

Axiom-Free Ontological Trinity

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Abstract

This study reconstructs metaphysical arguments within a framework of computational formalization and machine verification, thereby recasting ontological claims as candidates for formal validation.

This paper presents a formal development in **automated reasoning for metaphysical systems**, treating ontological arguments as precisely specified logical theories subject to machine verification. We provide an Isabelle/HOL formalization that reconstructs and verifies the core claims of **two prior philosophical arguments** within higher-order logic.

Working entirely within HOL and introducing no additional axioms beyond the base logic, the development proceeds by conservative definitional extension (U-layer methodology). We define the concept of **H-Optimality** (H_{opt})—capturing the ultimate truth concept of “a truth so certain that no more certain truth can be conceived”—as a structurally maximal admissible ground characterized by maximal non-trivial support relations and a finality condition.

A Hilbert-style flat-model interpretation establishes the internal consistency and non-vacuity of this definitional package. This confirmation of the concept’s consistency fulfills the core objective pursued by ontological arguments since G. W. Leibniz. Within this framework, we formally derive structural exclusion results for H_{opt} at the level of argument-classes: the cases $N = 1$ (singularity), $N = 2$ (strict duality), and $N \geq 4$ independent maxima are ruled out by \approx -collapse (Arg-equivalence collapse) and $=$ -collapse (numerical-identity collapse) mechanisms. Consequently, $N = 3$ emerges as the unique admissible cardinality compatible with the stated maximality and exclusion conditions.

We further prove a **Definitional Finality Theorem**: assuming $H_{\text{opt}}(q)$ and that any definition D ranges over the pan-domain (PDom), there does not exist an r satisfying $D(r)$ such that $\text{Arg}(q) \prec \text{Arg}(r)$. This establishes a precise formal boundary for admissible strengthening under the given definitions, proving that the definition of a truth strictly superior to H_{opt} is impossible.

Finally, bounded finite-model search (Nitpick) identifies a genuine satisfying model, providing mechanized evidence for the existence of a non-vacuous and genuine triune model.

Contributions

The central technical result is an **Isabelle-kernel-certified consistency and satisfiability guarantee**: without introducing additional axioms at the U-layer (axiom-free), the candidate supreme-truth structure H_{opt} remains internally coherent and avoids informational vacuity or unintended identifications across minimal and flat interpretations. Its satisfiability is witnessed by an explicit **Hilbert-style flat-model construction**.

- **Axiom-free, definition-only foundation (U-layer).** All principal results are derived by conservative definitional extension within HOL, without additional user-level axioms, and are accompanied by an explicit **axiom-audit artifact**.
- **Epistemic Admissibility, Not Ontological Postulation.** Crucially, in deriving the necessary multiplicity of the ground, the relational **Edge** is not assumed as an ontological fact but treated as an epistemically admissible configuration—i.e., Edge has not been refuted in the current proof-theoretic state. The exclusion results therefore rely on formal admissibility status, not on ontological postulation.
- **Maximality via Cantorian size comparison (injection-based).** The maximality core of H_{opt} compares support-edge sets using injections (\preceq_c), enabling the treatment of infinite support structures without reliance on finite cardinal arithmetic.
- **Vacuity Diagnosis via \approx -Collapse (Arg-equivalence collapse).** As rigorously detailed in **Section 11**, the framework introduces a computational “Vacuity Diagnosis.” It mathematically proves that when hypostases undergo an \approx -collapse (**Arg-equivalence collapse**), the **joint-support between them becomes vacuous**, thereby yielding a **relationally vacuous triune structure of MaxNT-satisfiers** (i.e., a triune configuration of MaxNT-satisfiers whose Arg-images fall into a single equivalence class, so that MaxNT loses its relational discriminative content under Arg-equivalence). **Crucially, the necessity of the triune configuration ($N = 3$) persists as the unique logical fixed point even under this vacuous support state, as any other cardinality remains strictly inconsistent.**
- **Structural exclusions at the level of argument-classes.** The formalization excludes $N = 1$ (singularity), $N = 2$ (strict duality), and $N \geq 4$ independent maximal configurations via \approx -collapse (**Arg-equivalence collapse**) and $=$ -collapse (**numerical-identity collapse**) mechanisms, thereby establishing $N = 3$ as **the unique cardinality** compatible with the stated maximality and exclusion conditions.
- **Triune closure derived as an internal theorem ($N3$).** From the exclusion results together with maximality and coverage conditions, the system derives a fully symmetric “pair implies third” closure pattern, formalized as the $N3$ case.
- **Definitional Finality and Formal Limit.** The system establishes a **Definitional Finality Theorem**: assuming $H_{\text{opt}}(q)$ and that a definition D ranges over PDom , there does not exist an r satisfying $D(r)$ such that $\text{Arg}(q) \prec \text{Arg}(r)$. Accordingly, H_{opt} constitutes a **logically maximal admissible structure** under the given definitional package, identifying a precise formal boundary for structurally coherent strengthening within the system.
- **Leibnizian possibility via internal consistency proof.** The consistency of H_{opt} is formally established through a flat-model interpretation without additional axioms, pro-

viding a **mechanized realization of Leibniz’s requirement** that the possibility (non-contradiction) of the most perfect being be secured within the system.

- **Avoidance of Gödelian modal collapse.** Unlike many Gödel-style ontological formalizations, the present system preserves modal contingency and **avoids the standard modal collapse phenomenon** associated with certain Gödel-style axiom systems, while admitting a concrete satisfying model.
- **Mechanized witness of non-vacuity (Nitpick genuine model).** Automated finite-model search identifies a **genuine model** witnessing satisfiability, confirming that the $N = 3$ configuration constitutes a non-vacuous logical structure.
- **Actuality specialization at the designated point e_0 (TriuneGod_ e_0).** The universal $N3$ closure is instantiated at the distinguished U-point e_0 and packaged as a single internal theorem, yielding an “**actuality-at- e_0** ” result without invoking external modal axioms.
- **Structural reinterpretation of G. Frege’s “The True.”** By identifying the triune structure of H_{opt} as a structured logical object that can be interpreted as corresponding to Frege’s *Das Wahre*, the formalization offers a constructive account of how the referent (*Bedeutung*) of true propositions may possess **internal, non-trivial structure** rather than being informationally trivial.
- **Ordinal/Cardinal Transcendence of Triune Unity.** The formalization mathematically demonstrates that the triune relational pattern cannot be embedded into a simple linear ordinal chain. It proves that the symmetric “pair implies third” joint-support structure is mutually irreducible and exceeds linear hierarchies, formally modeling the plurality of persons and unity of essence as distinct, non-contradictory dimensions.

Hierarchical Dependency of the Core Conditions

The MaxNT framework, which serves as the formal engine of this development, is governed by a precise four-level dependency. This architecture establishes a rigorous ontological foundation, blocks informationally vacuous states, and guarantees structural stability:

1. **Internal Consistency** (*satisfiability*): The definitional package of MaxNT is formally proven to be free of contradiction via a flat-model witness. This satisfies Leibniz’s strict prerequisite that the supreme concept must first be demonstrated as logically possible before any structural properties are derived.
2. **Finality** (*no-superiority*): Within the epistemic domain, no strictly higher certainty point exists, arresting infinite regress.
3. **Relational Maximality** (*structural richness*): MaxNT maximizes non-trivial incoming relational structure. This maximal richness exerts decisive logical pressure toward a *triune* realization rather than a degenerate or \approx -**collapsible** form.

4. **Non-vacuity** (*triune realization, strong level*): The triune form is upgraded to a genuine, non-vacuous structure by *forbidding \approx -collapse (Arg-equivalence collapse)*. Importantly, non-vacuity is **not** a necessary condition for the Trinity-necessity claim itself; it functions as an anti-vacuity certification that the triune distinction is **structurally non- \approx -collapsible**.

Accordingly, the structural fixed point is *founded* upon proven consistency, *motivated* by relational maximality, and strictly deduced via Arg-nonidentity, while non-vacuity *strengthens* the overall result by certifying a non-collapsible, non-empty realization.

Keywords: Automated Reasoning in Metaphysics, Modal Collapse, Kurt Gödel, Ontological Argument, Epistemic Modal Logic, Consistency, Necessity, Trinity, Isabelle/HOL.

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1 Introduction and Axiom-Free Methodology

1.1 Motivation: Historical Context and Limitations

The ontological argument, from Anselm to Gödel, aims to derive the existence (and attributes) of a Supreme Being from conceptual structure. However, traditional ontological arguments remain in an incomplete state because the consistency of the concept of a “most perfect being” has never been rigorously demonstrated. This limitation stems from the fact that “perfection”—the core concept of such proofs—suffers from ambiguity in its definition and allows for divergent metaphysical interpretations.

Additional technical limitation: modal collapse. A further well-known fragility in Gödel-style ontological encodings under strong modal backgrounds is the *modal collapse* pattern, where local modal principles can propagate globally and erase contingency. In this development, this risk is addressed explicitly at the mechanized level in **Section 7 of the Diagnostics file** by a targeted pattern whose intent is to block derivations of the strengthened implication (Trinity $\rightarrow R$) from the weaker enabling implication (Trinity $\rightarrow \diamond R$). A *Nitpick* countermodel witness is recorded to confirm that Trinity and $\neg R$ can co-exist consistently while $\diamond R$ holds.

1.2 The Paradigm Shift: From Ambiguity to Mathematical Definition

A critical flaw in Gödel’s original formulation is its reliance on the concepts of “**Perfection**” and “**Positive Properties.**” Traditionally, the supreme being is defined as an entity so perfect that no greater perfection can be conceived. However, these notions are semantically ambiguous and lack a precise decision procedure, making the logical foundation vulnerable to subjective interpretation.

In contrast, this paper eliminates such ambiguity by introducing the concept of “**Relative Certainty**” and defining it mathematically via the support order ($a \preceq b$). By replacing vague qualitative notions with a rigorous structural definition, we ensure that the deduction proceeds from clear logical properties rather than intuitive moral qualities. Consequently, this work shifts the axis of the theistic argumentation from “**Existence and Perfection**” to “**Truth and Maximal Certainty,**” achieving a formal verification that is logically robust. Specifically, the concept of “**a truth so certain that no greater certainty can be conceived**” corresponds directly to H_{opt} in our formalization, and the mechanized development rigorously proves the existence of an argument satisfying this H_{opt} . Ultimately, this formalization is grounded in the principle that certainty is intrinsically tied to universality: the most certain truth is the most universal truth.

Clarification on “Axiom-Free” Methodology In this paper, the term *axiom-free* is used in a relative, Isabelle/HOL-internal sense. It does *not* mean that the axioms and inference principles of Higher-Order Logic (HOL), on which Isabelle is based, are avoided or questioned. Rather, it means that the development introduces **no additional axioms beyond HOL** in the

user theory—in particular, no extra metaphysical or modal postulates (e.g. S5 axioms, “positive property” axioms, or existence postulates for distinguished predicates). All results are obtained by **definitional (conservative) extensions** and standard HOL reasoning. Accordingly, the trust base is the standard Isabelle/HOL kernel (and the definitions stated in this development), and an **axiom-audit** is provided to document that no unintended axioms are assumed. From a positioning perspective, this axiom-free development can be read as engaging with a Fregean constraint on truth: the objectivity of truth is treated not as a semantic stipulation, but as a consequence of definitional closure within the mechanization.

1.3 Why Gödel-style Ontological Arguments Often Become Fragile

The technical difficulty of ontological arguments is not merely to derive some modal conclusion from a few premises, but to do so without allowing modal strength to *leak* into the entire system. Gödel-style arguments are typically based on: (i) a strong modal logic (e.g., S5), (ii) a substantive axiom system about “positive properties,” and (iii) a definition of God designed to interact maximally with both. Small changes in any component can produce disproportionate consequences, such as inconsistency, vacuity, or *modal collapse*.

A further source of fragility is *domain confusion*: the “supreme being” is frequently treated as an object fully internal to the same domain as ordinary truths, while the proof simultaneously requires it to function as a regulator of that domain. This is precisely the kind of setting in which collapse phenomena are easiest to trigger.

1.4 Resolution in the Diagnostics File: Blocking Modal Collapse by a targeted pattern and witness

The collapse route is probed and blocked explicitly in the mechanization by the **Trinity truth-making pattern** introduced in **Section 7 of the Diagnostics file**. The design intent is to keep necessity confined to the supreme structure while avoiding a system-level strengthening that would force creaturely truths.

Formally, the development records the enabling pattern:

$$\text{Trinity}(\Phi, \Omega, \psi) \longrightarrow \diamond R \quad \text{and} \quad \neg \text{Trinity}(\Phi, \Omega, \psi) \longrightarrow \neg R,$$

and then runs a bounded countermodel search to refute the strengthened implication ($\text{Trinity} \rightarrow R$). A genuine *Nitpick* countermodel witness is recorded to confirm that $\text{Trinity}(\Phi, \Omega, \psi) \wedge \neg R$ is consistent while $\diamond R$ holds. This block is diagnostic: within tested bounds, it shows that the enabling implication does not force the stronger one.

1.5 Formal Blueprint: The Four Phases

To address these challenges, this paper structures the formal verification into four logical phases:

Phase I: Foundations (Sections 1–2) We establish the **U-Layer**, an abstract universe of discourse, relying on a primitive entailment relation (\vdash) and a designated world-point \mathbf{e}_0 .

Phase II: Core Principles and Existence (Sections 3–4) We rigorously define **H-Optimality** (H_{opt}) and provide a **Consistency Proof** using a *flat-model witness* to demonstrate satisfiability.

Phase III: Uniqueness and Necessity (Sections 5–6) We introduce the *Sandwich Theorem* and *Band \approx -Collapse*, proving that any attempt to introduce a fourth independent principle forces an \approx -collapse into the existing core. Combined with the exclusion of $N = 1$ and $N = 2$, we derive that a triune structure (*TriSupport*) is the only stable maximal configuration.

