rightarrow$ *nat* *spmf*

where *dis-log-A* $\mathcal{A}$ *h* = *do* {

(*c*, *m*, *d*, *m'*, *d'*) $\leftarrow$ $\mathcal{A}$ *h*;

- :: *unit* $\leftarrow$ *assert-spmf* (*m* $\neq$ *m'* $\wedge$ *valid-msg* *m* $\wedge$ *valid-msg* *m'*);

- :: *unit* $\leftarrow$ *assert-spmf* (*c* = **g** [$\ulcorner$] *d* $\otimes$ *h* [$\urcorner$] *m* $\wedge$ *c* = **g** [$\ulcorner$] *d'* $\otimes$ *h* [$\urcorner$] *m'*);

return-spmf (if (*m* > *m'*) then (*nat* ((*int* *d'* - *int* *d*) * *inverse* (*m* - *m'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod* *order* $\mathcal{G}$)) else

(*nat* ((*int* *d* - *int* *d'*) * *inverse* (*m'* - *m*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$) *mod* *order* $\mathcal{G}$))))}

sublocale *ped-commit*: *abstract-commitment* *key-gen* *commit* *verify* *valid-msg* .

sublocale *discrete-log*: *dis-log* -

unfolding *dis-log-def* **by** (*simp*)

end

locale *pedersen* = *pedersen-base* + *cyclic-group* $\mathcal{G}$

begin

lemma *mod-one-cancel*: **assumes** [*int* *y* * *z* * *x* = *y'* * *x*] (*mod* *order* $\mathcal{G}$) **and** [*z* * *x* = 1] (*mod* *order* $\mathcal{G}$)

shows [*int* *y* = *y'* * *x*] (*mod* *order* $\mathcal{G}$)

by (*metis* *assms* *Groups.mult-ac*(2) *cong-scalar-right* *cong-sym-eq* *cong-trans* *more-arith-simps*(11) *more-arith-simps*(5))

lemma *dis-log-break*:

fixes *d* *d'* *m* *m'* :: *nat*

assumes *c*: **g** [$\ulcorner$] *d'* $\otimes$ (**g** [$\ulcorner$] *y*) [$\urcorner$] *m'* = **g** [$\ulcorner$] *d* $\otimes$ (**g** [$\ulcorner$] *y*) [$\urcorner$] *m*

and *y-less-order*: *y* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$

and *m-ge-m'*: *m* > *m'*

and *m*: *m* < *order* $\mathcal{G}$

shows *y* = *nat* ((*int* *d'* - *int* *d*) * (*fst* (*bezw* ((*m* - *m'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))) *mod* *order* $\mathcal{G}$)

proof -

have *mm'*: $\neg$ [*m* = *m'*] (*mod* *order* $\mathcal{G}$)

using *m* *m-ge-m'* *basic-trans-rules*(19) *cong-less-modulus-unique-nat* **by** *blast*

hence *gcd*: *int* (*gcd* ((*m* - *m'*) (*order* $\mathcal{G}$))) = 1

using *assms*(3) *assms*(4) *prime-field* *prime-order* **by** *auto*

have **g** [$\ulcorner$] (*d* + *y* * *m*) = **g** [$\ulcorner$] (*d'* + *y* * *m'*)

using *c* **by** (*simp* *add*: *nat-pow-mult* *nat-pow-pow*)

hence [*d* + *y* * *m* = *d'* + *y* * *m'*] (*mod* *order* $\mathcal{G}$)

by (*simp* *add*: *pow-generator-eq-iff-cong* *finite-carrier*)

hence [*int* *d* + *int* *y* * *int* *m* = *int* *d'* + *int* *y* * *int* *m'*] (*mod* *order* $\mathcal{G}$)

using *cong-int-iff* **by** *force*

```

from cong-diff[OF this cong-refl, of int d + int y * int m']
have [int y * int (m - m') = int d' - int d] (mod order G) using m-ge-m'
by(simp add: int-distrib of-nat-diff)
hence *: [int y * int (m - m') * (fst (bezw ((m - m') (order G)))) = (int d' -
int d) * (fst (bezw ((m - m') (order G))))] (mod order G)
by (simp add: cong-scalar-right)
hence [int y * (int (m - m') * (fst (bezw ((m - m') (order G)))) = (int d' -
int d) * (fst (bezw ((m - m') (order G))))] (mod order G)
by (simp add: more-arith-simps(11))
hence [int y * 1 = (int d' - int d) * (fst (bezw ((m - m') (order G))))] (mod
order G)
using inverse gcd
by (smt Groups.mult-ac(2) Number-Theory-Aux.inverse Totient.of-nat-eq-1-iff
* cong-def int-ops(9) mod-mult-right-eq mod-one-cancel)
hence [int y = (int d' - int d) * (fst (bezw ((m - m') (order G))))] (mod order
G) by simp
hence y mod order G = (int d' - int d) * (fst (bezw ((m - m') (order G))))
mod order G
using cong-def zmod-int by auto
thus ?thesis using y-less-order by simp
qed

```

```

lemma dis-log-break':
  assumes y < order G
  and ¬ m' < m
  and m ≠ m'
  and m: m' < order G
  and g [⌈ d ⊗ (g [⌈ y) [⌈ m = g [⌈ d' ⊗ (g [⌈ y) [⌈ m'
  shows y = nat ((int d - int d') * fst (bezw ((m' - m)) (order G))) mod int
  (order G))
proof-
  have m' > m using assms
  using group-eq-pow-eq-mod nat-neq-iff order-gt-0 by blast
  thus ?thesis
  using dis-log-break[of d y m d' m'] assms cong-sym-eq assms by blast
qed

```

```

lemma set-spmf-samp-uni [simp]: set-spmf (sample-uniform (order G)) = {x. x <
order G}
by(auto simp add: sample-uniform-def)

```

```

lemma correct:
  shows spmf (ped-commit.correct-game m) True = 1
  using finite-carrier order-gt-0-iff-finite
  apply(simp add: abstract-commitment.correct-game-def Let-def commit-def ver-
ify-def)
  by(simp add: key-gen-def Let-def bind-spmf-const cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)

```

```

theorem abstract-correct:

```

```

shows ped-commit.correct
unfolding abstract-commitment.correct-def using correct by simp

lemma perfect-hiding:
  shows spmf (ped-commit.hiding-game-ind-cpa A) True - 1/2 = 0
  including monad-normalisation
proof -
  obtain A1 A2 where [simp]: A = (A1, A2) by(cases A)
  note [simp] = Let-def split-def
  have ped-commit.hiding-game-ind-cpa (A1, A2) = TRY do {
    (ck, vk)  $\leftarrow$  key-gen;
    ((m0, m1),  $\sigma$ )  $\leftarrow$  A1 vk;
    - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (valid-msg m0  $\wedge$  valid-msg m1);
    b  $\leftarrow$  coin-spmf;
    (c, d)  $\leftarrow$  commit ck (if b then m0 else m1);
    b'  $\leftarrow$  A2 c  $\sigma$ ;
    return-spmf (b' = b) } ELSE coin-spmf
    by(simp add: abstract-commitment.hiding-game-ind-cpa-def)
  also have ... = TRY do {
    x :: nat  $\leftarrow$  sample-uniform (order G);
    let h = g [ $\top$ ] x;
    ((m0, m1),  $\sigma$ )  $\leftarrow$  A1 h;
    - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (valid-msg m0  $\wedge$  valid-msg m1);
    b  $\leftarrow$  coin-spmf;
    d :: nat  $\leftarrow$  sample-uniform (order G);
    let c = ((g [ $\top$ ] d)  $\otimes$  (h [ $\top$ ] (if b then m0 else m1)));
    b'  $\leftarrow$  A2 c  $\sigma$ ;
    return-spmf (b' = b) } ELSE coin-spmf
    by(simp add: commit-def key-gen-def)
  also have ... = TRY do {
    x :: nat  $\leftarrow$  sample-uniform (order G);
    let h = (g [ $\top$ ] x);
    ((m0, m1),  $\sigma$ )  $\leftarrow$  A1 h;
    - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (valid-msg m0  $\wedge$  valid-msg m1);
    b  $\leftarrow$  coin-spmf;
    z  $\leftarrow$  map-spmf ( $\lambda z. g [ $\top$ ] z \otimes (h [ $\top$ ] (if b then m0 else m1))) (sample-uniform$ 
    (order G));
    guess :: bool  $\leftarrow$  A2 z  $\sigma$ ;
    return-spmf(guess = b) } ELSE coin-spmf
    by(simp add: bind-map-spmf o-def)
  also have ... = TRY do {
    x :: nat  $\leftarrow$  sample-uniform (order G);
    let h = (g [ $\top$ ] x);
    ((m0, m1),  $\sigma$ )  $\leftarrow$  A1 h;
    - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (valid-msg m0  $\wedge$  valid-msg m1);
    b  $\leftarrow$  coin-spmf;
    z  $\leftarrow$  map-spmf ( $\lambda z. g [ $\top$ ] z) (sample-uniform (order G))$ ;
    guess :: bool  $\leftarrow$  A2 z  $\sigma$ ;
    return-spmf(guess = b) } ELSE coin-spmf

```

```

  by(simp add: sample-uniform-one-time-pad)
also have ... = TRY do {
  x :: nat ← sample-uniform (order  $\mathcal{G}$ );
  let h = ( $\mathbf{g} \ [\top] \ x$ );
  ((m0, m1),  $\sigma$ ) ←  $\mathcal{A}1 \ h$ ;
  - :: unit ← assert-spmf (valid-msg m0  $\wedge$  valid-msg m1);
  z ← map-spmf ( $\lambda z. \ \mathbf{g} \ [\top] \ z$ ) (sample-uniform (order  $\mathcal{G}$ ));
  guess :: bool ←  $\mathcal{A}2 \ z \ \sigma$ ;
  map-spmf((=) guess) coin-spmf} ELSE coin-spmf
  by(simp add: map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf)
also have ... = coin-spmf
  by(auto simp add: bind-spmf-const map-eq-const-coin-spmf try-bind-spmf-lossless2'
scale-bind-spmf weight-spmf-le-1 scale-scale-spmf)
ultimately show ?thesis by(simp add: spmf-of-set)
qed

```

theorem *abstract-perfect-hiding:*

shows *ped-commit.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa $\mathcal{A}$*

proof–

have *spm*f (ped-commit.hiding-game-ind-cpa $\mathcal{A}$) True $- 1/2 = 0$

using *perfect-hiding* **by** *fastforce*

thus ?thesis

by(simp add: abstract-commitment.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa-def abstract-commitment.hiding-advantage-ind-cpa)

qed

lemma *bind-output-cong:*

assumes $x < \text{order } \mathcal{G}$

shows $(x = \text{nat } ((\text{int } b - \text{int } ab) * \text{fst } (\text{bezw } (aa - ac) (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) \bmod \text{int } (\text{order } \mathcal{G})))$

$\longleftrightarrow [x = \text{nat } ((\text{int } b - \text{int } ab) * \text{fst } (\text{bezw } (aa - ac) (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) \bmod \text{int } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))] \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}$

using *assms cong-less-modulus-unique-nat nat-less-iff* **by** *auto*

lemma *bind-game-eq-dis-log:*

shows *ped-commit.bind-game $\mathcal{A} = \text{discrete-log.dis-log } (\text{dis-log-}\mathcal{A} \ \mathcal{A})$*

proof–

note [*simp*] = *Let-def split-def*

have *ped-commit.bind-game $\mathcal{A} = \text{TRY do } \{$*

(ck,vk) ← key-gen;

(c, m, d, m', d') ← $\mathcal{A} \ ck$;

- :: unit ← assert-spmf($m \neq m' \wedge \text{valid-msg } m \wedge \text{valid-msg } m'$);

let b = verify vk m c d;

let b' = verify vk m' c d';

- :: unit ← assert-spmf ($b \wedge b'$);

return-spmf True} ELSE return-spmf False

by(simp add: abstract-commitment.bind-game-alt-def)

also have ... = TRY do {

x :: nat ← sample-uniform (Coset.order $\mathcal{G}$);

(c, m, d, m', d') ← $\mathcal{A} \ (\mathbf{g} \ [\top] \ x)$;

```

- :: unit ← assert-spmf (m ≠ m' ∧ valid-msg m ∧ valid-msg m');
- :: unit ← assert-spmf (c = g [∧] d ⊗ (g [∧] x) [∧] m ∧ c = g [∧] d' ⊗ (g [∧]
x) [∧] m');
  return-spmf True} ELSE return-spmf False
  by(simp add: verify-def key-gen-def)
also have ... = TRY do {
  x :: nat ← sample-uniform (order G);
  (c, m, d, m', d') ← A (g [∧] x);
  - :: unit ← assert-spmf (m ≠ m' ∧ valid-msg m ∧ valid-msg m');
  - :: unit ← assert-spmf (c = g [∧] d ⊗ (g [∧] x) [∧] m ∧ c = g [∧] d' ⊗ (g [∧]
x) [∧] m');
  return-spmf (x = (if (m > m') then (nat ((int d' - int d) * (fst (bezw ((m -
m'))) (order G))) mod order G)) else
    (nat ((int d - int d') * (fst (bezw ((m' - m)) (order G))) mod order
G))))} ELSE return-spmf False
  apply(intro try-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?)
  apply(auto simp add: valid-msg-def)
  apply(intro bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?)+
  apply(simp add: dis-log-break)
  apply(intro bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?)+
  by(simp add: dis-log-break')
ultimately show ?thesis
  apply(simp add: discrete-log.dis-log-def dis-log-A-def cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
  apply(intro try-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?)+
  using bind-output-cong by auto
qed

theorem pedersen-bind: ped-commit.bind-advantage A = discrete-log.advantage
(dis-log-A A)
  unfolding abstract-commitment.bind-advantage-def discrete-log.advantage-def
  using bind-game-eq-dis-log by simp

end

locale pedersen-asymp =
  fixes G :: nat ⇒ 'grp cyclic-group
  assumes pedersen: ∧η. pedersen (G η)
begin

sublocale pedersen G η for η by(simp add: pedersen)

theorem pedersen-correct-asymp:
  shows ped-commit.correct n
  using abstract-correct by simp

theorem pedersen-perfect-hiding-asymp:
  shows ped-commit.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa n (A n)
  by (simp add: abstract-perfect-hiding)

```

```

theorem pedersen-bind-asym:
  shows negligible ( $\lambda n. \text{ped-commit.bind-advantage } n \ (\mathcal{A} \ n)$ )
     $\longleftrightarrow$  negligible ( $\lambda n. \text{discrete-log.advantage } n \ (\text{dis-log-}\mathcal{A} \ n \ (\mathcal{A} \ n))$ )
  by(simp add: pedersen-bind)

end

end

```

1.3 Rivest Commitment Scheme

The Rivest commitment scheme was first introduced in [10]. We note however the original scheme did not allow for perfect hiding. This was pointed out by Blundo and Masucci in [3] who alightly ammended the commitment scheme so that is provided perfect hiding.

The Rivest commitment scheme uses a trusted initialiser to provide correlated randomness to the two parties before an execution of the protocol. In our framework we set these as keys that held by the respective parties.

```

theory Rivest imports
  Commitment-Schemes
  HOL-Number-Theory.Cong
  CryptHOL.CryptHOL
  Cyclic-Group-Ext
  Discrete-Log
  Number-Theory-Aux
  Uniform-Sampling
begin

locale rivest =
  fixes  $q :: \text{nat}$ 
  assumes prime-q: prime  $q$ 
begin

lemma q-gt-0 [simp]:  $q > 0$ 
  by (simp add: prime-q prime-gt-0-nat)

type-synonym ck =  $\text{nat} \times \text{nat}$ 
type-synonym vk =  $\text{nat} \times \text{nat}$ 
type-synonym plain =  $\text{nat}$ 
type-synonym commit =  $\text{nat}$ 
type-synonym opening =  $\text{nat} \times \text{nat}$ 

definition key-gen ::  $(\text{ck} \times \text{vk}) \text{ spmf}$ 
where
  key-gen = do {
     $a :: \text{nat} \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } q$ ;
     $b :: \text{nat} \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } q$ ;
     $x1 :: \text{nat} \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } q$ ;

```

```

let y1 = (a * x1 + b) mod q;
return-spmf ((a,b), (x1,y1))}

```

definition *commit* :: *ck* $\Rightarrow$ *plain* $\Rightarrow$ (*commit* $\times$ *opening*) *spmf*
where

```

commit ck m = do {
  let (a,b) = ck;
  return-spmf ((m + a) mod q, (a,b))}

```

fun *verify* :: *vk* $\Rightarrow$ *plain* $\Rightarrow$ *commit* $\Rightarrow$ *opening* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where

```

verify (x1,y1) m c (a,b) = (((c = (m + a) mod q))  $\wedge$  (y1 = (a * x1 + b) mod q))

```

definition *valid-msg* :: *plain* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*

where *valid-msg* *msg* $\equiv$ *msg* $\in$ $\{..< q\}$

sublocale *rivest-commit*: *abstract-commitment* *key-gen* *commit* *verify* *valid-msg* .

lemma *abstract-correct*: *rivest-commit.correct*

unfolding *abstract-commitment.correct-def* *abstract-commitment.correct-game-def*
by(*simp* *add*: *key-gen-def* *commit-def* *bind-spmf-const* *lossless-weight-spmfD*)

lemma *rivest-hiding*: (*spmf* (*rivest-commit.hiding-game-ind-cpa* *A*) *True* - 1/2 = 0)

including *monad-normalisation*

proof–

note [*simp*] = *Let-def* *split-def*

obtain *A1* *A2* **where** [*simp*]: *A* = (*A1*, *A2*) **by**(*cases* *A*)

have *rivest-commit.hiding-game-ind-cpa* (*A1*, *A2*) = *TRY* *do* {

```

  a :: nat  $\leftarrow$  sample-uniform q;
  x1 :: nat  $\leftarrow$  sample-uniform q;
  y1  $\leftarrow$  map-spmf ( $\lambda$  b. (a * x1 + b) mod q) (sample-uniform q);
  ((m0, m1),  $\sigma$ )  $\leftarrow$  A1 (x1,y1);
  - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (valid-msg m0  $\wedge$  valid-msg m1);
  d  $\leftarrow$  coin-spmf;
  let c = ((if d then m0 else m1) + a) mod q;
  b'  $\leftarrow$  A2 c  $\sigma$ ;
  return-spmf (b' = d)} ELSE coin-spmf

```

unfolding *abstract-commitment.hiding-game-ind-cpa-def*

by(*simp* *add*: *commit-def* *key-gen-def* *o-def* *bind-map-spmf*)

also have ... = *TRY* *do* {

```

  a :: nat  $\leftarrow$  sample-uniform q;
  x1 :: nat  $\leftarrow$  sample-uniform q;
  y1  $\leftarrow$  sample-uniform q;
  ((m0, m1),  $\sigma$ )  $\leftarrow$  A1 (x1,y1);
  - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (valid-msg m0  $\wedge$  valid-msg m1);
  d  $\leftarrow$  coin-spmf;
  let c = ((if d then m0 else m1) + a) mod q;

```

```

    b' ←  $\mathcal{A}2$  c  $\sigma$ ;
    return-spmf (b' = d)} ELSE coin-spmf
  by(simp add: samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad)
also have ... = TRY do {
  x1 :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
  y1 ← sample-uniform q;
  ((m0, m1),  $\sigma$ ) ←  $\mathcal{A}1$  (x1, y1);
  - :: unit ← assert-spmf (valid-msg m0  $\wedge$  valid-msg m1);
  d ← coin-spmf;
  c ← map-spmf ( $\lambda$  a. ((if d then m0 else m1) + a) mod q) (sample-uniform q);
  b' ←  $\mathcal{A}2$  c  $\sigma$ ;
  return-spmf (b' = d)} ELSE coin-spmf
  by(simp add: o-def bind-map-spmf)
also have ... = TRY do {
  x1 :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
  y1 ← sample-uniform q;
  ((m0, m1),  $\sigma$ ) ←  $\mathcal{A}1$  (x1, y1);
  - :: unit ← assert-spmf (valid-msg m0  $\wedge$  valid-msg m1);
  d ← coin-spmf;
  c ← sample-uniform q;
  b' :: bool ←  $\mathcal{A}2$  c  $\sigma$ ;
  return-spmf (b' = d)} ELSE coin-spmf
  by(simp add: samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad)
also have ... = TRY do {
  x1 :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
  y1 ← sample-uniform q;
  ((m0, m1),  $\sigma$ ) ←  $\mathcal{A}1$  (x1, y1);
  - :: unit ← assert-spmf (valid-msg m0  $\wedge$  valid-msg m1);
  c :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
  guess :: bool ←  $\mathcal{A}2$  c  $\sigma$ ;
  map-spmf((=) guess) coin-spmf} ELSE coin-spmf
  by(simp add: map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf)
also have ... = coin-spmf
  by(simp add: map-eq-const-coin-spmf bind-spmf-const try-bind-spmf-lossless2'
    scale-bind-spmf weight-spmf-le-1 scale-scale-spmf)
ultimately show ?thesis
  by(simp add: spmf-of-set)
qed

```

lemma rivest-perfect-hiding: rivest-commit.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa $\mathcal{A}$

unfolding abstract-commitment.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa-def abstract-commitment.hiding-advantage-ind-cpa-def

by(simp add: rivest-hiding)

lemma samp-uni-break':

assumes fst-cond: $m \neq m' \wedge \text{valid-msg } m \wedge \text{valid-msg } m'$

and c: $c = (m + a) \bmod q \wedge y1 = (a * x1 + b) \bmod q$

and c': $c = (m' + a') \bmod q \wedge y1 = (a' * x1 + b') \bmod q$

and x1: $x1 < q$

shows $x1 = (\text{if } (a \bmod q > a' \bmod q) \text{ then nat } ((\text{int } b' - \text{int } b) * (\text{inverse } (\text{nat } q)))$

```

((int a mod q - int a' mod q) mod q) q) mod q) else
  nat ((int b - int b') * (inverse (nat ((int a' mod q - int a mod q) mod q))
q) mod q))
proof -
  have m: m < q ∧ m' < q using fst-cond valid-msg-def by simp
  have a-a': ¬ [a = a'] (mod q)
  proof -
    have [m + a = m' + a'] (mod q)
    using assms cong-def by blast
    thus ?thesis
    by (metis m fst-cond c c' add.commute cong-less-modulus-unique-nat cong-add-rcancel-nat
cong-mod-right)
  qed
  have cong-y1: [int a * int x1 + int b = int a' * int x1 + int b'] (mod q)
  by (metis c c' cong-def Num.of-nat-simps(4) Num.of-nat-simps(5) cong-int-iff)
  show ?thesis
  proof (cases a mod q > a' mod q)
    case True
      moreover have ⟨((int a mod q - int a' mod q) mod q) ≠ 0⟩
      by (metis True comm-monoid-add-class.add-0 diff-add-cancel mod-add-left-eq
mod-diff-eq nat-mod-as-int order-less-irrefl)
      moreover have ((int a mod q - int a' mod q) mod q) < q by simp
      ultimately have ⟨coprime (nat ((int a mod q - int a' mod q) mod q)) q⟩
      using prime-field [of q ⟨nat ((int a mod int q - int a' mod int q) mod int q)⟩]
    prime-q
      by (simp flip: of-nat-mod of-nat-diff)
      then have gcd: gcd (nat ((int a mod q - int a' mod q) mod q)) q = 1
      by simp
      hence [int a * int x1 - int a' * int x1 = int b' - int b] (mod q)
      by (smt cong-diff-iff-cong-0 cong-y1 cong-diff cong-diff)
      hence [int a mod q * int x1 - int a' mod q * int x1 = int b' - int b] (mod q)
      proof -
        have [int x1 * (int a mod int q - int a' mod int q) = int x1 * (int a - int
a')] (mod int q)
        by (meson cong-def cong-mult cong-refl mod-diff-eq)
        then show ?thesis
        by (metis (no-types, opaque-lifting) Groups.mult-ac(2) ⟨[int a * int x1 - int
a' * int x1 = int b' - int b] (mod int q)⟩ cong-def mod-diff-left-eq mod-diff-right-eq
mod-mult-right-eq)
      qed
      hence [int x1 * (int a mod q - int a' mod q) = int b' - int b] (mod q)
      by (metis int-distrib(3) mult.commute)
      hence [int x1 * (int a mod q - int a' mod q) mod q = int b' - int b] (mod q)
      using cong-def by simp
      hence [int x1 * nat ((int a mod q - int a' mod q) mod q) = int b' - int b] (mod
q)
      by (simp add: True cong-def mod-mult-right-eq)
      hence [int x1 * nat ((int a mod q - int a' mod q) mod q) * inverse (nat ((int
a mod q - int a' mod q) mod q)) q

```

$$= (\text{int } b' - \text{int } b) * \text{inverse} (\text{nat } ((\text{int } a \bmod q - \text{int } a' \bmod q) \bmod q))$$

$$q] (\bmod q)$$
using *cong-scalar-right* **by** *blast*
hence $[\text{int } x1 * (\text{nat } ((\text{int } a \bmod q - \text{int } a' \bmod q) \bmod q) * \text{inverse} (\text{nat } ((\text{int } a \bmod q - \text{int } a' \bmod q) \bmod q)) \bmod q)$

$$= (\text{int } b' - \text{int } b) * \text{inverse} (\text{nat } ((\text{int } a \bmod q - \text{int } a' \bmod q) \bmod q))$$

$$q] (\bmod q)$$
by (*simp add: more-arith-simps(11)*)
hence $[\text{int } x1 * 1 = (\text{int } b' - \text{int } b) * \text{inverse} (\text{nat } ((\text{int } a \bmod q - \text{int } a' \bmod q) \bmod q)) \bmod q] (\bmod q)$
using *inverse gcd*
by (*meson cong-scalar-left cong-sym-eq cong-trans*)
hence $[\text{int } x1 = (\text{int } b' - \text{int } b) * \text{inverse} (\text{nat } ((\text{int } a \bmod q - \text{int } a' \bmod q) \bmod q)) \bmod q] (\bmod q)$
by *simp*
hence $\text{int } x1 \bmod q = ((\text{int } b' - \text{int } b) * \text{inverse} (\text{nat } ((\text{int } a \bmod q - \text{int } a' \bmod q) \bmod q)) \bmod q) \bmod q$
using *cong-def* **by** *fast*
thus *?thesis* **using** *x1 True* **by** *simp*
next
case *False*
hence *aa'*: $a \bmod q < a' \bmod q$
using *a-a' cong-refl nat-neq-iff*
by (*simp add: cong-def*)
moreover **have** $((\text{int } a' \bmod q - \text{int } a \bmod q) \bmod q) \neq 0$
by (*metis aa' comm-monoid-add-class.add-0 diff-add-cancel mod-add-left-eq mod-diff-eq nat-mod-as-int order-less-irrefl*)
moreover **have** $((\text{int } a' \bmod q - \text{int } a \bmod q) \bmod q) < q$ **by** *simp*
ultimately **have** $\langle \text{coprime} (\text{nat } ((\text{int } a' \bmod q - \text{int } a \bmod q) \bmod q)) \rangle q$
using *prime-field* $[\text{of } q \langle \text{nat } ((\text{int } a' \bmod \text{int } q - \text{int } a \bmod \text{int } q) \bmod \text{int } q) \rangle]$
prime-q
by (*simp flip: of-nat-mod of-nat-diff*)
then **have** *gcd*: $\text{gcd} (\text{nat } ((\text{int } a' \bmod q - \text{int } a \bmod q) \bmod q)) \bmod q = 1$
by *simp*
have $[\text{int } b - \text{int } b' = \text{int } a' * \text{int } x1 - \text{int } a * \text{int } x1] (\bmod q)$
by (*smt cong-diff-iff-cong-0 cong-y1 cong-diff cong-diff*)
hence $[\text{int } b - \text{int } b' = \text{int } x1 * (\text{int } a' - \text{int } a)] (\bmod q)$
using *int-distrib mult.commute* **by** *metis*
hence $[\text{int } b - \text{int } b' = \text{int } x1 * (\text{int } a' \bmod q - \text{int } a \bmod q)] (\bmod q)$
by (*metis (no-types, lifting) cong-def mod-diff-eq mod-mult-right-eq*)
hence $[\text{int } b - \text{int } b' = \text{int } x1 * (\text{int } a' \bmod q - \text{int } a \bmod q) \bmod q] (\bmod q)$
using *cong-def* **by** *simp*
hence $[(\text{int } b - \text{int } b') * \text{inverse} (\text{nat } ((\text{int } a' \bmod q - \text{int } a \bmod q) \bmod q)) \bmod q$

$$= \text{int } x1 * (\text{int } a' \bmod q - \text{int } a \bmod q) \bmod q * \text{inverse} (\text{nat } ((\text{int } a' \bmod q - \text{int } a \bmod q) \bmod q)) \bmod q] (\bmod q)$$
using *cong-scalar-right* **by** *blast*
hence $[(\text{int } b - \text{int } b') * \text{inverse} (\text{nat } ((\text{int } a' \bmod q - \text{int } a \bmod q) \bmod q)) \bmod q$

$$= \text{int } x1 * ((\text{int } a' \bmod q - \text{int } a \bmod q) \bmod q * \text{inverse} (\text{nat } ((\text{int } a' \bmod q - \text{int } a \bmod q) \bmod q)) \bmod q)] (\bmod q)$$

```

    by (metis (mono-tags, lifting) cong-def mod-mult-left-eq mod-mult-right-eq
more-arith-simps(11))
  hence *: [int x1 * ((int a' mod q - int a mod q) mod q * inverse (nat ((int a'
mod q - int a mod q) mod q)) q)
    = (int b - int b') * inverse (nat ((int a' mod q - int a mod q) mod q))
q] (mod q)
  using cong-sym-eq by auto
  hence [int x1 * 1 = (int b - int b') * inverse (nat ((int a' mod q - int a mod
q) mod q)) q] (mod q)
  proof -
    have [(int a' mod int q - int a mod int q) mod int q * Number-Theory-Aux.inverse
(nat ((int a' mod int q - int a mod int q) mod int q)) q = 1] (mod int q)
    using inverse [of ⟨nat ((int a' mod int q - int a mod int q) mod int q)⟩ q,
OF gcd]
    by simp
  then show ?thesis
    by (meson * cong-scalar-left cong-sym-eq cong-trans)
qed
  hence [int x1 = (int b - int b') * inverse (nat ((int a' mod q - int a mod q)
mod q)) q] (mod q)
  by simp
  hence int x1 mod q = (int b - int b') * (inverse (nat ((int a' mod q - int a
mod q) mod q)) q) mod q
  using cong-def by auto
  thus ?thesis using x1 aa' by simp
qed
qed

