# Solution to the xkcd Blue Eyes puzzle

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#### October 13, 2025

#### Abstract

In a puzzle published by Randall Munroe [2], perfect logicians forbidden from communicating are stranded on an island, and may only leave once they have figured out their own eye color. We present a method of modeling the behavior of perfect logicians and formalize a solution of the puzzle.

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### 1 Introduction

The original problem statement [2] explains the puzzle well:

A group of people with assorted eye colors live on an island. They are all perfect logicians – if a conclusion can be logically deduced, they will do it instantly. No one knows the color of their eyes. Every night at midnight, a ferry stops at the island. Any islanders who have figured out the color of their own eyes then leave the island, and the rest stay. Everyone can see everyone else at all times and keeps a count of the number of people they see with each eye color (excluding themselves), but they cannot otherwise communicate. Everyone on the island knows all the rules in this paragraph.

On this island there are 100 blue-eyed people, 100 brown-eyed people, and the Guru (she happens to have green eyes). So any given blue-eyed person can see 100 people with brown eyes and 99 people with blue eyes (and one with green), but that does not tell him his own eye color; as far as he knows the totals could be 101 brown and 99 blue. Or 100 brown, 99 blue, and he could have red eyes.

The Guru is allowed to speak once (let's say at noon), on one day in all their endless years on the island. Standing before the islanders, she says the following:

"I can see someone who has blue eyes."

Who leaves the island, and on what night?

It might seem weird that the Guru's declaration gives anyone any new information. For an informal discussion, see [1, Section 1.1].

# 2 Modeling the world

We begin by fixing two type variables: 'color and 'person. The puzzle doesn't specify how many eye colors are possible, but four are mentioned. Crucially, we must assume they are distinct. We specify the existence of colors other than blue and brown, even though we don't mention them later, because when blue and brown are the only possible colors, the puzzle has a different solution — the brown-eyed logicians may leave one day after the blue-eyed ones.

We refrain from specifying the exact population of the island, choosing to only assume it is finite and denote a specific person as the Guru.

We could also model the Guru as an outside entity instead of a participant. This doesn't change the answer and results in a slightly simpler proof, but is less faithful to the problem statement.

#### context

```
fixes blue brown green red :: 'color
assumes colors-distinct: distinct [blue, brown, green, red]
fixes guru :: 'person
assumes finite (UNIV :: 'person set)
begin
```

It's slightly tricky to formalize the behavior of perfect logicians. The representation we use is centered around the type of a *world*, which describes the entire state of the environment. In our case, it's a function 'person  $\Rightarrow$  'color that assigns an eye color to everyone.<sup>1</sup>

The only condition known to everyone and not dependent on the observer is Guru's declaration:

```
definition valid :: ('person \Rightarrow 'color) \Rightarrow bool where valid w \longleftrightarrow (\exists p. \ p \neq guru \land w \ p = blue)
```

We then define the function possible  $n \ p \ w \ w'$ , which returns True if on day n the potential world w' is plausible from the perspective of person p, based on the observations they made in the actual world w.

Then, leaves n p w is True if p is able to unambiguously deduce the color of their own eyes, i.e. if it is the same in all possible worlds. Note that if p actually left many moons ago, this function still returns True.

```
fun leaves :: nat \Rightarrow 'person \Rightarrow ('person \Rightarrow 'color) \Rightarrow bool

and possible :: nat \Rightarrow 'person \Rightarrow ('person \Rightarrow 'color) \Rightarrow ('person \Rightarrow 'color) \Rightarrow bool

where

leaves \ n \ p \ w = (\forall \ w'. \ possible \ n \ p \ w \ w' \longrightarrow w' \ p = w \ p) \ |

possible \ n \ p \ w \ w' \longleftrightarrow valid \ w \land valid \ w'

\land \ (\forall \ p' \neq p. \ w \ p' = w' \ p')

\land \ (\forall \ n' < n. \ \forall \ p'. \ leaves \ n' \ p' \ w = leaves \ n' \ p' \ w')
```

Naturally, the act of someone leaving can be observed by others, thus the two definitions are mutually recursive. As such, we need to instruct the simplifier to not unfold these definitions endlessly.

declare possible.simps[simp del] leaves.simps[simp del]

A world is possible if

- 1. The Guru's declaration holds.
- 2. The eye color of everyone but the observer matches.
- 3. The same people left on each of the previous days.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>We would introduce a type synonym, but at the time of writing Isabelle doesn't support including type variables fixed by a locale in a type synonym.