Phase IV: Actuality and Diagnostics (Section 17 & Diagnostics File) We prove that the triune structure is actual at \mathbf{e}_0 (*TriuneGod_e0*), explicitly discharge methodological preconditions, and report sanity checks via bounded finite-model search (Nitpick).

Phase V: Final Locale Audit (Section 28) We mathematically discharge the core locale assumptions via a *sublocale* proof. This section features two distinct subsections (**28.1** for discharging No-Superfluous and related core conditions, and **28.2** for discharging the *Excl4* constraint for the Uniqueness of the Trinity), finalizing the strictly axiom-free certification of the system.

1.6 Reproducibility and Trust Base

All formal claims in this paper refer to theorems checked by the Isabelle/HOL kernel (`theorem ... proof ... qed`). The intended trust base is therefore:

- the standard Isabelle/HOL kernel and its standard libraries,
- the conservative definitions introduced in this development, and
- an accompanying axiom-audit artifact documenting that no unintended axioms are assumed in user space.

Build recipe (template). The development is intended to be buildable by the standard command:

```
isabelle build -D .
```

The following metadata should be recorded in the final camera-ready version:

- Isabelle version: Isabelle2025
- Platform: Windows x86_64 (Poly/ML 5.9.1)
- Session name(s): Trinity_necessity_Proof
- Optional: Nitpick used for diagnostic model exploration.

2 Related Work and Positioning

This work is positioned at the intersection of (i) classical ontological arguments, (ii) formal metaphysics, and (iii) interactive theorem proving. The standard Gödel-style lineage proceeds by stipulating a *positivity* predicate and adopting strong modal axioms (commonly S5), then defining a Godlike being to interact maximally with both. Subsequent variants refine the axiom set or the definition of positivity, often motivated by known fragilities (e.g. inconsistency risks, modal collapse patterns, or sensitivity to domain assumptions).

In contrast, the present development shifts the core engine from “positive properties” to a *structural order* on grounds (support-based \preceq), and formulates supreme truth via a definitional package (H_{opt}) expressing *maximal non-trivial support*. The headline methodological distinction is that we assume no additional metaphysical or modal axioms in user space beyond HOL; instead we push all strength into conservative definitions and prove consequences inside the standard kernel. In this sense the contribution is less about proposing another axiom set, and more about presenting a verified *definition-driven* reconstruction whose exclusion results force a uniquely stable triune configuration (up to argument-equivalence).

Formal-methods note. In the tradition of mechanized metaphysics, our emphasis is not only on producing a derivation, but also on making the trust base explicit (kernel + definitions) and adding diagnostics that guard against vacuity or “toy-model” readings.

3 Formal Preliminaries: The U-Layer and e_0

3.1 Propositions, grounds, and support

Definition 3.1 (U-Layer, Propositions, and Grounds). To perfectly match the structural definitions within the Isabelle/HOL formalization, we define the foundational elements as follows:

- Propositions are standard HOL booleans (`bool`).
- \mathcal{U} (\mathcal{U}) is an abstract type representing the universe of grounds (or world-points).
- $\text{Arg} : \text{bool} \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$ maps propositions to their corresponding argument-objects (grounds).
- $\text{SuppU}(u) = \{e \in \mathcal{U} \mid e \vdash u\}$ defines the support set for a ground u , based on a primitive entailment relation (\vdash).
- $\text{Supports}(e, p) \equiv e \vdash \text{Arg}(p)$ abbreviates the relation: “ground e supports proposition p .”

3.2 Strength order on grounds

Definition 3.2 (Support order \preceq). For argument objects $a, b \in \mathcal{U}$, define

$$a \preceq b \iff \text{SuppU}(a) \subseteq \text{SuppU}(b).$$

Definition 3.3 (Equivalence of grounds). For argument objects $a, b \in \mathcal{U}$,

$$a \approx b \iff (a \preceq b) \wedge (b \preceq a).$$

3.3 Epistemic possibility

Definition 3.4 (Epistemic possibility, \diamond_e). We formally define the refutation status as follows:

- $\text{Refuted}(p)$ ¹: The truth-bearer p is in a **currently refuted state** (a proof of falsity exists within the current system).
- $\neg\text{Refuted}(p)$: The truth-bearer p is in a **currently unrefuted state** (currently no proof of falsity exists).

Consequently, epistemic possibility is defined as:

$$\diamond_e p \iff \neg\text{Refuted}(p).$$

In our code, “**Not-refuted**” means that no proof of falsity has been obtained yet (It may be that it is inherently unfalsifiable, or simply that the proof of its impossibility has not yet been attained; regardless, no refutation of it currently exists.); hence the proposition remains epistemically admissible. For example, the Riemann hypothesis may in fact be true or false; however, since no proof of its falsity has been established, it remains epistemically possible.

3.4 The designated actuality ground \mathbf{e}_0

Definition 3.5 (Actuality ground \mathbf{e}_0). $\mathbf{e}_0 \in \mathcal{U}$ is a designated ground representing the actual state of affairs (the “now” of this paper).

Definition 3.6 (Truth-at-actuality, TrueNow). A proposition p is true-at-actuality iff it is supported by \mathbf{e}_0 :

$$\text{TrueNow}(p) \iff \text{Supports}(\mathbf{e}_0, p).$$

¹In the Isabelle development, the refutation predicate is named `Ref`.

4 The H-Optimality (H_{opt})

We now introduce the core engine of the argument: H_{opt} . The role of H_{opt} is to capture “supreme truth grounding” structurally. In the formalization, this is realized via the concept of **Maximal Non-Trivial (MaxNT)** support edges.

4.1 Structure of H-Optimality and Cantorian Size

The definition of H_{opt} is designed to identify a structural maximum in the universe of grounds without resorting to arbitrary “positive properties.”

Definition 4.1 (Maximality via Cantorian One-to-One Correspondence). The formalization utilizes a score-based maximality where $H_{\text{opt}}(q)$ implies that the argument-class of q maximizes the set of incoming non-trivial support edges among possible heads. **As detailed in Section 9**, this size comparison is not limited to finite cardinality. Instead, it employs the **Cantorian method of one-to-one correspondence** (injections) to handle potentially infinite sets of supporting grounds. Formally, we define $A \preceq_c B$ iff there exists an injection from A into B . Thus, maximality implies that no other head has a support-set strictly larger (in the Cantorian sense) than that of q .

Definition 4.2 (Strict Superiority Block). A candidate q satisfying H_{opt} includes a strict anti-above condition, ensuring no other argument in the relevant domain is strictly superior to it.

4.2 The Core Mechanism: The H-Principle

The definition of H_{opt} directly entails a structural *grounding participation* constraint, which we term the **H-Principle**. It is important to emphasize that the H-Principle is **not introduced as an additional premise or axiom**; rather, it is a **formally proven theorem** derived exclusively from the definitional structure of H_{opt} and the deductive rules of Higher-Order Logic (HOL). Intuitively: any truth that is strictly less certain than the Supreme Truth must *contribute to its grounding*.

Definition 4.3 (Strict order on grounds). For $a, b \in \mathcal{U}$, define the strict part of \preceq by

$$a \prec b \iff (a \preceq b) \wedge \neg(b \preceq a).$$

Definition 4.4 (H-Principle (grounding participation)). Let $K \in \mathcal{U}$ be an H_{opt} -candidate. Then every pan-domain truth strictly below K supports K . This principle is formally defined and verified in the mechanization purely from base logic (cf. `H_principle_ep_basic` in **Code Sec 13.1** and `H_principle_self` in **Code Sec 7.3**). Furthermore, **Section 9.2** formally demonstrates that satisfying H_{opt} necessarily implies satisfying this H-Principle (`Hopt_implies_H_principle`). It functions as the logical engine behind the exclusion results: any attempt to introduce a superfluous “supreme” candidate would violate this required grounding participation pattern.

5 Ontological Supremacy and Definitional Finality

In this formalization, the philosophical concept of the “Supreme Being” is strictly stripped of subjective or anthropomorphic attributes. Instead, it is rigorously reconstructed through the lens of relational structure and epistemic support. At the core of this reconstruction lies the definitional equivalence between the ontological label and its mathematical mechanism.

5.1 The Structural Equivalence: $H_{\text{opt}} \equiv \text{MaxNT}$

We define the Supreme Truth, denoted as H_{opt} (Optimal Head), not by an arbitrary list of perfections, but by a purely graph-theoretic and order-theoretic property: MaxNT (Maximal Non-Trivial Support). In Section 9.1 of our formalization, the definition is explicitly given as:

```
definition H_opt :: "bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "H_opt q  $\equiv$  MaxNT q"
```

Crucially, the use of the \equiv symbol in Isabelle/HOL signifies a *meta-equality* rather than mere logical equality ($=$). This means that to the verification kernel, the ontological label H_{opt} is instantly and unconditionally substituted by its mathematical mechanism MaxNT . Furthermore, in Section 9.2, this identity is formally operationalized via the lemma Hopt_to_MaxNT .

This definitional identity is not an isolated occurrence. In Section 13.1, the exact same structural equivalence is mirrored in the epistemic layer:

```
definition H_opt_ep :: "bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "H_opt_ep q  $\equiv$  MaxNT_ep q"
```

This demonstrates that the equivalence between the ontological label and its structural mechanism is a universal principle systematically maintained across all domains of the formalization. MaxNT (and its epistemic counterpart MaxNT_ep) structurally measures the maximal cardinality of incoming non-trivial support edges (\preceq_c) within the logical universe.

Philosophically, to identify the Supreme Being with MaxNT is to redefine God not as an isolated, static entity, but as the ultimate “Ground of Being” structurally realized. If God is the foundational truth from which all other truths derive their reality, then in a formal network of epistemic dependence, God must mathematically appear as the ultimate node that maximally sustains the fabric of reality without relying on a strictly superior support.

By establishing this meta-equivalence at the kernel level across multiple layers, we demonstrate that the “nature of God” in this logical framework is mathematically identical to the “most robust, non-collapsing structural network of truths.”

5.2 Definitional Finality Theorem: The Absolute Bound of Conception

One major achievement of this formalization is the mechanical verification of Anselm’s intuition—“that than which nothing greater can be conceived”—translated into the strict bounds of Higher-Order Logic (HOL).

In Section 27, the theorem `God_finality` establishes that if a proposition q satisfies H_{opt} , there exists no conceivable truth ζ within the entire domain of epistemic possibility (PDom) that is strictly more certain or foundational than q :

$$\forall \zeta \in \text{PDom}. \neg(\text{Arg}(q) < \text{Arg}(\zeta))$$

Furthermore, we elevate this to a meta-logical absolute in Section 9.4. We prove the **Definitional Finality Theorem** (mechanized as `no_definition_strictly_superior_than_H_opt`): assuming $H_{\text{opt}}(q)$ and that a logical definition D ranges over the pan-domain ($\forall r. D r \longrightarrow r \in \text{PDom}$), there does not exist an r satisfying $D(r)$ such that its argument is strictly superior to the argument of H_{opt} :

$$\neg(\exists r. D r \wedge \text{Arg}(q) < \text{Arg}(r))$$

This corollary (`no_definition_strictly_superior_than_H_opt`) serves as a definitive closure to ontological infinite regress. It proves that H_{opt} is a truth so absolutely certain that a more certain truth cannot even be defined or imagined within the logical system. Any attempt to define a concept “greater” or “more fundamental” than the Supreme Truth is not merely philosophically unsound, but is strictly blocked by the definitional boundaries of the system.

6 Consistency of H_{opt} : The Flat-Model Witness

A definition is uninformative if it is contradictory (i.e. unsatisfiable). Before deriving the $N = 3$ structure, we justify that $\exists x. H_{\text{opt}}(x)$ is not vacuous by exhibiting a simple interpretation (a “flat model”) in which the clauses of Definition can be simultaneously satisfied.

6.1 Abstract sanity checks

In the mechanization, automated tools (e.g. SMT via proof reconstruction, and finite counter-model search where appropriate) are used to probe for inconsistency in local configurations of definitions. The intended outcome is evidence that no immediate contradiction is forced by the definitional package.

6.2 Concrete flat-model idea

Let $W = \{i_1, \dots, i_n\}$ be a nonempty index set. Interpret:

- Interpret the abstract ground type \mathcal{U} as $\mathcal{P}(W)$.
- Interpret the primitive entailment \vdash by inclusion: for $e, u \in \mathcal{U}$, define $e \vdash u$ iff $u \subseteq e$.
- Then $\text{Supp}\mathcal{U}(u) := \{e \in \mathcal{U} \mid e \vdash u\} = \{e \in \mathcal{U} \mid u \subseteq e\}$.
- The interpretation of the map $\text{Arg} : \text{bool} \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$ is defined trivially (e.g., $\text{Arg}(p) := \emptyset$ for all p), as provided by the mechanized flat-model witness in the Isabelle development.
- The actuality ground is interpreted as the total set: $\mathbf{e}_0 := W$.

Under this interpretation, since $\text{Arg}(p) \in \mathcal{P}(W)$, the condition $\text{TrueNow}(p)$ equates to $\text{Arg}(p) \subseteq W$, which holds trivially. Hence every proposition is “true-at-actuality” in the degenerate flat witness. Epistemic possibility \diamond_e can be interpreted by taking Refuted to be empty (no proposition is refuted) so that all propositions are epistemically possible.

Define a candidate proposition g such that its argument evaluates to the empty set, $\text{Arg}(g) := \emptyset$. Then for any proposition p , since $\emptyset \subseteq e$ is always true, $\text{SuppU}(\text{Arg}(p)) = \mathcal{U} = \text{SuppU}(\text{Arg}(g))$ holds trivially, hence $\text{Arg}(p) \preceq \text{Arg}(g)$ is satisfied, making g maximal and final by construction.