```

```

lemma samp-uni-spmf-mod-q:
  shows spmf (sample-uniform q) (x mod q) = 1/q
proof-
  have indicator {.. $q$ } (x mod q) = 1
  using q-gt-0 by auto
  moreover have real (card {.. $q$ }) = q by simp
  ultimately show ?thesis
    by(auto simp add: spmf-of-set sample-uniform-def)
qed

```

```

lemma spmf-samp-uni-eq-return-bool-mod:
  shows spmf (do {
    x1 ← sample-uniform q;
    return-spmf (int x1 = y mod q)}) True = 1/q
proof-
  have spmf (do {
    x1 ← sample-uniform q;
    return-spmf (x1 = y mod q)}) True = spmf (sample-uniform q ≫= (λ x1.
return-spmf x1)) (y mod q)
  apply(simp only: spmf-bind)

```

```

    apply(rule Bochner-Integration.integral-cong[OF refl])+
  proof -
    fix x :: nat
    have y mod q = x  $\longrightarrow$  indicator {True} (x = (y mod q)) = (indicator {(y mod q)} x :: real)
    by simp
    then have indicator {True} (x = y mod q) = (indicator {y mod q} x :: real)
    by fastforce
    then show spmf (return-spmf (x = y mod q)) True = spmf (return-spmf x)
    (y mod q)
    by (metis pmf-return spmf-of-pmf-return-pmf spmf-spmf-of-pmf)
  qed
  thus ?thesis using samp-uni-spmf-mod-q by simp
qed

```

lemma bind-game-le-inv-q:

```

  shows spmf (rivest-commit.bind-game  $\mathcal{A}$ ) True  $\leq 1 / q$ 
  proof -
    let ?eq =  $\lambda a \ a' \ b \ b'. (=)$ 
    (if (a mod q > a' mod q) then nat ((int b' - int b) * (inverse (nat ((int a mod q - int a' mod q) mod q)) q) mod q)
    else nat ((int b - int b') * (inverse (nat ((int a' mod q - int a mod q) mod q)) q) mod q))
    have spmf (rivest-commit.bind-game  $\mathcal{A}$ ) True = spmf (do {
      (ck, (x1, y1))  $\leftarrow$  key-gen;
      (c, m, (a, b), m', (a', b'))  $\leftarrow$   $\mathcal{A}$  ck;
      - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (m  $\neq$  m'  $\wedge$  valid-msg m  $\wedge$  valid-msg m');
      let b = verify (x1, y1) m c (a, b);
      let b' = verify (x1, y1) m' c (a', b');
      - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (b  $\wedge$  b');
      return-spmf True}) True
    by (simp add: abstract-commitment.bind-game-alt-def split-def spmf-try-spmf del:
    verify.simps)
    also have ... = spmf (do {
      a' :: nat  $\leftarrow$  sample-uniform q;
      b' :: nat  $\leftarrow$  sample-uniform q;
      x1 :: nat  $\leftarrow$  sample-uniform q;
      let y1 = (a' * x1 + b') mod q;
      (c, m, (a, b), m', (a', b'))  $\leftarrow$   $\mathcal{A}$  (a', b');
      - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (m  $\neq$  m'  $\wedge$  valid-msg m  $\wedge$  valid-msg m');
      - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (c = (m + a) mod q  $\wedge$  y1 = (a * x1 + b) mod q  $\wedge$  c
      = (m' + a') mod q  $\wedge$  y1 = (a' * x1 + b') mod q);
      return-spmf True}) True
    by (simp add: key-gen-def Let-def)
    also have ... = spmf (do {
      a'' :: nat  $\leftarrow$  sample-uniform q;
      b'' :: nat  $\leftarrow$  sample-uniform q;
      x1 :: nat  $\leftarrow$  sample-uniform q;
      let y1 = (a'' * x1 + b'') mod q;

```

```

(c, m, (a,b), m', (a',b')) ←  $\mathcal{A}$  (a'',b'');
- :: unit ← assert-spmf (m ≠ m' ∧ valid-msg m ∧ valid-msg m');
- :: unit ← assert-spmf (c = (m + a) mod q ∧ y1 = (a * x1 + b) mod q ∧ c
= (m' + a') mod q ∧ y1 = (a' * x1 + b') mod q);
return-spmf (?eq a a' b b' x1)) True
unfolding split-def Let-def
by(rule arg-cong2[where f=spmf, OF - refl] bind-spmf-cong[OF refl])+
(auto simp add: eq-commute samp-uni-break' Let-def split-def valid-msg-def
cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
also have ... ≤ spmf (do {
a'' :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
b'' :: nat ← sample-uniform q;
(c, m, (a,(b::nat)), m', (a',b')) ←  $\mathcal{A}$  (a'',b'');
map-spmf (?eq a a' b b') (sample-uniform q)}) True
including monad-normalisation
unfolding split-def Let-def assert-spmf-def
apply(simp add: map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf)
apply(rule ord-spmf-eq-leD ord-spmf-bind-refl)+
apply auto
done
also have ... ≤ 1/q
proof((rule spmf-bind-leI)+, clarify)
fix a a' b b'
define A where A = Collect (?eq a a' b b')
define x1 where x1 = The (?eq a a' b b')
note q-gt-0[simp del]
have A ⊆ {x1} by(auto simp add: A-def x1-def)
hence card (A ∩ {.. $q$ }) ≤ card {x1} by(intro card-mono) auto
also have ... = 1 by simp
finally have spmf (map-spmf (λx. x ∈ A) (sample-uniform q)) True ≤ 1 / q
using q-gt-0 unfolding sample-uniform-def
by(subst map-mem-spmf-of-set)(auto simp add: field-simps)
then show spmf (map-spmf (?eq a a' b b') (sample-uniform q)) True ≤ 1 / q
unfolding A-def mem-Collect-eq .
qed auto
finally show ?thesis .
qed

lemma rivest-bind:
shows rivest-commit.bind-advantage  $\mathcal{A}$  ≤ 1 / q
using bind-game-le-inv-q rivest-commit.bind-advantage-def by simp

end

locale rivest-asymp =
fixes q :: nat ⇒ nat
assumes rivest:  $\bigwedge \eta$ . rivest (q  $\eta$ )
begin

```

sublocale *rivest* $q \ \eta$ **for** η **by** (*simp add: rivest*)

theorem *rivest-correct*:

shows *rivest-commit.correct* n

using *abstract-correct* **by** *simp*

theorem *rivest-perfect-hiding-asy*:

assumes *lossless-A: rivest-commit.lossless* ($\mathcal{A} \ n$)

shows *rivest-commit.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa* $n \ (\mathcal{A} \ n)$

by (*simp add: lossless-A rivest-perfect-hiding*)

theorem *rivest-binding-asy*:

assumes *negligible* ($\lambda n. \ 1 / (q \ n)$)

shows *negligible* ($\lambda n. \text{rivest-commit.bind-advantage } n \ (\mathcal{A} \ n)$)

using *negligible-le rivest-bind assms rivest-commit.bind-advantage-def* **by** *auto*

end

end

2 Σ -Protocols

Σ -protocols were first introduced as an abstract notion by Cramer [9]. We point the reader to [7] for a good introduction to the primitive as well as informal proofs of many of the constructions we formalise in this work. In particular the construction of commitment schemes from Σ -protocols and the construction of compound AND and OR statements.

In this section we define Σ -protocols then provide a general proof that they can be used to construct commitment schemes. Defining security for Σ -protocols uses a mixture of the game-based and simulation-based paradigms. The honest verifier zero knowledge property is considered using simulation-based proof, thus we follow the simulation-based formalisation of [1] and [4].

2.1 Defining Σ -protocols

theory *Sigma-Protocols* **imports**

CryptHOL.CryptHOL

Commitment-Schemes

begin

type-synonym (*'msg', 'challenge', 'response'*) *conv-tuple* = (*'msg' $\times$ 'challenge'* $\times$ *'response'*)

type-synonym (*'msg', 'response'*) *sim-out* = (*'msg' $\times$ 'response'*)

type-synonym ('pub-input', 'msg', 'challenge', 'response', 'witness') prover-adversary

$$= 'pub-input' \Rightarrow ('msg', 'challenge', 'response') \text{ conv-tuple} \\ \Rightarrow ('msg', 'challenge', 'response') \text{ conv-tuple} \Rightarrow 'witness' \text{ spmf}$$

locale Σ -protocols-base =

fixes *init* :: 'pub-input $\Rightarrow$ 'witness $\Rightarrow$ ('rand $\times$ 'msg) spmf — initial message in Σ -protocol

and *response* :: 'rand $\Rightarrow$ 'witness $\Rightarrow$ 'challenge $\Rightarrow$ 'response spmf

and *check* :: 'pub-input $\Rightarrow$ 'msg $\Rightarrow$ 'challenge $\Rightarrow$ 'response $\Rightarrow$ bool

and *Rel* :: ('pub-input $\times$ 'witness) set — The relation the Σ protocol is considered over

and *S-raw* :: 'pub-input $\Rightarrow$ 'challenge $\Rightarrow$ ('msg, 'response) sim-out spmf — Simulator for the HVZK property

and *Ass* :: ('pub-input, 'msg, 'challenge, 'response, 'witness) prover-adversary — Special soundness adversary

and *challenge-space* :: 'challenge set — The set of valid challenges

and *valid-pub* :: 'pub-input set

assumes *domain-subset-valid-pub*: Domain *Rel* $\subseteq$ *valid-pub*

begin

lemma assumes $x \in \text{Domain } Rel$ **shows** $\exists w. (x, w) \in Rel$

using *assms* **by** *auto*

The language defined by the relation is the set of all public inputs such that there exists a witness that satisfies the relation.

definition $L \equiv \{x. \exists w. (x, w) \in Rel\}$

The first property of Σ -protocols we consider is completeness, we define a probabilistic programme that runs the components of the protocol and outputs the boolean defined by the check algorithm.

definition *completeness-game* :: 'pub-input $\Rightarrow$ 'witness $\Rightarrow$ 'challenge $\Rightarrow$ bool spmf

where *completeness-game* *h w e* = do {

(*r*, *a*) $\leftarrow$ *init* *h w*;

z $\leftarrow$ *response* *r w e*;

return-spmf (*check* *h a e z*)}

We define completeness as the probability that the completeness-game returns true for all challenges assuming the relation holds on *h* and *w*.

definition *completeness* $\equiv (\forall h w e. (h, w) \in Rel \longrightarrow e \in \text{challenge-space} \longrightarrow \text{spmof } (\text{completeness-game } h w e) \text{ True} = 1)$

Second we consider the honest verifier zero knowledge property (HVZK). To reason about this we construct the real view of the Σ -protocol given a challenge *e* as input.

definition *R* :: 'pub-input $\Rightarrow$ 'witness $\Rightarrow$ 'challenge $\Rightarrow$ ('msg, 'challenge, 'response) conv-tuple spmf

where *R* *h w e* = do {

```

(r,a) ← init h w;
z ← response r w e;
return-spmf (a,e,z)}

```

definition S where $S\ h\ e = \text{map-spmf } (\lambda (a, z). (a, e, z))\ (S\text{-raw } h\ e)$

lemma *lossless-S-raw-imp-lossless-S*: $\text{lossless-spmf } (S\text{-raw } h\ e) \longrightarrow \text{lossless-spmf } (S\ h\ e)$
by(*simp add: S-def*)

The HVZK property requires that the simulator's output distribution is equal to the real views output distribution.

definition $HVZK \equiv (\forall e \in \text{challenge-space}.$
 $(\forall (h, w) \in \text{Rel}. R\ h\ w\ e = S\ h\ e)$
 $\wedge (\forall h \in \text{valid-pub}. \forall (a, z) \in \text{set-spmf } (S\text{-raw } h\ e). \text{check } h\ a\ e\ z))$

The final property to consider is that of special soundness. This says that given two valid transcripts such that the challenges are not equal there exists an adversary $\mathcal{A}ss$ that can output the witness.

definition *special-soundness* $\equiv (\forall\ h\ e\ e'\ a\ z\ z'.\ h \in \text{valid-pub} \longrightarrow e \in \text{challenge-space} \longrightarrow e' \in \text{challenge-space} \longrightarrow e \neq e' \longrightarrow \text{check } h\ a\ e\ z \longrightarrow \text{check } h\ a\ e'\ z' \longrightarrow (\text{lossless-spmf } (\mathcal{A}ss\ h\ (a,e,z))\ (a, e', z')) \wedge (\forall w' \in \text{set-spmf } (\mathcal{A}ss\ h\ (a,e,z)\ (a,e',z')). (h,w') \in \text{Rel}))$

lemma *special-soundness-alt*:

special-soundness $\longleftrightarrow$
 $(\forall\ h\ a\ e\ z\ e'\ z'.\ e \in \text{challenge-space} \longrightarrow e' \in \text{challenge-space} \longrightarrow h \in \text{valid-pub} \longrightarrow e \neq e' \longrightarrow \text{check } h\ a\ e\ z \wedge \text{check } h\ a\ e'\ z' \longrightarrow \text{bind-spmf } (\mathcal{A}ss\ h\ (a,e,z)\ (a,e',z'))\ (\lambda w'. \text{return-spmf } ((h,w') \in \text{Rel})) = \text{return-spmf } \text{True})$
apply(*auto simp add: special-soundness-def map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf[symmetric] map-pmf-eq-return-pmf-iff in-set-spmf lossless-iff-set-pmf-None*)
apply(*metis Domain.DomainI in-set-spmf not-Some-eq*)
using *Domain.intros by blast +*

definition $\Sigma\text{-protocol} \equiv \text{completeness} \wedge \text{special-soundness} \wedge HVZK$

General lemmas

lemma *lossless-complete-game*:

assumes *lossless-init*: $\forall\ h\ w. \text{lossless-spmf } (\text{init } h\ w)$
and *lossless-response*: $\forall\ r\ w\ e. \text{lossless-spmf } (\text{response } r\ w\ e)$
shows $\text{lossless-spmf } (\text{completeness-game } h\ w\ e)$
by(*simp add: completeness-game-def lossless-init lossless-response split-def*)

lemma *complete-game-return-true*:

```

assumes  $(h,w) \in Rel$ 
and completeness
and lossless-init:  $\forall h w. \text{lossless-spmf } (\text{init } h w)$ 
and lossless-response:  $\forall r w e. \text{lossless-spmf } (\text{response } r w e)$ 
and  $e \in \text{challenge-space}$ 
shows completeness-game  $h w e = \text{return-spmf } \text{True}$ 
proof –
  have spmf  $(\text{completeness-game } h w e) \text{ True} = \text{spmf } (\text{return-spmf } \text{True}) \text{ True}$ 
  using assms  $\Sigma\text{-protocol-def completeness-def}$  by fastforce
  then have completeness-game  $h w e = \text{return-spmf } \text{True}$ 
  by (metis (full-types) lossless-complete-game lossless-init lossless-response lossless-return-spmf spmf-False-conv-True spmf-eqI)
  then show ?thesis
  by (simp add: completeness-game-def)
qed

```

```

lemma HVZK-unfold1:
assumes  $\Sigma\text{-protocol}$ 
shows  $\forall h w e. (h,w) \in Rel \longrightarrow e \in \text{challenge-space} \longrightarrow R h w e = S h e$ 
using assms by (auto simp add:  $\Sigma\text{-protocol-def HVZK-def}$ )

```

```

lemma HVZK-unfold2:
assumes  $\Sigma\text{-protocol}$ 
shows  $\forall h e \text{out}. e \in \text{challenge-space} \longrightarrow h \in \text{valid-pub} \longrightarrow \text{out} \in \text{set-spmf}$ 
 $(S\text{-raw } h e) \longrightarrow \text{check } h (\text{fst out}) e (\text{snd out})$ 
using assms by (auto simp add:  $\Sigma\text{-protocol-def HVZK-def split-def}$ )

```

```

lemma HVZK-unfold2-alt:
assumes  $\Sigma\text{-protocol}$ 
shows  $\forall h a e z. e \in \text{challenge-space} \longrightarrow h \in \text{valid-pub} \longrightarrow (a,z) \in \text{set-spmf}$ 
 $(S\text{-raw } h e) \longrightarrow \text{check } h a e z$ 
using assms by (fastforce simp add:  $\Sigma\text{-protocol-def HVZK-def}$ )

```

end

2.2 Commitments from Σ -protocols

In this section we provide a general proof that Σ -protocols can be used to construct commitment schemes. We follow the construction given by Damgard in [7].

locale $\Sigma\text{-protocols-to-commitments} = \Sigma\text{-protocols-base init response check Rel } S\text{-raw}$
Ass challenge-space valid-pub

```

for init ::  $'\text{pub-input} \Rightarrow '\text{witness} \Rightarrow ('rand \times '\text{msg}) \text{ spmf}$ 
and response ::  $'rand \Rightarrow '\text{witness} \Rightarrow '\text{challenge} \Rightarrow '\text{response} \text{ spmf}$ 
and check ::  $'\text{pub-input} \Rightarrow '\text{msg} \Rightarrow '\text{challenge} \Rightarrow '\text{response} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ 
and Rel ::  $('pub-input \times '\text{witness}) \text{ set}$ 
and S-raw ::  $'\text{pub-input} \Rightarrow '\text{challenge} \Rightarrow ('msg, '\text{response}) \text{ sim-out spmf}$ 
and Ass ::  $('pub-input, '\text{msg}, '\text{challenge}, '\text{response}, '\text{witness}) \text{ prover-adversary}$ 
and challenge-space ::  $'challenge \text{ set}$ 

```

and *valid-pub* :: 'pub-input set
and *G* :: ('pub-input × 'witness) spmf — generates pairs that satisfy the relation
 +
assumes *Σ-prot*: *Σ-protocol* — assume we have a *Σ*-protocol
and *set-spmf-G-rel* [*simp*]: $(h,w) \in \text{set-spmf } G \implies (h,w) \in \text{Rel}$ — the generator
 has the desired property
and *lossless-G*: *lossless-spmf* *G*
and *lossless-init*: *lossless-spmf* (*init* *h w*)
and *lossless-response*: *lossless-spmf* (*response* *r w e*)
begin

lemma *set-spmf-G-domain-rel* [*simp*]: $(h,w) \in \text{set-spmf } G \implies h \in \text{Domain Rel}$
using *set-spmf-G-rel* **by** *fast*

lemma *set-spmf-G-L* [*simp*]: $(h,w) \in \text{set-spmf } G \implies h \in L$
by (*metis mem-Collect-eq set-spmf-G-rel L-def*)

We define the advantage associated with the hard relation, this is used in the proof of the binding property where we reduce the binding advantage to the relation advantage.

definition *rel-game* :: ('pub-input $\Rightarrow$ 'witness spmf) $\Rightarrow$ bool spmf
where *rel-game* *A* = TRY do {
 (*h,w*) $\leftarrow$ *G*;
w' $\leftarrow$ *A* *h*;
 return-spmf $((h,w') \in \text{Rel})$ } ELSE return-spmf *False*

definition *rel-advantage* :: ('pub-input $\Rightarrow$ 'witness spmf) $\Rightarrow$ real
where *rel-advantage* *A* $\equiv$ spmf (*rel-game* *A*) *True*

We now define the algorithms that define the commitment scheme constructed from a *Σ*-protocol.

definition *key-gen* :: ('pub-input × ('pub-input × 'witness)) spmf
where
key-gen = do {
 (*x,w*) $\leftarrow$ *G*;
 return-spmf (*x*, (*x,w*))}

definition *commit* :: 'pub-input $\Rightarrow$ 'challenge $\Rightarrow$ ('msg × 'response) spmf
where
commit *x e* = do {
 (*a,e,z*) $\leftarrow$ *S* *x e*;
 return-spmf (*a*, *z*)}

definition *verify* :: ('pub-input × 'witness) $\Rightarrow$ 'challenge $\Rightarrow$ 'msg $\Rightarrow$ 'response $\Rightarrow$ bool
where *verify* *x e a z* = (*check* (*fst* *x*) *a e z*)

We allow the adversary to output any message, so this means the type constraint is enough

definition *valid-msg* $m = (m \in \text{challenge-space})$

Showing the construction of a commitment scheme from a Σ -protocol is a valid commitment scheme is trivial.

sublocale *abstract-com*: *abstract-commitment key-gen commit verify valid-msg* .

Correctness lemma *commit-correct*:

shows *abstract-com.correct*

including *monad-normalisation*

proof–

have $\forall m \in \text{challenge-space}. \text{abstract-com.correct-game } m = \text{return-spmf True}$

proof

fix m

assume $m: m \in \text{challenge-space}$

show *abstract-com.correct-game* $m = \text{return-spmf True}$

proof–

have *abstract-com.correct-game* $m = \text{do}$ {

$(ck, (vk1, vk2)) \leftarrow \text{key-gen};$

$(a, e, z) \leftarrow S \text{ ck } m;$

$\text{return-spmf } (\text{check } vk1 \text{ } a \text{ } m \text{ } z)$ }

unfolding *abstract-com.correct-game-def*

by(*simp add: commit-def verify-def split-def*)

also have $\dots = \text{do}$ {

$(x, w) \leftarrow G;$

$\text{let } (ck, (vk1, vk2)) = (x, (x, w));$

$(a, e, z) \leftarrow S \text{ ck } m;$

$\text{return-spmf } (\text{check } vk1 \text{ } a \text{ } m \text{ } z)$ }

by(*simp add: key-gen-def split-def*)

also have $\dots = \text{do}$ {

$(x, w) \leftarrow G;$

$(a, e, z) \leftarrow S \text{ x } m;$

$\text{return-spmf } (\text{check } x \text{ } a \text{ } m \text{ } z)$ }

by(*simp add: Let-def*)

also have $\dots = \text{do}$ {

$(x, w) \leftarrow G;$

$(a, e, z) \leftarrow R \text{ x } w \text{ } m;$

$\text{return-spmf } (\text{check } x \text{ } a \text{ } m \text{ } z)$ }

using $\Sigma\text{-prot HVZK-unfold1 } m$

by(*intro bind-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?*)

also have $\dots = \text{do}$ {

$(x, w) \leftarrow G;$

$(r, a) \leftarrow \text{init } x \text{ } w;$

$z \leftarrow \text{response } r \text{ } w \text{ } m;$

$\text{return-spmf } (\text{check } x \text{ } a \text{ } m \text{ } z)$ }

by(*simp add: R-def split-def*)

also have $\dots = \text{do}$ {

$(x, w) \leftarrow G;$

return-spmf True }

apply(*intro bind-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?*)

```

    using complete-game-return-true lossless-init lossless-response  $\Sigma$ -prot  $\Sigma$ -protocol-def
    by(simp add: split-def completeness-game-def  $\Sigma$ -protocols-base. $\Sigma$ -protocol-def
m cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
    ultimately show abstract-com.correct-game m = return-spmf True
    by(simp add: bind-spmf-const lossless-G lossless-weight-spmfD split-def)
qed
qed
thus ?thesis
    using abstract-com.correct-def abstract-com.valid-msg-set-def valid-msg-def by
simp
qed

```

The hiding property We first show we have perfect hiding with respect to the hiding game that allows the adversary to choose the messages that are committed to, this is akin to the ind-cpa game for encryption schemes.

lemma perfect-hiding:

```

shows abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa  $\mathcal{A}$ 
including monad-normalisation
proof -
  obtain  $\mathcal{A}1$   $\mathcal{A}2$  where [simp]:  $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}1, \mathcal{A}2)$  by(cases  $\mathcal{A}$ )
  have abstract-com.hiding-game-ind-cpa ( $\mathcal{A}1, \mathcal{A}2$ ) = TRY do {
     $(x, w) \leftarrow G$ ;
     $((m0, m1), \sigma) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}1 (x, w)$ ;
    - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (valid-msg m0  $\wedge$  valid-msg m1);
     $b \leftarrow$  coin-spmf;
     $(a, e, z) \leftarrow S x$  (if b then m0 else m1);
     $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}2 a \sigma$ ;
    return-spmf (b' = b)} ELSE coin-spmf
  by(simp add: abstract-com.hiding-game-ind-cpa-def commit-def; simp add: key-gen-def
split-def)
  also have ... = TRY do {
     $(x, w) \leftarrow G$ ;
     $((m0, m1), \sigma) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}1 (x, w)$ ;
    - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (valid-msg m0  $\wedge$  valid-msg m1);
     $b :: \text{bool} \leftarrow$  coin-spmf;
     $(a, e, z) \leftarrow R x w$  (if b then m0 else m1);
     $b' :: \text{bool} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}2 a \sigma$ ;
    return-spmf (b' = b)} ELSE coin-spmf
  apply(intro try-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?)+
  by(simp add:  $\Sigma$ -prot HVZK-unfold1 valid-msg-def)
  also have ... = TRY do {
     $(x, w) \leftarrow G$ ;
     $((m0, m1), \sigma) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}1 (x, w)$ ;
    - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (valid-msg m0  $\wedge$  valid-msg m1);
     $b \leftarrow$  coin-spmf;
     $(r, a) \leftarrow$  init x w;
     $z :: \text{'response} \leftarrow$  response r w (if b then m0 else m1);
    guess :: bool  $\leftarrow \mathcal{A}2 a \sigma$ ;

```

```

    return-spmf(guess = b)} ELSE coin-spmf
  using  $\Sigma$ -protocols-base.R-def
  by(simp add: bind-map-spmf o-def R-def split-def)
also have ... = TRY do {
  (x,w)  $\leftarrow$  G;
  ((m0, m1),  $\sigma$ )  $\leftarrow$  A1 (x,w);
  - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (valid-msg m0  $\wedge$  valid-msg m1);
  b  $\leftarrow$  coin-spmf;
  (r,a)  $\leftarrow$  init x w;
  guess :: bool  $\leftarrow$  A2 a  $\sigma$ ;
  return-spmf(guess = b)} ELSE coin-spmf
  by(simp add: bind-spmf-const lossless-response lossless-weight-spmfD)
also have ... = TRY do {
  (x,w)  $\leftarrow$  G;
  ((m0, m1),  $\sigma$ )  $\leftarrow$  A1 (x,w);
  - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (valid-msg m0  $\wedge$  valid-msg m1);
  (r,a)  $\leftarrow$  init x w;
  guess :: bool  $\leftarrow$  A2 a  $\sigma$ ;
  map-spmf( (=) guess) coin-spmf } ELSE coin-spmf
  apply(simp add: map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf)
  by(simp add: split-def)
also have ... = coin-spmf
  by(auto simp add: map-eq-const-coin-spmf try-bind-spmf-lossless2' Let-def split-def
bind-spmf-const scale-bind-spmf weight-spmf-le-1 scale-scale-spmf)
  ultimately have spmf (abstract-com.hiding-game-ind-cpa A) True = 1/2
  by(simp add: spmf-of-set)
thus ?thesis
  by (simp add: abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa-def abstract-com.hiding-advantage-ind-cpa-def)
qed