Moreover, we require that the actual world w is valid, so that the relation is symmetric:

```
lemma possible-sym: possible n p w w' = possible n p w' w
by (auto simp: possible.simps)

In fact, possible n p is an equivalence relation:
lemma possible-refl: valid w ⇒ possible n p w w
by (auto simp: possible.simps)

lemma possible-trans: possible n p w1 w2 ⇒ possible n p w2 w3 ⇒ possible n p w1 w3
by (auto simp: possible.simps)
```

## 3 Eye colors other than blue

Since there is no way to distinguish between the colors other than blue, only the blue-eyed people will ever leave. To formalize this notion, we define a function that takes a world and replaces the eye color of a specified person. The original color is specified too, so that the transformation composes nicely with the recursive hypothetical worlds of *local.possible*.

```
definition try-swap :: 'person \Rightarrow 'color \Rightarrow 'color \Rightarrow ('person \Rightarrow 'color) \Rightarrow ('person \Rightarrow 'color) where
 try-swap p c_1 c_2 w x = (if c_1 = blue \lor c_2 = blue \lor x \neq p then w x else transpose <math>c_1 c_2 (w x)
lemma try-swap-valid[simp]: valid (try-swap p c_1 c_2 w) = valid w
 by (cases \langle c_1 = blue \rangle; cases \langle c_2 = blue \rangle)
   (auto simp add: try-swap-def valid-def transpose-eq-iff)
lemma try-swap-eq[simp]: try-swap p c_1 c_2 w x = try-swap p c_1 c_2 w' x \longleftrightarrow w x = w' x
 by (auto simp add: try-swap-def transpose-eq-iff)
lemma try-swap-inv[simp]: try-swap p c_1 c_2 (try-swap p c_1 c_2 w) = w
 by (rule ext) (auto simp add: try-swap-def swap-id-eq)
lemma leaves-try-swap[simp]:
 assumes valid w
 shows leaves n \ p \ (try\text{-swap} \ p' \ c_1 \ c_2 \ w) = leaves \ n \ p \ w
 using assms
proof (induction n arbitrary: p w rule: less-induct)
 case (less n)
 have leaves n p w if leaves n p (try-swap p' c_1 c_2 w) for w
 proof (unfold leaves.simps; rule+)
   fix w'
   assume possible n p w w'
   then have possible n p (try-swap p' c_1 c_2 w) (try-swap p' c_1 c_2 w')
     by (fastforce simp: possible.simps less.IH)
   with (leaves n \ p \ (try\text{-swap} \ p' \ c_1 \ c_2 \ w)) have try\text{-swap} \ p' \ c_1 \ c_2 \ w' \ p = try\text{-swap} \ p' \ c_1 \ c_2 \ w \ p
     unfolding leaves.simps
     by simp
    thus w' p = w p by simp
 qed
 with try-swap-inv show ?case by auto
qed
This lets us prove that only blue-eyed people will ever leave the island.
proposition only-blue-eyes-leave:
 assumes leaves n p w and valid w
 shows w p = blue
proof (rule ccontr)
```

```
assume w p \neq blue

then obtain c where c: w p \neq c c \neq blue

using colors-distinct

by (metis distinct-length-2-or-more)

let ?w' = try-swap p (w p) c w

have possible n p w ?w'

using \langle valid \ w \rangle apply (simp add: possible.simps)

by (auto simp: try-swap-def)

moreover have ?w' p \neq w p

using c \langle w p \neq blue \rangle by (auto simp: try-swap-def)

ultimately have \neg leaves n p w

by (auto simp: leaves.simps)

with assms show False by simp

qed
```