Theorem 6.1 (Existence in the flat witness). *In the flat-model interpretation above, there exists a candidate g such that $\text{H}_{\text{opt}}(g)$ holds.*

$$\exists p :: \text{bool}. \text{H}_{\text{opt}}(p).$$

Remark 6.1. This flat witness is intentionally degenerate: its sole role is to establish *satisfiability* (hence consistency) of the definitional package, i.e. that the definitions do not immediately collapse into contradiction. It is therefore only a *Stage I* guarantee.

The *informational non-vacuity* and *structural richness* of the framework are secured independently in later sections: non-trivial joint-support edges (`NT_edge`), the anti-collapse results, and (within stated bounds) Nitpick’s explicit genuine satisfying witness for a *non-vacuous triune* configuration (Section 8 in Diagnostics file). Accordingly, the present development goes beyond the flat witness by separately analyzing non-vacuity and structural differentiation.

7 Exclusion of Alternatives and N3 Necessity

Having established that $\exists x.H_{\text{opt}}(x)$ is non-vacuous, we turn to the structural question:

How many mutually non-equivalent H_{opt} -witnesses can coexist without \approx -collapse (Arg-equivalence collapse) at the argument level?

The key point is that we do *not* count witnesses extensionally (as mere syntactic objects), but *modulo argument-equivalence*. Hence, “many” witnesses are only meaningful insofar as they inhabit genuinely different argument classes. We proceed by structural exclusion, eliminating $N = 1$, $N = 2$, and $N \geq 4$, and then exhibiting the positive stability of $N = 3$.

7.1 Method: Epistemic Distinctness via Argument Classes

Definition 7.1 (Epistemic Distinctness).

$$\text{Distinct}_{ep}(A, B) := \neg(\text{Arg}(A) \approx \text{Arg}(B)).$$

When we speak of N witnesses, we mean N candidates satisfying H_{opt} that are pairwise Distinct_{ep} . This choice is crucial: in the U-layer, two objects can be syntactically different while still being indistinguishable as grounds/reasons once passed through $\text{Arg}(\cdot)$.

Interpretive Note. Intuitively, $\text{Arg}(X) \preceq \text{Arg}(Y)$ reads as “the grounds carried by Y cover (at least) those carried by X.” Therefore, $\text{Arg}(X) \approx \text{Arg}(Y)$ means that the joint-support between X and Y degenerates into a **relationally vacuous (trivial) state**, losing genuine informational distinction. Crucially, even under such an \approx -collapse, the structural necessity of the triune configuration ($N = 3$) remains strictly intact; it is merely the relational *content* that becomes vacuous. To ensure we are counting genuinely non-vacuous pillars of truth, we define epistemic distinctness via non-equivalence. Our exclusion results show that any attempt to introduce additional independent pillars (e.g., $N \geq 4$) inevitably forces them to undergo this vacuous \approx -collapse.

7.2 The Epistemic Fact of the Edge: Foundation of Exclusion

The structural exclusion of Monism ($N = 1$) and Dualism ($N = 2$) hinges on a single, undeniable pivot: **The Non-Refutation of the Edge**. Within the framework of the \mathcal{U} -layer, a non-trivial, creative relationship (an “Edge”) is not assumed to be an objective reality; rather, it is treated strictly as an **not yet unrefuted epistemic possibility** (\diamond_e). **The appeal to non-refutation is not an ontological commitment to the existence of the Edge, but a bookkeeping constraint within the admissibility layer: any structure claiming maximal coverage must remain compatible with unrefuted configurations.**

The role of non-refutation. Under $\diamond_e p \leftrightarrow \neg \text{Refuted}(p)$, the Edge proposition is treated as an *admissible* configuration unless it is refuted in the current theory-state. This does not assert

the Edge as an objective ontological fact; it only constrains maximal-coverage claims to remain compatible with currently unrefuted configurations. Non-degeneracy of \diamond_e is separately guarded by the sanity checks reported in the Diagnostics file (Section 7).

Therefore, the mere fact that a relational Edge (which structurally requires at least three distinct entities: $A \neq B \neq r$) remains in the set of currently not-yet-refuted epistemic possibilities is logically sufficient to trigger the **H-Principle**. Because the Edge is epistemically admissible, the Optimal Head (H_{opt}) is strictly obligated to be structurally capable of supporting and covering it. Since $N = 1$ and $N = 2$ lack the combinatorial capacity to host three distinct entities (by the Pigeonhole Principle), they are structurally incapable of providing this coverage and are thus disqualified by their own structural poverty. (As diagnostically explored later in Section 9(Diagnostics file), the existence of a genuine triadic model within the tested scopes supports the reading that this Edge is a logically viable configuration, not a spurious construct.)

The computational diagnostics detailed in Section 9(Diagnostics file) provide bounded computational evidence of the epistemic admissibility of the Edge by exhibiting a non-vacuous model of the trinitarian structure. The existence of this genuine model serves as an ancillary witness supporting the core premise of the exclusion results: that the relational Edge constitutes a non-explosive possibility within the Isabelle/HOL environment.

7.3 Section 11: Vacuity Diagnosis: If NT-edge is dead, a relationally vacuous triune structure of MaxNT-satisfiers emerges

In Section 11(Main Code), we establish the strict mathematical criterion for Maximality (MaxNT) via a formal vacuity diagnosis. It proves that if hypostases undergo an \approx -collapse (**Arg-equivalence collapse**)—for instance, if the Arg-images of the triune form an equivalence class induced by pervasive 1-to-1 mutual support—then the relational (joint) support among the Trinity is reduced to vacuous support, yielding a **relationally vacuous triune structure of MaxNT-satisfiers** (a triune configuration of MaxNT-satisfiers whose Arg-images are \approx -equivalent, so that MaxNT loses its relational discriminative content and collapses to a purely head-like condition). This formally establishes that without non-trivial distinction, the structural supports become informationally vacuous.

Fixed-point invariance. Even under \approx -collapse (Arg-equivalence collapse) where joint-support becomes vacuous, the cardinality exclusions ($\neg(N = 1)$, $\neg(N = 2)$, $\neg(N \geq 4)$) remain intact; hence $N = 3$ persists as the unique consistency-preserving fixed point. Vacuity affects informational content, not the structural necessity. Relational vacuity affects only informational content, and does not affect the **structural necessity** ($N = 3$).

Definition 7.2 (Non-trivial joint-support edge). We say that $(A, B) \Rightarrow C$ is a *non-trivial* joint-support edge iff

$$\text{NT_edge}(A, B, C) \iff (\text{Arg}(A \wedge B) \preceq \text{Arg}(C)) \wedge \neg(\text{Arg}(A \wedge B) \approx \text{Arg}(A)) \wedge \neg(\text{Arg}(A \wedge B) \approx \text{Arg}(B)).$$

Thus a joint-support counts as non-trivial only if the conjunction does *not* undergo an \approx -collapse (Arg-equivalence collapse) to either conjunct.

Lemma 7.1 (Binary subordination forces \approx -collapse on joint support). *If $\text{Arg}(A) \preceq \text{Arg}(B)$, then $\text{Arg}(A \wedge B) \approx \text{Arg}(A)$.*

Kernel-certified reference. This is the mechanized collapse lemma proved in the formalization. □

Corollary 7.1 (\approx -collapse blocks non-trivial edges). *If $\text{Arg}(A) \preceq \text{Arg}(B)$, then for any C , $\neg \text{NT_edge}(A, B, C)$.*

Proof. By Lemma 7.1, $\text{Arg}(A \wedge B) \approx \text{Arg}(A)$, contradicting Definition 7.2. □

7.4 Section 12: TriSupport-Joint and Ternary Semantics (No 1-to-1)

Building upon the vacuity diagnosis of Section 11–12 mechanically verifies how 1-to-1 subordination destroys the trinitarian engine. If 1-to-1 mutual support is allowed between any elements a and b , the ternary joint-support equation ($\text{Arg}(a \wedge b) \preceq \text{Arg}(c)$) devolves into a mere linear derivation ($\text{Arg}(a) \preceq \text{Arg}(c)$). In this informationally vacuous state, the joint participation of the second entity (b) becomes mathematically superfluous, failing to generate a genuine, non-reductive triadic relation.

Because the Supreme Truth (H_{opt}) is defined mathematically by the maximization of *non-trivial* relational edges (MaxNT), any configuration that trivializes joint support inherently fails to reach the maximum cardinality of MaxNT . Therefore, the kernel-verified code explicitly proves that the strict structural exclusion of 1-to-1 mutual support ($\neg(\text{Arg}(a) \preceq \text{Arg}(b))$) is not an arbitrary theological constraint, but a strict mathematical necessity to prevent the vacuity collapse proven in Section 11.

7.5 Section 13.3: Rescue block: $H_{\text{opt}3} \Rightarrow N3$ (with pure joint support)

Section 13.3 explicitly formulates the $H_{\text{opt}3}$ rescue block, logically guaranteeing that three optimal heads (H_{opt}) can strictly co-support a third without falling into 1-to-1 subordination. This section verifies that the pure ternary joint-support structure (TriSupport_Joint) seamlessly bridges into the $N = 3$ necessity, successfully preserving the maximal non-triviality required by H_{opt} without succumbing to the informational vacuity proven in Section 11.

7.6 Section 15.2: Structural Collapse of Monism ($N = 1$)

Section 15.2 demonstrates the logical impossibility of a single-headed ground ($N = 1$) through the lens of the **H-Principle (Coverage Principle)**.

- **The Requirement of Plurality:** A non-trivial relationship or “Edge” ($A, B \rightarrow r$) structurally requires at least two distinct participants ($A \neq B$). In a Monistic model where exactly one Head exists, any potential relation undergoes a **=-collapse (numerical-identity collapse)**, rendering the set of creative edges necessarily empty (\emptyset).

- **The H-Principle Contradiction:** According to the **H-Principle**, an Optimal Head (H_{opt}) must cover and support the entire domain of epistemic possibilities (\diamond_e) (proved in **Code Sec 13.1 and 7.3**, and **Code Sec 9.2** formally demonstrates that satisfying H_{opt} implies satisfying this H-Principle). Since **EdgeExist remains in the set of currently not-yet-refuted epistemic possibilities**, an $N = 1$ head—which is structurally incapable of relations—cannot provide the required coverage.
- **Conclusion:** The $N = 1$ model is disqualified not by an external axiom, but by its own structural poverty; it is too “small” to ground a universe that contains the possibility of relationship.

To use a simple analogy: being the sole top student in a weaker school does not yet guarantee absolute supremacy, since a stronger student may still exist in a more demanding school. By contrast, sharing first place in the most elite school, already populated by the strongest admissible students, leaves no such open possibility. Structurally, the same point holds here. A solitary top element in an impoverished comparison domain may still fail to be genuinely unsurpassable, since a richer domain could in principle contain a stronger candidate. By contrast, a co-maximal structure realized within a comparison domain already saturated by the strongest admissible candidates removes that possibility altogether. Hence the decisive issue is not merely whether a candidate is “top”, but whether its top-status is realized within the maximally relevant comparison space.

7.7 Section 16: Exclusion of $N = 2$: duality cannot strictly exceed $N = 1$ in MaxNT (mutual vs. non-mutual cases)

Section 16 excludes the dualistic model ($N = 2$) by a two-pronged formal analysis, showing both its internal structural instability and its inability to sustain the higher-order creative richness required by MaxNT.

- **Internal collapse dilemma (mutual vs. non-mutual):** As established in the formal development, an $N = 2$ configuration faces a strict dilemma. If the two ultimate Heads mutually support one another, they immediately undergo an \approx -collapse at the level of Arg-equivalence. If, on the other hand, they are non-mutual yet perfectly symmetric, they generate identically empty relational scores ($A \approx_{NT} B$), so that no epistemically significant distinction is preserved (Distinct_ep fails). In either case, a genuinely functionally differentiated dual structure fails to arise. Thus, $N = 2$ cannot establish a structure that strictly surpasses the effective capacity of $N = 1$.
- **Combinatorial incapacity (pigeonhole constraint):** Within this framework, a non-trivial creative edge requires at least three distinct relata ($A \neq B \neq r$), so that the relation is genuinely productive rather than a disguised form of self-circularity. But in an exactly $N = 2$ world, only two Heads are available in total. Hence, by a simple pigeonhole constraint, it is impossible to assign three distinct relational roles from a domain of size two.

- **Epistemic disqualification (MaxNT candidate failure):** Following the exact formal refutation architecture used for $N = 1$, the $N = 2$ model is formally disqualified as a viable `MaxNT_candidate`. The proof hinges on the epistemically unrefuted status of a non-trivial edge (\diamond_E `EdgeExist`). Because `EdgeExist` structurally requires three distinct relational nodes, it entails \neg `ExactlyTwoHeadsP`. Consequently, the epistemic admissibility of the edge entails the epistemic admissibility of \neg `ExactlyTwoHeadsP`. Within the `MaxNT` evaluation, this renders \neg `ExactlyTwoHeadsP` a strictly `stronger_edge` alternative than $N = 2$ itself. The $N = 2$ configuration therefore formally fails the `MaxNT_candidate_N2` condition and is accordingly excluded.