```

We reduce the security of the binding property to the relation advantage. To do this we first construct an adversary that interacts with the relation game. This adversary succeeds if the binding adversary succeeds.

definition *adversary* :: ('pub-input $\Rightarrow$ ('msg $\times$ 'challenge $\times$ 'response $\times$ 'challenge $\times$ 'response) spmf) $\Rightarrow$ 'pub-input $\Rightarrow$ 'witness spmf

where *adversary* A x = do {
 (c, e, ez, e', ez') $\leftarrow$ A x;
 Ass x (c,e,ez) (c,e',ez')}

lemma *bind-advantage*:

shows *abstract-com.bind-advantage* A $\leq$ *rel-advantage* (adversary A)

proof–

have *abstract-com.bind-game* A = TRY do {
 (x,w) $\leftarrow$ G;
 (c, m, d, m', d') $\leftarrow$ A x;
 - :: unit $\leftarrow$ assert-spmf (m $\neq$ m' $\wedge$ m $\in$ challenge-space $\wedge$ m' $\in$ challenge-space);
 let b = check x c m d;
 let b' = check x c m' d';
 - :: unit $\leftarrow$ assert-spmf (b $\wedge$ b');

```

w' ← Ass x (c,m, d) (c,m', d');
return-spmf ((x,w') ∈ Rel)} ELSE return-spmf False
  unfolding abstract-com.bind-game-alt-def
  apply(simp add: key-gen-def verify-def Let-def split-def valid-msg-def)
  apply(intro try-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?)+
  using special-soundness-def Σ-prot Σ-protocol-def special-soundness-alt spe-
cial-soundness-def set-spmf-G-rel set-spmf-G-domain-rel
  by (smt basic-trans-rules(31) bind-spmf-cong domain-subset-valid-pub)
  hence abstract-com.bind-advantage  $\mathcal{A} \leq \text{spm}$ f (TRY do {
(x,w) ← G;
(c, m, d, m', d') ←  $\mathcal{A}$  x;
w' ← Ass x (c,m, d) (c,m', d');
return-spmf ((x,w') ∈ Rel)} ELSE return-spmf False) True
  unfolding abstract-com.bind-advantage-def
  apply(simp add: spmf-try-spmf)
  apply(rule ord-spmf-eq-leD)
  apply(rule ord-spmf-bind-reflI;clarsimp)+
  by(simp add: assert-spmf-def)
thus ?thesis
  by(simp add: rel-game-def adversary-def split-def rel-advantage-def)
qed

end

end

```

2.3 Schnorr Σ -protocol

In this section we show the Schnoor protocol [11] is a Σ -protocol and then use it to construct a commitment scheme. The security statements for the resulting commitment scheme come for free from our general proof of the construction.

theory Schnorr-Sigma-Commit imports

Commitment-Schemes
Sigma-Protocols
Cyclic-Group-Ext
Discrete-Log
Number-Theory-Aux
Uniform-Sampling
HOL-Number-Theory.Cong

begin

locale schnorr-base =

fixes $\mathcal{G} :: 'grp$ cyclic-group (**structure**)
assumes prime-order: prime (order $\mathcal{G}$)

begin

lemma order-gt-0 [simp]: order $\mathcal{G} > 0$

using prime-order prime-gt-0-nat by blast

The types for the Σ -protocol.

type-synonym *witness* = nat
type-synonym *rand* = nat
type-synonym *'grp' msg* = *'grp'*
type-synonym *response* = nat
type-synonym *challenge* = nat
type-synonym *'grp' pub-in* = *'grp'*

definition *R-DL* :: (*'grp pub-in* $\times$ *witness*) set
 where *R-DL* = $\{(h, w). h = \mathbf{g} [\wedge] w\}$

definition *init* :: *'grp pub-in* $\Rightarrow$ *witness* $\Rightarrow$ (*rand* $\times$ *'grp msg*) *spmf*
 where *init* *h w* = do {
 r $\leftarrow$ sample-uniform (order *G*);
 return-spmf (*r*, $\mathbf{g} [\wedge] r$)}

lemma *lossless-init*: *lossless-spmf* (*init* *h w*)
 by(*simp add: init-def*)

definition *response* *r w c* = return-spmf $((w * c + r) \bmod (\text{order } G))$

lemma *lossless-response*: *lossless-spmf* (*response* *r w c*)
 by(*simp add: response-def*)

definition *G* :: (*'grp pub-in* $\times$ *witness*) *spmf*
 where *G* = do {
 w $\leftarrow$ sample-uniform (order *G*);
 return-spmf ($\mathbf{g} [\wedge] w, w$)}

lemma *lossless-G*: *lossless-spmf* *G*
 by(*simp add: G-def*)

definition *challenge-space* = $\{.. < \text{order } G\}$

definition *check* :: *'grp pub-in* $\Rightarrow$ *'grp msg* $\Rightarrow$ *challenge* $\Rightarrow$ *response* $\Rightarrow$ bool
 where *check* *h a e z* = $(a \otimes (h [\wedge] e) = \mathbf{g} [\wedge] z \wedge a \in \text{carrier } G)$

definition *S2* :: *'grp* $\Rightarrow$ *challenge* $\Rightarrow$ (*'grp msg*, *response*) *sim-out* *spmf*
 where *S2* *h e* = do {
 c $\leftarrow$ sample-uniform (order *G*);
 let *a* = $\mathbf{g} [\wedge] c \otimes (\text{inv } (h [\wedge] e))$;
 return-spmf (*a*, *c*)}

definition *ss-adversary* :: *'grp* $\Rightarrow$ (*'grp msg*, *challenge*, *response*) *conv-tuple* $\Rightarrow$
 (*'grp msg*, *challenge*, *response*) *conv-tuple* $\Rightarrow$ nat *spmf*
 where *ss-adversary* *x c1 c2* = do {
 let (*a*, *e*, *z*) = *c1*;

```

    let (a', e', z') = c2;
    return-spmf (if (e > e') then
      (nat ((int z - int z') * inverse ((e - e') (order G) mod order G))
    else
      (nat ((int z' - int z) * inverse ((e' - e) (order G) mod order
G))))}

```

definition *valid-pub* = *carrier G*

We now use the Schnorr Σ -protocol use Schnorr to construct a commitment scheme.

```

type-synonym 'grp' ck = 'grp'
type-synonym 'grp' vk = 'grp'  $\times$  nat
type-synonym plain = nat
type-synonym 'grp' commit = 'grp'
type-synonym opening = nat

```

The adversary we use in the discrete log game to reduce the binding property to the discrete log assumption.

```

definition dis-log-A :: ('grp ck, plain, 'grp commit, opening) bind-adversary  $\Rightarrow$ 
'grp ck  $\Rightarrow$  nat spmf
  where dis-log-A A h = do {
    (c, e, z, e', z')  $\leftarrow$  A h;
    - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (e > e'  $\wedge$   $\neg$  [e = e'] (mod order G)  $\wedge$  (gcd (e - e') (order
G) = 1)  $\wedge$  c  $\in$  carrier G);
    - :: unit  $\leftarrow$  assert-spmf (((c  $\otimes$  h [ ] e) = g [ ] z)  $\wedge$  (c  $\otimes$  h [ ] e') = g [ ] z');
    return-spmf (nat ((int z - int z') * inverse ((e - e') (order G) mod order G)))}

```

```

sublocale discrete-log: dis-log G
  unfolding dis-log-def by simp

```

end

```

locale schnorr-sigma-protocol = schnorr-base + cyclic-group G
begin

```

```

sublocale Schnorr-Σ: Σ-protocols-base init response check R-DL S2 ss-adversary
challenge-space valid-pub
  apply unfold-locale
  by(simp add: R-DL-def valid-pub-def; blast)

```

The Schnorr Σ -protocol is complete.

lemma *completeness*: *Schnorr-Σ.completeness*

proof –

```

  have g [ ] y  $\otimes$  (g [ ] w') [ ] e = g [ ] (y + w' * e) for y e w' :: nat
  using nat-pow-pow nat-pow-mult by simp
  then show ?thesis
  unfolding Schnorr-Σ.completeness-game-def Schnorr-Σ.completeness-def

```

by(*auto simp add: init-def response-def check-def pow-generator-mod R-DL-def*
add.commute bind-spmf-const)

qed

The next two lemmas help us rewrite terms in the proof of honest verifier zero knowledge.

lemma *zr-rewrite:*

assumes $z: z = (x*c + r) \text{ mod } (\text{order } \mathcal{G})$

and $r: r < \text{order } \mathcal{G}$

shows $(z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * x*c - x*c) \text{ mod } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) = r$

proof(*cases x = 0*)

case *True*

then show *?thesis* **using** *assms* **by** *simp*

next

case *x-neq-0: False*

then show *?thesis*

proof(*cases c = 0*)

case *True*

then show *?thesis*

by (*simp add: assms*)

next

case *False*

have *cong*: $[z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * x*c = x*c + r] \text{ (mod } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$

by (*simp add: cong-def mult.assoc z*)

hence $[z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * x*c - x*c = r] \text{ (mod } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$

proof–

have $z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * x*c > x*c$

by (*metis One-nat-def mult-less-cancel2 n-less-m-mult-n neq0-conv prime-gt-1-nat*
prime-order trans-less-add2 x-neq-0 False)

then show *?thesis*

by (*metis cong add-diff-inverse-nat cong-add-lcancel-nat less-imp-le linorder-not-le*)

qed

then show *?thesis*

by(*simp add: cong-def r*)

qed

qed

lemma *h-sub-rewrite:*

assumes $h = \mathbf{g} [\text{ }] x$

and $z: z < \text{order } \mathcal{G}$

shows $\mathbf{g} [\text{ }] ((z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * x*c - x*c)) = \mathbf{g} [\text{ }] z \otimes \text{inv } (h [\text{ }] c)$

(*is ?lhs = ?rhs*)

proof(*cases x = 0*)

case *True*

then show *?thesis* **using** *assms* **by** *simp*

next

case *x-neq-0: False*

then show *?thesis*

```

proof-
  have (z + order  $\mathcal{G}$  * x * c - x * c) = (z + (order  $\mathcal{G}$  * x * c - x * c))
    using z by (simp add: less-imp-le-nat mult-le-mono)
  then have lhs: ?lhs = g [⌈] z ⊗ g [⌈] ((order  $\mathcal{G}$ )*x*c - x*c)
    by (simp add: nat-pow-mult)
  have g [⌈] ((order  $\mathcal{G}$ )*x*c - x*c) = inv (h [⌈] c)
  proof (cases c = 0)
    case True
    then show ?thesis by simp
  next
    case False
    hence bound: ((order  $\mathcal{G}$ )*x*c - x*c) > 0
      using assms x-neg-0 prime-gt-1-nat prime-order by auto
    then have g [⌈] ((order  $\mathcal{G}$ )*x*c - x*c) = g [⌈] int ((order  $\mathcal{G}$ )*x*c - x*c)
      by (metis int-pow-int)
    also have ... = g [⌈] int ((order  $\mathcal{G}$ )*x*c) ⊗ inv (g [⌈] (x*c))
      by (metis bound generator-closed int-ops(6) int-pow-int of-nat-eq-0-iff
of-nat-less-0-iff of-nat-less-iff int-pow-diff)
    also have ... = g [⌈] ((order  $\mathcal{G}$ )*x*c) ⊗ inv (g [⌈] (x*c))
      by (metis int-pow-int)
    also have ... = g [⌈] ((order  $\mathcal{G}$ )*x*c) ⊗ inv ((g [⌈] x) [⌈] c)
      by (simp add: nat-pow-pow)
    also have ... = g [⌈] ((order  $\mathcal{G}$ )*x*c) ⊗ inv (h [⌈] c)
      using assms by simp
    also have ... = 1 ⊗ inv (h [⌈] c)
      using generator-pow-order
    by (metis generator-closed mult-is-0 nat-pow-0 nat-pow-pow)
    ultimately show ?thesis
      by (simp add: assms(1))
  qed
  then show ?thesis using lhs by simp
qed
qed

lemma hvzk-R-rewrite-grp:
  fixes x c r :: nat
  assumes r < order  $\mathcal{G}$ 
  shows g [⌈] (((x * c + order  $\mathcal{G}$  - r) mod order  $\mathcal{G}$  + order  $\mathcal{G}$  * x * c - x * c)
mod order  $\mathcal{G}$ ) = inv g [⌈] r
    (is ?lhs = ?rhs)
proof-
  have [(x * c + order  $\mathcal{G}$  - r) mod order  $\mathcal{G}$  + order  $\mathcal{G}$  * x * c - x * c = order  $\mathcal{G}$ 
- r] (mod order  $\mathcal{G}$ )
  proof-
    have [(x * c + order  $\mathcal{G}$  - r) mod order  $\mathcal{G}$  + order  $\mathcal{G}$  * x * c - x * c
      = x * c + order  $\mathcal{G}$  - r + order  $\mathcal{G}$  * x * c - x * c] (mod order  $\mathcal{G}$ )
    by (smt cong-def One-nat-def add-diff-inverse-nat cong-diff-nat less-imp-le-nat
linorder-not-less mod-add-left-eq mult.assoc n-less-m-mult-n prime-gt-1-nat prime-order
trans-less-add2 zero-less-diff)

```

```

hence  $[(x * c + \text{order } \mathcal{G} - r) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G} + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * x * c - x * c$ 
       $= \text{order } \mathcal{G} - r + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * x * c] \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}$ 
using assms by auto
thus ?thesis
by (simp add: cong-def mult.assoc)
qed
hence  $\mathbf{g} \ [ \wedge ] ((x * c + \text{order } \mathcal{G} - r) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G} + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * x * c - x * c) =$ 
 $\mathbf{g} \ [ \wedge ] (\text{order } \mathcal{G} - r)$ 
using finite-carrier pow-generator-eq-iff-cong by blast
thus ?thesis using neg-power-inverse
by (simp add: assms inverse-pow-pow pow-generator-mod)
qed

```

lemma *hv-zk*:

```

assumes  $(h, x) \in R\text{-DL}$ 
shows  $\text{Schnorr-}\Sigma.R \ h \ x \ c = \text{Schnorr-}\Sigma.S \ h \ c$ 
including monad-normalisation
proof -
have  $\text{Schnorr-}\Sigma.R \ h \ x \ c = \text{do } \{$ 
   $r \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$ 
   $\text{let } z = (x * c + r) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$ 
   $\text{let } a = \mathbf{g} \ [ \wedge ] ((z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * x * c - x * c) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G}));$ 
   $\text{return-spmf } (a, c, z)\}$ 
apply (simp add: Let-def Schnorr-}\Sigma.R-def init-def response-def)
using assms zr-rewrite R-DL-def
by (simp cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
also have  $\dots = \text{do } \{$ 
   $z \leftarrow \text{map-spmf } (\lambda r. (x * c + r) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) (\text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}));$ 
   $\text{let } a = \mathbf{g} \ [ \wedge ] ((z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * x * c - x * c) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G}));$ 
   $\text{return-spmf } (a, c, z)\}$ 
by (simp add: bind-map-spmf o-def Let-def)
also have  $\dots = \text{do } \{$ 
   $z \leftarrow (\text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}));$ 
   $\text{let } a = \mathbf{g} \ [ \wedge ] ((z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * x * c - x * c));$ 
   $\text{return-spmf } (a, c, z)\}$ 
by (simp add: samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad pow-generator-mod)
also have  $\dots = \text{do } \{$ 
   $z \leftarrow (\text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}));$ 
   $\text{let } a = \mathbf{g} \ [ \wedge ] z \otimes \text{inv } (h \ [ \wedge ] c);$ 
   $\text{return-spmf } (a, c, z)\}$ 
using h-sub-rewrite assms R-DL-def
by (simp cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
ultimately show ?thesis
by (simp add: Schnorr-}\Sigma.S-def S2-def map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf)
qed

```

We can now prove that honest verifier zero knowledge holds for the Schnorr Σ -protocol.

lemma *honest-verifier-ZK*:

shows *Schnorr- Σ .HVZK*
unfolding *Schnorr- Σ .HVZK-def*
by(*auto simp add: hv-zk R-DL-def S2-def check-def valid-pub-def challenge-space-def cyclic-group-assoc*)

It is left to prove the special soundness property. First we prove a lemma we use to rewrite a term in the special soundness proof and then prove the property itself.

lemma *ss-rewrite:*

assumes $e' < e$
and $e < \text{order } \mathcal{G}$
and $a\text{-mem}: a \in \text{carrier } \mathcal{G}$
and $h\text{-mem}: h \in \text{carrier } \mathcal{G}$
and $a: a \otimes h [\cdot] e = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] z$
and $a': a \otimes h [\cdot] e' = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] z'$
shows $h = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] ((\text{int } z - \text{int } z') * \text{inverse } ((e - e') (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) \bmod \text{int } (\text{order } \mathcal{G})))$
proof –
have $\text{gcd: gcd } (\text{int } e - \text{int } e') \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) = 1$
using *prime-field*
by (*metis Primes.prime-nat-def assms(1) assms(2) coprime-imp-gcd-eq-1 diff-is-0-eq less-imp-diff-less mod-less nat-minus-as-int not-less schnorr-base.prime-order schnorr-base-axioms*)
have $a = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] z \otimes \text{inv } (h [\cdot] e)$
using $a\text{-mem}$
by (*simp add: h-mem group.inv-solve-right*)
moreover have $a = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] z' \otimes \text{inv } (h [\cdot] e')$
using $a'\text{-mem}$
by (*simp add: h-mem group.inv-solve-right*)
ultimately have $\mathbf{g} [\cdot] z \otimes h [\cdot] e' = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] z' \otimes h [\cdot] e$
using $h\text{-mem}$
by (*metis (no-types, lifting) a a' h-mem a-mem cyclic-group-assoc cyclic-group-commute nat-pow-closed*)
moreover obtain $t :: \text{nat}$ **where** $t: h = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] t$
using $h\text{-mem generatorE}$ **by** *blast*
ultimately have $\mathbf{g} [\cdot] (z + t * e') = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] (z' + t * e)$
by (*simp add: monoid.nat-pow-mult nat-pow-pow*)
hence $[z + t * e' = z' + t * e] (\bmod \text{ order } \mathcal{G})$
using *group-eq-pow-eq-mod order-gt-0* **by** *blast*
hence $[\text{int } z + \text{int } t * \text{int } e' = \text{int } z' + \text{int } t * \text{int } e] (\bmod \text{ order } \mathcal{G})$
using *cong-int-iff* **by** *force*
hence $[\text{int } z - \text{int } z' = \text{int } t * \text{int } e - \text{int } t * \text{int } e'] (\bmod \text{ order } \mathcal{G})$
by (*smt cong-iff-lin*)
hence $[\text{int } z - \text{int } z' = \text{int } t * (\text{int } e - \text{int } e')] (\bmod \text{ order } \mathcal{G})$
by (*simp add: $\langle [\text{int } z - \text{int } z' = \text{int } t * \text{int } e - \text{int } t * \text{int } e'] (\bmod \text{int } (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) \rangle$ right-diff-distrib*)
hence $[\text{int } z - \text{int } z' = \text{int } t * (\text{int } e - \text{int } e')] (\bmod \text{ order } \mathcal{G})$
by (*meson cong-diff cong-mod-left cong-mult cong-refl cong-trans*)
hence $*: [\text{int } z - \text{int } z' = \text{int } t * (\text{int } e - \text{int } e')] (\bmod \text{ order } \mathcal{G})$

```

using assms
by (simp add: int-ops(9) of-nat-diff)
hence  $[int\ z - int\ z' = int\ t * nat\ (int\ e - int\ e')] \text{ (mod } order\ \mathcal{G})$ 
using assms
by auto
hence **:  $[(int\ z - int\ z') * fst\ (bezw\ ((nat\ (int\ e - int\ e'))\ (order\ \mathcal{G})))$ 
 $= int\ t * (nat\ (int\ e - int\ e'))$ 
 $* fst\ (bezw\ ((nat\ (int\ e - int\ e'))\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))) \text{ (mod } order\ \mathcal{G})]$ 
by (smt  $\langle [int\ z - int\ z' = int\ t * (int\ e - int\ e')] \text{ (mod } int\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) \rangle$  assms(1)
assms(2)
cong-scalar-right int-nat-eq less-imp-of-nat-less mod-less more-arith-simps(11)
nat-less-iff of-nat-0-le-iff)
hence  $[(int\ z - int\ z') * fst\ (bezw\ ((nat\ (int\ e - int\ e'))\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))) = int\ t * 1]$ 
 $\text{ (mod } order\ \mathcal{G})$ 
by (metis (no-types, opaque-lifting) gcd inverse assms(2) cong-scalar-left cong-trans
less-imp-diff-less mod-less mult.comm-neutral nat-minus-as-int)
hence  $[(int\ z - int\ z') * fst\ (bezw\ ((nat\ (int\ e - int\ e'))\ (order\ \mathcal{G})))$ 
 $= t] \text{ (mod } order\ \mathcal{G})$  by simp
hence  $[((int\ z - int\ z') * fst\ (bezw\ ((nat\ (int\ e - int\ e'))\ (order\ \mathcal{G})))) \text{ mod } order\ \mathcal{G}$ 
 $= t] \text{ (mod } order\ \mathcal{G})$ 
using cong-mod-left by blast
hence **:  $[nat\ (((int\ z - int\ z') * fst\ (bezw\ ((nat\ (int\ e - int\ e'))\ (order\ \mathcal{G})))) \text{ mod } order\ \mathcal{G})$ 
 $= t] \text{ (mod } order\ \mathcal{G})$ 
by (metis cong-def mod-mod-trivial nat-int of-nat-mod)
hence  $\mathbf{g}\ [\ulcorner\ (nat\ (((int\ z - int\ z') * fst\ (bezw\ ((nat\ (int\ e - int\ e'))\ (order\ \mathcal{G})))) \text{ mod } order\ \mathcal{G})) = \mathbf{g}\ [\ulcorner\ t$ 
 $\text{ (mod } order\ \mathcal{G})) = \mathbf{g}\ [\ulcorner\ t$ 
using cyclic-group.pow-generator-eq-iff-cong cyclic-group-axioms order-gt-0 order-gt-0-iff-finite by blast
thus ?thesis using t
by (simp add: nat-minus-as-int)
qed

```

The special soundness property for the Schnorr Σ -protocol.

lemma *special-soundness:*

shows *Schnorr- Σ .special-soundness*

unfolding *Schnorr- Σ .special-soundness-def*

by(*auto simp add: valid-pub-def ss-rewrite challenge-space-def split-def ss-adversary-def*
check-def R-DL-def Let-def)

We are now able to prove that the Schnorr Σ -protocol is a Σ -protocol, the proof comes from the properties of completeness, HVZK and special soundness we have previously proven.

theorem *sigma-protocol:*

shows *Schnorr- Σ . Σ -protocol*

by(*simp add: Schnorr- Σ . Σ -protocol-def completeness honest-verifier-ZK special-soundness*)

Having proven the Σ -protocol property is satisfied we can show the com-

mitment scheme we construct from the Schnorr Σ -protocol has the desired properties. This result comes with very little proof effort as we can instantiate our general proof.

```

sublocale Schnorr- $\Sigma$ -commit:  $\Sigma$ -protocols-to-commitments init response check R-DL
S2 ss-adversary challenge-space valid-pub G
unfolding  $\Sigma$ -protocols-to-commitments-def  $\Sigma$ -protocols-to-commitments-axioms-def
apply(auto simp add:  $\Sigma$ -protocols-base-def)
apply(simp add: R-DL-def valid-pub-def)
apply(auto simp add: sigma-protocol lossless-G lossless-init lossless-response)
by(simp add: R-DL-def G-def)

```

```

lemma Schnorr- $\Sigma$ -commit.abstract-com.correct
by(fact Schnorr- $\Sigma$ -commit.commit-correct)

```

```

lemma Schnorr- $\Sigma$ -commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa A
by(fact Schnorr- $\Sigma$ -commit.perfect-hiding)

```

```

lemma rel-adv-eq-dis-log-adv:
Schnorr- $\Sigma$ -commit.rel-advantage A = discrete-log.advantage A
proof -
have Schnorr- $\Sigma$ -commit.rel-game A = discrete-log.dis-log A
unfolding Schnorr- $\Sigma$ -commit.rel-game-def discrete-log.dis-log-def
by(auto intro: try-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]
simp add: G-def R-DL-def cong-less-modulus-unique-nat group-eq-pow-eq-mod
finite-carrier pow-generator-eq-iff-cong)
thus ?thesis
using Schnorr- $\Sigma$ -commit.rel-advantage-def discrete-log.advantage-def by simp
qed

```

```

lemma bind-advantage-bound-dis-log:
Schnorr- $\Sigma$ -commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage A  $\leq$  discrete-log.advantage (Schnorr- $\Sigma$ -commit.adversary
A)
using Schnorr- $\Sigma$ -commit.bind-advantage rel-adv-eq-dis-log-adv by simp

```

end

```

locale schnorr-asymp =
fixes G :: nat  $\Rightarrow$  'grp cyclic-group
assumes schnorr:  $\bigwedge \eta$ . schnorr-sigma-protocol (G  $\eta$ )
begin

```

```

sublocale schnorr-sigma-protocol G  $\eta$  for  $\eta$ 
by(simp add: schnorr)

```

The Σ -protocol statement comes easily in the asymptotic setting.

```

theorem sigma-protocol:
shows Schnorr- $\Sigma$ . $\Sigma$ -protocol n
by(simp add: sigma-protocol)

```

We now show the statements of security for the commitment scheme in the asymptotic setting, the main difference is that we are able to show the binding advantage is negligible in the security parameter.

lemma *asympt-correct*: *Schnorr- Σ -commit.abstract-com.correct* *n*
using *Schnorr- Σ -commit.commit-correct* **by** *simp*

lemma *asympt-perfect-hiding*: *Schnorr- Σ -commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa* *n* (*A* *n*)
using *Schnorr- Σ -commit.perfect-hiding* **by** *blast*

lemma *asympt-computational-binding*:
assumes *negligible* (λ *n*. *discrete-log.advantage* *n* (*Schnorr- Σ -commit.adversary* *n* (*A* *n*)))
shows *negligible* (λ *n*. *Schnorr- Σ -commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage* *n* (*A* *n*))
using *Schnorr- Σ -commit.bind-advantage* *assms* *Schnorr- Σ -commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage-def* *negligible-le* *bind-advantage-bound-dis-log* **by** *auto*
end
end

2.4 Chaum-Pedersen Σ -protocol

The Chaum-Pedersen Σ -protocol [6] considers a relation of equality of discrete logs.