## 4 The blue-eyed logicians

We will now consider the behavior of the logicians with blue eyes. First, some simple lemmas. Reasoning about set cardinalities often requires considering infinite sets separately. Usefully, all sets of people are finite by assumption.

```
lemma people-finite[simp]: finite (S::'person set)

proof (rule finite-subset)

show S \subseteq UNIV by auto

show finite (UNIV::'person set) by fact

qed
```

Secondly, we prove a destruction rule for *local.possible*. It is strictly weaker than the definition, but thanks to the simpler form, it's easier to guide the automation with it.

```
lemma possible D-colors:

assumes possible n \ p \ w \ w' and p' \neq p

shows w' \ p' = w \ p'

using assms unfolding possible.simps by simp
```

A central concept in the reasoning is the set of blue-eyed people someone can see.

```
definition blues-seen :: ('person \Rightarrow 'color) \Rightarrow 'person \Rightarrow 'person set where blues-seen w p = \{p'. w p' = blue\} - \{p\}
```

```
\mathbf{lemma}\ \mathit{blues}\text{-}\mathit{seen}\text{-}\mathit{others}\text{:}
  assumes w p' = blue and p \neq p'
  shows w p = blue \Longrightarrow card (blues-seen w p) = card (blues-seen w p')
    and w p \neq blue \implies card (blues-seen w p) = Suc (card (blues-seen w p'))
proof -
  assume w p = blue
  then have blues-seen w p' = blues-seen w p \cup \{p\} - \{p'\}
    by (auto simp add: blues-seen-def)
  moreover have p \notin blues\text{-}seen \ w \ p
    unfolding blues-seen-def by auto
  moreover have p' \in blues\text{-}seen \ w \ p \cup \{p\}
   unfolding blues-seen-def using \langle p \neq p' \rangle \langle w | p' = blue \rangle by auto
  ultimately show card (blues-seen w p) = card (blues-seen w p')
    by simp
next
  assume w p \neq blue
  then have blues-seen w p' = blues-seen w p - \{p'\}
   by (auto simp add: blues-seen-def)
```

```
moreover have p' \in blues-seen w p
   unfolding blues-seen-def using \langle p \neq p' \rangle \langle w | p' = blue \rangle by auto
 ultimately show card (blues-seen w p) = Suc (card (blues-seen w p'))
   by (simp only: card-Suc-Diff1 people-finite)
qed
lemma blues-seen-same[simp]:
 assumes possible n p w w'
 shows blues-seen w' p = blues-seen w p
 using assms
 by (auto simp: blues-seen-def possible.simps)
lemma possible-blues-seen:
 assumes possible n p w w'
 assumes w p' = blue and p \neq p'
 shows w' p = blue \implies card (blues-seen w p) = card (blues-seen w' p')
   and w' p \neq blue \Longrightarrow card (blues-seen w p) = Suc (card (blues-seen w' p'))
 using possible D-colors [OF \land possible \ n \ p \ w \ w' \rangle] and blues-seen-others assms
 by (auto simp flip: blues-seen-same)
Finally, the crux of the solution. We proceed by strong induction.
lemma blue-leaves:
 assumes w p = blue and valid w
   and guru: w guru \neq blue
 shows leaves n \ p \ w \longleftrightarrow n \ge card \ (blues\text{-seen} \ w \ p)
 using assms
proof (induction n arbitrary: p w rule: less-induct)
 case (less n)
 show ?case
 proof
    — First, we show that day n is sufficient to deduce that the eyes are blue.
   assume n \ge card \ (blues\text{-}seen \ w \ p)
   have w' p = blue if possible n p w w' for w'
   proof (cases card (blues-seen w'(p))
     case \theta
     moreover from \langle possible \ n \ p \ w \ w' \rangle have valid w'
       by (simp add: possible.simps)
     ultimately show w' p = blue
       unfolding valid-def blues-seen-def by auto
    next
     case (Suc\ k)

    We consider the behavior of somebody else, who also has blue eyes.

     then have blues-seen w' p \neq \{\}
       by auto
     then obtain p' where w' p' = blue and p \neq p'
       unfolding blues-seen-def by auto
     then have w p' = blue
       using possible D\text{-}colors[OF \land possible n p w w' \land] by simp
     have p \neq guru
       using \langle w | p = blue \rangle and \langle w | guru \neq blue \rangle by auto
     hence w' guru \neq blue
       using \langle w | guru \neq blue \rangle and possible D-colors [OF \langle possible | n | p | w | w' \rangle] by simp
     have valid w'
       using \langle possible \ n \ p \ w \ w' \rangle unfolding possible.simps by simp
     show w' p = blue
```

```
proof (rule ccontr)
       assume w' p \neq blue
       — If our eyes weren't blue, then p' would see one blue-eyed person less than us.
       with possible-blues-seen [OF \langle possible\ n\ p\ w\ w' \rangle\ \langle w\ p' = blue \rangle\ \langle p \neq p' \rangle]
       have *: card (blues-seen w p) = Suc (card (blues-seen w' p'))