7.8 Exclusion of Multiplicity ($N \geq 4$): Band \approx -Collapse

Theorem 7.1 (No Four Distinct Argument Classes: Band \approx -Collapse). *As proven in the mechanization (cf. `no_four_distinct_classes`), there do not exist four H_{opt} -witnesses that are pairwise Distinct_{ep} .*

Proof Sketch. The proof utilizes a **Band \approx -Collapse** argument. If we assume a core structure (e.g., $S = \Omega \wedge \Psi$) and introduce a fourth independent pillar Δ , the *Sandwich Theorem* demonstrates that Δ must sit between the core and the covering band. Under the structural constraints of H_{opt} , this position is unstable for an independent pillar, forcing Δ to undergo an **\approx -collapse (Arg-equivalence collapse)** into the core ($\text{Arg}(\Delta) \approx \text{Arg}(S)$). Thus, any attempt to proliferate beyond three results in an **\approx -collapse**. \square

7.9 The Dual Avoidance: Identity vs. Equivalence

The structural proof rigorously distinguishes between numerical identity and logical equivalence, thereby avoiding two distinct logical cliffs:

- **Identity ($=$ -collapse) \Rightarrow Inconsistency (Contradiction):** If the hypostases undergo a **$=$ -collapse (numerical-identity collapse)** ($A = B = C$), the system is forced into a monistic state ($N = 1$). As established, a strictly monistic ground is structurally incapable of hosting the non-trivial relational support required by the definitions. Forcing $N = 1$ into the maximal coverage system induces a **logical contradiction**, causing the system to collapse entirely. This proves that *a non-triune configuration is formally impossible to exist*.
- **Equivalence Class (\approx -collapse) \Rightarrow Vacuity (Informational Emptiness):** If the hypostases maintain the $N = 3$ structural boundary but their argument-grounds (`Arg`) undergo an **\approx -collapse (Arg-equivalence collapse)**, the system avoids formal contradiction. However, the joint-support relations cease to produce non-trivial information, devolving into **vacuous support**. This is the “vacuous \approx -collapse” diagnosed in Section 11.

Identity collapse ($=$) yields inconsistency; equivalence collapse (\approx) yields relational vacuity. Thus $N = 3$ is the unique consistency-preserving fixed point, while $\text{non-}\approx$ is the condition for non-vacuous maximality.

7.10 Synthesis: The Necessity of the Trinity ($N = 3$)

The formalization demonstrates why the proof successfully avoids both cliffs. The necessity of $N = 3$ overcomes the cliff of **Inconsistency** (since $N = 1, 2, 4+$ are formally impossible), while the non-trivial edge (**NT_edge**) overcomes the cliff of **Vacuity**. The logical sequence of Sections 15.2 and 16 establishes a “**Stability Threshold.**”

Through these exclusions, the **Trinity** ($N = 3$) emerges as the unique, minimal, and optimal configuration—the first structure capable of supporting the “pair \rightarrow third” perichoretic law while maintaining maximal coverage over the epistemic universe. Therefore, a non-vacuous, mutually supporting triune structure is the unique, mathematically stable fixed point of the entire formal architecture.

7.11 Ordinal/Cardinal Transcendence and the Unity of the Trinity

In the formal development (corresponding to Section 25 of the mechanization), we provide an ordinal/cardinal diagnostic for the unity of the Trinity. A fundamental question is whether a triune relational pattern can be faithfully embedded into a simple linear three-step order (e.g., an ordinal chain $O1 < O2 < O3$).

We model a finite ordinal chain with three points, equip it with a meet-like operation (**CAP**), and mathematically ask whether three distinct hypostases can be mapped bijectively into this linear structure while preserving the triune “pair implies third” pattern.

The formal verification yields a negative result: **no such embedding exists**. The reason is purely structural. In a linear chain, the meet operation behaves like a minimum, causing any pairwise joint structure to inevitably collapse downward into a lower point. However, the triune pattern requires a symmetric and irreducible relational form in which each pair stands in a directed, non-collapsing relation to the third. This demand cannot be realized inside a merely linear ordinal hierarchy.

Consequently, the formalization mathematically proves that the unity of the Trinity is not representable as a simple ordinal ranking or as a one-dimensional cardinal ladder. The triune structure possesses a mode of unity that *transcends* linear order: it is not a serial progression of ranks, but a mutually irreducible relational whole. This establishes that the plurality of persons and the unity of essence are modeled not as a mathematical contradiction, but as two formally distinct dimensions.

8 The Actuality of the Supreme Truth

In the previous sections, we established (within the U-layer development) that the only structurally stable configuration for H_{opt} -witnesses, measured up to argument-equivalence, is the triune case ($N = 3$). A natural next question is how this structure connects to the designated actuality point \mathbf{e}_0 introduced in the preliminaries.

8.1 Designated Actuality: Formal vs. Interpretive

Formally, \mathbf{e}_0 is a designated constant of the U-layer, and $\text{TrueNow}(\varphi)$ was introduced as the notion of truth-at- \mathbf{e}_0 via support. Accordingly, the *formal* claim of this section is:

If the triune structure holds universally in the U-layer sense, then its characteristic support/closure pattern holds at the designated point \mathbf{e}_0 .

Any further identification of \mathbf{e}_0 with “our actual world” is an *interpretive* move. We treat this identification as a methodology premise: that the U-layer structure captures the logical substrate of reality.

We do not insert this identification as an “axiom” inside the U-layer (that would be circular). Rather, it is a methodological identification we adopt when interpreting mathematics:

For example, we ordinarily accept that what is proven in mathematics also holds in our world. The mathematical fact $1 + 1 = 2$ is proved internally on the basis of axioms, yet we naturally interpret it as “true in reality as well.” This amounts to assuming that the axioms/rules that make the proof possible are applicable to our reasoning and to the description of the actual world.

Likewise, the basic commitments of HOL are constructed only from principles regarded as strictly self-evident (otherwise we would have no reason to trust HOL at all). Therefore, treating HOL’s basic commitments as applicable in our world is not an arbitrary stipulation, but a methodologically justified interpretation (i.e., an adoption of the formal structure as a model for reality).

8.2 Instantiation at \mathbf{e}_0 (Formal Derivation)

In the mechanization, the $N3$ package is formulated with universal quantification over U-layer points (typically of the form $\forall e. \dots$). By applying the standard Universal Instantiation rule of Higher-Order Logic, we specialize this universal quantifier to the constant \mathbf{e}_0 .

Theorem 8.1 (Instantiation at \mathbf{e}_0). *If $N3$ holds in the U-layer development, then the triune closure/support pattern holds at the designated point \mathbf{e}_0 . More precisely, from an $N3$ statement of the schematic form*

$$N3 \implies \exists a b c. (\dots) \wedge \forall e. \text{MS}(e; a, b, c),$$

we obtain

$$N3 \implies \exists a b c. (\dots) \wedge \text{MS}(\mathbf{e}_0; a, b, c),$$

where $MS(e; a, b, c)$ abbreviates the triune mutual-support clause used in the formal development.

8.3 Packaging as the Constant

Definition 8.1 (Constant: Triune God at \mathbf{e}_0). We define $TriuneGod_e0$ as the existence of three H_{opt} -witnesses whose triune mutual-support/closure pattern holds at \mathbf{e}_0 :

$$TriuneGod_e0 := \exists a b c. (H_{opt}(a) \wedge H_{opt}(b) \wedge H_{opt}(c)) \wedge MS(\mathbf{e}_0; a, b, c).$$

Theorem 8.2 (Actuality at the Designated Point). *In the mechanization, $N3$ entails $TriuneGod_e0$. Specifically, based on the lemma $TriuneGod_e0_holds_from_N3$:*

$$N3 \implies TriuneGod_e0.$$

Interpretive note. If one accepts the bridge that \mathbf{e}_0 corresponds to the actual world, $TriuneGod_e0$ can be read as asserting that the triune closure pattern is operative at the designated actuality point. The formal content of the paper, however, is the derivation inside HOL and the specialization to \mathbf{e}_0 by universal instantiation.

8.4 On Double Negation and Existence

Finally, we address the non-vacuity of the argument. Isabelle/HOL is a classical logic system, meaning Double Negation Elimination is available:

$$\neg\neg(\exists x. H_{opt}(x)) \implies \exists x. H_{opt}(x).$$

While the consistency proof (Flat-Model) in Part III ensures that H_{opt} is not contradictory, the logical derivation of existence in a classical setting may utilize this principle. We define the existence of the Supreme Truth in the world as follows:

Definition 8.2 (Constant: God Exists in the World).

$$GodExists_world := \exists x. H_{opt}(x).$$

9 Computational Diagnostics and Model Existence (Nitpick)

In the final phase of the formalization (referencing **Section 8–9 of the Diagnostics_Nitpick file**), we subject the derived trinitarian structure to exhaustive finite-model search using the *Nitpick* tool. This phase serves as a computational “experiment” to verify the theory’s structural predictions.

9.1 8.1 Trinity Model existence Nitpick Test- MaxNT

The diagnostics perform a sweep across different universe sizes (N) to identify where the definitional package allows for a *genuine* model.

- **Singularity and Duality** ($N = 1, 2$): When the search space is restricted to $N = 1$ or $N = 2$ by the definitions, the system reports `expect = none` (UNSAT).
- **Triunity** ($N = 3$): Upon reaching $N = 3$ (verified in the U_{10} universe), Nitpick identifies a **genuine model** (`expect = genuine`).
- **Significance**: This result provides bounded computational evidence that the theory is **Non-Trivial**. In particular, under the present definitional package, models do not appear at $N = 1, 2$ but do appear at $N = 3$; this is consistent with the analytic derivation that the trinitarian configuration is not obtained by an informationally vacuous relaxation, but emerges only once the relevant constraints become jointly satisfiable.

The attainment of a **genuine model** within the bounded scopes of the finite-model search under full universal quantification (\forall) and axiom-free conditions indicates that the internal “gears” of the H_{opt} engine—specifically *Maximality* (MaxNT) and *Support-Density*—remain coherent when checked against Nitpick’s stricter (less approximative) treatment of the higher-order constraints.

9.2 8.2 Numerical Diagnostics for Trinity Necessity with number of distinct MaxCov entities

We additionally tested whether a configuration with *four* MaxCov points can exist such that they are pairwise non- \approx . Concretely, the diagnostic asks for A, B, C, D satisfying: (i) $\text{MaxCov}(A), \text{MaxCov}(B), \text{MaxCov}(C), \text{MaxCov}(D)$ and (ii) *pairwise non-equivalence* $\neg(A \approx B), \neg(A \approx C), \neg(A \approx D), \neg(B \approx C), \neg(B \approx D), \neg(C \approx D)$. Note that there are $\binom{4}{2} = 6$ such non- \approx constraints.

Within the chosen finite scopes, *Nitpick* reports UNSAT (`expect = none`) for this query. The fact that Nitpick fails to find a model for $N \geq 4$ within the tested bounds provides supporting diagnostic evidence that the current framework does not employ any axioms to exclude a specific N , and that the semantic impossibility of $N \geq 4$ is already inherent at the level of pure definitions.

We therefore record this result as a smoke test supporting the intended “no $N \geq 4$ independent maxima” reading, while maintaining the formal separation between (i) kernel-checked theorems and (ii) bounded model-search diagnostics.

The computational diagnostics serve as a crucial empirical complement to the abstract deduction. The fact that the $N \geq 4$ search reports UNSAT within the tested scopes supports the hypothesis that the definitional framework inherently resists configurations with four or more independent maxima. While Nitpick is a bounded diagnostic tool and not a universal proof, its failure to find an $N \geq 4$ model—combined with its success in finding an $N = 3$ model—is consistent with the formal derivation that the trinitarian ground is not an informationally vacuous “toy” concept, but a robust structural reality structurally favored by the laws of consistency and maximality.

9.3 9. Non-vacuous Genuine Trinity Model (Nitpick Witness and Sanity Check)

To sanity-check that the $N = 3$ configuration can realize genuinely non-vacuous relational content, we introduce the strict predicate `Trinity_nonvacuousP`. It simultaneously requires (i) `TriSupport_JointP`, enforcing pure ternary joint-support while prohibiting any pairwise 1-to-1 subordination (six constraints of the form $\neg(\text{ArgP } x \preceq \text{ArgP } y)$), and (ii) `NT_edgeP` in all three directions, enforcing non-trivial edges by forbidding \approx -collapse of each conjunction into either conjunct (six constraints of the form $\neg(\text{ArgP}(x \sqcap y) \approx \text{ArgP } x)$ and $\neg(\text{ArgP}(x \sqcap y) \approx \text{ArgP } y)$). Together this yields a negation-heavy, anti-triviality specification.

Automated finite-model search (*Nitpick*) finds a **genuine** satisfying model for `Trinity_nonvacuousP` already in the minimal scope $\text{card}(P) = 3$ and $\text{card}(U) = 3$. In the returned witness (up to renaming of elements), the Skolem triple P_1, P_2, P_3 satisfies the cyclic law

$$P_1 \sqcap P_2 = P_3, \quad P_2 \sqcap P_3 = P_1, \quad P_3 \sqcap P_1 = P_2.$$

Moreover, a diagnostic check on the negation, $\neg \text{Trinity_nonvacuousP}$, also yields a **genuine** model under the same bounds. Hence `Trinity_nonvacuousP` is satisfiable but not valid (i.e., not forced by the definitions) in the tested finite scope.

Significance. These finite-scope witnesses provide evidence that the “non-vacuous Trinity” package is neither definitionally inconsistent nor definitionally trivial. In particular, the existence of a model satisfying the anti-collapse and anti-subordination constraints shows that the intended non-vacuous $N = 3$ pattern is realizable within the framework, complementing the deductive results established elsewhere in this development.

10 Discussion: Computational Verification

This section interprets the computational diagnostic tests performed in the later portion of the mechanization.

10.1 Anti-vacuity / soundness sanity check

In a `Diagnostics-Optional.thy` file of the Isabelle source, we utilized *Nitpick* to perform sanity checks. The following check is intended as a guard against accidental trivialization and vacuous readings, and is ancillary to the kernel-checked theorems.