theory *Chaum-Pedersen-Sigma-Commit* **imports**
Commitment-Schemes
Sigma-Protocols
Cyclic-Group-Ext
Discrete-Log
Number-Theory-Aux
Uniform-Sampling
begin

locale *chaum-ped- Σ -base* =
fixes *G* :: '*grp cyclic-group* (**structure**)
and *x* :: *nat*
assumes *prime-order*: *prime* (*order* *G*)
begin

definition *g'* = *g* [$\wedge$] *x*

lemma *or-gt-1*: *order* *G* > 1
using *prime-order*
using *prime-gt-1-nat* **by** *blast*

lemma *or-gt-0* [*simp*]: *order* *G* > 0
using *or-gt-1* **by** *simp*

type-synonym *witness* = *nat*
type-synonym *rand* = *nat*
type-synonym *'grp' msg* = *'grp' × 'grp'*
type-synonym *response* = *nat*
type-synonym *challenge* = *nat*
type-synonym *'grp' pub-in* = *'grp' × 'grp'*

definition *G* = *do* {
 $w \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$
 $\text{return-spmf } ((\mathbf{g} [\cdot] w, g' [\cdot] w), w)$

lemma *lossless-G*: *lossless-spmf G*
by(*simp add: G-def*)

definition *challenge-space* = $\{..< \text{order } \mathcal{G}\}$

definition *init* :: *'grp pub-in* $\Rightarrow$ *witness* $\Rightarrow$ (*rand* $\times$ *'grp msg*) *spmf*
where *init h w* = *do* {
 $\text{let } (h, h') = h;$
 $r \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$
 $\text{return-spmf } (r, \mathbf{g} [\cdot] r, g' [\cdot] r)$

lemma *lossless-init*: *lossless-spmf (init h w)*
by(*simp add: init-def*)

definition *response r w e* = $\text{return-spmf } ((w * e + r) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$

lemma *lossless-response*: *lossless-spmf (response r w e)*
by(*simp add: response-def*)

definition *check* :: *'grp pub-in* $\Rightarrow$ *'grp msg* $\Rightarrow$ *challenge* $\Rightarrow$ *response* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where *check h a e z* = $(\text{fst } a \otimes (\text{fst } h [\cdot] e) = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] z \wedge \text{snd } a \otimes (\text{snd } h [\cdot] e) = g' [\cdot] z \wedge \text{fst } a \in \text{carrier } \mathcal{G} \wedge \text{snd } a \in \text{carrier } \mathcal{G})$

definition *R* :: (*'grp pub-in* $\times$ *witness*) *set*
where *R* = $\{(h, w). (\text{fst } h = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] w \wedge \text{snd } h = g' [\cdot] w)\}$

definition *S2* :: *'grp pub-in* $\Rightarrow$ *challenge* $\Rightarrow$ (*'grp msg*, *response*) *sim-out spmf*
where *S2 H c* = *do* {
 $\text{let } (h, h') = H;$
 $z \leftarrow (\text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}));$
 $\text{let } a = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] z \otimes \text{inv } (h [\cdot] c);$
 $\text{let } a' = g' [\cdot] z \otimes \text{inv } (h' [\cdot] c);$
 $\text{return-spmf } ((a, a'), z)$

definition *ss-adversary* :: *'grp pub-in* $\Rightarrow$ (*'grp msg*, *challenge*, *response*) *conv-tuple*
 $\Rightarrow$ (*'grp msg*, *challenge*, *response*) *conv-tuple* $\Rightarrow$ *nat spmf*
where *ss-adversary x' c1 c2* = *do* {

```

    let ((a,a'), e, z) = c1;
    let ((b,b'), e', z') = c2;
    return-spmf (if (e mod order  $\mathcal{G}$  > e' mod order  $\mathcal{G}$ ) then (nat ((int z - int z') *
(fst (bezw ((e mod order  $\mathcal{G}$  - e' mod order  $\mathcal{G}$ ) mod order  $\mathcal{G}$ ) (order  $\mathcal{G}$ ))) mod order
 $\mathcal{G}$ )) else
(nat ((int z' - int z) * (fst (bezw ((e' mod order  $\mathcal{G}$  - e mod order  $\mathcal{G}$ ) mod order
 $\mathcal{G}$ ) (order  $\mathcal{G}$ ))) mod order  $\mathcal{G}$ )))}

```

definition *valid-pub* = carrier $\mathcal{G}$ $\times$ carrier $\mathcal{G}$

end

locale *chaum-ped- Σ* = *chaum-ped- Σ -base* + *cyclic-group* $\mathcal{G}$
begin

lemma *g'-in-carrier* [*simp*]: $g' \in \text{carrier } \mathcal{G}$
by (*simp add: g'-def*)

sublocale *chaum-ped-sigma*: Σ -protocols-base init response check *R S2 ss-adversary*
challenge-space valid-pub
by *unfold-locale (auto simp add: R-def valid-pub-def)*

lemma *completeness*:

shows *chaum-ped-sigma.completeness*

proof–

have $g' [\cdot] y \otimes (g' [\cdot] w') [\cdot] e = g' [\cdot] ((w' * e + y) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G})$ **for** $y \in w'$
by (*simp add: Groups.add-ac(2) pow-carrier-mod nat-pow-pow nat-pow-mult*)
moreover have $\mathbf{g} [\cdot] y \otimes (\mathbf{g} [\cdot] w') [\cdot] e = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] ((w' * e + y) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G})$
for $y \in w'$

by (*metis add.commute nat-pow-pow nat-pow-mult pow-generator-mod generator-closed mod-mult-right-eq*)

ultimately show *?thesis*

unfolding *chaum-ped-sigma.completeness-def chaum-ped-sigma.completeness-game-def*

by (*auto simp add: R-def challenge-space-def init-def check-def response-def split-def bind-spmf-const*)

qed

lemma *hvzk-xr'-rewrite*:

assumes $r: r < \text{order } \mathcal{G}$

shows $((w*c + r) \text{ mod } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ mod } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w*c - w*c) \text{ mod } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) = r$

(is ?lhs = ?rhs)

proof–

have *?lhs* = $(w*c + r + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w*c - w*c) \text{ mod } (\text{order } \mathcal{G})$

by (*metis Nat.add-diff-assoc Num.of-nat-simps(1) One-nat-def add-less-same-cancel2 less-imp-le-nat*

mod-add-left-eq mult.assoc mult-0-right n-less-m-mult-n nat-neq-iff not-add-less2 of-nat-0-le-iff prime-gt-1-nat prime-order)

thus *?thesis using r*

```

    by (metis ab-semigroup-add-class.add-ac(1) ab-semigroup-mult-class.mult-ac(1)
diff-add-inverse mod-if mod-mult-self2)
qed

lemma hvzk-h-sub-rewrite:
  assumes  $h = \mathbf{g} \, [\ulcorner] \, w$ 
  and  $z: z < \text{order } \mathcal{G}$ 
  shows  $\mathbf{g} \, [\ulcorner] \, ((z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c - w * c)) = \mathbf{g} \, [\ulcorner] \, z \otimes \text{inv } (h \, [\ulcorner] \, c)$ 
  (is ?lhs = ?rhs)
proof(cases  $w = 0$ )
  case True
  then show ?thesis using assms by simp
next
  case  $w\text{-gt-0}$ : False
  then show ?thesis
  proof-
    have  $(z + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * w * c - w * c) = (z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G} * w * c - w * c))$ 
    using  $z$  by (simp add: less-imp-le-nat mult-le-mono)
    then have lhs: ?lhs =  $\mathbf{g} \, [\ulcorner] \, z \otimes \mathbf{g} \, [\ulcorner] \, ((\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c - w * c)$ 
    by (simp add: nat-pow-mult)
    have  $\mathbf{g} \, [\ulcorner] \, ((\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c - w * c) = \text{inv } (h \, [\ulcorner] \, c)$ 
    proof(cases  $c = 0$ )
      case True
      then show ?thesis using lhs by simp
    next
      case False
      hence *:  $((\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c - w * c) > 0$  using assms  $w\text{-gt-0}$ 
      using  $\text{gr0I mult-less-cancel2 n-less-m-mult-n numeral-nat(7) prime-gt-1-nat}$ 
      prime-order zero-less-diff by presburger
      then have  $\mathbf{g} \, [\ulcorner] \, ((\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c - w * c) = \mathbf{g} \, [\ulcorner] \, \text{int } ((\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c - w * c)$ 
      by (metis int-pow-int)
      also have ... =  $\mathbf{g} \, [\ulcorner] \, \text{int } ((\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c) \otimes \text{inv } (\mathbf{g} \, [\ulcorner] \, (w * c))$ 
      using int-pow-diff[of  $\mathbf{g} \, \text{order } \mathcal{G} * w * c \, w * c$ ] * generator-closed
      int-ops(6) int-pow-neg int-pow-neg-int by presburger
      also have ... =  $\mathbf{g} \, [\ulcorner] \, ((\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c) \otimes \text{inv } (\mathbf{g} \, [\ulcorner] \, (w * c))$ 
      by (metis int-pow-int)
      also have ... =  $\mathbf{g} \, [\ulcorner] \, ((\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c) \otimes \text{inv } ((\mathbf{g} \, [\ulcorner] \, w) \, [\ulcorner] \, c)$ 
      by (simp add: nat-pow-pow)
      also have ... =  $\mathbf{g} \, [\ulcorner] \, ((\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c) \otimes \text{inv } (h \, [\ulcorner] \, c)$ 
      using assms by simp
      also have ... =  $1 \otimes \text{inv } (h \, [\ulcorner] \, c)$ 
      using generator-pow-order
      by (metis generator-closed mult-is-0 nat-pow-0 nat-pow-pow)
      ultimately show ?thesis
      by (simp add: assms(1))
    qed
  qed
  then show ?thesis using lhs by simp
qed
qed

```

```

lemma hvzk-h-sub2-rewrite:
  assumes  $h' = g' \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket w$ 
  and  $z: z < \text{order } \mathcal{G}$ 
  shows  $g' \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket ((z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c - w * c)) = g' \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket z \otimes \text{inv } (h' \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket c)$ 
  (is ?lhs = ?rhs)
proof(cases  $w = 0$ )
  case True
  then show ?thesis
    using assms by (simp add: g'-def)
next
  case w-gt-0: False
  then show ?thesis
  proof–
    have  $g' = \mathbf{g} \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket x$  using g'-def by simp
    have  $g' \text{-carrier}: g' \in \text{carrier } \mathcal{G}$  using g'-def by simp
    have  $1: g' \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket ((\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c - w * c) = \text{inv } (h' \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket c)$ 
    proof(cases  $c = 0$ )
      case True
      then show ?thesis by simp
    next
      case False
      hence  $*$ :  $((\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c - w * c) > 0$ 
      using assms mult-strict-mono w-gt-0 prime-gt-1-nat prime-order by auto
      then have  $g' \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket ((\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c - w * c) = g' \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket (\text{int } (\text{order } \mathcal{G} * w * c) - \text{int } (w * c))$ 
      by (metis int-ops(6) int-pow-int of-nat-0-less-iff order.irrefl)
      also have  $\dots = g' \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket ((\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c) \otimes \text{inv } (g' \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket (w * c))$ 
      by (metis g'-carrier int-pow-diff int-pow-int)
      also have  $\dots = g' \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket ((\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c) \otimes \text{inv } (h' \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket c)$ 
      by(simp add: nat-pow-pow assms)
      also have  $\dots = 1 \otimes \text{inv } (h' \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket c)$ 
      by (metis g'-carrier nat-pow-one nat-pow-pow pow-order-eq-1)
      ultimately show ?thesis
      by (simp add: assms(1))
    qed
    have  $(z + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * w * c - w * c) = (z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G} * w * c - w * c))$ 
    using  $z$  by (simp add: less-imp-le-nat mult-le-mono)
    then have lhs:  $?lhs = g' \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket z \otimes g' \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket ((\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w * c - w * c)$ 
    by(auto simp add: nat-pow-mult)
    then show ?thesis using  $1$  by simp
  qed
qed

lemma hv-zk2:
  assumes  $(H, w) \in R$ 
  shows chaum-ped-sigma.R H w c = chaum-ped-sigma.S H c
  including monad-normalisation
proof–

```

```

have  $H$ :  $H = (\mathbf{g} [\cdot] (w::\text{nat}), g' [\cdot] w)$ 
  using assms R-def by(simp add: prod.expand)
have  $g'$ -carrier:  $g' \in \text{carrier } \mathcal{G}$  using  $g'$ -def by simp
have chaum-ped-sigma.R  $H$   $w$   $c = \text{do}$  {
  let  $(h, h') = H$ ;
   $r \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G})$ ;
   $z = (w*c + r) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G})$ ;
   $a = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] ((z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w*c - w*c) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$ ;
   $a' = g' [\cdot] ((z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w*c - w*c) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$ ;
  return-spmf  $((a, a'), c, z)$ 
apply(simp add: chaum-ped-sigma.R-def Let-def response-def split-def init-def)
using assms hvzk-xr'-rewrite
by(simp cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
also have ... = do {
  let  $(h, h') = H$ ;
   $z \leftarrow \text{map-spmf } (\lambda r. (w*c + r) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) (\text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$ ;
   $a = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] ((z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w*c - w*c) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$ ;
   $a' = g' [\cdot] ((z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w*c - w*c) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$ ;
  return-spmf  $((a, a'), c, z)$ 
by(simp add: bind-map-spmf Let-def o-def)
also have ... = do {
  let  $(h, h') = H$ ;
   $z \leftarrow (\text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$ ;
   $a = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] ((z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w*c - w*c) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$ ;
   $a' = g' [\cdot] ((z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w*c - w*c) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$ ;
  return-spmf  $((a, a'), c, z)$ 
by(simp add: samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad)
also have ... = do {
  let  $(h, h') = H$ ;
   $z \leftarrow (\text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$ ;
   $a = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] z \otimes \text{inv } (h [\cdot] c)$ ;
   $a' = g' [\cdot] ((z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w*c - w*c) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$ ;
  return-spmf  $((a, a'), c, z)$ 
using hvzk-h-sub-rewrite assms
apply(simp add: Let-def H)
apply(intro bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?)
by (simp add: pow-generator-mod)
also have ... = do {
  let  $(h, h') = H$ ;
   $z \leftarrow (\text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$ ;
   $a = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] z \otimes \text{inv } (h [\cdot] c)$ ;
   $a' = g' [\cdot] ((z + (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) * w*c - w*c) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$ ;
  return-spmf  $((a, a'), c, z)$ 
using  $g'$ -carrier pow-carrier-mod[of g'] by simp
also have ... = do {
  let  $(h, h') = H$ ;
   $z \leftarrow (\text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$ ;
   $a = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] z \otimes \text{inv } (h [\cdot] c)$ ;
   $a' = g' [\cdot] z \otimes \text{inv } (h' [\cdot] c)$ ;

```

```

    return-spmf ((a,a'),c, z)}
    using hvzk-h-sub2-rewrite assms H
    by(simp cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
  ultimately show ?thesis
    unfolding chaum-ped-sigma.S-def chaum-ped-sigma.R-def
    by(simp add: init-def S2-def split-def Let-def  $\Sigma$ -protocols-base.S-def bind-map-spmf
    map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf)
qed

```

```

lemma HVZK:
  shows chaum-ped-sigma.HVZK
    unfolding chaum-ped-sigma.HVZK-def
    by(auto simp add: hv-zk2 R-def valid-pub-def S2-def check-def cyclic-group-assoc)

```

```

lemma ss-rewrite1:
  assumes fst h  $\in$  carrier  $\mathcal{G}$ 
    and a  $\in$  carrier  $\mathcal{G}$ 
    and e: e < order  $\mathcal{G}$ 
    and a  $\otimes$  fst h  $[\cdot]$  e = g  $[\cdot]$  z
    and e': e' < e
    and a  $\otimes$  fst h  $[\cdot]$  e' = g  $[\cdot]$  z'
  shows fst h = g  $[\cdot]$  ((int z - int z') * inverse (e - e') (order  $\mathcal{G}$ ) mod int (order  $\mathcal{G}$ ))
proof-
  have gcd: gcd (e - e') (order  $\mathcal{G}$ ) = 1
    using e e' prime-field prime-order by simp
  have a = g  $[\cdot]$  z  $\otimes$  inv (fst h  $[\cdot]$  e)
    using assms
    by (simp add: assms inv-solve-right)
  moreover have a = g  $[\cdot]$  z'  $\otimes$  inv (fst h  $[\cdot]$  e')
    using assms
    by (simp add: assms inv-solve-right)
  ultimately have g  $[\cdot]$  z  $\otimes$  fst h  $[\cdot]$  e' = g  $[\cdot]$  z'  $\otimes$  fst h  $[\cdot]$  e
    by (metis (no-types, lifting) assms cyclic-group-assoc cyclic-group-commute
    nat-pow-closed)
  moreover obtain t :: nat where t: fst h = g  $[\cdot]$  t
    using assms generatorE by blast
  ultimately have g  $[\cdot]$  (z + t * e') = g  $[\cdot]$  (z' + t * e)
    using nat-pow-pow
    by (simp add: nat-pow-mult)
  hence [z + t * e' = z' + t * e] (mod order  $\mathcal{G}$ )
    using group-eq-pow-eq-mod or-gt-0 by blast
  hence [int z + int t * int e' = int z' + int t * int e] (mod order  $\mathcal{G}$ )
    using cong-int-iff by force
  hence [int z - int z' = int t * int e - int t * int e'] (mod order  $\mathcal{G}$ )
    by (smt cong-diff-iff-cong-0)
  hence [int z - int z' = int t * (int e - int e')] (mod order  $\mathcal{G}$ )
    by (simp add: right-diff-distrib)
  hence [int z - int z' = int t * (e - e')] (mod order  $\mathcal{G}$ )

```

using *assms* **by** (*simp add: of-nat-diff*)
hence $[(int\ z - int\ z') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) = int\ t * (e - e') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))] \ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
using *cong-scalar-right* **by** *blast*
hence $[(int\ z - int\ z') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) = int\ t * ((e - e') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))) \ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by (*simp add: more-arith-simps(11)*)
hence $[(int\ z - int\ z') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) = int\ t * 1] \ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by (*metis (no-types, opaque-lifting) cong-scalar-left cong-trans inverse gcd*)
hence $[(int\ z - int\ z') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) \ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G} = t] \ (mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by *simp*
hence $[nat\ ((int\ z - int\ z') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) \ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G}) = t]$
 $(mod\ order\ \mathcal{G})$
by (*metis cong-def int-ops(9) mod-mod-trivial nat-int*)
hence $g\ [\wedge] \ (nat\ ((int\ z - int\ z') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) \ mod\ order\ \mathcal{G}))$
 $= g\ [\wedge] \ t$
using *order-gt-0 order-gt-0-iff-finite pow-generator-eq-iff-cong* **by** *blast*
thus *?thesis* **using** *t* **by** *simp*
qed

lemma *ss-rewrite2*:

assumes $fst\ h \in carrier\ \mathcal{G}$
and $snd\ h \in carrier\ \mathcal{G}$
and $a \in carrier\ \mathcal{G}$
and $b \in carrier\ \mathcal{G}$
and $e < order\ \mathcal{G}$
and $a \otimes fst\ h\ [\wedge] \ e = g\ [\wedge] \ z$
and $b \otimes snd\ h\ [\wedge] \ e = g'\ [\wedge] \ z$
and $e' < e$
and $a \otimes fst\ h\ [\wedge] \ e' = g\ [\wedge] \ z'$
and $b \otimes snd\ h\ [\wedge] \ e' = g'\ [\wedge] \ z'$
shows $snd\ h = g'\ [\wedge] \ ((int\ z - int\ z') * inverse\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G}) \ mod\ int\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))$
proof–
have $gcd: gcd\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G}) = 1$
using *prime-field assms prime-order* **by** *simp*
have $b = g'\ [\wedge] \ z \otimes inv\ (snd\ h\ [\wedge] \ e)$
by (*simp add: assms inv-solve-right*)
moreover **have** $b = g'\ [\wedge] \ z' \otimes inv\ (snd\ h\ [\wedge] \ e')$
by (*metis assms(2) assms(4) assms(10) g'-def generator-closed group.inv-solve-right' group-l-invI l-inv-ex nat-pow-closed*)
ultimately **have** $g'\ [\wedge] \ z \otimes snd\ h\ [\wedge] \ e' = g'\ [\wedge] \ z' \otimes snd\ h\ [\wedge] \ e$
by (*metis (no-types, lifting) assms cyclic-group-assoc cyclic-group-commute nat-pow-closed*)
moreover **obtain** $t :: nat$ **where** $t: snd\ h = g\ [\wedge] \ t$
using *assms(2) generatorE* **by** *blast*
ultimately **have** $g\ [\wedge] \ (x * z + t * e') = g\ [\wedge] \ (x * z' + t * e)$

```

    using g'-def nat-pow-pow
    by (simp add: nat-pow-mult)
  hence  $[x * z + t * e' = x * z' + t * e] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$ 
    using group-eq-pow-eq-mod order-gt-0 by blast
  hence  $[int\ x * int\ z + int\ t * int\ e' = int\ x * int\ z' + int\ t * int\ e] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$ 
    by (metis Groups.add-ac(2) Groups.mult-ac(2) cong-int-iff int-ops(7) int-plus)
  hence  $[int\ x * int\ z - int\ x * int\ z' = int\ t * int\ e - int\ t * int\ e'] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$ 
    by (smt cong-diff-iff-cong-0)
  hence  $[int\ x * (int\ z - int\ z') = int\ t * (int\ e - int\ e')] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$ 
    by (simp add: int-distrib(4))
  hence  $[int\ x * (int\ z - int\ z') = int\ t * (e - e')] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$ 
    using assms by (simp add: of-nat-diff)
  hence  $[(int\ x * (int\ z - int\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) = int\ t * (e - e') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$ 
    using cong-scalar-right by blast
  hence  $[(int\ x * (int\ z - int\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) = int\ t * ((e - e') * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})))] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$ 
    by (simp add: more-arith-simps(11))
  hence *:  $[(int\ x * (int\ z - int\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G})) = int\ t * 1] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$ 
    by (metis (no-types, opaque-lifting) cong-scalar-left cong-trans gcd inverse)
  hence  $[nat\ ((int\ x * (int\ z - int\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) = t] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$ 
    by (metis cong-def cong-mod-right more-arith-simps(6) nat-int zmod-int)
  hence  $g\ [\ ]\ (nat\ ((int\ x * (int\ z - int\ z')) * fst\ (bezw\ (e - e')\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) = g\ [\ ]\ t$ 
    using order-gt-0 order-gt-0-iff-finite pow-generator-eq-iff-cong by blast
  thus ?thesis using t
    by (metis (mono-tags, opaque-lifting) * cong-def g'-def generator-closed int-pow-int int-pow-pow mod-mult-right-eq more-arith-simps(11) more-arith-simps(6) pow-generator-mod-int)
qed

```

lemma *ss-rewrite-snd-h*:

```

  assumes e-e'-mod:  $e' \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} < e \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}$ 
    and h-mem:  $snd\ h \in carrier\ \mathcal{G}$ 
    and a-mem:  $snd\ a \in carrier\ \mathcal{G}$ 
    and a1:  $snd\ a \otimes snd\ h\ [\ ]\ e = g'\ [\ ]\ z$ 
    and a2:  $snd\ a \otimes snd\ h\ [\ ]\ e' = g'\ [\ ]\ z'$ 
  shows  $snd\ h = g'\ [\ ]\ ((int\ z - int\ z') * fst\ (bezw\ ((e \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} - e' \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}))) \text{ mod int } (order\ \mathcal{G})$ 
  proof -
    have gcd:  $gcd\ ((e \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} - e' \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G})\ (order\ \mathcal{G}) = 1$ 
      using prime-field
    by (simp add: assms less-imp-diff-less linorder-not-le prime-order)
  have  $snd\ a = g'\ [\ ]\ z \otimes inv\ (snd\ h\ [\ ]\ e)$ 
    using a1
  by (metis (no-types, lifting) Group.group.axioms(1) h-mem a-mem group.inv-closed)

```

group-l-invI l-inv-ex monoid.m-assoc nat-pow-closed r-inv r-one
moreover have $\text{snd } a = g' [\wedge] z' \otimes \text{inv } (\text{snd } h [\wedge] e')$
by (*metis a2 h-mem a-mem g'-def generator-closed group.inv-solve-right' group-l-invI l-inv-ex nat-pow-closed*)
ultimately have $g' [\wedge] z \otimes \text{snd } h [\wedge] e' = g' [\wedge] z' \otimes \text{snd } h [\wedge] e$
by (*metis (no-types, lifting) a2 h-mem a-mem a1 cyclic-group-assoc cyclic-group-commute nat-pow-closed*)
moreover obtain $t :: \text{nat}$ **where** $t: \text{snd } h = \mathbf{g} [\wedge] t$
using *assms(2) generatorE* **by** *blast*
ultimately have $\mathbf{g} [\wedge] (x * z + t * e') = \mathbf{g} [\wedge] (x * z' + t * e)$
using *g'-def nat-pow-pow*
by (*simp add: nat-pow-mult*)
hence $[x * z + t * e' = x * z' + t * e] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$
using *group-eq-pow-eq-mod order-gt-0* **by** *blast*
hence $[\text{int } x * \text{int } z + \text{int } t * \text{int } e' = \text{int } x * \text{int } z' + \text{int } t * \text{int } e] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$
by (*metis Groups.add-ac(2) Groups.mult-ac(2) cong-int-iff int-ops(7) int-plus*)
hence $[\text{int } x * \text{int } z - \text{int } x * \text{int } z' = \text{int } t * \text{int } e - \text{int } t * \text{int } e'] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$
by (*smt cong-diff-iff-cong-0*)
hence $[\text{int } x * (\text{int } z - \text{int } z') = \text{int } t * (\text{int } e - \text{int } e')] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$
by (*simp add: int-distrib(4)*)
hence $[\text{int } x * (\text{int } z - \text{int } z') = \text{int } t * (\text{int } e \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} - \text{int } e' \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$
by (*metis (no-types, lifting) cong-def mod-diff-eq mod-mod-trivial mod-mult-right-eq*)
hence $*: [\text{int } x * (\text{int } z - \text{int } z') = \text{int } t * (e \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} - e' \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$
by (*simp add: assms(1) int-ops(9) less-imp-le-nat*)
hence $[\text{int } x * (\text{int } z - \text{int } z') * \text{fst } (\text{bezw } ((e \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} - e' \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G})$
 $\quad = \text{int } t * ((e \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} - e' \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G})$
 $\quad * \text{fst } (\text{bezw } ((e \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} - e' \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ (order } \mathcal{G})))] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$
by (*smt (verit, best) int-ops(9) mod-mult-left-eq mod-mult-right-eq more-arith-simps(11) unique-euclidean-semiring-class.cong-def*)
hence $[\text{int } x * (\text{int } z - \text{int } z') * \text{fst } (\text{bezw } ((e \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} - e' \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ (order } \mathcal{G}))$
 $\quad = \text{int } t * 1] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$
by (*meson Number-Theory-Aux.inverse * gcd cong-scalar-left cong-trans*)
hence $\mathbf{g} [\wedge] (\text{int } x * (\text{int } z - \text{int } z') * \text{fst } (\text{bezw } ((e \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} - e' \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ (order } \mathcal{G}))) = \mathbf{g} [\wedge] t$
by (*metis cong-def int-pow-int more-arith-simps(6) pow-generator-mod-int*)
thus *?thesis* **using** *t*
by (*metis (mono-tags, opaque-lifting) g'-def generator-closed int-pow-int int-pow-pow mod-mult-right-eq more-arith-simps(11) pow-generator-mod-int*)
qed

lemma *special-soundness:*
shows *chaum-ped-sigma.special-soundness*

```

unfolding chaum-ped-sigma.special-soundness-def
apply(auto simp add: challenge-space-def check-def ss-adversary-def R-def valid-pub-def)
using ss-rewrite2 ss-rewrite1 by auto

theorem  $\Sigma$ -protocol: chaum-ped-sigma. $\Sigma$ -protocol
by(simp add: chaum-ped-sigma. $\Sigma$ -protocol-def completeness HVZK special-soundness)

sublocale chaum-ped- $\Sigma$ -commit:  $\Sigma$ -protocols-to-commitments init response check
R S2 ss-adversary challenge-space valid-pub G
apply unfold-locales
apply(auto simp add:  $\Sigma$ -protocol lossless-init lossless-response lossless-G)
by(simp add: R-def G-def)

sublocale dis-log: dis-log  $\mathcal{G}$ 
unfolding dis-log-def by simp

sublocale dis-log-alt: dis-log-alt  $\mathcal{G}$  x
unfolding dis-log-alt-def by simp

lemma reduction-to-dis-log:
shows chaum-ped- $\Sigma$ -commit.rel-advantage  $\mathcal{A} = \text{dis-log.} \text{advantage } (\text{dis-log-alt.adversary3 } \mathcal{A})$ 
proof –
have chaum-ped- $\Sigma$ -commit.rel-game  $\mathcal{A} = \text{TRY do } \{$ 
   $w \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$ 
   $\text{let } (h, w) = ((\mathbf{g} [\cdot] w, g' [\cdot] w), w);$ 
   $w' \leftarrow \mathcal{A} h;$ 
   $\text{return-spmf } ((\text{fst } h = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] w' \wedge \text{snd } h = g' [\cdot] w')) \}$  ELSE  $\text{return-spmf False}$ 
unfolding chaum-ped- $\Sigma$ -commit.rel-game-def
by(simp add: G-def R-def)
also have ... =  $\text{TRY do } \{$ 
   $w \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$ 
   $\text{let } (h, w) = ((\mathbf{g} [\cdot] w, g' [\cdot] w), w);$ 
   $w' \leftarrow \mathcal{A} h;$ 
   $\text{return-spmf } ([w = w'] \pmod{(\text{order } \mathcal{G})} \wedge [x * w = x * w'] \pmod{\text{order } \mathcal{G}}) \}$  ELSE
 $\text{return-spmf False}$ 
apply(intro try-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; simp add: dis-log-alt.dis-log3-def
dis-log-alt.g'-def g'-def)
by (simp add: finite-carrier nat-pow-pow pow-generator-eq-iff-cong)
also have ... =  $\text{dis-log-alt.dis-log3 } \mathcal{A}$ 
apply(auto simp add: dis-log-alt.dis-log3-def dis-log-alt.g'-def g'-def)
by(intro try-spmf-cong bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?; auto simp add:
cong-scalar-left)
ultimately have chaum-ped- $\Sigma$ -commit.rel-advantage  $\mathcal{A} = \text{dis-log-alt.advantage3 } \mathcal{A}$ 
by(simp add: chaum-ped- $\Sigma$ -commit.rel-advantage-def dis-log-alt.advantage3-def)
thus ?thesis
by (simp add: dis-log-alt-reductions.dis-log-adv3 cyclic-group-axioms dis-log-alt.dis-log-alt-axioms
dis-log-alt-reductions.intro)