         bv simp
       — By induction, they would've left on day k = blues-seen w' p'.
       let ?k = card (blues-seen w' p')
       have ?k < n
         using \langle n \geq card \ (blues\text{-}seen \ w \ p) \rangle and * by simp
       hence leaves ?k p' w'
         using \langle valid \ w' \rangle \ \langle w' \ p' = blue \rangle \ \langle w' \ guru \neq blue \rangle
         by (intro less.IH[THEN iffD2]; auto)
        — However, we know that actually, p' didn't leave that day yet.
       moreover have \neg leaves ?k p' w
       proof
         assume leaves ?k p' w
         then have ?k \ge card \ (blues\text{-}seen \ w \ p')
           using \langle ?k < n \rangle \langle w | p' = blue \rangle \langle valid | w \rangle \langle w | guru \neq blue \rangle
           by (intro less.IH[THEN iffD1]; auto)
         have card (blues-seen w p) = card (blues-seen w p')
           by (intro blues-seen-others; fact)
         with * have ?k < card (blues-seen w p')
           by simp
         with \langle ?k \geq card \ (blues\text{-}seen \ w \ p') \rangle show False by simp
       moreover have leaves ?k p' w' = leaves ?k p' w
         using \langle possible\ n\ p\ w\ w' \rangle \ \langle ?k < n \rangle
         unfolding possible.simps by simp
       ultimately show False by simp
     qed
   \mathbf{qed}
    thus leaves n p w
     unfolding leaves.simps using \langle w|p = blue \rangle by simp
    — Then, we show that it's not possible to deduce the eye color any earlier.
   {
     assume n < card (blues-seen w p)
     — Consider a hypothetical world where p has brown eyes instead. We will prove that this world is
possible.
     let ?w' = w(p := brown)
     have ?w' quru \neq blue
       using \langle w | guru \neq blue \rangle \langle w | p = blue \rangle
       by auto
     have valid ?w'
     proof -
       from \langle n < card \ (blues\text{-}seen \ w \ p) \rangle have card \ (blues\text{-}seen \ w \ p) \neq 0 by auto
       hence blues-seen w p \neq \{\}
         by auto
       then obtain p' where p' \in blues-seen w p
         by auto
       hence p \neq p' and w p' = blue
         by (auto simp: blues-seen-def)
       hence ?w' p' = blue by auto
       with \langle ?w' \ guru \neq blue \rangle show valid ?w'
         unfolding valid-def by auto
     qed
```

```
moreover have leaves n' p' w = leaves n' p' ?w' if n' < n for n' p'
   proof -
     have not-leavesI: \neg leaves n' p' w'
       if valid w' w' guru \neq blue and P: w' p' = blue \implies n' < card (blues-seen w' p') for w'
     proof (cases w' p' = blue)
       case True
       then have leaves n' p' w' \longleftrightarrow n' \ge card (blues-seen w' p')
         using less. IH \langle n' < n \rangle \langle valid \ w' \rangle \langle w' \ quru \neq blue \rangle
       with P[OF \langle w' | p' = blue \rangle] show \neg leaves n' p' w' by simp
     \mathbf{next}
       case False
       then show \neg leaves n' p' w'
         using only-blue-eyes-leave \langle valid \ w' \rangle by auto
     qed
     have \neg leaves n' p' w
     proof (intro not-leavesI)
       assume w p' = blue
       with \langle w|p = blue \rangle have card (blues-seen w|p \rangle = card (blues-seen w|p' \rangle
         apply (cases p = p', simp)
         by (intro blues-seen-others; auto)
       with \langle n' < n \rangle and \langle n < card (blues-seen w p) \rangle show n' < card (blues-seen w p')
         by simp
     \mathbf{qed} \ fact +
     moreover have \neg leaves n' p' ?w'
     proof (intro not-leavesI)
       assume ?w' p' = blue
       with colors-distinct have p \neq p' and ?w' p \neq blue by auto
       hence card (blues-seen ?w'p) = Suc (card (blues-seen ?w'p'))
         using \langle ?w' | p' = blue \rangle
         by (intro blues-seen-others; auto)
       moreover have blues-seen w p = blues-seen ?w' p
         unfolding blues-seen-def by auto
       ultimately show n' < card (blues\text{-}seen ?w' p')
         using \langle n' < n \rangle and \langle n < card (blues-seen w p) \rangle
         by auto
     qed fact +
     ultimately show leaves n' p' w = leaves n' p' ?w' by simp
   ultimately have possible n p w ?w'
     using \langle valid w \rangle
     by (auto simp: possible.simps)
   moreover have ?w' p \neq blue
     using colors-distinct by auto
   ultimately have \neg leaves n p w
     unfolding leaves.simps
     using \langle w | p = blue \rangle by blast
  then show leaves n \ p \ w \Longrightarrow n \ge card \ (blues\text{-seen} \ w \ p)
   \mathbf{by} fastforce
qed
```