1. **Anti-vacuity / soundness sanity check (`not_explosion`):** We tested for accidental trivialization by attempting to realize logical falsehood under the diagnostic discipline. *Nitpick* did not produce a model for `False` in this setting.

- **Interpretation:** This is a diagnostic against “everything becomes true” readings. The primary guarantee of correctness remains the Isabelle/HOL kernel proof-checking of the theorems.

10.2 Diagnostics Section 7: Anti-“modal collapse” witness

The mechanization contains a focused diagnostic block in **Section 7 of the Diagnostics file** to probe for collapse-style strengthening. Specifically, the development records a *Nitpick* countermodel search refuting the implication ($\text{Trinity} \rightarrow R$) under the enabling pattern ($\text{Trinity} \rightarrow \diamond R$), thereby witnessing that the strengthening is not forced by the definitional package. Two short sanity checks are also recorded to guard against vacuous readings of \diamond : (i) $\neg(\forall P. \diamond P)$ and (ii) $\neg(\diamond \text{False})$ is not forced. These diagnostics are bounded and ancillary; the primary correctness guarantee remains kernel-level proof checking of the proved theorems.

10.3 The Principled Impossibility of Higher Truth

As established earlier, the definitional package blocks any attempt to define a truth strictly superior to H_{opt} within the relevant domain.

11 The H-Principle: Structural Properties of the argument of H-Optimality

11.1 From H-opt to H-Principle

H_{opt} does not merely exist as a passive state of highest certainty. It actively exhibits the **H-Principle** as its defining structural property. **The so-called H-Principle is not introduced as an independent assumption or normative constraint. Crucially, the principle is a formally proven theorem within the Isabelle/HOL environment, derived exclusively from the internal deductive rules of Higher-Order Logic (HOL) prior to the**

definition of H_{opt} (cf. Code Sec 13.1 and 7.3). Subsequently, Section 9.2 formally demonstrates that any candidate satisfying H_{opt} necessarily satisfies this H-Principle (`Hopt_implies_H_principle`). No additional metaphysical, modal, or ontological premise is invoked at this stage.

Accordingly, H_{opt} mathematically inherits and triggers this universal law by virtue of its structural maximality. The H-Principle performs no substantive inferential work beyond what is already implicit in the raw mathematical order of the U -layer. Any appearance of obligation or necessity should therefore be read purely as a structural property derived from the underlying definitions. This principle dictates a state of **Maximal Coverage**: if any contingent truth (ζ) exists, it must necessarily be supported by H_{opt} . In the mechanization, this is established by demonstrating that the argument of H_{opt} provides a comprehensive epistemic ground for the pan-domain (PDom).

11.2 The Self-Reflexive Structure

The formulation of H_{opt} captures the philosophical notion that the highest truth must be a self-reflexive subject. The H-Principle requires no external observer to validate its operations; instead, H_{opt} internally supports its own hypostases. This formalizes a structure where the truth is not an inert object but a dynamic, self-sustaining logical entity, mirroring the concept of ‘Truth as Subject.’

11.3 Trinitarian Closure

The H-Principle operates flawlessly within the $N = 3$ structure, establishing what we term **Trinitarian Closure**.

- **Exclusion of Instability:** As shown in earlier sections, $N = 1$ and $N = 2$ configurations lack the internal relational capacity to provide the sufficient grounding required by the H-Principle, leading to structural collapse.
- **Mutual Necessity:** Within the $N = 3$ configuration, the H-Principle ensures that each element mutually and optimally supports the others. This cyclic, perichoretic support network constitutes the core structural mechanism of the supreme ground, demonstrating that the trinitarian form is the necessary expression of H-Optimality.

12 Analytic Self-Evidence of Core Logical Assumptions (Locale Audit)

This section performs a comprehensive audit of the ten core locales utilized in the Isabelle/HOL formalization. Crucially, this audit was mechanically executed and verified by the dedicated `Axiom_And_Assumption_Audit.thy` file, which formally certifies a strict zero-axiom count (i.e., exactly zero unproven axioms are injected into the global context). Consequently, we demonstrate that the local assumptions (*assumes*) within these ten locales are not external metaphysical

postulates or smuggled modal axioms. Rather, they constitute strictly bounded components: either analytic truths of classical Boolean logic, deductive consequences of the H_{opt} definition, or controlled diagnostic hypotheses used exclusively for structural exclusion and simulation.

12.1 Locales 1 & 2: `Band_Collapse_From_Hopt` and `Band_Collapse_Superfluous`

These locales formalize the structural minimality of the supreme truth, ensuring no redundant or independent pillars coexist with the optimal core.

- **ES: Epistemic Possibility** ($EDia_ep(\Omega \wedge \Psi)$)
Status: Evidential Non-Refutation. In this framework, epistemic possibility ($EDia_ep$) does not assert absolute metaphysical possibility. Rather, it is strictly defined as the absence of formal refutation within the current theory-state ($\neg Ref$). Whether the core ($\Omega \wedge \Psi$) is ultimately irrefutable or merely not yet refuted is irrelevant at this level. So long as no formal proof of its falsity has been derived, it remains an epistemically live (i.e., admissible) configuration. Accordingly, the premise $EDia_ep(\Omega \wedge \Psi)$ functions not as a heavyweight modal axiom, but as a logical bookkeeping condition recording the current non-refuted status of the core. Furthermore, this epistemic admissibility is computationally corroborated by Sections 8 and 9 of the auxiliary `Diagnostics` file, which explicitly exhibit non-vacuous models of the core and thereby verify its non-explosive status within the Isabelle/HOL environment.
- **Cov: Ontological Coverage** ($Arg(\Omega \wedge \Psi) \preceq Arg\Phi$)
Status: Geometric Projection of the H-principle. Φ , defined as H_{opt} , must by definition cover all valid propositions in the domain. Consequently, the moment Φ is identified as H_{opt} , this relation is deductively generated.
- **MCL, MCR, MCI: Analytic Validity of Conjunction**
Status: Standard Boolean Axiomatics. The rules for decomposing or composing $A \wedge B$ are grammatically self-evident within Boolean algebra, providing a guideline for the Isabelle kernel rather than a new framework.
- **NS (No-Superfluous): The Principle of Parsimonious Exclusion**
Status: Discharged Theorem. If H_{opt} is optimal, there can be no superfluous information existing independently. This condition is fully proven and **discharged**(Section 28.1) in the subsequent stages; thus, it places no axiomatic burden on the system.

Mechanical Discharge of Locale Assumptions (Section 28.1): It is crucial to note that the assumptions underlying these locales(Cov, MCL, MCR, MCI, NS) are completely discharged. As demonstrated in **Section 28.1 (Final Locale Audit)**, the Isabelle kernel mechanically verifies via a `sublocale` proof that all premises of `Band_Collapse_From_Hopt` and `Band_Collapse_Superfluous` are entirely satisfied by minimal analytic Boolean grammar and the definitional properties of H_{opt} . This confirms that no hidden axioms remain.

12.2 Locale 3: Boolean_at_our_world

Status: Logical Homogeneity at the World-Point.

This locale assumes that logical operators (\wedge, \neg) behave according to standard truth-functional rules at the distinguished world-point \mathbf{e}_0 . It is a technical necessity for the “World-Lift,” asserting that the logic of the \mathcal{U} -layer is identical to the logic operative in our actuality, ensuring that formal results remain relevant to reality.

12.3 Locale 4: Epistemic_N1_Exclusion

This locale provides the infrastructure to refute solitary, isolated ontological states.

- **ref_back: Refutation Back-propagation**

Status: The Contrapositive Principle. Asserts that if P entails Q , a refutation of Q implies a refutation of P . This invokes standard “physical laws” of logical inference.

- **poss_edge / EdgeExist: Epistemic Possibility of Relational Support**

Status: Non-vacuity Verification. Asserts that relational support is possible. Since models for $N \geq 3$ are satisfiable (cf. Section 9(Diagnostics file), this is a mathematically verified fact of the system’s geometry.

- **notEdia_False: Epistemic Impossibility of Contradiction**

Status: Fundamental Logical Consistency. Prevents the “Principle of Explosion” by asserting that a logical contradiction cannot be epistemically possible.

12.4 Locale 5: FullIdBridge

Status: Auxiliary Model-Theoretic Construction.

The assumptions introduced within this locale have no direct relation to the core ontological argument or the formal proof of $N = 3$ necessity. The main exclusion theorems remain entirely independent of **FullIdBridge**. It is provided solely as an auxiliary “**Satisfiability Witness**” to demonstrate how the abstract \mathcal{U} -layer logic harmonizes with standard possible-world semantics, thereby ensuring that the definitional framework is model-theoretically sound and free from vacuity.

12.5 Locale 6: Refuted_Backprop

Status: Formalization of Epistemic Modus Tollens.

It ensures that refutations propagate backward through the chain of necessity. By the logic of the contrapositive, it ensures that the potentiality of a relational “Edge” flows forward to validate the possibility of the Triune configuration, systematically refuting structures that preclude such possibility (e.g., $N = 1, 2$).

12.6 Locales 7 & 8: Riemann_Toy and Riemann_Toy_Core

Status: Diagnostic Sandbox (Simulation Only).

It is imperative to clarify that these locales are not constituent parts of the core proof. They function as a “simulation chamber” to verify consistency. By introducing contingent propositions (e.g., the Riemann Hypothesis), they prove that the necessity of the Trinity does not force a global “Modal Collapse.” They act as logical instrumentation to confirm the engine’s capacity.

12.7 Locale 9: Trinity_Truthmaking

Status: Post-Deductive Interpretative Application.

This locale also have no direct relation to the core ontological argument or the formal proof of $N = 3$ necessity. This locale is an interpretative blueprint describing how the established Triune ground relates to contingent reality (R).

- **T-Pattern:** Defines the ground as the provider of logical space for existence.
- **S-Pattern:** Defines “Ultimacy”—that no contingent reality can exist outside the scope of the H_{opt} . It is an analytic consequence of the definition of the PH.

12.8 Locale 10: Trinity_Uniqueness_MaxCov

Status: The Final Seal (Interpretative Framework).

This locale does not help create the Trinity; it proves that the Trinity derived is **Unique**.

- **Excl4:** Not a new premise, but the discharged result of the Band \approx -Collapse theorems. It is a manifestation of the **Pigeonhole Principle** applied to ontological coverage.
- **SYM & TRANS:** Self-evident properties of equivalence classes, invoked as grammatical rules to interpret the $N = 3$ structure as a unified essence.

Mechanical Discharge of Uniqueness Locale (Section 28.2): As formally proven in Section 28.2, the `Trinity_Uniqueness_MaxCov` locale is strictly discharged. The `Excl4` assumption is not a postulate but is mechanically verified by the first-order logic solver (`blast`) directly applying the Band \approx -Collapse theorems from Section 14.4.

13 Conclusion

By reconstructing metaphysical arguments within a framework of computational formalization and machine-assisted verification, this study repositions ontological discourse from an interpretation-centered tradition toward the domain of formal validation. While inheriting classical formalization efforts—most notably the post-Kurt Gödel tradition—it advances a distinctive research direction by treating metaphysical propositions directly within computational structures. Ultimately, this approach suggests that metaphysics can extend beyond purely speculative reflection into a theoretically disciplined inquiry grounded in demonstrable logical coherence.

This paper has presented a formally verified, axiom-free (in the Isabelle/HOL-internal sense) reconstruction of an ontological argument using the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant. By constructing the **U-Layer** substrate, we have:

1. **H-Optimality** (H_{opt}) is defined purely structurally as maximal non-trivial relational support (**MaxNT**), thereby avoiding the traditional injection of “positive property” axioms.
2. Proved the **consistency of the H-optimality concept** (H_{opt})—corresponding to the concept of “a truth so certain that no greater certainty can be conceived”—within an axiom-free framework and identified a flat-model witness.
3. Demonstrated through **Structural Exclusion** that maximality is incompatible with Singularity ($N = 1$), Duality ($N = 2$), or Multiplicity ($N \geq 4$)
4. Proved the **Necessity of the Triune Structure** ($N = 3$), characterized by a cyclic **TriSupport** pattern, as the uniquely stable configuration for H_{opt} -witnesses modulo argument-equivalence.
5. Established the **specialization of the structure to the designated actuality point** e_0 , packaged as **TriuneGod_e0**.
6. Verified the **Definitional Finality Theorem** (`no_definition_strictly_superior_than_H_opt`), which formally blocks the existence of any strictly superior truth definable over the pan-domain.
7. Included a targeted diagnostic block (Section 7 of the Diagnostics file) addressing the standard collapse fragility in Gödel-style encodings by recording a *Nitpick* countermodel witness against $(\text{Trinity} \rightarrow R)$ under the enabling pattern $(\text{Trinity} \rightarrow \diamond R)$, together with non-degeneracy sanity checks for \diamond .
8. Documented the development as an explicit axiom-audit artifact documentation that no unintended axioms are assumed beyond HOL.
9. Formalized the maximality core using Cantorian size comparison (injection-based), ensuring that the framework remains robust even when support structures are infinite.
10. **Total Mechanical Discharge of Core Locales:** Citing the results of Section 28, we mechanically proved that the locale assumptions for `Band_Collapse_From_Hopt`, `Band_Collapse_Superfluous` and `Trinity_Uniqueness_MaxCov` are not newly added metaphysical premises. The code definitively demonstrates that these assumptions are either self-evident analytic rules or theorems strictly proven from the definitions, effectively discharging them via a `sublocale` command and sealing the axiom-free status of the derivation.

We conclude that the concept of a supreme truth-ground, when analyzed through the order-theoretic semantics of grounding strength, yields a rigorously checkable structure whose internal logic forces a triune closure pattern. The resulting development is fully mechanized in

Isabelle/HOL and documented as an axiom-audited definitional extension beyond HOL. In this sense, the present results suggest that a Fregean objectivity of truth—assumed but not derived in the original semantic framework—can be obtained here as a formal consequence in an axiom-free, kernel-checked setting.