```

qed

lemma *commitment-correct*: *chaum-ped- Σ -commit.abstract-com.correct*
by(*simp add: chaum-ped- Σ -commit.commit-correct*)

lemma *chaum-ped- Σ -commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa $\mathcal{A}$*
using *chaum-ped- Σ -commit.perfect-hiding* **by** *blast*

lemma *binding*: *chaum-ped- Σ -commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage $\mathcal{A} \leq \text{dis-log.}advantage$*
(dis-log-alt.adversary3 ((chaum-ped- Σ -commit.adversary $\mathcal{A}$)))
using *chaum-ped- Σ -commit.bind-advantage reduction-to-dis-log* **by** *simp*

end

locale *chaum-ped-async* =
fixes $\mathcal{G} :: \text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{'grp cyclic-group}$
and $x :: \text{nat}$
assumes *cp- Σ* : $\bigwedge \eta. \text{chaum-ped-}\Sigma(\mathcal{G} \ \eta)$
begin

sublocale *chaum-ped- $\Sigma \ \mathcal{G} \ \eta$ for η*
by(*simp add: cp- Σ*)

The Σ -protocol statement comes easily in the asymptotic setting.

theorem *sigma-protocol*:
shows *chaum-ped-sigma. Σ -protocol n*
by(*simp add: Σ -protocol*)

We now show the statements of security for the commitment scheme in the asymptotic setting, the main difference is that we are able to show the binding advantage is negligible in the security parameter.

lemma *asyp-correct*: *chaum-ped- Σ -commit.abstract-com.correct n*
using *chaum-ped- Σ -commit.commit-correct* **by** *simp*

lemma *asyp-perfect-hiding*: *chaum-ped- Σ -commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa*
 $n \ (\mathcal{A} \ n)$
using *chaum-ped- Σ -commit.perfect-hiding* **by** *blast*

lemma *asyp-computational-binding*:
assumes *negligible* $(\lambda \ n. \text{dis-log.}advantage \ n \ (\text{dis-log-alt.adversary3} \ n \ ((\text{chaum-ped-}\Sigma\text{-commit.adversary} \ n \ (\mathcal{A} \ n))))$
shows *negligible* $(\lambda \ n. \text{chaum-ped-}\Sigma\text{-commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage} \ n \ (\mathcal{A} \ n))$
using *chaum-ped- Σ -commit.bind-advantage assms chaum-ped- Σ -commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage-def negligible-le binding* **by** *auto*

end

end

2.5 Okamoto Σ -protocol

theory *Okamoto-Sigma-Commit* **imports**

Commitment-Schemes

Sigma-Protocols

Cyclic-Group-Ext

Discrete-Log

HOL.GCD

Number-Theory-Aux

Uniform-Sampling

begin

locale *okamoto-base* =

fixes $\mathcal{G} :: 'grp$ *cyclic-group* (**structure**)

and $x :: nat$

assumes *prime-order*: *prime* (*order* $\mathcal{G}$)

begin

definition $g' = g \ [\wedge] \ x$

lemma *order-gt-1*: *order* $\mathcal{G} > 1$

using *prime-order*

using *prime-gt-1-nat* **by** *blast*

lemma *order-gt-0* [*simp*]: *order* $\mathcal{G} > 0$

using *order-gt-1* **by** *simp*

definition *response* $r \ w \ e = do \{$

let $(r1, r2) = r;$

let $(x1, x2) = w;$

let $z1 = (e * x1 + r1) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$

let $z2 = (e * x2 + r2) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$

return-spmf $((z1, z2))\}$

lemma *lossless-response*: *lossless-spmf* (*response* $r \ w \ e$)

by (*simp* *add*: *response-def* *split-def*)

type-synonym *witness* = $nat \times nat$

type-synonym *rand* = $nat \times nat$

type-synonym $'grp'$ *msg* = $'grp'$

type-synonym *response* = $(nat \times nat)$

type-synonym *challenge* = nat

type-synonym $'grp'$ *pub-in* = $'grp'$

definition *init* :: $'grp$ *pub-in* $\Rightarrow$ *witness* $\Rightarrow$ ($rand \times 'grp$ *msg*) *spmf*

where *init* $y \ w = do \{$

let $(x1, x2) = w;$

$r1 \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$

$r2 \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$

return-spmf $((r1, r2), g \ [\wedge] \ r1 \otimes g' \ [\wedge] \ r2)\}$

lemma *lossless-init*: *lossless-spmf* (*init h w*)

by(*simp add: init-def*)

definition *check* :: '*grp pub-in* $\Rightarrow$ '*grp msg* $\Rightarrow$ *challenge* $\Rightarrow$ *response* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*

where *check* *h a e z* = (**g** [$\neg$] (*fst z*) $\otimes$ *g'* [$\neg$] (*snd z*) = *a* $\otimes$ (*h* [$\neg$] *e*) $\wedge$ *a* $\in$ *carrier G*)

definition *R* :: ('*grp pub-in* $\times$ *witness*) *set*

where *R* $\equiv$ {(*h*, *w*). (*h* = **g** [$\neg$] (*fst w*) $\otimes$ *g'* [$\neg$] (*snd w*))}

definition *G* :: ('*grp pub-in* $\times$ *witness*) *spmf*

where *G* = *do* {
w1 $\leftarrow$ *sample-uniform* (*order G*);
w2 $\leftarrow$ *sample-uniform* (*order G*);
return-spmf (**g** [$\neg$] *w1* $\otimes$ *g'* [$\neg$] *w2* , (*w1*,*w2*))}

definition *challenge-space* = {..*order G*}

lemma *lossless-G*: *lossless-spmf G*

by(*simp add: G-def*)

definition *S2* :: '*grp pub-in* $\Rightarrow$ *challenge* $\Rightarrow$ ('*grp msg*, *response*) *sim-out spmf*

where *S2 h c* = *do* {
z1 $\leftarrow$ *sample-uniform* (*order G*);
z2 $\leftarrow$ *sample-uniform* (*order G*);
let a = (**g** [$\neg$] *z1* $\otimes$ *g'* [$\neg$] *z2*) $\otimes$ (*inv h* [$\neg$] *c*);
return-spmf (*a*, (*z1*,*z2*))}

definition *R2* :: '*grp pub-in* $\Rightarrow$ *witness* $\Rightarrow$ *challenge* $\Rightarrow$ ('*grp msg*, *challenge*, *response*) *conv-tuple spmf*

where *R2 h w c* = *do* {
let (*x1*,*x2*) = *w*;
r1 $\leftarrow$ *sample-uniform* (*order G*);
r2 $\leftarrow$ *sample-uniform* (*order G*);
let z1 = (*c* * *x1* + *r1*) *mod* (*order G*);
let z2 = (*c* * *x2* + *r2*) *mod* (*order G*);
return-spmf (**g** [$\neg$] *r1* $\otimes$ *g'* [$\neg$] *r2* ,*c*,(*z1*,*z2*))}

definition *ss-adversary* :: '*grp* $\Rightarrow$ ('*grp msg*, *challenge*, *response*) *conv-tuple* $\Rightarrow$ ('*grp msg*, *challenge*, *response*) *conv-tuple* $\Rightarrow$ (*nat* $\times$ *nat*) *spmf*

where *ss-adversary y c1 c2* = *do* {
let (*a*, *e*, (*z1*,*z2*)) = *c1*;
let (*a'*, *e'*, (*z1'*,*z2'*)) = *c2*;
return-spmf (*if* (*e* > *e'*) *then* (*nat* ((*int z1* - *int z1'*) * *inverse* (*e* - *e'*) (*order G*) *mod order G*)) *else*
(*nat* ((*int z1'* - *int z1*) * *inverse* (*e'* - *e*) (*order G*) *mod order G*)),
if (*e* > *e'*) *then* (*nat* ((*int z2* - *int z2'*) * *inverse* (*e* - *e'*) (*order*

$\mathcal{G}) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G})) \text{ else}$
 $(\text{nat } ((\text{int } z2' - \text{int } z2) * \text{inverse } (e' - e) (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G})))\}$

definition *valid-pub* = *carrier* $\mathcal{G}$
end

locale *okamoto* = *okamoto-base* + *cyclic-group* $\mathcal{G}$
begin

lemma *g'-in-carrier* [simp]: $g' \in \text{carrier } \mathcal{G}$
using *g'-def* **by** *auto*

sublocale $\Sigma\text{-protocols-base}$: $\Sigma\text{-protocols-base}$ *init response check R S2 ss-adversary*
challenge-space valid-pub
by *unfold-locales (auto simp add: R-def valid-pub-def)*

lemma $\Sigma\text{-protocols-base.R } h \ w \ c = R2 \ h \ w \ c$
by (*simp add: $\Sigma\text{-protocols-base.R-def R2-def$; simp add: init-def split-def response-def*)

lemma *completeness*:

shows $\Sigma\text{-protocols-base.completeness}$

proof–

have $(\mathbf{g} [\] ((e * \text{fst } w' + y) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) \otimes g' [\] ((e * \text{snd } w' + ya) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G})) = \mathbf{g} [\] y \otimes g' [\] ya \otimes (\mathbf{g} [\] \text{fst } w' \otimes g' [\] \text{snd } w') [\] e)$

for $e \ y \ ya :: \text{nat}$ **and** $w' :: \text{nat} \times \text{nat}$

proof–

have $\mathbf{g} [\] ((e * \text{fst } w' + y) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) \otimes g' [\] ((e * \text{snd } w' + ya) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) = \mathbf{g} [\] ((y + e * \text{fst } w')) \otimes g' [\] ((ya + e * \text{snd } w'))$

by (*simp add: cyclic-group.pow-carrier-mod cyclic-group-axioms g'-def add.commute pow-generator-mod*)

also have $\dots = \mathbf{g} [\] y \otimes \mathbf{g} [\] (e * \text{fst } w') \otimes g' [\] ya \otimes g' [\] (e * \text{snd } w')$

by (*simp add: g'-def m-assoc nat-pow-mult*)

also have $\dots = \mathbf{g} [\] y \otimes g' [\] ya \otimes \mathbf{g} [\] (e * \text{fst } w') \otimes g' [\] (e * \text{snd } w')$

by (*smt add.commute g'-def generator-closed m-assoc nat-pow-closed nat-pow-mult nat-pow-pow*)

also have $\dots = \mathbf{g} [\] y \otimes g' [\] ya \otimes ((\mathbf{g} [\] \text{fst } w') [\] e \otimes (g' [\] \text{snd } w') [\] e)$

by (*simp add: m-assoc mult.commute nat-pow-pow*)

also have $\dots = \mathbf{g} [\] y \otimes g' [\] ya \otimes ((\mathbf{g} [\] \text{fst } w' \otimes g' [\] \text{snd } w') [\] e)$

by (*smt power-distrib g'-def generator-closed mult.commute nat-pow-closed nat-pow-mult nat-pow-pow*)

ultimately show *?thesis* **by** *simp*

qed

thus *?thesis*

unfolding $\Sigma\text{-protocols-base.completeness-def } \Sigma\text{-protocols-base.completeness-game-def}$

by (*simp add: R-def challenge-space-def init-def check-def response-def split-def bind-spmf-const*)

qed

```

lemma hvzk-z-r:
  assumes r1: r1 < order G
  shows r1 = ((r1 + c * (x1 :: nat)) mod (order G) + order G * c * x1 - c *
x1) mod (order G)
proof(cases x1 = 0)
  case True
  then show ?thesis using r1 by simp
next
  case x1-neq-0: False
  have z1-eq: [(r1 + c * x1) mod (order G) + order G * c * x1 = r1 + c * x1]
(mod (order G))
    using gr-implies-not-zero order-gt-1
    by (simp add: Groups.mult-ac(1) cong-def)
  hence [(r1 + c * x1) mod (order G) + order G * c * x1 - c * x1 = r1] (mod
(order G))
  proof(cases c = 0)
    case True
    then show ?thesis
      using z1-eq by auto
    next
    case False
    have order G * c * x1 - c * x1 > 0 using x1-neq-0 False
      using prime-gt-1-nat prime-order by auto
    thus ?thesis
      by (smt Groups.add-ac(2) add-diff-inverse-nat cong-add-lcancel-nat diff-is-0-eq
le-simps(1) neq0-conv trans-less-add2 z1-eq zero-less-diff)
    qed
    thus ?thesis
      by (simp add: r1 cong-def)
  qed

lemma hvzk-z1-r1-tuple-rewrite:
  assumes r1: r1 < order G
  shows (g [^] r1  $\otimes$  g' [^] r2, c, (r1 + c * x1) mod order G, (r2 + c * x2) mod
order G) =
    (g [^] (((r1 + c * x1) mod order G + order G * c * x1 - c * x1) mod
order G)
       $\otimes$  g' [^] r2, c, (r1 + c * x1) mod order G, (r2 + c * x2) mod order
G)
  proof-
    have g [^] r1 = g [^] (((r1 + c * x1) mod order G + order G * c * x1 - c *
x1) mod order G)
      using assms hvzk-z-r by simp
    thus ?thesis by argo
  qed

lemma hvzk-z2-r2-tuple-rewrite:
  assumes xb < order G

```

shows $(g \text{ [}\text{]} (((x' + xa * x1) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * xa * x1 - xa * x1) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G})$
 $\otimes g' \text{ [}\text{]} xb, xa, (x' + xa * x1) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}, (xb + xa * x2) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) =$
 $(g \text{ [}\text{]} (((x' + xa * x1) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * xa * x1 - xa * x1) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G})$
 $\otimes g' \text{ [}\text{]} ((xb + xa * x2) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * xa * x2 - xa * x2) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}), xa, (x' + xa * x1) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}, (xb + xa * x2) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G})$
proof–
have $g' \text{ [}\text{]} xb = g' \text{ [}\text{]} ((xb + xa * x2) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * xa * x2 - xa * x2) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G})$
using *hvk-z-r assms by simp*
thus *?thesis by argo*
qed

lemma *hvk-sim-inverse-rewrite:*

assumes $h: h = g \text{ [}\text{]} (x1 :: nat) \otimes g' \text{ [}\text{]} (x2 :: nat)$
shows $g \text{ [}\text{]} (((z1 :: nat) + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * c * x1 - c * x1) \text{ mod } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$
 $\otimes g' \text{ [}\text{]} (((z2 :: nat) + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * c * x2 - c * x2) \text{ mod } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$
 $= (g \text{ [}\text{]} z1 \otimes g' \text{ [}\text{]} z2) \otimes (\text{inv } h \text{ [}\text{]} c)$
(is ?lhs = ?rhs)
proof–
have *in-carrier1: $(g' \text{ [}\text{]} x2) \text{ [}\text{]} c \in \text{carrier } \mathcal{G}$ by simp*
have *in-carrier2: $(g \text{ [}\text{]} x1) \text{ [}\text{]} c \in \text{carrier } \mathcal{G}$ by simp*
have *pow-distrib1: $\text{order } \mathcal{G} * c * x1 - c * x1 = (\text{order } \mathcal{G} - 1) * c * x1$*
and *pow-distrib2: $\text{order } \mathcal{G} * c * x2 - c * x2 = (\text{order } \mathcal{G} - 1) * c * x2$*
using *assms by (simp add: diff-mult-distrib)+*
have *?lhs = $g \text{ [}\text{]} (z1 + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * c * x1 - c * x1) \otimes g' \text{ [}\text{]} (z2 + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * c * x2 - c * x2)$*
by *(simp add: pow-carrier-mod)*
also have $\dots = g \text{ [}\text{]} (z1 + (\text{order } \mathcal{G} * c * x1 - c * x1)) \otimes g' \text{ [}\text{]} (z2 + (\text{order } \mathcal{G} * c * x2 - c * x2))$
using *h*
by *(smt Nat.add-diff-assoc diff-zero le-simps(1) nat-0-less-mult-iff neq0-conv pow-distrib1 pow-distrib2 prime-gt-1-nat prime-order zero-less-diff)*
also have $\dots = g \text{ [}\text{]} z1 \otimes g \text{ [}\text{]} (\text{order } \mathcal{G} * c * x1 - c * x1) \otimes g' \text{ [}\text{]} z2 \otimes g' \text{ [}\text{]} (\text{order } \mathcal{G} * c * x2 - c * x2)$
using *nat-pow-mult*
by *(simp add: m-assoc)*
also have $\dots = g \text{ [}\text{]} z1 \otimes g' \text{ [}\text{]} z2 \otimes g \text{ [}\text{]} (\text{order } \mathcal{G} * c * x1 - c * x1) \otimes g' \text{ [}\text{]} (\text{order } \mathcal{G} * c * x2 - c * x2)$
by *(smt add.commute g'-def generator-closed m-assoc nat-pow-closed nat-pow-mult nat-pow-pow)*
also have $\dots = g \text{ [}\text{]} z1 \otimes g' \text{ [}\text{]} z2 \otimes g \text{ [}\text{]} ((\text{order } \mathcal{G} - 1) * c * x1) \otimes g' \text{ [}\text{]} ((\text{order } \mathcal{G} - 1) * c * x2)$
using *pow-distrib1 pow-distrib2 by argo*
also have $\dots = g \text{ [}\text{]} z1 \otimes g' \text{ [}\text{]} z2 \otimes (g \text{ [}\text{]} (\text{order } \mathcal{G} - 1)) \text{ [}\text{]} (c * x1) \otimes (g' \text{ [}\text{]} ((\text{order } \mathcal{G} - 1))) \text{ [}\text{]} (c * x2)$
by *(simp add: more-arith-simps(11) nat-pow-pow)*

also have ... = $\mathbf{g} [\wedge] z1 \otimes g' [\wedge] z2 \otimes (\text{inv } (\mathbf{g} [\wedge] c)) [\wedge] x1 \otimes (\text{inv } (g' [\wedge] c)) [\wedge] x2$
using *assms neg-power-inverse inverse-pow-pow nat-pow-pow prime-gt-1-nat prime-order* **by** *auto*
also have ... = $\mathbf{g} [\wedge] z1 \otimes g' [\wedge] z2 \otimes (\text{inv } ((\mathbf{g} [\wedge] c) [\wedge] x1)) \otimes (\text{inv } ((g' [\wedge] c) [\wedge] x2))$
by (*simp add: inverse-pow-pow*)
also have ... = $\mathbf{g} [\wedge] z1 \otimes g' [\wedge] z2 \otimes ((\text{inv } ((\mathbf{g} [\wedge] x1) [\wedge] c)) \otimes (\text{inv } ((g' [\wedge] x2) [\wedge] c)))$
by (*simp add: mult.commute cyclic-group-assoc nat-pow-pow*)
also have ... = $\mathbf{g} [\wedge] z1 \otimes g' [\wedge] z2 \otimes \text{inv } ((\mathbf{g} [\wedge] x1) [\wedge] c \otimes (g' [\wedge] x2) [\wedge] c)$
using *inverse-split in-carrier2 in-carrier1* **by** *simp*
also have ... = $\mathbf{g} [\wedge] z1 \otimes g' [\wedge] z2 \otimes \text{inv } (h [\wedge] c)$
using *h cyclic-group-commute monoid-comm-monoidI*
by (*simp add: pow-mult-distrib*)
ultimately show *?thesis*
by (*simp add: h inverse-pow-pow*)
qed

lemma *hv-zk*:

assumes $h = \mathbf{g} [\wedge] x1 \otimes g' [\wedge] x2$
shows $\Sigma\text{-protocols-base}.R \ h \ (x1, x2) \ c = \Sigma\text{-protocols-base}.S \ h \ c$
including *monad-normalisation*

proof–

have $\Sigma\text{-protocols-base}.R \ h \ (x1, x2) \ c = \text{do } \{$
 $r1 \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$
 $r2 \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$
 $\text{let } z1 = (r1 + c * x1) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$
 $\text{let } z2 = (r2 + c * x2) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$
 $\text{return-spmf } (\mathbf{g} [\wedge] r1 \otimes g' [\wedge] r2, c, (z1, z2))\}$
by (*simp add: $\Sigma\text{-protocols-base}.R\text{-def}$ $R2\text{-def}$; simp add: add.commute init-def split-def response-def*)
also have ... = $\text{do } \{$
 $r2 \leftarrow \text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$
 $z1 \leftarrow \text{map-spmf } (\lambda r1. (r1 + c * x1) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) (\text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}));$
 $\text{let } z2 = (r2 + c * x2) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G});$
 $\text{return-spmf } (\mathbf{g} [\wedge] ((z1 + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * c * x1 - c * x1) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) \otimes g' [\wedge] r2, c, (z1, z2))\}$
by (*simp add: bind-map-spmf o-def Let-def hvzk-z1-r1-tuple-rewrite assms cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp*)
also have ... = $\text{do } \{$
 $z1 \leftarrow \text{map-spmf } (\lambda r1. (r1 + c * x1) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) (\text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}));$
 $z2 \leftarrow \text{map-spmf } (\lambda r2. (r2 + c * x2) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) (\text{sample-uniform } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}));$
 $\text{return-spmf } (\mathbf{g} [\wedge] ((z1 + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * c * x1 - c * x1) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) \otimes g' [\wedge] ((z2 + \text{order } \mathcal{G} * c * x2 - c * x2) \bmod (\text{order } \mathcal{G})), c, (z1, z2))\}$
by (*simp add: bind-map-spmf o-def Let-def hvzk-z2-r2-tuple-rewrite cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp*)

```

also have ... = do {
  z1 ← map-spmf (λ r1. (c * x1 + r1) mod (order  $\mathcal{G}$ )) (sample-uniform (order  $\mathcal{G}$ ));
  z2 ← map-spmf (λ r2. (c * x2 + r2) mod (order  $\mathcal{G}$ )) (sample-uniform (order  $\mathcal{G}$ ));
  return-spmf (g [⌈] ((z1 + order  $\mathcal{G}$  * c * x1 - c * x1) mod (order  $\mathcal{G}$ )) ⊗ g' [⌈]
    ((z2 + order  $\mathcal{G}$  * c * x2 - c * x2) mod (order  $\mathcal{G}$ )) , c, (z1, z2)))
  by(simp add: add.commute)
also have ... = do {
  z1 ← (sample-uniform (order  $\mathcal{G}$ ));
  z2 ← (sample-uniform (order  $\mathcal{G}$ ));
  return-spmf (g [⌈] ((z1 + order  $\mathcal{G}$  * c * x1 - c * x1) mod (order  $\mathcal{G}$ )) ⊗ g' [⌈]
    ((z2 + order  $\mathcal{G}$  * c * x2 - c * x2) mod (order  $\mathcal{G}$ )) , c, (z1, z2)))
  by(simp add: samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad)
also have ... = do {
  z1 ← (sample-uniform (order  $\mathcal{G}$ ));
  z2 ← (sample-uniform (order  $\mathcal{G}$ ));
  return-spmf ((g [⌈] z1 ⊗ g' [⌈] z2) ⊗ (inv h [⌈] c) , c, (z1, z2)))
  by(simp add: hvzk-sim-inverse-rewrite assms cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
ultimately show ?thesis
by(simp add: Σ-protocols-base.S-def S2-def bind-map-spmf map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf)
qed

```

lemma HVZK:

```

shows Σ-protocols-base.HVZK
unfolding Σ-protocols-base.HVZK-def
apply(auto simp add: R-def challenge-space-def hv-zk S2-def check-def valid-pub-def)
by (metis (no-types, lifting) cyclic-group-commute g'-in-carrier generator-closed
inv-closed inv-solve-left inverse-pow-pow m-closed nat-pow-closed)

```

lemma ss-rewrite:

```

assumes h ∈ carrier  $\mathcal{G}$ 
and a ∈ carrier  $\mathcal{G}$ 
and e < order  $\mathcal{G}$ 
and g [⌈] z1 ⊗ g' [⌈] z1' = a ⊗ h [⌈] e
and e' < e
and g [⌈] z2 ⊗ g' [⌈] z2' = a ⊗ h [⌈] e'
shows h = g [⌈] ((int z1 - int z2) * fst (bezw (e - e') (order  $\mathcal{G}$ )) mod int (order  $\mathcal{G}$ ))
  ⊗ g' [⌈] ((int z1' - int z2') * fst (bezw (e - e') (order  $\mathcal{G}$ )) mod int (order  $\mathcal{G}$ ))
proof -
have gcd: gcd (e - e') (order  $\mathcal{G}$ ) = 1
using prime-field assms prime-order by simp
have g [⌈] z1 ⊗ g' [⌈] z1' ⊗ inv (h [⌈] e) = a
by (simp add: inv-solve-right' assms)
moreover have g [⌈] z2 ⊗ g' [⌈] z2' ⊗ inv (h [⌈] e') = a
by (simp add: assms inv-solve-right')
ultimately have g [⌈] z2 ⊗ g' [⌈] z2' ⊗ inv (h [⌈] e') = g [⌈] z1 ⊗ g' [⌈] z1' ⊗
  inv (h [⌈] e)
using g'-def by (simp add: nat-pow-pow)