This can be combined into a theorem that describes the behavior of the logicians based on the objective count of blue-eyed people, and not the count by a specific person. The xkcd puzzle is

qed

```
the instance where n = 99.
theorem blue-eyes:
  assumes card \{p. \ w \ p = blue\} = Suc \ n \ and \ valid \ w \ and \ w \ guru \neq blue
 shows leaves k \ p \ w \longleftrightarrow w \ p = blue \land k \ge n
proof (cases w p = blue)
  \mathbf{case} \ \mathit{True}
  with assms have card (blues-seen w p) = n
    unfolding blues-seen-def by simp
  then show ?thesis
    \mathbf{using} \ \langle w \ p = blue \rangle \ \langle valid \ w \rangle \ \langle w \ guru \neq blue \rangle \ blue-leaves
    by simp
next
  {f case}\ {\it False}
  then show ?thesis
    using only-blue-eyes-leave \langle valid \ w \rangle by auto
qed
end
```

### 5 Future work

After completing this formalization, I have been made aware of epistemic logic. The *possible worlds* model in section 2 turns out to be quite similar to the usual semantics of this logic. It might be interesting to solve this puzzle within the axiom system of epistemic logic, without explicit reasoning about possible worlds.

### References

- [1] R. Fagin, J.Y. Halpern, Y. Moses, and M.Y. Vardi. Reasoning About Knowledge. MIT Press, 1995
- [2] Randall Munroe. Blue eyes a logic puzzle. URL: https://xkcd.com/blue\_eyes.html.