Finally, this theory opens a coherent possibility for resolving the classical Fregean dilemma concerning truth-referents. Frege succeeded in securing logical objectivity by identifying the referent of a true sentence with an undifferentiated truth value; however, this achievement came at the cost of externalizing informational content from the logical core itself. The difficulty arises because, if distinct sentences are assumed to refer to the same single truth (the truth), there is no way to account for their semantic distinctions at the level of reference.

By contrast, our theory formalizes truth as a structurally articulated, triune referent, thereby offering a coherent theoretical possibility for internalizing informational differentiation directly within the domain of reference. Informational richness is no longer a secondary byproduct of sense, but a primary, formally tractable constituent of the Highest Truth (H_{opt}).

This suggests that the triune structure is not merely a theological postulate within the present framework, but a formally motivated candidate for preserving informational differentiation at the level of reference.

Final Remarks: The Structural Fixed Point of the Supreme Truth

The formal development establishes that MaxNT is not merely a terminal element of an ordering, but a *structural fixed point* within the epistemic domain. This fixed point is governed by the aforementioned four-level dependency:

1. **Internal Consistency:** The supreme truth candidate is mathematically certified to be non-contradictory.
2. **Finality:** No strictly higher certainty point exists *within the domain*.
3. **Relational Maximality:** Non-trivial incoming structure is maximized under Cantor-style comparison, thereby forcing the system away from monadic degeneration and toward a pluralistic ground.
4. **Non-vacuity:** Genuine *NT_{edge}* structure survives the diagnostic filter, forbidding \approx -collapse (**Arg-equivalence collapse**).

As Section 11 shows, when relational structure globally undergoes an \approx -collapse (**Arg-equivalence collapse**) (e.g., under universal 1-to-1 comparability), MaxNT does not become inconsistent; rather, the joint-support among the hypostases undergoes an \approx -collapse into an informationally vacuous state. **This demonstrates that the necessity of the triune structure is invariant: even when the relational structure becomes informationally vacuous due to Arg-equivalence, the system is structurally forced toward $N = 3$ as the only architecture that avoids formal inconsistency.** Hence, these conditions are not independent: together they characterize the unique stability of the “supreme truth” candidate not as a solitary monad, but as an irreducibly *triune* structure. *Moreover, non-vacuity is not required to*

obtain the Trinity-necessity claim itself; it is required only to rule out informationally vacuous (Arg-equivalent) realizations and to certify that the triune distinction is **structurally non- \approx -collapsible**. The triune logic is therefore not a theological postulate inserted into the system, but the only mathematically stable configuration that survives the stringent demands of consistency, finality, and maximality—and, where imposed, the anti-vacuity demand.

Appendix A: Formalized Isabelle Source Code

The formalization is structured into two files: the Main Argument Body and the Developer-only Diagnostics. The following includes the full kernel-checked Isabelle/HOL formalization, constituting the core verification engine of the argument.

```
theory Axiom_Free_Ontological_Trinity
  imports Main
```

```
begin
```

14 1. Universe and primitive entailment

We posit an abstract universe U and a primitive entailment \vdash on U

NOTICE: This entire development is strictly ****axiom-free****. We do not use the “axiom” or any unproven modal postulates. All results are derived solely from definitions and the primitive entailment relation on the abstract universe U .

```
typedecl U
consts Entails :: "U  $\Rightarrow$  U  $\Rightarrow$  bool" (infix " $\vdash$ " 60)
```

15 2. Support sets, preorder and equivalence on U

```
definition SuppU :: "U  $\Rightarrow$  U set" where
  "SuppU u = {e. Entails e u}"
```

```
definition LeU :: "U  $\Rightarrow$  U  $\Rightarrow$  bool" (infix " $\preceq$ " 50) where
  "p  $\preceq$  q  $\longleftrightarrow$  SuppU p  $\subseteq$  SuppU q"
```

```
definition EqU :: "U  $\Rightarrow$  U  $\Rightarrow$  bool" (infix " $\approx$ " 50) where
  "p  $\approx$  q  $\longleftrightarrow$  SuppU p = SuppU q"
```

15.1 2.1 Basic calculus (preorder/equivalence; point tools)

```
lemma LeU_refl[simp]: "p  $\preceq$  p"  $\langle$ proof $\rangle$ 
```

```
lemma LeU_trans: "p  $\preceq$  q  $\Longrightarrow$  q  $\preceq$  r  $\Longrightarrow$  p  $\preceq$  r"
 $\langle$ proof $\rangle$ 
```

```
lemma EqU_refl[simp]: "p  $\approx$  p"  $\langle$ proof $\rangle$ 
```

```
lemma EqU_sym: "p  $\approx$  q  $\Longrightarrow$  q  $\approx$  p"  $\langle$ proof $\rangle$ 
```

```
lemma EqU_trans: "p  $\approx$  q  $\Longrightarrow$  q  $\approx$  r  $\Longrightarrow$  p  $\approx$  r"  $\langle$ proof $\rangle$ 
```

```
lemma EqU_iff_sets: "p  $\approx$  q  $\longleftrightarrow$  SuppU p = SuppU q"
 $\langle$ proof $\rangle$ 
```

```
lemma LeU_antisym_eq:
```

assumes " $p \preceq q$ " and " $q \preceq p$ " shows " $p \approx q$ "
 ⟨proof⟩

lemma EqU_iff_LeU_both: " $p \approx q \longleftrightarrow (p \preceq q \wedge q \preceq p)$ "
 ⟨proof⟩

lemma SuppU_memI: " $e \vdash u \implies e \in \text{SuppU } u$ " ⟨proof⟩

lemma SuppU_memD: " $e \in \text{SuppU } u \implies e \vdash u$ " ⟨proof⟩

lemma LeU_pointI:

assumes " $\forall e \in \text{SuppU } p. e \in \text{SuppU } q$ " shows " $p \preceq q$ "
 ⟨proof⟩

lemma le_pointwise:

assumes " $p \preceq q$ " and " $e \vdash p$ " shows " $e \vdash q$ "
 ⟨proof⟩

named_theorems leU_pointwise_rules

lemmas le_pointwise_SuppU [leU_pointwise_rules] = le_pointwise

15.2 2.2 Useful \approx -extensionality shifters

lemma EqU_mono_left: " $p \approx q \implies (p \preceq r) \longleftrightarrow (q \preceq r)$ " ⟨proof⟩

lemma EqU_mono_right: " $p \approx q \implies (r \preceq p) \longleftrightarrow (r \preceq q)$ " ⟨proof⟩

definition LtU :: " $U \Rightarrow U \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ " (infix "<" 50) where

" $p < q \longleftrightarrow (p \preceq q \wedge \neg (q \preceq p))$ "

16 3. (Symbols only) Modal primitives for " \Box/\Diamond " - no axioms here

Several later definitions use the raw symbols " \Box/\Diamond " syntactically (e.g., in generic "truthmaking pattern" locales). We introduce the symbols here as uninterpreted constants. Any S5-style axioms/rules appear.

consts

Box :: " $\text{bool} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ " (" \Box _" [60] 60)

Dia :: " $\text{bool} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ " (" \Diamond _" [60] 60)

17 4. Introduction of the Notion of "Relative Certainty"(ReCert)

[Concept: Relative Certainty] "P is relatively less certain than Q" (denoted $P \preceq Q$) implies that the set of entailments supporting P is a subset of those supporting Q. Ontologically, this means Q is "heavier" or "more fundamental" than P, as Q is necessitated by every witness that necessitates P.

17.1 4.1 Bridge

consts *Arg* :: "bool \Rightarrow U"

definition *Supports* :: "U \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool" where

"Supports e $\varphi \equiv (e \vdash \text{Arg } \varphi)$ "

definition *EDia* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool" (" \diamond_e _" [60]) where

" $\diamond_e \zeta \equiv (\exists e. \text{Supports } e \zeta)$ "

lemma *epi_possible_supports_Arg*: " $\diamond_e \zeta \implies \exists e. e \vdash \text{Arg } \zeta$ "

<proof>

definition *Makes* :: "U \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool" where

"Makes e X $\equiv \text{Supports } e X$ "

lemma *in_SuppU_Arg_iff [simp]*:

"e $\in \text{SuppU } (\text{Arg } X) \longleftrightarrow \text{Makes } e X$ "

<proof>

lemma *LeU_iff_all*:

"((Arg S) \preceq (Arg T)) $\longleftrightarrow (\forall e. \text{Makes } e S \longrightarrow \text{Makes } e T)$ "

<proof>

lemma *not_LeU_iff_exists_witness*:

" $\neg ((\text{Arg } S) \preceq (\text{Arg } T)) \longleftrightarrow (\exists a. \text{Makes } a S \wedge \neg \text{Makes } a T)$ "

<proof>

corollary *gap_equiv_witness_OmegaPsi_Phi'*:

" $\neg ((\text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi)) \preceq (\text{Arg } \Phi')) \longleftrightarrow (\exists a. \text{Makes } a (\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge \neg \text{Makes } a \Phi')$ "

<proof>

lemma *witness_breaks_back_imp*:

assumes "Makes a X" and " \neg Makes a Y"

shows " $\neg (\forall e. \text{Makes } e X \longrightarrow \text{Makes } e Y)$ "

<proof>

definition *RelCert* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool" where

"RelCert R S $\equiv (\text{Arg } R) \prec (\text{Arg } S)$ "

definition *MoreCertain_pred* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool" where

"MoreCertain_pred $\Phi' \Phi \equiv (\forall e. \text{Makes } e \Phi' \longrightarrow \text{Makes } e \Phi) \wedge \neg (\forall e. \text{Makes } e \Phi \longrightarrow \text{Makes } e \Phi')$ "

17.2 4.2 EH q: "every epistemically possible truth support q"

definition *EH* :: "U \Rightarrow bool" where

"EH $q \equiv (\forall \zeta. \diamond_e \zeta \longrightarrow (\text{Arg } \zeta) \preceq q)$ "

[EH (Epistemic H)] "Maximality over Epistemic Possibility" A truth q satisfies EH if it serves as a necessary ground for every epistemically possible truth-bearer ($\diamond_e p$). (Definition: A truth-bearer p is epistemically possible if it has not yet been refuted by our current state of knowledge, thereby remaining a valid candidate for truth. This means that, regardless of whether p is inherently false or its negation simply remains unproven, from our current epistemic standpoint, its refutation is unknown.) i.e., "If it is epistemically possible, it is supported by q ."

lemma *EH_inclusion*:

assumes "EH q " " $\diamond_e \zeta$ " shows " $(\text{Arg } \zeta) \preceq q$ "
 <proof>

lemma *EH_pointwise*:

assumes "EH q " " $\diamond_e \zeta$ " "Supports $e \zeta$ " shows " $e \vdash q$ "
 <proof>

lemma *H_principle_from_EH_inclusion*:

assumes "EH $(\text{Arg } Q)$ " " $\diamond_e \zeta$ " shows " $(\text{Arg } \zeta) \preceq (\text{Arg } Q)$ "
 <proof>

lemma *H_principle_from_EH_pointwise*:

assumes "EH $(\text{Arg } Q)$ " " $\diamond_e \zeta$ " "Supports $e \zeta$ " shows " $e \vdash \text{Arg } Q$ "
 <proof>

named_theorems *EH_intros*

lemmas *EH_to_inclusion* [*EH_intros*] = *EH_inclusion*

lemmas *EH_to_pointwise* [*EH_intros*] = *EH_pointwise*

18 5. Witness construction from the failure of EH

If a candidate q fails to satisfy EH, then there must exist an epistemically possible truth-bearer (denoted as ζ) that explicitly witnesses this failure by remaining unsupported by q .

theorem *not_EH_witnessE*:

assumes " $\neg \text{EH } q$ " shows " $\exists \zeta. \diamond_e \zeta \wedge \neg ((\text{Arg } \zeta) \preceq q)$ "
 <proof>

lemma *witness_from_failure_of_EH*:

assumes " $\diamond_e b$ " " $\diamond_e c$ "
 and " $(\text{Arg } b) \preceq (\text{Arg } a)$ " " $(\text{Arg } c) \preceq (\text{Arg } a)$ "
 and " $\neg ((\text{Arg } b) \preceq (\text{Arg } a')) \vee \neg ((\text{Arg } c) \preceq (\text{Arg } a'))$ "
 shows " $\neg \text{EH } (\text{Arg } a')$ "
 <proof>

19 6. “TrueNow” basis: relative certainty via actual truths

[TH (TrueNow H)] “Maximality over Actuality” A truth q satisfies TH if it serves as a necessary ground for every truth-bearer that is actually true in the present world (TrueNow). (Definition: A truth-bearer p is “TrueNow” if it possesses an actualized truth value in our current reality ($e0$). Unlike epistemic possibility, which only requires the absence of refutation, TrueNow demands robust ontological actuality.) i.e., “If it is an actualized truth, its ontological foundation is supported by q .” This firmly anchors the abstract universal logic (“U-layer”) to the concrete actual world ($e0$).

consts $e0 :: U$

definition $TrueNow :: "bool \Rightarrow bool"$ **where**

$"TrueNow \varphi \equiv Supports\ e0\ \varphi"$

definition $TSupp :: "U \Rightarrow bool\ set"$ **where**

$"TSupp\ q \equiv \{\varphi.\ TrueNow\ \varphi \wedge (Arg\ \varphi) \preceq\ q\}"$

definition $MoreCertainT :: "U \Rightarrow U \Rightarrow bool"$ (infix \prec^T 50) **where**

$"x \prec^T\ y \longleftrightarrow TSupp\ x \subset TSupp\ y"$

definition $TH :: "U \Rightarrow bool"$ **where**

$"TH\ q \equiv (\forall \varphi.\ TrueNow\ \varphi \longrightarrow (Arg\ \varphi) \preceq\ q)"$

19.1 6.1 Monotonicity and basic consequences

lemma $TSupp_mono$:

assumes $"q \preceq r"$ **shows** $"TSupp\ q \subseteq TSupp\ r"$

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma $TSupp_strict_by_extra$:

assumes $"TSupp\ x \subseteq TSupp\ y"$

and $"TrueNow\ S"$ **and** $"(Arg\ S) \preceq\ y"$ **and** $"\neg ((Arg\ S) \preceq\ x)"$

shows $"TSupp\ x \subset TSupp\ y"$

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma $more_true_supports_implies_less_than_T$:

assumes $"TSupp\ (Arg\ \Gamma) \subseteq TSupp\ (Arg\ \Phi)"$

and $"TrueNow\ S"$ $"(Arg\ S) \preceq\ (Arg\ \Phi)"$ $"\neg ((Arg\ S) \preceq\ (Arg\ \Gamma))"$

shows $"(Arg\ \Gamma) \prec^T\ (Arg\ \Phi)"$

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma $MoreCertainT_not_TH_left$:

assumes $"(Arg\ \Gamma) \prec^T\ (Arg\ \Phi)"$ **shows** $"\neg TH\ (Arg\ \Gamma)"$

$\langle proof \rangle$

20 7. Philosophical H (PH): “PH q \longleftrightarrow (EH q \wedge TH q)”

[Definition: PH (Philosophical H)] “Total Maximality (The Supreme Truth)” PH is the conjunction of EH and TH. A truth “q” satisfies PH if it grounds the entire domain of discourse (PDom), covering both what is “Actually True” and what is “Epistemically Possible”.