```

moreover obtain $t :: \text{nat}$ **where** $t: h = \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ t$
using *assms generatorE* **by** *blast*
ultimately have $\mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ z2 \otimes \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ (x * z2') \otimes \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ (t * e) = \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ z1 \otimes \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ (x * z1') \otimes (\mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ (t * e'))$
using *assms(2) assms(4) cyclic-group-commute m-assoc g'-def nat-pow-pow* **by** *auto*
hence $\mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ (z2 + x * z2' + t * e) = \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ (z1 + x * z1' + t * e')$
by (*simp add: nat-pow-mult*)
hence $[z2 + x * z2' + t * e = z1 + x * z1' + t * e'] \ (\text{mod } \text{order } \mathcal{G})$
using *group-eq-pow-eq-mod order-gt-0* **by** *blast*
hence $[int \ z2 + int \ x * int \ z2' + int \ t * int \ e = int \ z1 + int \ x * int \ z1' + int \ t * int \ e'] \ (\text{mod } \text{order } \mathcal{G})$
using *cong-int-iff* **by** *force*
hence $[int \ z1 + int \ x * int \ z1' - int \ z2 - int \ x * int \ z2' = int \ t * int \ e - int \ t * int \ e'] \ (\text{mod } \text{order } \mathcal{G})$
by (*smt cong-diff-iff-cong-0 cong-sym*)
hence $[int \ z1 + int \ x * int \ z1' - int \ z2 - int \ x * int \ z2' = int \ t * (e - e')] \ (\text{mod } \text{order } \mathcal{G})$
using *int-distrib(4) assms* **by** (*simp add: of-nat-diff*)
hence $[(int \ z1 + int \ x * int \ z1' - int \ z2 - int \ x * int \ z2') * fst \ (bezw \ (e - e') \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) = int \ t * (e - e') * fst \ (bezw \ (e - e') \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))] \ (\text{mod } \text{order } \mathcal{G})$
using *cong-scalar-right* **by** *blast*
hence $[(int \ z1 + int \ x * int \ z1' - int \ z2 - int \ x * int \ z2') * fst \ (bezw \ (e - e') \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) = int \ t * ((e - e') * fst \ (bezw \ (e - e') \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G})))] \ (\text{mod } \text{order } \mathcal{G})$
by (*simp add: mult.assoc*)
hence $[(int \ z1 + int \ x * int \ z1' - int \ z2 - int \ x * int \ z2') * fst \ (bezw \ (e - e') \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) = int \ t * 1] \ (\text{mod } \text{order } \mathcal{G})$
by (*metis (no-types, opaque-lifting) cong-scalar-left cong-trans inverse gcd*)
hence $[(int \ z1 - int \ z2 + int \ x * int \ z1' - int \ x * int \ z2') * fst \ (bezw \ (e - e') \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) = int \ t] \ (\text{mod } \text{order } \mathcal{G})$
by *smt*
hence $[(int \ z1 - int \ z2 + int \ x * (int \ z1' - int \ z2')) * fst \ (bezw \ (e - e') \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) = int \ t] \ (\text{mod } \text{order } \mathcal{G})$
by (*simp add: Rings.ring-distrib(4) add-diff-eq*)
hence $[nat \ ((int \ z1 - int \ z2 + int \ x * (int \ z1' - int \ z2')) * fst \ (bezw \ (e - e') \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))) \ \text{mod} \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) = int \ t] \ (\text{mod } \text{order } \mathcal{G})$
by *auto*
hence $\mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ (nat \ ((int \ z1 - int \ z2 + int \ x * (int \ z1' - int \ z2')) * fst \ (bezw \ (e - e') \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))) \ \text{mod} \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) = \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ t$
using *cong-int-iff finite-carrier pow-generator-eq-iff-cong* **by** *blast*
hence $\mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ ((int \ z1 - int \ z2 + int \ x * (int \ z1' - int \ z2')) * fst \ (bezw \ (e - e') \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))) = \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ t$
using *pow-generator-mod-int* **by** *auto*
hence $\mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ ((int \ z1 - int \ z2) * fst \ (bezw \ (e - e') \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) + int \ x * (int \ z1' - int \ z2') * fst \ (bezw \ (e - e') \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))) = \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ t$
by (*metis Rings.ring-distrib(2) t*)
hence $\mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ ((int \ z1 - int \ z2) * fst \ (bezw \ (e - e') \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))) \otimes \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ (int \ x * (int \ z1' - int \ z2') * fst \ (bezw \ (e - e') \ (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))) = \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ t$
using *int-pow-mult* **by** *auto*

thus ?thesis
 by (metis (mono-tags, opaque-lifting) g'-def generator-closed int-pow-int int-pow-pow
 mod-mult-right-eq more-arith-simps(11) pow-generator-mod-int t)
 qed

lemma

assumes h-mem: $h \in \text{carrier } \mathcal{G}$
 and a-mem: $a \in \text{carrier } \mathcal{G}$
 and a: $\mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] \text{fst } z \otimes g' [\ulcorner] \text{snd } z = a \otimes h [\ulcorner] e$
 and a': $\mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] \text{fst } z' \otimes g' [\ulcorner] \text{snd } z' = a \otimes h [\ulcorner] e'$
 and e-e'-mod: $e' \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} < e \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}$
 shows $h = \mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] ((\text{int } (\text{fst } z) - \text{int } (\text{fst } z')) * \text{fst } (\text{bezw } ((e \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} - e' \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))) \text{ mod int } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$
 $\otimes g' [\ulcorner] ((\text{int } (\text{snd } z) - \text{int } (\text{snd } z')) * \text{fst } (\text{bezw } ((e \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} - e' \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))) \text{ mod int } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$
 proof –
 have gcd: $\text{gcd } ((e \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G} - e' \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) \text{ mod order } \mathcal{G}) (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) = 1$
 using prime-field
 by (simp add: assms less-imp-diff-less linorder-not-le prime-order)
 have $\mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] \text{fst } z \otimes g' [\ulcorner] \text{snd } z \otimes \text{inv } (h [\ulcorner] e) = a$
 using a h-mem a-mem by (simp add: inv-solve-right')
 moreover have $\mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] \text{fst } z' \otimes g' [\ulcorner] \text{snd } z' \otimes \text{inv } (h [\ulcorner] e') = a$
 using a h-mem a-mem by (simp add: assms(4) inv-solve-right')
 ultimately have $\mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] \text{fst } z \otimes \mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] (x * \text{snd } z) \otimes \text{inv } (h [\ulcorner] e) = \mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] \text{fst } z' \otimes$
 $\mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] (x * \text{snd } z') \otimes \text{inv } (h [\ulcorner] e')$
 using g'-def by (simp add: nat-pow-pow)
 moreover obtain $t :: \text{nat}$ where $t: h = \mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] t$
 using h-mem generatorE by blast
 ultimately have $\mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] \text{fst } z \otimes \mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] (x * \text{snd } z) \otimes \mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] (t * e') = \mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] \text{fst } z' \otimes$
 $\mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] (x * \text{snd } z') \otimes \mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] (t * e)$
 using a-mem assms(3) assms(4) cyclic-group-assoc cyclic-group-commute g'-def
 nat-pow-pow by auto
 hence $\mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] (\text{fst } z + x * \text{snd } z + t * e') = \mathbf{g} [\ulcorner] (\text{fst } z' + x * \text{snd } z' + t * e)$
 by (simp add: nat-pow-mult)
 hence $[\text{fst } z + x * \text{snd } z + t * e' = \text{fst } z' + x * \text{snd } z' + t * e] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$
 using group-eq-pow-eq-mod order-gt-0 by blast
 hence $[\text{int } (\text{fst } z) + \text{int } x * \text{int } (\text{snd } z) + \text{int } t * \text{int } e' = \text{int } (\text{fst } z') + \text{int } x * \text{int } (\text{snd } z') + \text{int } t * \text{int } e] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$
 using cong-int-iff by force
 hence $[\text{int } (\text{fst } z) - \text{int } (\text{fst } z') + \text{int } x * \text{int } (\text{snd } z) - \text{int } x * \text{int } (\text{snd } z') =$
 $\text{int } t * \text{int } e - \text{int } t * \text{int } e'] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$
 by (smt cong-diff-iff-cong-0)
 hence $[\text{int } (\text{fst } z) - \text{int } (\text{fst } z') + \text{int } x * (\text{int } (\text{snd } z) - \text{int } (\text{snd } z')) = \text{int } t * (\text{int } e - \text{int } e')] \text{ (mod order } \mathcal{G})$
 proof –
 have $[\text{int } (\text{fst } z) + (\text{int } (x * \text{snd } z) - (\text{int } (\text{fst } z') + \text{int } (x * \text{snd } z')))] = \text{int } t * (\text{int } e - \text{int } e')] \text{ (mod int } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$
 by (simp add: Rings.ring-distrib(4) $\langle [\text{int } (\text{fst } z) - \text{int } (\text{fst } z') + \text{int } x * \text{int } (\text{snd } z) - \text{int } x * \text{int } (\text{snd } z')] = \text{int } t * \text{int } e - \text{int } t * \text{int } e'] \text{ (mod int } (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) \rangle$)

```

add-diff-add add-diff-eq
  then have  $\exists i. [int (fst z) + (int x * int (snd z) - (int (fst z') + i * int (snd z')) = int t * (int e - int e') + int (snd z') * (int x - i)] \pmod{int (order \mathcal{G})}$ 
  by (metis (no-types) add.commute arith-simps(49) cancel-comm-monoid-add-class.diff-cancel
int-ops(7) mult-eq-0-iff)
  then have  $\exists i. [int (fst z) - int (fst z') + (int x * (int (snd z) - int (snd z')) + i) = int t * (int e - int e') + i] \pmod{int (order \mathcal{G})}$ 
  by (metis (no-types) add-diff-add add-diff-eq mult-diff-mult mult-of-nat-commute)
  then show ?thesis
  by (metis (no-types) add.assoc cong-add-rcancel)
qed
  hence  $[int (fst z) - int (fst z') + int x * (int (snd z) - int (snd z')) = int t * (int e \bmod order \mathcal{G} - int e' \bmod order \mathcal{G}) \bmod order \mathcal{G}] \pmod{order \mathcal{G}}$ 
  by (metis (mono-tags, lifting) cong-def mod-diff-eq mod-mod-trivial mod-mult-right-eq)
  hence  $[int (fst z) - int (fst z') + int x * (int (snd z) - int (snd z')) = int t * (e \bmod order \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod order \mathcal{G}) \bmod order \mathcal{G}] \pmod{order \mathcal{G}}$ 
  using e-e'-mod
  by (simp add: int-ops(9) of-nat-diff)
  hence  $[(int (fst z) - int (fst z') + int x * (int (snd z) - int (snd z'))) * fst (bezw ((e \bmod order \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod order \mathcal{G}) \bmod order \mathcal{G}) (order \mathcal{G})) \bmod order \mathcal{G}]$ 

$$= int t * (e \bmod order \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod order \mathcal{G}) \bmod order \mathcal{G}$$


$$* fst (bezw ((e \bmod order \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod order \mathcal{G}) \bmod order \mathcal{G}) (order \mathcal{G})) \bmod order \mathcal{G}] \pmod{order \mathcal{G}}$$

  using cong-cong-mod-int cong-scalar-right by blast
  hence  $[(int (fst z) - int (fst z') + int x * (int (snd z) - int (snd z'))) * fst (bezw ((e \bmod order \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod order \mathcal{G}) \bmod order \mathcal{G}) (order \mathcal{G})) \bmod order \mathcal{G}]$ 

$$= int t * ((e \bmod order \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod order \mathcal{G}) \bmod order \mathcal{G})$$


$$* fst (bezw ((e \bmod order \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod order \mathcal{G}) \bmod order \mathcal{G}) (order \mathcal{G})) \bmod order \mathcal{G}] \pmod{order \mathcal{G}}$$

  by (metis (no-types, opaque-lifting) cong-mod-right mod-mult-eq mod-mult-left-eq
more-arith-simps(11) zmod-int)
  hence  $[(int (fst z) - int (fst z') + int x * (int (snd z) - int (snd z'))) * fst (bezw ((e \bmod order \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod order \mathcal{G}) \bmod order \mathcal{G}) (order \mathcal{G})) \bmod order \mathcal{G}]$ 

$$= int t * 1] \pmod{order \mathcal{G}}$$

  using inverse gcd
  by (smt Num.of-nat-simps(5) Number-Theory-Aux.inverse cong-def mod-mult-right-eq
more-arith-simps(6) of-nat-1)
  hence  $[((int (fst z) - int (fst z')) + (int x * (int (snd z) - int (snd z')))) * fst (bezw ((e \bmod order \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod order \mathcal{G}) \bmod order \mathcal{G}) (order \mathcal{G})) \bmod order \mathcal{G}]$ 

$$= int t] \pmod{order \mathcal{G}}$$

  by auto
  hence  $[(int (fst z) - int (fst z')) * (fst (bezw ((e \bmod order \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod order \mathcal{G}) \bmod order \mathcal{G}) (order \mathcal{G})) \bmod order \mathcal{G}) + (int x * (int (snd z) - int (snd z')) * (fst (bezw ((e \bmod order \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod order \mathcal{G}) \bmod order \mathcal{G}) (order \mathcal{G})) \bmod order \mathcal{G})) \bmod order \mathcal{G}]$ 

```

[illegible]

$\mathcal{G}) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) \bmod \text{int } (\text{order } \mathcal{G}) + \text{int } x * (\text{int } (\text{snd } z) - \text{int } (\text{snd } z')) * (\text{fst } (\text{bezw } ((e \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) \bmod \text{int } (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) = \text{int } t] (\bmod \text{int } (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) \rangle \text{cong-trans by blast}$
then show *?thesis*
by (*metis (no-types) Groups.mult-ac(1)*)
qed
hence $\mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ (((\text{int } (\text{fst } z) - \text{int } (\text{fst } z')) * \text{fst } (\text{bezw } ((e \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G} + (\text{int } x * (\text{int } (\text{snd } z) - \text{int } (\text{snd } z'))))$
 $* \text{fst } (\text{bezw } ((e \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$
 $\bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G})$
 $= \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ t$
by (*metis cong-def int-pow-int pow-generator-mod-int*)
hence $\mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ (((\text{int } (\text{fst } z) - \text{int } (\text{fst } z')) * \text{fst } (\text{bezw } ((e \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) \otimes \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ ((\text{int } x * (\text{int } (\text{snd } z) - \text{int } (\text{snd } z'))))$
 $* \text{fst } (\text{bezw } ((e \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$
 $\bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G})$
 $= \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ t$
using *int-pow-mult by auto*
hence $\mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ (((\text{int } (\text{fst } z) - \text{int } (\text{fst } z')) * \text{fst } (\text{bezw } ((e \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) \otimes \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ ((\text{int } x * ((\text{int } (\text{snd } z) - \text{int } (\text{snd } z'))))$
 $* \text{fst } (\text{bezw } ((e \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$
 $\bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}))$
 $= \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ t$
by *blast*
hence $\mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ (((\text{int } (\text{fst } z) - \text{int } (\text{fst } z')) * \text{fst } (\text{bezw } ((e \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) (\text{order } \mathcal{G})) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) \otimes \mathbf{g}' \ [\frown] \ (((\text{int } (\text{snd } z) - \text{int } (\text{snd } z'))))$
 $* \text{fst } (\text{bezw } ((e \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G} - e' \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) \bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}) (\text{order } \mathcal{G}))$
 $\bmod \text{order } \mathcal{G}))$
 $= \mathbf{g} \ [\frown] \ t$
by (*smt g'-def cyclic-group.generator-closed int-pow-int int-pow-pow mod-mult-right-eq more-arith-simps(11) okamoto-axioms okamoto-def pow-generator-mod-int*)
thus *?thesis using t by simp*
qed

lemma *special-soundness:*

shows $\Sigma\text{-protocols-base.special-soundness}$
unfolding $\Sigma\text{-protocols-base.special-soundness-def}$
by (*auto simp add: valid-pub-def check-def R-def ss-adversary-def Let-def ss-rewrite challenge-space-def split-def*)

theorem $\Sigma\text{-protocol:}$

shows $\Sigma\text{-protocols-base.}\Sigma\text{-protocol}$
by (*simp add: $\Sigma\text{-protocols-base.}\Sigma\text{-protocol-def completeness HVZK special-soundness}$*)

sublocale *okamoto- Σ -commit:* $\Sigma\text{-protocols-to-commitments init response check R}$

```

S2 ss-adversary challenge-space valid-pub G
apply unfold-locales
apply(auto simp add: Σ-protocol)
by(auto simp add: G-def R-def lossless-init lossless-response)

sublocale dis-log: dis-log G
unfolding dis-log-def by simp

sublocale dis-log-alt: dis-log-alt G x
unfolding dis-log-alt-def
by(simp add:)

lemma reduction-to-dis-log:
shows okamoto-Σ-commit.rel-advantage A = dis-log.advantage (dis-log-alt.adversary2 A)
proof –
have exp-rewrite: g [⌈ w1 ⊗ g' [⌈ w2 = g [⌈ (w1 + x * w2) for w1 w2 :: nat
by (simp add: nat-pow-mult nat-pow-pow g'-def)
have okamoto-Σ-commit.rel-game A = TRY do {
  w1 ← sample-uniform (order G);
  w2 ← sample-uniform (order G);
  let h = (g [⌈ w1 ⊗ g' [⌈ w2);
  (w1',w2') ← A h;
  return-spmf (h = g [⌈ w1' ⊗ g' [⌈ w2') } ELSE return-spmf False
unfolding okamoto-Σ-commit.rel-game-def
by(simp add: Let-def split-def R-def G-def)
also have ... = TRY do {
  w1 ← sample-uniform (order G);
  w2 ← sample-uniform (order G);
  let w = (w1 + x * w2) mod (order G);
  let h = g [⌈ w;
  (w1',w2') ← A h;
  return-spmf (h = g [⌈ w1' ⊗ g' [⌈ w2') } ELSE return-spmf False
using g'-def exp-rewrite pow-generator-mod by simp
also have ... = TRY do {
  w2 ← sample-uniform (order G);
  w ← map-spmf (λ w1. (x * w2 + w1) mod (order G)) (sample-uniform (order
G));
  let h = g [⌈ w;
  (w1',w2') ← A h;
  return-spmf (h = g [⌈ w1' ⊗ g' [⌈ w2') } ELSE return-spmf False
including monad-normalisation
by(simp add: bind-map-spmf o-def Let-def add.commute)
also have ... = TRY do {
  w2 :: nat ← sample-uniform (order G);
  w ← sample-uniform (order G);
  let h = g [⌈ w;
  (w1',w2') ← A h;
  return-spmf (h = g [⌈ w1' ⊗ g' [⌈ w2') } ELSE return-spmf False

```

```

    using samp-uni-plus-one-time-pad add.commute by simp
  also have ... = TRY do {
    w ← sample-uniform (order  $\mathcal{G}$ );
    let h =  $\mathbf{g} [\cdot] w$ ;
    ( $w1', w2'$ ) ←  $\mathcal{A} h$ ;
    return-spmf ( $h = \mathbf{g} [\cdot] w1' \otimes g' [\cdot] w2'$ ) } ELSE return-spmf False
  by(simp add: bind-spmf-const)
  also have ... = dis-log-alt.dis-log2  $\mathcal{A}$ 
  apply(simp add: dis-log-alt.dis-log2-def Let-def dis-log-alt.g'-def g'-def)
  apply(intro try-spmf-cong)
  apply(intro bind-spmf-cong[OF refl]; clarsimp?)
  apply auto
  using exp-rewrite pow-generator-mod g'-def
  apply (metis group-eq-pow-eq-mod okamoto-axioms okamoto-base.order-gt-0
okamoto-def)
  using exp-rewrite g'-def order-gt-0-iff-finite pow-generator-eq-iff-cong by auto
  ultimately have okamoto- $\Sigma$ -commit.rel-game  $\mathcal{A} = \text{dis-log-alt.dis-log2 } \mathcal{A}$ 
  by simp
  hence okamoto- $\Sigma$ -commit.rel-advantage  $\mathcal{A} = \text{dis-log-alt.advantage2 } \mathcal{A}$ 
  by(simp add: okamoto- $\Sigma$ -commit.rel-advantage-def dis-log-alt.advantage2-def)
  thus ?thesis
  by (simp add: dis-log-alt-reductions.dis-log-adv2 cyclic-group-axioms dis-log-alt.dis-log-alt-axioms
dis-log-alt-reductions.intro)
qed

lemma commitment-correct: okamoto- $\Sigma$ -commit.abstract-com.correct
  by(simp add: okamoto- $\Sigma$ -commit.commit-correct)

lemma okamoto- $\Sigma$ -commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa  $\mathcal{A}$ 
  using okamoto- $\Sigma$ -commit.perfect-hiding by blast

lemma binding:
  shows okamoto- $\Sigma$ -commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage  $\mathcal{A}$ 
    ≤ dis-log.advantage (dis-log-alt.adversary2 (okamoto- $\Sigma$ -commit.adversary
 $\mathcal{A}$ ))
  using okamoto- $\Sigma$ -commit.bind-advantage reduction-to-dis-log by auto

end

locale okamoto-asympt =
  fixes  $\mathcal{G} :: \text{nat} \Rightarrow \text{'grp cyclic-group}$ 
  and  $x :: \text{nat}$ 
  assumes okamoto:  $\bigwedge \eta. \text{okamoto } (\mathcal{G} \ \eta)$ 
begin

sublocale okamoto  $\mathcal{G} \ \eta$  for  $\eta$ 
  by(simp add: okamoto)

```

The Σ -protocol statement comes easily in the asymptotic setting.

theorem *sigma-protocol*:
shows Σ -protocols-base. Σ -protocol n
by (*simp add: Σ -protocol*)

We now show the statements of security for the commitment scheme in the asymptotic setting, the main difference is that we are able to show the binding advantage is negligible in the security parameter.

lemma *asyp-correct: okamoto- Σ -commit.abstract-com.correct n*
using *okamoto- Σ -commit.commit-correct* **by** *simp*

lemma *asyp-perfect-hiding: okamoto- Σ -commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa n ($\mathcal{A}$ n)*
using *okamoto- Σ -commit.perfect-hiding* **by** *blast*

lemma *asyp-computational-binding*:
assumes *negligible* (λ n . *dis-log.advantage n (dis-log-alt.adversary2 (okamoto- Σ -commit.adversary n ($\mathcal{A}$ n)))*)
shows *negligible* (λ n . *okamoto- Σ -commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage n ($\mathcal{A}$ n)*)
using *okamoto- Σ -commit.bind-advantage* *assms okamoto- Σ -commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage-def negligible-le binding* **by** *auto*

end

end

theory *Xor imports*
HOL-Algebra.Complete-Lattice
CryptHOL.Misc-CryptHOL
begin

unbundle *no lattice-syntax*

context *bounded-lattice* **begin**

lemma *top-join [simp]*: $x \in \text{carrier } L \implies \top \sqcup x = \top$
using *eq-is-equal top-join* **by** *auto*

lemma *join-top [simp]*: $x \in \text{carrier } L \implies x \sqcup \top = \top$
using *le-iff-meet* **by** *blast*

lemma *bot-join [simp]*: $x \in \text{carrier } L \implies \perp \sqcup x = x$
using *le-iff-meet* **by** *blast*

lemma *join-bot [simp]*: $x \in \text{carrier } L \implies x \sqcup \perp = x$
by (*metis bot-join join-comm*)

lemma *bot-meet [simp]*: $x \in \text{carrier } L \implies \perp \sqcap x = \perp$
using *bottom-meet* **by** *auto*

lemma *meet-bot [simp]*: $x \in \text{carrier } L \implies x \sqcap \perp = \perp$

by (*metis bot-meet meet-comm*)

lemma *top-meet* [*simp*]: $x \in \text{carrier } L \implies \top \sqcap x = x$
by (*metis le-iff-join meet-comm top-closed top-higher*)

lemma *meet-top* [*simp*]: $x \in \text{carrier } L \implies x \sqcap \top = x$
by (*metis meet-comm top-meet*)

lemma *join-idem* [*simp*]: $x \in \text{carrier } L \implies x \sqcup x = x$
using *le-iff-meet* **by** *blast*

lemma *meet-idem* [*simp*]: $x \in \text{carrier } L \implies x \sqcap x = x$
using *le-iff-join le-refl* **by** *presburger*

lemma *meet-leftcomm*: $x \sqcap (y \sqcap z) = y \sqcap (x \sqcap z)$ **if** $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$
 $z \in \text{carrier } L$
by (*metis meet-assoc meet-comm that*)

lemma *join-leftcomm*: $x \sqcup (y \sqcup z) = y \sqcup (x \sqcup z)$ **if** $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$ $z \in \text{carrier } L$
by (*metis join-assoc join-comm that*)

lemmas *meet-ac = meet-assoc meet-comm meet-leftcomm*
lemmas *join-ac = join-assoc join-comm join-leftcomm*

end

record *'a boolean-algebra* = *'a gorder* +
compl :: *'a* $\Rightarrow$ *'a* (*'a* $\langle -1 \rangle$ 1000)

definition *xor* :: (*'a*, *'b*) *boolean-algebra-scheme* $\Rightarrow$ *'a* $\Rightarrow$ *'a* $\Rightarrow$ *'a* (**infixr** $\langle \oplus_1 \rangle$ 100)
where
 $x \oplus y = (x \sqcup y) \sqcap (\neg (x \sqcap y))$ **for** L (**structure**)

locale *boolean-algebra* = *bounded-lattice* L
for L (**structure**) +
assumes *compl-closed* [*intro*, *simp*]: $x \in \text{carrier } L \implies \neg x \in \text{carrier } L$
and *meet-compl-bot* [*simp*]: $x \in \text{carrier } L \implies \neg x \sqcap x = \bot$
and *join-compl-top* [*simp*]: $x \in \text{carrier } L \implies \neg x \sqcup x = \top$
and *join-meet-distrib1*: $\llbracket x \in \text{carrier } L; y \in \text{carrier } L; z \in \text{carrier } L \rrbracket \implies x \sqcup (y \sqcap z) = (x \sqcup y) \sqcap (x \sqcup z)$
begin

lemma *join-meet-distrib2*: $(y \sqcap z) \sqcup x = (y \sqcup x) \sqcap (z \sqcup x)$
if $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$ $z \in \text{carrier } L$
by (*simp add: join-comm join-meet-distrib1 that*)

lemma *meet-join-distrib1*: $x \sqcap (y \sqcup z) = (x \sqcap y) \sqcup (x \sqcap z)$
if [*simp*]: $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$ $z \in \text{carrier } L$

```

proof –
  have  $x \sqcap (y \sqcup z) = (x \sqcap (x \sqcup z)) \sqcap (y \sqcup z)$ 
    using join-left le-iff-join by auto
  also have  $\dots = x \sqcap (z \sqcup (x \sqcap y))$ 
    by (simp add: join-comm join-meet-distrib1 meet-assoc)
  also have  $\dots = ((x \sqcap y) \sqcup x) \sqcap ((x \sqcap y) \sqcup z)$ 
    by (metis join-comm le-iff-meet meet-closed meet-left that(1) that(2))
  also have  $\dots = (x \sqcap y) \sqcup (x \sqcap z)$ 
    by (simp add: join-meet-distrib1)
  finally show ?thesis .
qed

lemma meet-join-distrib2:  $(y \sqcup z) \sqcap x = (y \sqcap x) \sqcup (z \sqcap x)$ 
  if [simp]:  $x \in \text{carrier } L \ y \in \text{carrier } L \ z \in \text{carrier } L$ 
  by (simp add: meet-comm meet-join-distrib1)

lemmas join-meet-distrib = join-meet-distrib1 join-meet-distrib2

lemmas meet-join-distrib = meet-join-distrib1 meet-join-distrib2

lemmas distrib = join-meet-distrib meet-join-distrib

lemma meet-compl2-bot [simp]:  $x \in \text{carrier } L \implies x \sqcap - x = \perp$ 
  by (metis meet-comm meet-compl-bot)

lemma join-compl2-top [simp]:  $x \in \text{carrier } L \implies x \sqcup - x = \top$ 
  by (metis join-comm join-compl-top)

lemma compl-unique:
  assumes  $x \sqcap y = \perp$ 
  and  $x \sqcup y = \top$ 
  and [simp]:  $x \in \text{carrier } L \ y \in \text{carrier } L$ 
  shows  $- x = y$ 
proof –
  have  $(x \sqcap - x) \sqcup (- x \sqcap y) = (x \sqcap y) \sqcup (- x \sqcap y)$ 
    using inf-compl-bot assms(1) by simp
  then have  $(- x \sqcap x) \sqcup (- x \sqcap y) = (y \sqcap x) \sqcup (y \sqcap - x)$ 
    by (simp add: meet-comm)
  then have  $- x \sqcap (x \sqcup y) = y \sqcap (x \sqcup - x)$ 
    using assms(3) assms(4) compl-closed meet-join-distrib1 by presburger
  then have  $- x \sqcap \top = y \sqcap \top$ 
    by (simp add: assms(2))
  then show  $- x = y$ 
    using le-iff-join top-higher by auto
qed

lemma double-compl [simp]:  $- (- x) = x$  if [simp]:  $x \in \text{carrier } L$ 
  by(rule compl-unique)(simp-all)