Formal Equivalence: PH q \longleftrightarrow (EH q AND TH q)

definition PDom :: "bool set" where

"PDom \equiv { ζ . TrueNow $\zeta \vee \diamond_e \zeta$ }"

definition PSupp :: "U \Rightarrow bool set" where

"PSupp q \equiv { ζ . (TrueNow $\zeta \vee \diamond_e \zeta$) \wedge (Arg ζ) \preceq q}"

definition MoreCertainP :: "U \Rightarrow U \Rightarrow bool" (infix " \prec^P " 50) where

"x \prec^P y \longleftrightarrow PSupp x \subset PSupp y"

definition PH :: "U \Rightarrow bool" where

"PH q \equiv ($\forall \zeta$. (TrueNow $\zeta \vee \diamond_e \zeta$) \longrightarrow (Arg ζ) \preceq q)"

20.1 7.1 Basic facts, monotonicity, and extensionality

lemma PH_imp_EH: "PH q \implies EH q" *<proof>*

lemma PH_imp_TH: "PH q \implies TH q" *<proof>*

lemma EH_TH_imp_PH:

assumes "EH q" "TH q" shows "PH q"

<proof>

corollary PH_iff_EH_TH: "PH q \longleftrightarrow (EH q \wedge TH q)"

<proof>

lemma PH_pointwise_possible:

assumes "PH q" " $\diamond_e \zeta$ " "Supports e ζ " shows "e \vdash q"

<proof>

lemma PSupp_subset_PDom: "PSupp q \subseteq PDom" *<proof>*

lemma PSupp_mono:

assumes "q \preceq r" shows "PSupp q \subseteq PSupp r"

<proof>

lemma PH_iff_PSupp_full: "PH q \longleftrightarrow PSupp q = PDom"

<proof>

lemma PH_no_strict_superior:

assumes "PH q" shows " \neg ($\exists r$. q \prec^P r)"

<proof>

```

lemma TSupp_extensional: "q ≈ r ⇒ TSupp q = TSupp r"
  ⟨proof⟩
lemma PSupp_extensional: "q ≈ r ⇒ PSupp q = PSupp r"
  ⟨proof⟩
lemma EH_extensional: "q ≈ r ⇒ EH q ↔ EH r"
  ⟨proof⟩
lemma TH_extensional: "q ≈ r ⇒ TH q ↔ TH r"
  ⟨proof⟩
lemma PH_extensional: "q ≈ r ⇒ PH q ↔ PH r"
  ⟨proof⟩

```

21 7.2 Riemann toy (Core-only, no ontic bridge)

Core layer only. Two U-points eI, eII and three propositions R, Phi, Phi'. We assume only local facts at eI. No ontic bridge (no Val/iw).

```

locale Riemann_Toy_Core =
  fixes eI eII :: U
    and R Phi Phi' :: bool
  assumes RI      : "Supports eI R"
    and RII     : "¬ Supports eII R"
    and PhiI    : "Supports eI Phi"
    and nPhiI'  : "¬ Supports eI Phi'"

```

begin

Since R holds at eI, R is epistemically possible (EDia R).

```

lemma EDia_R: "EDia R"
  ⟨proof⟩

```

If Phi' fails at eI, then PH (Arg Phi') would contradict nPhiI'.

```

lemma not_PH_of_Phi': "¬ PH (Arg Phi')"
  ⟨proof⟩

```

Helper: at eI, both R and Phi hold (just local evidence).

```

lemma both_at_eI: "Supports eI R ∧ Supports eI Phi"
  ⟨proof⟩

```

end

21.1 7.3 The H-principle: Structural Properties of Strict Subordination

Below_on K e : e is in PDom and Arg e < Arg K (strictly less certain than K). **H_principle** K Q : every such e supports Q (i.e., Arg e ≤ Q).

```

definition Below_on :: "bool ⇒ bool ⇒ bool" where
  "Below_on K e ≡ (e ∈ PDom ∧ (Arg e) < (Arg K))"

```

definition $H_principle$:: "bool \Rightarrow U \Rightarrow bool" where
 $"H_principle\ K\ Q \equiv (\forall e. Below_on\ K\ e \longrightarrow (Arg\ e) \preceq Q)"$

Minimal form: for $Q = Arg\ K$ it follows immediately from the definition of \prec .

lemma $H_principle_self$:
shows $"H_principle\ K\ (Arg\ K)"$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

It also transfers to any Q that is EqU-equivalent to $Arg\ K$.

lemma $H_principle_of_EqU$:
assumes $"Q \approx (Arg\ K)"$
shows $"H_principle\ K\ Q"$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

22 8. Epistemic Frame: Definition of H_negU_strict and Derivation of EH

22.1 8.1 Strong negative-form H (ban all equivalence/superiority; includes a non-vacuity guard)

definition H_negU_strict :: "bool \Rightarrow bool" where
 $"H_negU_strict\ q \equiv$
 $(\forall \zeta \in PDom. \zeta \neq q \longrightarrow \neg ((Arg\ q) \prec (Arg\ \zeta)))"$

lemma $H_negU_strict_no_at_or_above$:
assumes $"H_negU_strict\ q"$ $"\zeta \in PDom"$ $"\zeta \neq q"$
shows $"\neg ((Arg\ q) \prec (Arg\ \zeta))"$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma $possible_in_PDom$: $"\diamond_e \zeta \implies \zeta \in PDom"$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

22.2 8.2 Hmax: "all current truths supported (TH) + strong negative-form"

definition $Hmax$:: "bool \Rightarrow bool" where
 $"Hmax\ q \equiv TH\ (Arg\ q) \wedge H_negU_strict\ q"$

lemma $Hmax_imp_TH$: $"Hmax\ q \implies TH\ (Arg\ q)"$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma $Hmax_blocks_tautology$:
assumes $"Hmax\ q"$ $"q \neq True"$ $"\diamond_e True"$
shows $"\neg ((Arg\ q) \prec (Arg\ True))"$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

22.3 8.3 Strict epistemic variants: “currently true” excluded

definition $EDia_strict$:: "bool \Rightarrow bool" where

" $EDia_strict \zeta \equiv EDia \zeta \wedge \neg TrueNow \zeta$ "

notation $EDia_strict$ (" \diamond_e '_" [60] 60)

lemma $EDia_strict_imp_EDia$: " $EDia_strict \zeta \Longrightarrow EDia \zeta$ "

<proof>

lemma $TrueNow_imp_not_EDia_strict$: " $TrueNow \zeta \Longrightarrow \neg EDia_strict \zeta$ "

<proof>

Strict version of EH: covers only epistemic possibilities that are not currently true($TrueNow$).

definition EH_strict :: " $U \Rightarrow bool$ " where

" $EH_strict q \equiv (\forall \zeta. EDia_strict \zeta \longrightarrow (Arg \zeta) \preceq q)$ "

lemma $EH_imp_EH_strict$: " $EH q \Longrightarrow EH_strict q$ "

<proof>

lemma $TrueNow_implies_EDia$: " $TrueNow \zeta \Longrightarrow EDia \zeta$ "

<proof>

lemma $EH_from_strict_plus_TH$:

assumes " $EH_strict q$ " and " $TH q$ "

shows " $EH q$ "

<proof>

22.4 8.4 PDom/PSupp (strict version)

definition $PDom_strict$:: "bool set" where

" $PDom_strict \equiv \{\zeta. TrueNow \zeta \vee EDia_strict \zeta\}$ "

definition $PSupp_strict$:: " $U \Rightarrow bool$ set" where

" $PSupp_strict q \equiv \{\zeta. (TrueNow \zeta \vee EDia_strict \zeta) \wedge (Arg \zeta) \preceq q\}$ "

lemma $PSupp_strict_subset_PDom_strict$: " $PSupp_strict q \subseteq PDom_strict$ "

<proof>

lemma $PSupp_strict_mono$:

assumes " $q \preceq r$ " shows " $PSupp_strict q \subseteq PSupp_strict r$ "

<proof>

22.5 8.5 PH(strict)

Strict version of PH.

definition *PH_strict* :: "U \Rightarrow bool" where
 "PH_strict q \equiv ($\forall \zeta. (\text{TrueNow } \zeta \vee \text{EDia_strict } \zeta) \longrightarrow (\text{Arg } \zeta) \preceq q$)"

lemma *PH_strict_imp_TH*: "PH_strict q \implies TH q"
 <proof>

lemma *PH_strict_imp_EH_strict*: "PH_strict q \implies EH_strict q"
 <proof>

lemma *TH_EHstrict_imp_PH_strict*: "TH q \implies EH_strict q \implies PH_strict q"
 <proof>

lemma *PH_imp_PH_strict*: "PH q \implies PH_strict q"
 <proof>

Equivalence with PSupp/PDom (strict).

lemma *PH_strict_iff_PSupp_strict_full*:
 "PH_strict q \longleftrightarrow PSupp_strict q = PDom_strict"
 <proof>

Extensionality.

lemma *PH_strict_extensional*:
 assumes "q \approx r"
 shows "PH_strict q \longleftrightarrow PH_strict r"
 <proof>

lemma *PSupp_strict_extensional*:
 assumes "q \approx r"
 shows "PSupp_strict q = PSupp_strict r"
 <proof>

22.6 8.6 TH (one-way) and TSupp maximality: True vs q superiority

We adopt ****only one direction****: TH q \implies ($\forall x. \text{TSupp } x \subseteq \text{TSupp } q$).

lemma *TH_implies_TSupp_max*:
 assumes "TH q"
 shows " $\forall x. \text{TSupp } x \subseteq \text{TSupp } q$ "
 <proof>

lemma *Hmax_to_TSupp_max*:
 assumes "Hmax q"
 shows " $\forall x. \text{TSupp } x \subseteq \text{TSupp } (\text{Arg } q)$ "
 <proof>

23 9. PDom-robustness lemmas + H_opt \Rightarrow EH/TH/PH

EDia/TrueNow imply inclusion into PDom; impossibility (\neg EDia) is a trivial lower bound; and EH(\Rightarrow TH).

```
lemma EDia_in_PDom' [simp]: "EDia  $\zeta \Rightarrow \zeta \in PDom$ "
  <proof>
```

```
lemma TrueNow_in_PDom' [simp]: "TrueNow  $\zeta \Rightarrow \zeta \in PDom$ "
  <proof>
```

```
lemma not_EDia_le_any:
  assumes " $\neg$  EDia  $\zeta$ "
  shows "(Arg  $\zeta$ )  $\preceq$  q"
  <proof>
```

```
lemma EH_implies_TH:
  assumes "EH q"
  shows "TH q"
  <proof>
```

If EH fails, there exists a possible-true counterexample (i.e., failure of top-coverage over PDom).

```
lemma not_EH_on_Arg_witness:
  assumes " $\neg$  EH (Arg q)"
  shows " $\exists \zeta. EDia \zeta \wedge \neg ((Arg \zeta) \preceq (Arg q))$ "
  <proof>
```

23.1 9.1 Definition of H_opt: strict anti-above + maximal nontrivial support

Maximizing Nontrivial Relational Supports among Heads. We compare heads based on the cardinality of their nontrivial incoming support sets.

A support is defined as **nontrivial** into C only for patterns $\text{Arg}(A \wedge B) \preceq \text{Arg}(C)$ where A, B, and C are distinct ($A \neq B$, $A \neq C$, and $B \neq C$). Crucially, this excludes trivial logical properties such as plain \wedge -elimination into one of the conjuncts.