```

lemma *compl-eq-compl-iff* [simp]: $- x = - y \longleftrightarrow x = y$ **if** $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$
by (*metis double-compl that that*)

lemma *compl-bot-eq* [simp]: $- \perp = \top$
using *le-iff-join le-iff-meet local.compl-unique top-higher* **by** *auto*

lemma *compl-top-eq* [simp]: $- \top = \perp$
by (*metis bottom-closed compl-bot-eq double-compl*)

lemma *compl-inf* [simp]: $-(x \sqcap y) = -x \sqcup -y$ **if** [simp]: $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$
proof (*rule compl-unique*)
have $(x \sqcap y) \sqcap (-x \sqcup -y) = (y \sqcap (x \sqcap -x)) \sqcup (x \sqcap (y \sqcap -y))$
by (*smt compl-closed meet-assoc meet-closed meet-comm meet-join-distrib1 that*)
then show $(x \sqcap y) \sqcap (-x \sqcup -y) = \perp$
by (*metis bottom-closed bottom-lower le-iff-join le-iff-meet meet-comm meet-compl2-bot that*)
next
have $(x \sqcap y) \sqcup (-x \sqcup -y) = (-y \sqcup (x \sqcup -x)) \sqcap (-x \sqcup (y \sqcup -y))$
by (*smt compl-closed join-meet-distrib2 join-assoc join-comm local.boolean-algebra-axioms that join-closed*)
then show $(x \sqcap y) \sqcup (-x \sqcup -y) = \top$
by (*metis compl-closed join-compl2-top join-right le-iff-join le-iff-meet that top-closed*)
qed *simp-all*

lemma *compl-sup* [simp]: $-(x \sqcup y) = -x \sqcap -y$ **if** $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$
by (*metis compl-closed compl-inf double-compl meet-closed that*)

lemma *compl-mono*:
assumes $x \sqsubseteq y$
and $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$
shows $-y \sqsubseteq -x$
by (*metis assms(1) assms(2) assms(3) compl-closed join-comm le-iff-join le-iff-meet compl-inf*)

lemma *compl-le-compl-iff* [simp]: $-x \sqsubseteq -y \longleftrightarrow y \sqsubseteq x$ **if** $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$
using *that* **by** (*auto dest: compl-mono*)

lemma *compl-le-swap1*:
assumes $y \sqsubseteq -x$ $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$
shows $x \sqsubseteq -y$
by (*metis assms compl-closed compl-le-compl-iff double-compl*)

lemma *compl-le-swap2*:
assumes $-y \sqsubseteq x$ $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$
shows $-x \sqsubseteq y$

by (*metis* *assms* *compl-closed* *compl-le-compl-iff* *double-compl*)

lemma *join-compl-top-left1* [*simp*]: $\neg x \sqcup (x \sqcup y) = \top$ **if** [*simp*]: $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$
by (*simp* *add*: *join-assoc*[*symmetric*])

lemma *join-compl-top-left2* [*simp*]: $x \sqcup (\neg x \sqcup y) = \top$ **if** [*simp*]: $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$
using *join-compl-top-left1* [*of* $\neg x$ y] **by** *simp*

lemma *meet-compl-bot-left1* [*simp*]: $\neg x \sqcap (x \sqcap y) = \perp$ **if** [*simp*]: $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$
by (*simp* *add*: *meet-assoc*[*symmetric*])

lemma *meet-compl-bot-left2* [*simp*]: $x \sqcap (\neg x \sqcap y) = \perp$ **if** [*simp*]: $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$
using *meet-compl-bot-left1* [*of* $\neg x$ y] **by** *simp*

lemma *meet-compl-bot-right* [*simp*]: $x \sqcap (y \sqcap \neg x) = \perp$ **if** [*simp*]: $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$
by (*metis* *meet-compl-bot-left2* *meet-comm* *that*)

lemma *xor-closed* [*intro*, *simp*]: $\llbracket x \in \text{carrier } L; y \in \text{carrier } L \rrbracket \implies x \oplus y \in \text{carrier } L$
by(*simp* *add*: *xor-def*)

lemma *xor-comm*: $\llbracket x \in \text{carrier } L; y \in \text{carrier } L \rrbracket \implies x \oplus y = y \oplus x$
by(*simp* *add*: *xor-def* *meet-join-distrib* *join-comm*)

lemma *xor-assoc*: $(x \oplus y) \oplus z = x \oplus (y \oplus z)$
if [*simp*]: $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$ $z \in \text{carrier } L$
by(*simp* *add*: *xor-def*)(*simp* *add*: *meet-join-distrib* *meet-ac* *join-ac*)

lemma *xor-left-comm*: $x \oplus (y \oplus z) = y \oplus (x \oplus z)$ **if** $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$ $z \in \text{carrier } L$
using *that* *xor-assoc* *xor-comm* **by** *auto*

lemma [*simp*]:
assumes $x \in \text{carrier } L$
shows *xor-bot*: $x \oplus \perp = x$
and *bot-xor*: $\perp \oplus x = x$
and *xor-top*: $x \oplus \top = \neg x$
and *top-xor*: $\top \oplus x = \neg x$
by(*simp*-*all* *add*: *xor-def* *assms*)

lemma *xor-inverse* [*simp*]: $x \oplus x = \perp$ **if** $x \in \text{carrier } L$
by(*simp* *add*: *xor-def* *that*)

lemma *xor-left-inverse* [*simp*]: $x \oplus x \oplus y = y$ **if** $x \in \text{carrier } L$ $y \in \text{carrier } L$

```

using that xor-assoc by fastforce

lemmas xor-ac = xor-assoc xor-comm xor-left-comm

lemma inj-on-xor: inj-on (( $\oplus$ ) x) (carrier L) if x  $\in$  carrier L
  by(rule inj-onI)(metis that xor-left-inverse)

lemma surj-xor: ( $\oplus$ ) x ' carrier L = carrier L if [simp]: x  $\in$  carrier L
proof(rule Set.set-eqI, rule iffI)
  fix y
  assume [simp]: y  $\in$  carrier L
  have x  $\oplus$  y  $\in$  carrier L by(simp)
  moreover have y = x  $\oplus$  (x  $\oplus$  y) by simp
  ultimately show y  $\in$  ( $\oplus$ ) x ' carrier L by(rule rev-image-eqI)
qed auto

lemma one-time-pad: map-spmf (( $\oplus$ ) x) (spmf-of-set (carrier L)) = spmf-of-set
(carrier L)
  if x  $\in$  carrier L
  apply(subst map-spmf-of-set-inj-on)
  apply(rule inj-on-xor[OF that])
  by(simp add: surj-xor that)

end

end

## 2.6 $\Sigma$ -AND statements

theory Sigma-AND imports
  Sigma-Protocols
  Xor
begin

locale  $\Sigma$ -AND-base =  $\Sigma 0$ :  $\Sigma$ -protocols-base init0 response0 check0 Rel0 S0-raw
Ass0 carrier L valid-pub0
+  $\Sigma 1$ :  $\Sigma$ -protocols-base init1 response1 check1 Rel1 S1-raw Ass1 carrier L valid-pub1
for init1 :: 'pub1  $\Rightarrow$  'witness1  $\Rightarrow$  ('rand1  $\times$  'msg1) spmf
  and response1 :: 'rand1  $\Rightarrow$  'witness1  $\Rightarrow$  'bool  $\Rightarrow$  'response1 spmf
  and check1 :: 'pub1  $\Rightarrow$  'msg1  $\Rightarrow$  'bool  $\Rightarrow$  'response1  $\Rightarrow$  bool
  and Rel1 :: ('pub1  $\times$  'witness1) set
  and S1-raw :: 'pub1  $\Rightarrow$  'bool  $\Rightarrow$  ('msg1  $\times$  'response1) spmf
  and Ass1 :: 'pub1  $\Rightarrow$  'msg1  $\times$  'bool  $\times$  'response1  $\Rightarrow$  'msg1  $\times$  'bool  $\times$  'response1
 $\Rightarrow$  'witness1 spmf
  and challenge-space1 :: 'bool set
  and valid-pub1 :: 'pub1 set
  and init0 :: 'pub0  $\Rightarrow$  'witness0  $\Rightarrow$  ('rand0  $\times$  'msg0) spmf
  and response0 :: 'rand0  $\Rightarrow$  'witness0  $\Rightarrow$  'bool  $\Rightarrow$  'response0 spmf
  and check0 :: 'pub0  $\Rightarrow$  'msg0  $\Rightarrow$  'bool  $\Rightarrow$  'response0  $\Rightarrow$  bool

```

```

and  $Rel0 :: ('pub0 \times 'witness0) \text{ set}$ 
and  $S0\text{-raw} :: 'pub0 \Rightarrow 'bool \Rightarrow ('msg0 \times 'response0) \text{ spmf}$ 
and  $Ass0 :: 'pub0 \Rightarrow 'msg0 \times 'bool \times 'response0 \Rightarrow 'msg0 \times 'bool \times 'response0$ 
 $\Rightarrow 'witness0 \text{ spmf}$ 
and  $challenge\text{-}space0 :: 'bool \text{ set}$ 
and  $valid\text{-}pub0 :: 'pub0 \text{ set}$ 
and  $G :: (('pub0 \times 'pub1) \times ('witness0 \times 'witness1)) \text{ spmf}$ 
and  $L :: 'bool \text{ boolean-algebra (structure)}$ 
+
assumes  $\Sigma\text{-prot1}: \Sigma1.\Sigma\text{-protocol}$ 
and  $\Sigma\text{-prot0}: \Sigma0.\Sigma\text{-protocol}$ 
and  $lossless\text{-}init: lossless\text{-}spm f (init0\ h0\ w0) \text{ lossless}\text{-}spm f (init1\ h1\ w1)$ 
and  $lossless\text{-}response: lossless\text{-}spm f (response0\ r0\ w0\ e0) \text{ lossless}\text{-}spm f (response1$ 
 $r1\ w1\ e1)$ 
and  $lossless\text{-}S: lossless\text{-}spm f (S0\ h0\ e0) \text{ lossless}\text{-}spm f (S1\ h1\ e1)$ 
and  $lossless\text{-}Ass: lossless\text{-}spm f (Ass0\ x0\ (a0,e,z0)\ (a0,e',z0')) \text{ lossless}\text{-}spm f$ 
 $(Ass1\ x1\ (a1,e,z1)\ (a1,e',z1'))$ 
and  $lossless\text{-}G: lossless\text{-}spm f G$ 
and  $set\text{-}spm f\text{-}G [simp]: (h,w) \in set\text{-}spm f G \Longrightarrow Rel\ h\ w$ 
begin

```

definition $challenge\text{-}space = carrier\ L$

definition $Rel\text{-}AND :: (('pub0 \times 'pub1) \times ('witness0 \times 'witness1) \text{ set}$
where $Rel\text{-}AND = \{((x0,x1), (w0,w1)). ((x0,w0) \in Rel0 \wedge (x1,w1) \in Rel1)\}$

definition $init\text{-}AND :: ('pub0 \times 'pub1) \Rightarrow ('witness0 \times 'witness1) \Rightarrow (('rand0 \times$
 $'rand1) \times 'msg0 \times 'msg1) \text{ spmf}$
where $init\text{-}AND\ X\ W = do \{$
 $let\ (x0, x1) = X;$
 $let\ (w0,w1) = W;$
 $(r0, a0) \leftarrow init0\ x0\ w0;$
 $(r1, a1) \leftarrow init1\ x1\ w1;$
 $return\text{-}spm f ((r0,r1), (a0,a1))\}$

lemma $lossless\text{-}init\text{-}AND: lossless\text{-}spm f (init\text{-}AND\ X\ W)$
by ($simp\ add: lossless\text{-}init\ init\text{-}AND\text{-}def\ split\text{-}def$)

definition $response\text{-}AND :: ('rand0 \times 'rand1) \Rightarrow ('witness0 \times 'witness1) \Rightarrow 'bool$
 $\Rightarrow ('response0 \times 'response1) \text{ spmf}$
where $response\text{-}AND\ R\ W\ s = do \{$
 $let\ (r0,r1) = R;$
 $let\ (w0,w1) = W;$
 $z0 \leftarrow response0\ r0\ w0\ s;$
 $z1 :: 'response1 \leftarrow response1\ r1\ w1\ s;$
 $return\text{-}spm f (z0,z1)\}$

lemma $lossless\text{-}response\text{-}AND: lossless\text{-}spm f (response\text{-}AND\ R\ W\ s)$
by ($simp\ add: response\text{-}AND\text{-}def\ lossless\text{-}response\ split\text{-}def$)

fun *check-AND* :: ('pub0 × 'pub1) ⇒ ('msg0 × 'msg1) ⇒ 'bool ⇒ ('response0 × 'response1) ⇒ bool
where *check-AND* (x0,x1) (a0,a1) s (z0,z1) = (*check0* x0 a0 s z0 ∧ *check1* x1 a1 s z1)

definition *S-AND* :: 'pub0 × 'pub1 ⇒ 'bool ⇒ (('msg0 × 'msg1) × 'response0 × 'response1) spmf
where *S-AND* X e = do {
 let (x0,x1) = X;
 (a0, z0) ← *S0-raw* x0 e;
 (a1, z1) ← *S1-raw* x1 e;
 return-spmf ((a0,a1),(z0,z1))}

fun *Ass-AND* :: 'pub0 × 'pub1 ⇒ ('msg0 × 'msg1) × 'bool × 'response0 × 'response1 ⇒ ('msg0 × 'msg1) × 'bool × 'response0 × 'response1 ⇒ ('witness0 × 'witness1) spmf
where *Ass-AND* (x0,x1) ((a0,a1), e, (z0,z1)) ((a0',a1'), e', (z0',z1')) = do {
 w0 :: 'witness0 ← *Ass0* x0 (a0,e,z0) (a0',e',z0');
 w1 ← *Ass1* x1 (a1,e,z1) (a1',e',z1');
 return-spmf (w0,w1)}

definition *valid-pub-AND* = {(x0,x1). x0 ∈ *valid-pub0* ∧ x1 ∈ *valid-pub1*}

sublocale *Σ-AND*: *Σ-protocols-base init-AND response-AND check-AND Rel-AND S-AND Ass-AND challenge-space valid-pub-AND*
apply *unfold-locals* **apply**(*simp add: Rel-AND-def valid-pub-AND-def*)
using *Σ1.domain-subset-valid-pub Σ0.domain-subset-valid-pub* **by** *blast*

end

locale *Σ-AND* = *Σ-AND-base* +
assumes *set-spmf-G-L*: ((x0, x1), w0, w1) ∈ *set-spmf* G ⇒ ((x0, x1), (w0,w1)) ∈ *Rel-AND*
begin

lemma *hvzk*:
assumes *Rel-AND*: ((x0,x1), (w0,w1)) ∈ *Rel-AND*
and e ∈ *challenge-space*
shows *Σ-AND.R* (x0,x1) (w0,w1) e = *Σ-AND.S* (x0,x1) e
including *monad-normalisation*

proof –
have *x-in-dom*: x0 ∈ *Domain Rel0* **and** x1 ∈ *Domain Rel1*
using *Rel-AND Rel-AND-def* **by** *auto*
have *Σ-AND.R* (x0,x1) (w0,w1) e = do {
 ((r0,r1),(a0,a1)) ← *init-AND* (x0,x1) (w0,w1);
 (z0,z1) ← *response-AND* (r0,r1) (w0,w1) e;
 return-spmf ((a0,a1),e,(z0,z1))}
by(*simp add: Σ-AND.R-def split-def*)

```

also have ... = do {
  (r0, a0) ← init0 x0 w0;
  z0 ← response0 r0 w0 e;
  (r1, a1) ← init1 x1 w1;
  z1 :: 'f ← response1 r1 w1 e;
  return-spmf ((a0,a1),e,(z0,z1))}
apply(simp add: init-AND-def response-AND-def split-def)
apply(rewrite bind-commute-spmf[of response0 - w0 e])
by simp
also have ... = do {
  (a0, c0, z0) ←  $\Sigma 0.R$  x0 w0 e;
  (a1, c1, z1) ←  $\Sigma 1.R$  x1 w1 e;
  return-spmf ((a0,a1),e,(z0,z1))}
by(simp add:  $\Sigma 0.R$ -def  $\Sigma 1.R$ -def split-def)
also have ... = do {
  (a0, c0, z0) ←  $\Sigma 0.S$  x0 e;
  (a1, c1, z1) ←  $\Sigma 1.S$  x1 e;
  return-spmf ((a0,a1),e,(z0,z1))}
  using Rel-AND-def S-AND-def  $\Sigma$ -prot1  $\Sigma$ -prot0 assms  $\Sigma 0.HVZK$ -unfold1
 $\Sigma 1.HVZK$ -unfold1
  valid-pub-AND-def split-def challenge-space-def x-in-dom
by auto
ultimately show ?thesis
by(simp add:  $\Sigma 0.S$ -def  $\Sigma 1.S$ -def bind-map-spmf o-def split-def Let-def  $\Sigma$ -AND.S-def
map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf S-AND-def)
qed

```

```

lemma HVZK:  $\Sigma$ -AND.HVZK
  using  $\Sigma$ -AND.HVZK-def hvzk challenge-space-def
  apply(simp add: S-AND-def split-def)
  using  $\Sigma$ -prot1  $\Sigma$ -prot0  $\Sigma 0.HVZK$ -unfold2  $\Sigma 1.HVZK$ -unfold2 valid-pub-AND-def
by auto

```

```

lemma correct:
  assumes Rel-AND: ((x0,x1), (w0,w1)) ∈ Rel-AND
  and e ∈ challenge-space
  shows  $\Sigma$ -AND.completeness-game (x0,x1) (w0,w1) e = return-spmf True
  including monad-normalisation
proof–
  have  $\Sigma$ -AND.completeness-game (x0,x1) (w0,w1) e = do {
    ((r0,r1),(a0,a1)) ← init-AND (x0,x1) (w0,w1);
    (z0,z1) ← response-AND (r0,r1) (w0,w1) e;
    return-spmf (check-AND (x0,x1) (a0,a1) e (z0,z1))}
    by(simp add:  $\Sigma$ -AND.completeness-game-def split-def del: check-AND.simps)
  also have ... = do {
    (r0, a0) ← init0 x0 w0;
    z0 ← response0 r0 w0 e;
    (r1, a1) ← init1 x1 w1;
    z1 ← response1 r1 w1 e;

```

```

    return-spmf ((check0 x0 a0 e z0 ∧ check1 x1 a1 e z1))}
  apply(simp add: init-AND-def response-AND-def split-def)
  apply(rewrite bind-commute-spmf[of response0 - w0 e])
  by simp
  ultimately show ?thesis
  using  $\Sigma 1$ .complete-game-return-true  $\Sigma$ -prot1  $\Sigma 1$ . $\Sigma$ -protocol-def  $\Sigma 1$ .completeness-game-def
  asms
   $\Sigma 0$ .complete-game-return-true  $\Sigma$ -prot0  $\Sigma 0$ . $\Sigma$ -protocol-def  $\Sigma 0$ .completeness-game-def
  challenge-space-def
  apply(auto simp add: Let-def split-def bind-eq-return-spmf lossless-init loss-
  less-response Rel-AND-def)
  by(metis (mono-tags, lifting) asms(2) fst-conv snd-conv)+
  qed

```

lemma completeness: Σ -AND.completeness
 using Σ -AND.completeness-def correct challenge-space-def **by** force

lemma ss:

```

  assumes e-neq-e':  $s \neq s'$ 
  and valid-pub:  $(x0, x1) \in \text{valid-pub-AND}$ 
  and challenge-space:  $s \in \text{challenge-space}$   $s' \in \text{challenge-space}$ 
  and check-AND  $(x0, x1)$   $(a0, a1)$   $s$   $(z0, z1)$ 
  and check-AND  $(x0, x1)$   $(a0, a1)$   $s'$   $(z0', z1')$ 
  shows lossless-spmf ( $\text{Ass-AND}$   $(x0, x1)$   $((a0, a1), s, (z0, z1))$   $((a0, a1), s',$ 
   $(z0', z1'))$ )
   $\wedge (\forall w' \in \text{set-spmf} (\text{Ass-AND} (x0, x1) ((a0, a1), s, (z0, z1)) ((a0, a1),$ 
   $s', (z0', z1'))). ((x0, x1), w') \in \text{Rel-AND})$ 
  proof-
    have x0-in-dom:  $x0 \in \text{valid-pub0}$  and x1-in-dom:  $x1 \in \text{valid-pub1}$ 
    using valid-pub valid-pub-AND-def by auto
    moreover have 3: check0 x0 a0 s z0
    using asms by simp
    moreover have 4: check1 x1 a1 s' z1'
    using asms by simp
    moreover have  $w0 \in \text{set-spmf} (\text{Ass0 } x0 (a0, s, z0) (a0, s', z0')) \longrightarrow (x0, w0)$ 
   $\in \text{Rel0}$  for  $w0$ 
    using 3 4  $\Sigma 0$ .special-soundness-def  $\Sigma$ -prot0  $\Sigma 0$ . $\Sigma$ -protocol-def x0-in-dom chal-
    lenge-space-def asms valid-pub-AND-def valid-pub by fastforce
    moreover have  $w1 \in \text{set-spmf} (\text{Ass1 } x1 (a1, s, z1) (a1, s', z1')) \longrightarrow (x1, w1)$ 
   $\in \text{Rel1}$  for  $w1$ 
    using 3 4  $\Sigma 1$ .special-soundness-def  $\Sigma$ -prot1  $\Sigma 1$ . $\Sigma$ -protocol-def x1-in-dom chal-
    lenge-space-def asms valid-pub-AND-def valid-pub by fastforce
    ultimately show ?thesis
    by(auto simp add: lossless-Ass Rel-AND-def)
  qed

```

lemma special-soundness:

```

  shows  $\Sigma$ -AND.special-soundness
  using  $\Sigma$ -AND.special-soundness-def ss by fast

```

```

theorem  $\Sigma$ -protocol:
  shows  $\Sigma$ -AND. $\Sigma$ -protocol
  by(auto simp add:  $\Sigma$ -AND. $\Sigma$ -protocol-def completeness HVZK special-soundness)

sublocale AND- $\Sigma$ -commit:  $\Sigma$ -protocols-to-commitments init-AND response-AND
check-AND Rel-AND S-AND Ass-AND challenge-space valid-pub-AND G
  apply unfold-locales
  by(auto simp add:  $\Sigma$ -protocol set-spmf-G-L lossless-G lossless-init-AND lossless-response-AND)

lemma AND- $\Sigma$ -commit.abstract-com.correct
  using AND- $\Sigma$ -commit.commit-correct by simp

lemma AND- $\Sigma$ -commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa  $\mathcal{A}$ 
  using AND- $\Sigma$ -commit.perfect-hiding by blast

lemma bind-advantage-bound-dis-log:
  shows AND- $\Sigma$ -commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage  $\mathcal{A} \leq$  AND- $\Sigma$ -commit.rel-advantage
  (AND- $\Sigma$ -commit.adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ )
  using AND- $\Sigma$ -commit.bind-advantage by simp

end

end

```

2.7 Σ -OR statements

```

theory Sigma-OR imports
  Sigma-Protocols
  Xor
begin

locale  $\Sigma$ -OR-base =  $\Sigma 0$ :  $\Sigma$ -protocols-base init0 response0 check0 Rel0 S0-raw Ass0
carrier L valid-pub0
+  $\Sigma 1$ :  $\Sigma$ -protocols-base init1 response1 check1 Rel1 S1-raw Ass1 carrier L valid-pub1
for init1 :: 'pub1  $\Rightarrow$  'witness1  $\Rightarrow$  ('rand1  $\times$  'msg1) spmf
  and response1 :: 'rand1  $\Rightarrow$  'witness1  $\Rightarrow$  'bool  $\Rightarrow$  'response1 spmf
  and check1 :: 'pub1  $\Rightarrow$  'msg1  $\Rightarrow$  'bool  $\Rightarrow$  'response1  $\Rightarrow$  bool
  and Rel1 :: ('pub1  $\times$  'witness1) set
  and S1-raw :: 'pub1  $\Rightarrow$  'bool  $\Rightarrow$  ('msg1  $\times$  'response1) spmf
  and Ass1 :: 'pub1  $\Rightarrow$  'msg1  $\times$  'bool  $\times$  'response1  $\Rightarrow$  'msg1  $\times$  'bool  $\times$  'response1
 $\Rightarrow$  'witness1 spmf
  and challenge-space1 :: 'bool set
  and valid-pub1 :: 'pub1 set
  and init0 :: 'pub0  $\Rightarrow$  'witness0  $\Rightarrow$  ('rand0  $\times$  'msg0) spmf
  and response0 :: 'rand0  $\Rightarrow$  'witness0  $\Rightarrow$  'bool  $\Rightarrow$  'response0 spmf
  and check0 :: 'pub0  $\Rightarrow$  'msg0  $\Rightarrow$  'bool  $\Rightarrow$  'response0  $\Rightarrow$  bool
  and Rel0 :: ('pub0  $\times$  'witness0) set

```

```

and  $S0\text{-raw} :: 'pub0 \Rightarrow 'bool \Rightarrow ('msg0 \times 'response0) \text{ spmf}$ 
and  $Ass0 :: 'pub0 \Rightarrow 'msg0 \times 'bool \times 'response0 \Rightarrow 'msg0 \times 'bool \times 'response0$ 
 $\Rightarrow 'witness0 \text{ spmf}$ 
and  $challenge\text{-}space0 :: 'bool \text{ set}$ 
and  $valid\text{-}pub0 :: 'pub0 \text{ set}$ 
and  $G :: (('pub0 \times 'pub1) \times ('witness0 + 'witness1)) \text{ spmf}$ 
and  $L :: 'bool \text{ boolean-algebra (structure)}$ 
+
assumes  $\Sigma\text{-prot1} : \Sigma1.\Sigma\text{-protocol}$ 
and  $\Sigma\text{-prot0} : \Sigma0.\Sigma\text{-protocol}$ 
and  $lossless\text{-}init : lossless\text{-}spmf (init0\ h0\ w0) \text{ lossless}\text{-}spmf (init1\ h1\ w1)$ 
and  $lossless\text{-}response : lossless\text{-}spmf (response0\ r0\ w0\ e0) \text{ lossless}\text{-}spmf (response1$ 
 $r1\ w1\ e1)$ 
and  $lossless\text{-}S : lossless\text{-}spmf (S0\ h0\ e0) \text{ lossless}\text{-}spmf (S1\ h1\ e1)$ 
and  $finite\text{-}L : finite (carrier\ L)$ 
and  $carrier\text{-}L\text{-}not\text{-}empty : carrier\ L \neq \{\}$ 
and  $lossless\text{-}G : lossless\text{-}spmf\ G$ 
begin

inductive-set  $Rel\text{-}OR :: (('pub0 \times 'pub1) \times ('witness0 + 'witness1)) \text{ set where}$ 
 $Rel\text{-}OR\text{-}I0 : ((x0, x1), Inl\ w0) \in Rel\text{-}OR \text{ if } (x0, w0) \in Rel0 \wedge x1 \in valid\text{-}pub1$ 
 $| Rel\text{-}OR\text{-}I1 : ((x0, x1), Inr\ w1) \in Rel\text{-}OR \text{ if } (x1, w1) \in Rel1 \wedge x0 \in valid\text{-}pub0$ 

inductive-simps  $Rel\text{-}OR\text{-}simps [simp] :$ 
 $((x0, x1), Inl\ w0) \in Rel\text{-}OR$ 
 $((x0, x1), Inr\ w1) \in Rel\text{-}OR$ 

lemma  $Domain\text{-}Rel\text{-}cases :$ 
assumes  $(x0, x1) \in Domain\ Rel\text{-}OR$ 
shows  $(\exists w0. (x0, w0) \in Rel0 \wedge x1 \in valid\text{-}pub1) \vee (\exists w1. (x1, w1) \in Rel1 \wedge$ 
 $x0 \in valid\text{-}pub0)$ 
using  $assms$ 
by  $(meson\ DomainE\ Rel\text{-}OR.cases)$ 

lemma  $set\text{-}spmf\text{-}lists\text{-}sample [simp] : set\text{-}spmf (spmf\text{-}of\text{-}set (carrier\ L)) = (carrier$ 
 $L)$ 
using  $finite\text{-}L \text{ by } simp$ 

definition  $challenge\text{-}space = carrier\ L$ 

fun  $init\text{-}OR :: ('pub0 \times 'pub1) \Rightarrow ('witness0 + 'witness1) \Rightarrow (((('rand0 \times 'bool$ 
 $\times 'response1 + 'rand1 \times 'bool \times 'response0)) \times 'msg0 \times 'msg1)) \text{ spmf}$ 
where  $init\text{-}OR (x0, x1) (Inl\ w0) = do \{$ 
 $(r0, a0) \leftarrow init0\ x0\ w0;$ 
 $e1 \leftarrow spmf\text{-}of\text{-}set (carrier\ L);$ 
 $(a1, e'1, z1) \leftarrow \Sigma1.S\ x1\ e1;$ 
 $return\text{-}spmf (Inl (r0, e1, z1), a0, a1)\}$ 
 $|$ 
 $init\text{-}OR (x0, x1) (Inr\ w1) = do \{$ 
 $(r1, a1) \leftarrow init1\ x1\ w1;$ 

```

```

e0 ← spmf-of-set (carrier L);
(a0, e'0, z0) ← Σ0.S x0 e0;
return-spmf ((Inr (r1, e0, z0), a0, a1)))}

```

lemma *lossless-Σ-S*: *lossless-spmf* (Σ1.S x1 e1) *lossless-spmf* (Σ0.S x0 e0)
using *lossless-S* **by** *fast* +

lemma *lossless-init-OR*: *lossless-spmf* (*init-OR* (x0,x1) w)
by(*cases w*; *simp add: lossless-Σ-S split-def lossless-init lossless-S finite-L carrier-L-not-empty*)

```

fun response-OR :: (('rand0 × 'bool × 'response1 + 'rand1 × 'bool × 'response0))
⇒ ('witness0 + 'witness1)
    ⇒ 'bool ⇒ (('bool × 'response0) × ('bool × 'response1)) spmf
where response-OR (Inl (r0, e-1, z1)) (Inl w0) s = do {
  let e0 = s ⊕ e-1;
  z0 ← response0 r0 w0 e0;
  return-spmf ((e0,z0), (e-1,z1))} |
response-OR (Inr (r1, e-0, z0)) (Inr w1) s = do {
  let e1 = s ⊕ e-0;
  z1 ← response1 r1 w1 e1;
  return-spmf ((e-0, z0), (e1, z1))}

```

definition *check-OR* :: ('pub0 × 'pub1) ⇒ ('msg0 × 'msg1) ⇒ 'bool ⇒ (('bool × 'response0) × ('bool × 'response1)) ⇒ bool
where *check-OR* X A s Z
= (s = (fst (fst Z)) ⊕ (fst (snd Z))
 ∧ (fst (fst Z)) ∈ *challenge-space* ∧ (fst (snd Z)) ∈ *challenge-space*
 ∧ *check0* (fst X) (fst A) (fst (fst Z)) (snd (fst Z)) ∧ *check1* (snd X) (snd A) (fst (snd Z)) (snd (snd Z)))

lemma *check-OR* (x0,x1) (a0,a1) s ((e0,z0), (e1,z1))
= (s = e0 ⊕ e1
 ∧ e0 ∈ *challenge-space* ∧ e1 ∈ *challenge-space*
 ∧ *check0* x0 a0 e0 z0 ∧ *check1* x1 a1 e1 z1)
by(*simp add: check-OR-def*)

```

fun S-OR where S-OR (x0,x1) c = do {
  e1 ← spmf-of-set (carrier L);
  (a1, e1', z1) ← Σ1.S x1 e1;
  let e0 = c ⊕ e1;
  (a0, e0', z0) ← Σ0.S x0 e0;
  let z = ((e0',z0), (e1',z1));
  return-spmf ((a0, a1),z)}

```

definition *Ass-OR'* :: 'pub0 × 'pub1 ⇒ ('msg0 × 'msg1) × 'bool × ('bool × 'response0) × 'bool × 'response1
 ⇒ ('msg0 × 'msg1) × 'bool × ('bool × 'response0) × 'bool × 'response1
 ⇒ ('witness0 + 'witness1) spmf

where $\mathcal{A}ss-OR' X C1 C2 = TRY$ *do* {
 $- :: unit \leftarrow assert\text{-}spmf ((fst (fst (snd (snd C1)))) \neq (fst (fst (snd (snd C2)))))$;
 $w0 :: 'witness0 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}ss0 (fst X) (fst (fst C1), fst (fst (snd (snd C1))), snd (fst (snd (snd C1)))) (fst (fst C2), fst (fst (snd (snd C2))), snd (fst (snd (snd C2))))$;
 $return\text{-}spmf ((Inl w0)) :: ('witness0 + 'witness1) spmf$ } *ELSE* *do* {
 $w1 :: 'witness1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}ss1 (snd X) (snd (fst C1), fst (snd (snd (snd C1))), snd (snd (snd (snd C1)))) (snd (fst C2), fst (snd (snd (snd C2))), snd (snd (snd (snd C2))))$;
 $(return\text{-}spmf ((Inr w1)) :: ('witness0 + 'witness1) spmf)$ }

definition $\mathcal{A}ss-OR :: 'pub0 \times 'pub1 \Rightarrow ('msg0 \times 'msg1) \times 'bool \times ('bool \times 'response0) \times 'bool \times 'response1$
 $\Rightarrow ('msg0 \times 'msg1) \times 'bool \times ('bool \times 'response0) \times 'bool \times 'response1 \Rightarrow ('witness0 + 'witness1) spmf$

where $\mathcal{A}ss-OR X C1 C2 = do$ {
if $((fst (fst (snd (snd C1)))) \neq (fst (fst (snd (snd C2)))))$ *then* *do*
 $\{w0 :: 'witness0 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}ss0 (fst X) (fst (fst C1), fst (fst (snd (snd C1))), snd (fst (snd (snd C1)))) (fst (fst C2), fst (fst (snd (snd C2))), snd (fst (snd (snd C2))))$;
 $return\text{-}spmf (Inl w0)\}$
else
 $do \{w1 :: 'witness1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}ss1 (snd X) (snd (fst C1), fst (snd (snd (snd C1))), snd (snd (snd (snd C1)))) (snd (fst C2), fst (snd (snd (snd C2))), snd (snd (snd (snd C2))))$;
 $return\text{-}spmf (Inr w1)\}$

lemma $\mathcal{A}ss-OR\text{-}alt\text{-}def: \mathcal{A}ss-OR (x0, x1) ((a0, a1), s, (e0, z0), e1, z1) ((a0, a1), s', (e0', z0'), e1', z1')$
 $= do$ {
if $(e0 \neq e0')$ *then* $do \{w0 :: 'witness0 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}ss0 x0 (a0, e0, z0) (a0, e0', z0')$;
 $return\text{-}spmf (Inl w0)\}$
else $do \{w1 :: 'witness1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}ss1 x1 (a1, e1, z1) (a1, e1', z1')$;
 $return\text{-}spmf (Inr w1)\}$
by $(simp \text{ add: } \mathcal{A}ss-OR\text{-}def)$

definition $valid\text{-}pub\text{-}OR = \{(x0, x1). x0 \in valid\text{-}pub0 \wedge x1 \in valid\text{-}pub1\}$

sublocale $\Sigma\text{-}OR: \Sigma\text{-}protocols\text{-}base \text{ init-}OR \text{ response-}OR \text{ check-}OR \text{ Rel-}OR \text{ S-}OR$
 $\mathcal{A}ss-OR \text{ challenge-space } valid\text{-}pub\text{-}OR$

unfolding $\Sigma\text{-}protocols\text{-}base\text{-}def$

proof $(goal\text{-}cases)$

case 1

then show $?case$

proof

fix x

assume $asm: x \in Domain \text{ Rel-}OR$

then obtain $x0 x1$ **where** $x: (x0, x1) = x$

by $(metis \text{ surj-pair})$

show $x \in valid\text{-}pub\text{-}OR$

proof $(cases \exists w0. (x0, w0) \in Rel0 \wedge x1 \in valid\text{-}pub1)$

case *True*

then show $?thesis$

```

    using  $\Sigma 0$ .domain-subset-valid-pub valid-pub-OR-def  $x$  by auto
  next
  case False
  hence  $\exists w1. (x1, w1) \in Rel1 \wedge x0 \in valid\text{-}pub0$ 
    using Domain-Rel-cases asm  $x$  by auto
  then show ?thesis
    using  $\Sigma 1$ .domain-subset-valid-pub valid-pub-OR-def  $x$  by auto
  qed
qed
qed

end

locale  $\Sigma$ -OR-proofs =  $\Sigma$ -OR-base + boolean-algebra  $L$  +
  assumes G-Rel-OR:  $((x0, x1), w) \in set\text{-}spmf\ G \implies ((x0, x1), w) \in Rel\text{-}OR$ 
  and lossless-response-OR: lossless-spmf (response-OR  $R\ W\ s$ )
begin

lemma HVZK1:
  assumes  $(x1, w1) \in Rel1$ 
  shows  $\forall c \in challenge\text{-}space. \Sigma\text{-}OR.R\ (x0, x1)\ (Inr\ w1)\ c = \Sigma\text{-}OR.S\ (x0, x1)\ c$ 
  including monad-normalisation
proof
  fix  $c$ 
  assume  $c: c \in challenge\text{-}space$ 
  show  $\Sigma\text{-}OR.R\ (x0, x1)\ (Inr\ w1)\ c = \Sigma\text{-}OR.S\ (x0, x1)\ c$ 
  proof-
    have  $*: x \in carrier\ L \longrightarrow c \oplus c \oplus x = x$  for  $x$ 
      using c challenge-space-def by auto
    have  $\Sigma\text{-}OR.R\ (x0, x1)\ (Inr\ w1)\ c = do\ \{$ 
       $(r1, ab1) \leftarrow init1\ x1\ w1;$ 
       $eb' \leftarrow spmf\text{-}of\text{-}set\ (carrier\ L);$ 
       $(ab0', eb0'', zb0') \leftarrow \Sigma 0.S\ x0\ eb';$ 
       $let\ ((r, eb', zb'), a) = ((r1, eb', zb0'), ab0', ab1);$ 
       $let\ eb = c \oplus eb';$ 
       $zb1 \leftarrow response1\ r\ w1\ eb;$ 
       $let\ z = ((eb', zb'), (eb, zb1));$ 
       $return\text{-}spmf\ (a, c, z)\}$ 
      supply  $[[simproc\ del: monad-normalisation]]$ 
      by(simp add:  $\Sigma$ -OR.R-def split-def Let-def)
    also have  $\dots = do\ \{$ 
       $eb' \leftarrow spmf\text{-}of\text{-}set\ (carrier\ L);$ 
       $(ab0', eb0'', zb0') \leftarrow \Sigma 0.S\ x0\ eb';$ 
       $let\ eb = c \oplus eb';$ 
       $(ab1, c', zb1) \leftarrow \Sigma 1.R\ x1\ w1\ eb;$ 
       $let\ z = ((eb', zb0'), (eb, zb1));$ 
       $return\text{-}spmf\ ((ab0', ab1), c, z)\}$ 
      by(simp add:  $\Sigma 1$ .R-def split-def Let-def)
    also have  $\dots = do\ \{$ 

```

```

    eb' ← spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab0', eb0'', zb0') ← Σ0.S x0 eb';
    let eb = c ⊕ eb';
    (ab1, c', zb1) ← Σ1.S x1 eb;
    let z = ((eb', zb0'), (eb, zb1));
    return-spmf ((ab0', ab1), c, z)
  using c
  by(simp add: split-def Let-def Σ-prot1 Σ1.HVZK-unfold1 assms challenge-space-def
cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
  also have ... = do {
    eb ← map-spmf (λ eb'. c ⊕ eb') (spm-of-set (carrier L));
    (ab1, c', zb1) ← Σ1.S x1 eb;
    (ab0', eb0'', zb0') ← Σ0.S x0 (c ⊕ eb);
    let z = ((c ⊕ eb, zb0'), (eb, zb1));
    return-spmf ((ab0', ab1), c, z)
  }
  apply(simp add: bind-map-spmf o-def Let-def)
  by(simp add: * split-def cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
  also have ... = do {
    eb ← (spm-of-set (carrier L));
    (ab1, c', zb1) ← Σ1.S x1 eb;
    (ab0', eb0'', zb0') ← Σ0.S x0 (c ⊕ eb);
    let z = ((c ⊕ eb, zb0'), (eb, zb1));
    return-spmf ((ab0', ab1), c, z)
  }
  using assms assms one-time-pad c challenge-space-def by simp
  also have ... = do {
    eb ← (spm-of-set (carrier L));
    (ab1, c', zb1) ← Σ1.S x1 eb;
    (ab0', eb0'', zb0') ← Σ0.S x0 (c ⊕ eb);
    let z = ((eb0'', zb0'), (c', zb1));
    return-spmf ((ab0', ab1), c, z)
  }
  by(simp add: Σ0.S-def Σ1.S-def bind-map-spmf o-def split-def)
  ultimately show ?thesis by(simp add: Let-def map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf Σ-OR.S-def
split-def)
qed
qed

```

lemma HVZK0:

```

  assumes (x0, w0) ∈ Rel0
  shows ∀ c ∈ challenge-space. Σ-OR.R (x0, x1) (Inl w0) c = Σ-OR.S (x0, x1) c
proof
  fix c
  assume c: c ∈ challenge-space
  show Σ-OR.R (x0, x1) (Inl w0) c = Σ-OR.S (x0, x1) c
proof –
  have Σ-OR.R (x0, x1) (Inl w0) c = do {
    (r0, ab0) ← init0 x0 w0;
    eb' ← spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab1', eb1'', zb1') ← Σ1.S x1 eb';
    let ((r, eb', zb'), a) = ((r0, eb', zb1'), ab0, ab1');

```

```

    let eb = c  $\oplus$  eb';
    zb0  $\leftarrow$  response0 r w0 eb;
    let z = ((eb,zb0), (eb',zb'));
    return-spmf (a,c,z)
  by(simp add:  $\Sigma$ -OR.R-def split-def Let-def)
  also have ... = do {
    eb'  $\leftarrow$  (spm-of-set (carrier L));
    (ab1', eb1'', zb1')  $\leftarrow$   $\Sigma$ 1.S x1 eb';
    let eb = c  $\oplus$  eb';
    (ab0, c', zb0)  $\leftarrow$   $\Sigma$ 0.R x0 w0 eb;
    let z = ((eb,zb0), (eb',zb1'));
    return-spmf ((ab0, ab1'),c,z)
  }
  apply(simp add:  $\Sigma$ 0.R-def split-def Let-def)
  apply(rewrite bind-commute-spmf)
  apply(rewrite bind-commute-spmf[of -  $\Sigma$ 1.S -])
  by simp
  also have ... = do {
    eb'  $\leftarrow$  (spm-of-set (carrier L));
    (ab1', eb1'', zb1')  $\leftarrow$   $\Sigma$ 1.S x1 eb';
    let eb = c  $\oplus$  eb';
    (ab0, c', zb0)  $\leftarrow$   $\Sigma$ 0.S x0 eb;
    let z = ((eb,zb0), (eb',zb1'));
    return-spmf ((ab0, ab1'),c,z)
  }
  using c
  by(simp add:  $\Sigma$ -prot0  $\Sigma$ 0.HVZK-unfold1 assms challenge-space-def split-def
  Let-def cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
  ultimately show ?thesis
  by(simp add:  $\Sigma$ -OR.S-def  $\Sigma$ 1.S-def  $\Sigma$ 0.S-def Let-def o-def bind-map-spmf
  split-def map-spmf-conv-bind-spmf)
  qed
qed

```

```

lemma HVZK:
  shows  $\Sigma$ -OR.HVZK
  unfolding  $\Sigma$ -OR.HVZK-def
  apply auto
  subgoal for e a b w
    apply(cases w)
    using HVZK0 HVZK1 by auto
  apply(auto simp add: valid-pub-OR-def  $\Sigma$ -OR.S-def bind-map-spmf o-def check-OR-def
  image-def  $\Sigma$ 0.S-def  $\Sigma$ 1.S-def split-def challenge-space-def local.xor-ac(1))
  using  $\Sigma$ 0.HVZK-unfold2  $\Sigma$ -prot0 challenge-space-def apply force
  using  $\Sigma$ 1.HVZK-unfold2  $\Sigma$ -prot1 challenge-space-def by force

```

```

lemma assumes (x0,x1)  $\in$  Domain Rel-OR
  shows ( $\exists$  w0. (x0,w0)  $\in$  Rel0)  $\vee$  ( $\exists$  w1. (x1,w1)  $\in$  Rel1)
  using assms Rel-OR.simps by blast

```

```

lemma ss:

```

assumes *valid-pub-OR*: $(x0, x1) \in \text{valid-pub-OR}$
and *check*: *check-OR* $(x0, x1) (a0, a1) s ((e0, z0), (e1, z1))$
and *check'*: *check-OR* $(x0, x1) (a0, a1) s' ((e0', z0'), (e1', z1'))$
and $s \neq s'$
and *challenge-space*: $s \in \text{challenge-space } s' \in \text{challenge-space}$
shows *lossless-spmf* $(\text{Ass-OR } (x0, x1) ((a0, a1), s, (e0, z0), e1, z1) ((a0, a1), s', (e0', z0'), e1', z1')) \wedge$
 $(\forall w' \in \text{set-spmf } (\text{Ass-OR } (x0, x1) ((a0, a1), s, (e0, z0), e1, z1) ((a0, a1), s', (e0', z0'), e1', z1'))). ((x0, x1), w') \in \text{Rel-OR})$
proof–
have *e-or*: $e0 \neq e0' \vee e1 \neq e1'$ **using** *assms check-OR-def* **by** *auto*
show *?thesis*
proof(*cases* $e0 \neq e0'$)
case *True*
moreover **have** 2: $x0 \in \text{valid-pub0}$
using *valid-pub-OR valid-pub-OR-def* **by** *simp*
moreover **have** 3: *check0* $x0 a0 e0 z0$
using *assms check-OR-def* **by** *simp*
moreover **have** 4: *check0* $x0 a0 e0' z0'$
using *assms check-OR-def* **by** *simp*
moreover **have** *e*: $e0 \in \text{carrier } L \ e0' \in \text{carrier } L$
using *challenge-space-def check check' check-OR-def* **by** *auto*
ultimately **have** $(\forall w' \in \text{set-spmf } (\text{Ass0 } x0 (a0, e0, z0) (a0, e0', z0')). (x0, w') \in \text{Rel0})$
using *True $\Sigma 0$. Σ -protocol-def $\Sigma 0$.special-soundness-def Σ -prot0 challenge-space*
assms **by** *blast*
moreover **have** *lossless-spmf* $(\text{Ass0 } x0 (a0, e0, z0) (a0, e0', z0'))$
using 2 3 4 *Ass-OR-def True Σ -prot0 $\Sigma 0$. Σ -protocol-def $\Sigma 0$.special-soundness-def*
challenge-space-def e **by** *blast*
ultimately **have** $\forall w' \in \text{set-spmf } (\text{Ass-OR } (x0, x1) ((a0, a1), s, (e0, z0), e1, z1) ((a0, a1), s', (e0', z0'), e1', z1')). ((x0, x1), w') \in \text{Rel-OR}$
apply(*auto simp only: Ass-OR-alt-def True*)
apply(*auto simp add: o-def Ass-OR-def*)
using *assms valid-pub-OR-def* **by** *blast*
moreover **have** *lossless-spmf* $(\text{Ass-OR } (x0, x1) ((a0, a1), s, (e0, z0), e1, z1) ((a0, a1), s', (e0', z0'), e1', z1'))$
apply(*simp add: Ass-OR-def*)
using 2 3 4 *True Σ -prot0 $\Sigma 0$. Σ -protocol-def $\Sigma 0$.special-soundness-def challenge-space e* **by** *blast*
ultimately **show** *?thesis* **by** *simp*
next
case *False*
hence *e1-neq-e1'*: $e1 \neq e1'$ **using** *e-or* **by** *simp*
moreover **have** 2: $x1 \in \text{valid-pub1}$
using *valid-pub-OR valid-pub-OR-def* **by** *simp*
moreover **have** 3: *check1* $x1 a1 e1 z1$
using *assms check-OR-def* **by** *simp*
moreover **have** 4: *check1* $x1 a1 e1' z1'$
using *assms check-OR-def* **by** *simp*

```

moreover have  $e: e1 \in \text{carrier } L \ e1' \in \text{carrier } L$ 
using challenge-space-def check check' check-OR-def by auto
ultimately have  $(\forall w' \in \text{set-spmf } (\text{Ass1 } x1 \ (a1, e1, z1) \ (a1, e1', z1')). (x1, w') \in \text{Rel1})$ 
using False  $\Sigma 1$ . $\Sigma$ -protocol-def  $\Sigma 1$ .special-soundness-def  $\Sigma$ -prot1  $e1 \neq e1'$  challenge-space by blast
hence  $\forall w' \in \text{set-spmf } (\text{Ass-OR } (x0, x1) ((a0, a1), s, (e0, z0), e1, z1) ((a0, a1), s', (e0', z0'), e1', z1')). ((x0, x1), w') \in \text{Rel-OR}$ 
apply(auto simp add: o-def Ass-OR-def)
using False assms  $\Sigma 1$ .L-def assms valid-pub-OR-def by auto
moreover have lossless-spmf  $(\text{Ass-OR } (x0, x1) ((a0, a1), s, (e0, z0), e1, z1) ((a0, a1), s', (e0', z0'), e1', z1'))$ 
apply(simp add: Ass-OR-def)
using 2 3 4  $\Sigma$ -prot1  $\Sigma 1$ . $\Sigma$ -protocol-def  $\Sigma 1$ .special-soundness-def False  $e1 \neq e1'$  challenge-space  $e$  by blast
ultimately show ?thesis by simp
qed
qed

```

lemma *special-soundness:*

```

shows  $\Sigma\text{-OR. special-soundness}$ 
unfolding  $\Sigma\text{-OR. special-soundness-def}$ 
using ss prod.collapse by fastforce

```

lemma *correct0:*

```

assumes  $e \in \text{carrier } L$ 
and  $(x0, w0) \in \text{Rel0}$ 
and valid-pub:  $x1 \in \text{valid-pub1}$ 
shows  $\Sigma\text{-OR. completeness-game } (x0, x1) \ (Inl \ w0) \ e = \text{return-spmf } \text{True}$ 
(is ?lhs = ?rhs)

```

proof–

```

have  $x \in \text{carrier } L \longrightarrow e = (e \oplus x) \oplus x$  for  $x$ 
using e-in-carrier xor-assoc by simp
hence ?lhs = do {
   $(r0, ab0) \leftarrow \text{init0 } x0 \ w0;$ 
   $eb' \leftarrow \text{spmf-of-set } (\text{carrier } L);$ 
   $(ab1', eb1'', zb1') \leftarrow \Sigma 1.S \ x1 \ eb';$ 
   $\text{let } eb = e \oplus eb';$ 
   $zb0 \leftarrow \text{response0 } r0 \ w0 \ eb;$ 
   $\text{return-spmf } ((\text{check0 } x0 \ ab0 \ eb \ zb0 \wedge \text{check1 } x1 \ ab1' \ eb' \ zb1'))$ 
by(simp add:  $\Sigma\text{-OR. completeness-game-def split-def Let-def challenge-space-def$ 
assms check-OR-def cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
also have  $\dots = \text{do } \{$ 
   $eb' \leftarrow \text{spmf-of-set } (\text{carrier } L);$ 
   $(ab1', eb1'', zb1') \leftarrow \Sigma 1.S \ x1 \ eb';$ 
   $\text{let } eb = e \oplus eb';$ 
   $(r0, ab0) \leftarrow \text{init0 } x0 \ w0;$ 
   $zb0 \leftarrow \text{response0 } r0 \ w0 \ eb;$ 
   $\text{return-spmf } ((\text{check0 } x0 \ ab0 \ eb \ zb0 \wedge \text{check1 } x1 \ ab1' \ eb' \ zb1'))$ 

```

```

    apply(simp add: Let-def split-def)
    apply(rewrite bind-commute-spmf)
    apply(rewrite bind-commute-spmf[of -  $\Sigma 1.S$  -])
    by simp
  also have ... = do {
    eb' :: 'e  $\leftarrow$  spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab1', eb1'', zb1')  $\leftarrow$   $\Sigma 1.S$  x1 eb';
    return-spmf (check1 x1 ab1' eb' zb1')}
    apply(simp add: Let-def)
    apply(intro bind-spmf-cong; clarsimp?)
    subgoal for e' a e z
      apply(cases check1 x1 a e' z)
    using  $\Sigma 0.complete-game-return-true$   $\Sigma-prot0$   $\Sigma 0.completeness-game-def$   $\Sigma 0.\Sigma-protocol-def$ 

    by(auto simp add: assms bind-spmf-const lossless-init lossless-response loss-
less-weight-spmfD split-def cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
    done
  also have ... = do {
    eb' :: 'e  $\leftarrow$  spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab1', eb1'', zb1')  $\leftarrow$   $\Sigma 1.S$  x1 eb';
    return-spmf (True)}
    apply(intro bind-spmf-cong; clarsimp?)
    subgoal for x a aa b
      using  $\Sigma-prot1$ 
      apply(auto simp add:  $\Sigma 1.S-def$  split-def image-def  $\Sigma 1.HVZK-unfold2-alt$ )
      using  $\Sigma 1.S-def$  split-def image-def  $\Sigma 1.HVZK-unfold2-alt$   $\Sigma-prot1$  valid-pub
    by blast
    done
    ultimately show ?thesis
      using  $\Sigma 1.HVZK-unfold2-alt$ 
      by(simp add: bind-spmf-const Let-def  $\Sigma 1.HVZK-unfold2-alt$  split-def lossless- $\Sigma-S$ 
lossless-weight-spmfD carrier-L-not-empty finite-L)
    qed

lemma correct1:
  assumes rel1: (x1, w1)  $\in$  Rel1
    and valid-pub: x0  $\in$  valid-pub0
    and e-in-carrier: e  $\in$  carrier L
  shows  $\Sigma-OR.completeness-game$  (x0, x1) (Inr w1) e = return-spmf True
    (is ?lhs = ?rhs)
proof-
  have x1-inL: x1  $\in$   $\Sigma 1.L$ 
    using  $\Sigma 1.L-def$  rel1 by auto
  have x  $\in$  carrier L  $\longrightarrow$  e = x  $\oplus$  e  $\oplus$  x for x
    by (simp add: e-in-carrier xor-assoc xor-commute local.xor-ac(3))
  hence ?lhs = do {
    (r1, ab1)  $\leftarrow$  init1 x1 w1;
    eb'  $\leftarrow$  spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab0', eb0'', zb0')  $\leftarrow$   $\Sigma 0.S$  x0 eb';

```

```

    let eb = e  $\oplus$  eb';
    zb1  $\leftarrow$  response1 r1 w1 eb;
    return-spmf (check0 x0 ab0' eb' zb0'  $\wedge$  check1 x1 ab1 eb zb1)}
  by(simp add:  $\Sigma$ -OR.completeness-game-def split-def Let-def assms challenge-space-def
check-OR-def cong: bind-spmf-cong-simp)
  also have ... = do {
    eb'  $\leftarrow$  spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab0', eb0'', zb0')  $\leftarrow$   $\Sigma$ 0.S x0 eb';
    let eb = e  $\oplus$  eb';
    (r1, ab1)  $\leftarrow$  init1 x1 w1;
    zb1  $\leftarrow$  response1 r1 w1 eb;
    return-spmf (check0 x0 ab0' eb' zb0'  $\wedge$  check1 x1 ab1 eb zb1)}
  apply(simp add: Let-def split-def)
  apply(rewrite bind-commute-spmf)
  apply(rewrite bind-commute-spmf[of -  $\Sigma$ 0.S -])
  by simp
  also have ... = do {
    eb'  $\leftarrow$  spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab0', eb0'', zb0')  $\leftarrow$   $\Sigma$ 0.S x0 eb';
    return-spmf (check0 x0 ab0' eb' zb0')}
  apply(simp add: Let-def)
  apply(intro bind-spmf-cong; clarsimp?)+
  subgoal for e' a e z
    apply(cases check0 x0 a e' z)
  using  $\Sigma$ 1.complete-game-return-true  $\Sigma$ -prot1  $\Sigma$ 1.completeness-game-def  $\Sigma$ 1. $\Sigma$ -protocol-def
  by(auto simp add: x1-inL assms bind-spmf-const lossless-init lossless-response
lossless-weight-spmfD split-def)
  done
  also have ... = do {
    eb'  $\leftarrow$  spmf-of-set (carrier L);
    (ab0', eb0'', zb0')  $\leftarrow$   $\Sigma$ 0.S x0 eb';
    return-spmf (True)}
  apply(intro bind-spmf-cong; clarsimp?)
  subgoal for x a aa b
    using  $\Sigma$ -prot0
  by(auto simp add: valid-pub valid-pub-OR-def  $\Sigma$ 0.S-def split-def image-def
 $\Sigma$ 0.HVZK-unfold2-alt)
  done
  ultimately show ?thesis
  apply(simp add:  $\Sigma$ 0.HVZK-unfold2 Let-def)
  using  $\Sigma$ 0.complete-game-return-true  $\Sigma$ -OR.completeness-game-def
  by(simp add: bind-spmf-const split-def lossless- $\Sigma$ -S(2) lossless-weight-spmfD
Let-def carrier-L-not-empty finite-L)
qed

```

lemma completeness':

assumes Rel-OR-asm: $((x0, x1), w) \in \text{Rel-OR}$

shows $\forall e \in \text{carrier } L. \text{ spmf } (\Sigma\text{-OR.completeness-game } (x0, x1) \ w \ e) \ \text{True} = 1$

proof

```

fix  $e$ 
assume  $asm: e \in carrier\ L$ 
hence  $(\Sigma-OR.completeness-game\ (x0,x1)\ w\ e) = return-spmf\ True$ 
proof(cases  $w$ )
  case  $int: (Inl\ a)$ 
    then show  $?thesis$ 
    using  $asm\ correct0\ assms\ int$  by  $auto$ 
  next
    case  $inr: (Inr\ b)$ 
    then show  $?thesis$ 
    using  $asm\ correct1\ assms\ inr$  by  $auto$ 
qed
thus  $spmf\ (\Sigma-OR.completeness-game\ (x0,x1)\ w\ e)\ True = 1$ 
by  $simp$ 
qed

lemma  $completeness$ : shows  $\Sigma-OR.completeness$ 
unfolding  $\Sigma-OR.completeness-def$ 
using  $completeness'\ challenge-space-def$  by  $auto$ 

lemma  $\Sigma-protocol$ : shows  $\Sigma-OR.\Sigma-protocol$ 
by( $simp\ add: completeness\ HVZK\ special-soundness\ \Sigma-OR.\Sigma-protocol-def$ )

sublocale  $OR-\Sigma-commit: \Sigma-protocols-to-commitments\ init-OR\ response-OR\ check-OR$ 
 $Rel-OR\ S-OR\ Ass-OR\ challenge-space\ valid-pub-OR\ G$ 
by  $unfold-locales\ (auto\ simp\ add: \Sigma-protocol\ lossless-G\ lossless-init-OR\ G-Rel-OR$ 
 $lossless-response-OR)$ 

lemma  $OR-\Sigma-commit.abstract-com.correct$ 
using  $OR-\Sigma-commit.commit-correct$  by  $simp$ 

lemma  $OR-\Sigma-commit.abstract-com.perfect-hiding-ind-cpa\ A$ 
using  $OR-\Sigma-commit.perfect-hiding$  by  $blast$ 

lemma  $bind-advantage-bound-dis-log$ :
shows  $OR-\Sigma-commit.abstract-com.bind-advantage\ A \leq OR-\Sigma-commit.rel-advantage$ 
 $(OR-\Sigma-commit.adversary\ A)$ 
using  $OR-\Sigma-commit.bind-advantage$  by  $simp$ 

end

end

```

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