MaxNT q signifies that q is a head whose set of nontrivial incoming edges is cardinally at least as large as that of any other head (in the injection sense). This identifies the most relationally coherent and robust truth structure.

```
definition Head :: "bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "Head q  $\equiv H\_negU\_strict$  q"
```

```
definition NT_pair_support :: "bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "NT_pair_support A B C  $\equiv$ 
  A  $\neq$  B  $\wedge$  A  $\neq$  C  $\wedge$  B  $\neq$  C  $\wedge$  (Arg (A  $\wedge$  B)  $\preceq$  Arg C)"
```

definition *NT_in_edges* :: "bool \Rightarrow (bool \times bool) set" where
NT_in_edges C \equiv
 {(A,B). Head A \wedge Head B \wedge Head C \wedge NT_pair_support A B C}"

definition *le_card* :: "'a set \Rightarrow 'b set \Rightarrow bool" (infix " \preceq_c " 50) where
 "A \preceq_c B \longleftrightarrow ($\exists f$. inj_on f A \wedge f ' A \subseteq B)"

definition *lt_card* :: "'a set \Rightarrow 'b set \Rightarrow bool" (infix " \prec_c " 50) where
 "A \prec_c B \longleftrightarrow (A \preceq_c B \wedge \neg (B \preceq_c A))"

definition *eq_card* :: "'a set \Rightarrow 'b set \Rightarrow bool" (infix " \approx_c " 50) where
 "A \approx_c B \longleftrightarrow (A \preceq_c B \wedge B \preceq_c A)"

lemma *le_card_empty_left*: "{ } \preceq_c B"
 <proof>

definition *MaxNT* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool" where
 "MaxNT q \equiv
 Head q \wedge
 ($\forall r$. Head r \longrightarrow NT_in_edges r \preceq_c NT_in_edges q)"

definition *H_opt* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool" where
 "H_opt q \equiv MaxNT q"

23.2 9.2 Consequences of H_opt (Cantor-size / MaxNT version)

lemma *Hopt_to_MaxNT*:
 assumes HQ: "H_opt q"
 shows "MaxNT q"
 <proof>

lemma *NT_in_edges_empty_if_not_Head*:
 assumes NH: " \neg Head C"
 shows "NT_in_edges C = { }"
 <proof>

lemma *Hopt_score_ge_in_PDom*:
 assumes HQ: "H_opt q" and Zin: "z \in PDom"
 shows "NT_in_edges z \preceq_c NT_in_edges q"
 <proof>

lemma *Hopt_score_tie*:
 assumes HA: "H_opt A" and HB: "H_opt B"
 shows "NT_in_edges A \approx_c NT_in_edges B"
 <proof>

If H_opt holds for K, the minimal form above also follows automatically.

```

lemma Hopt_implies_H_principle:
  assumes "H_opt K"
  shows   "H_principle K (Arg K)"
  <proof>

```

```

lemma Hopt_implies_H_principle_EqU:
  assumes "H_opt K" "Q ≈ (Arg K)"
  shows   "H_principle K Q"
  <proof>

```

23.3 9.3 Consistency of H_opt (Cantor-size version)

```

lemma Hopt_has_no_strictly_better_in_PDom:
  assumes HQ: "H_opt q"
  shows   "¬ (∃z∈PDom. NT_in_edges q <_c NT_in_edges z)"
  <proof>

```

The consistency result for H_opt is purely order-theoretic (MaxNT) and does not require q (the argument of H_opt) to be a tautology. In particular, even under the extra assumption $q \neq True$, the same conclusion holds.

```

corollary Hopt_has_no_strictly_better_in_PDom_non_tautology:
  assumes HQ: "H_opt q"
         and nT: "q ≠ True"
  shows   "¬ (∃z∈PDom. NT_in_edges q <_c NT_in_edges z)"
  <proof>

```

23.4 9.4 Finality (H_opt): No argument strictly above an H_opt truth (proof route)

If $H_opt\ q$ holds, then $Arg\ q$ is final within $PDom$: no proposition in $PDom$ has an argument strictly above $Arg\ q$. The proof route is immediate: $H_opt\ q$ entails $H_negU_strict\ q$, and $H_negU_strict\ q$ already excludes any $\zeta \in PDom$ such that $Arg\ q < Arg\ \zeta$. Hence no $PDom$ -based definition can designate a proposition strictly superior to q in argument strength; the search for a strictly higher truth terminates at H_opt .

```

lemma argument_finality_PDom:
  assumes HQ: "H_opt q"
  shows   "∀ζ∈PDom. ¬ ((Arg q) < (Arg ζ))"
  <proof>

```

If a definition D only ranges over $PDom$, then it cannot designate an argument strictly superior to $Arg\ q$ under $H_opt\ q$.

```

lemma argument_finality_for_defs:
  assumes HQ: "H_opt q"
         and Drng: "∀r. D r → r ∈ PDom"
  shows   "¬ (∃r. D r ∧ (Arg q) < (Arg r))"

```

<proof>

Pointwise corollaries.

```
corollary argument_finality_point:
  assumes HQ: "H_opt q" and Rin: "r ∈ PDom"
  shows "¬ ((Arg q) < (Arg r))"
<proof>
```

```
corollary argument_finality_possible:
  assumes HQ: "H_opt q" and Er: "EDia r"
  shows "¬ ((Arg q) < (Arg r))"
<proof>
```

```
corollary argument_finality_true:
  assumes HQ: "H_opt q" and Tr: "TrueNow r"
  shows "¬ ((Arg q) < (Arg r))"
<proof>
```

```
corollary no_definition_strictly_superior_than_H_opt:
  assumes HQ: "H_opt q" and Drng: "∀ r. D r → r ∈ PDom"
  shows "¬ (∃ r. D r ∧ (Arg q) < (Arg r))"
<proof>
```

23.5 9.5 Flat-model consistency witness for $\exists q. H_opt\ q$

Purpose. Provide a concrete toy model (one-point world, always-true entailment, constant *Arg*) in which $H_opt\ q$ holds for any q . This shows the existential $\exists q. H_opt\ q$ is satisfiable (hence not explosive) relative to the U-style definitions below, without touching the main development.

****This adds no axioms; purely a satisfiability witness.****

****Not a semantics claim.**** The construction is intentionally “flat” (single world; entailment always true), so many propositions come out trivially true. It is ****not**** offered as an intended or endorsable semantics of the main theory, but solely as a ****consistency witness****: there exists at least one interpretation making $\langle exists \rangle H_opt\ q$ true without contradiction.

****No dependency back into the core.**** No main lemma or theorem should depend on this appendix. Keep it documentation/check-only, so the core results cannot be criticized as relying on a trivial model.

Concrete flat model ****without**** locales/interpretations (zero friction).

```
type_synonym U1 = unit
```

```
definition Arg_F :: "bool ⇒ U1" where
  "Arg_F _ ≡ ()"
```

```
definition Le_F :: "U1 ⇒ U1 ⇒ bool" where
  "Le_F _ _ ≡ True"
```

definition $Lt_F :: "U1 \Rightarrow U1 \Rightarrow bool"$ where
 $"Lt_F\ p\ q \equiv Le_F\ p\ q \wedge \neg Le_F\ q\ p"$

lemma $Le_F_true[simp]: "Le_F\ p\ q"$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma $not_Lt_F[simp]: "\neg Lt_F\ p\ q"$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

definition $PDom_F :: "bool\ set"$ where
 $"PDom_F \equiv UNIV"$

lemma $PDom_F_all[simp]: "z \in PDom_F"$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

definition $H_negU_strict_F :: "bool \Rightarrow bool"$ where
 $"H_negU_strict_F\ q \equiv$
 $(\forall z \in PDom_F. z \neq q \longrightarrow \neg (Lt_F\ (Arg_F\ q)\ (Arg_F\ z)))"$

definition $Head_F :: "bool \Rightarrow bool"$ where
 $"Head_F\ q \equiv H_negU_strict_F\ q"$

lemma $Head_F_true[simp]: "Head_F\ q"$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

definition $NT_pair_support_F :: "bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool"$ where
 $"NT_pair_support_F\ A\ B\ C \equiv$
 $A \neq B \wedge A \neq C \wedge B \neq C \wedge (Le_F\ (Arg_F\ (A \wedge B))\ (Arg_F\ C))"$

definition $NT_in_edges_F :: "bool \Rightarrow (bool \times bool)\ set"$ where
 $"NT_in_edges_F\ C \equiv$
 $\{(A,B). Head_F\ A \wedge Head_F\ B \wedge Head_F\ C \wedge NT_pair_support_F\ A\ B\ C\}"$

lemma $no_three_distinct_bools:$
fixes $A\ B\ C :: bool$
shows $"A = B \vee A = C \vee B = C"$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma $NT_pair_support_F_false[simp]: "\neg NT_pair_support_F\ A\ B\ C"$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma $NT_in_edges_F_empty[simp]: "NT_in_edges_F\ C = \{\}"$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma $le_card_refl: "X \preceq_c X"$

<proof>

definition *MaxNT_F* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool" where

"*MaxNT_F* q \equiv

Head_F q $\wedge (\forall r. \text{Head}_F r \longrightarrow \text{NT_in_edges}_F r \preceq_c \text{NT_in_edges}_F q)$ "

definition *H_opt_MaxNT_F* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool" where

"*H_opt_MaxNT_F* q \equiv *MaxNT_F* q"

lemma *MaxNT_F_all[simp]*: "*MaxNT_F* q"

<proof>

lemma *H_opt_MaxNT_F_all[simp]*: "*H_opt_MaxNT_F* q"

<proof>

corollary *exists_H_opt_MaxNT_F*: " $\exists q. \text{H_opt_MaxNT_F } q$ "

<proof>

Reading. The MaxNT/NT_in_edges shape is satisfiable in a concrete flat toy model. This witnesses non-explosiveness of the definitional pattern, without affecting the core.

24 10. Supplemental Ontic Frame: A Semantic Interpretation

[Note on the Supplemental Nature of this Section] The core proof of *H_opt* and the Trinitarian structure is self-contained within the abstract U-logic. This section provides an ****optional interpretative bridge**** to standard possible-world semantics.

By mapping model propositions to sets of worlds, we demonstrate that our universal logic is fully compatible with classical ontic frames. This serves as a semantic verification (Application) rather than a necessary foundation for the main argument.

locale *FullIdBridge* =

fixes *Val* :: "'W \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool"

and *iw* :: "'W \Rightarrow U"

assumes *surj_iw*: " $\forall e. \exists w. e = \text{iw } w$ "

and *bridge*: " $\forall w \zeta. (\text{iw } w \vdash \text{Arg } \zeta) \longleftrightarrow \text{Val } w \zeta$ "

begin

definition *Arg0* :: "bool \Rightarrow 'W set" where

"*Arg0* $\zeta \equiv \{w. \text{Val } w \zeta\}$ "

definition *EDia0* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool" where

"*EDia0* $\zeta \equiv (\exists w. \text{Val } w \zeta)$ "

lemma *SuppU_Arg_id*:

"*SuppU* (*Arg* ζ) = { *iw* w | w. *Val* w ζ }"

<proof>

lemma *Dia_equiv*: " $EDia\ \zeta \longleftrightarrow EDia0\ \zeta$ "
 <proof>

lemma *LeU_iff_subset*: " $(Arg\ \zeta) \preceq (Arg\ t) \longleftrightarrow Arg0\ \zeta \subseteq Arg0\ t$ "
 <proof>

end

datatype $W = I \mid II$

locale *Riemann_Toy* =

FullIdBridge *Val iw for Val* :: " $W \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool$ " **and** *iw* :: " $W \Rightarrow U$ "
 + **fixes** $R\ \Phi\ \Phi' :: bool$

assumes *RI*: "Val $I\ R$ "
and *RII*: " \neg Val $II\ R$ "
and *PhiI*: "Val $I\ \Phi$ "
and *nPhi'I*: " \neg Val $I\ \Phi'$ "

begin

lemma *Arg0_R_is_I*: " $Arg0\ R = \{w. w = I\}$ "
 <proof>

lemma *EDia0_R*: " $EDia0\ R$ "
 <proof>

lemma *EDia_R*: " $EDia\ R$ "
 <proof>

lemma *R_supports_Phi_model*: " $Arg0\ R \subseteq Arg0\ \Phi$ "
 <proof>

lemma *R_not_support_Phi'_model*: " $\neg (Arg0\ R \subseteq Arg0\ \Phi')$ "
 <proof>

lemma *R_supports_Phi_U*: " $(Arg\ R) \preceq (Arg\ \Phi)$ "
 <proof>

lemma *R_not_support_Phi'_U*: " $\neg ((Arg\ R) \preceq (Arg\ \Phi'))$ "
 <proof>

lemma *not_PH_of_Phi'*: " $\neg PH\ (Arg\ \Phi')$ "
 <proof>

end

25 11. Vacuity Diagnosis: NT_edge-death empties relational maximality, while N=3 remains the unique structural fixed point

Design note (two-tier MaxNT).

- MaxNT (Section 9) is the ranking core: it compares nontrivial incoming patterns under the minimal pairwise-distinctness guard $A \neq B$, $A \neq C$, and $B \neq C$. This is the weaker, refactor-stable notion of relational maximality.

- MaxNT_edge (Section 11) is the non-vacuity strengthening: it rebuilds incoming support using NT_edge, which additionally enforces non-collapse (no conjunction-elimination equivalence). Thus MaxNT_edge is strictly stronger and exists only when genuine relational structure is possible.

Therefore Section 11 is diagnostic: it shows that if NT_edge is globally impossible, then every edge-based incoming-support set is empty, and the Cantor-style comparison used in MaxNT_edge becomes vacuous. Hence MaxNT_edge collapses to Head-only.

This vacuity affects informational/relational content only; it does not by itself undermine the independent structural necessity of the triune fixed point (N=3).

Philosophical background.

In this development, MaxNT is intended to capture a “supreme truth” in a strong sense: not merely a truth that is final, but one whose superiority is expressed through maximal non-trivial relational support. Thus the real issue is not finality alone, but whether maximality is sustained by genuine relational content rather than by an informationally empty structure.

Section 11 isolates exactly this issue. It introduces NT_edge and the rebuilt notion MaxNT_edge in order to diagnose whether the incoming relational structure remains genuinely non-trivial. Here, “non-trivial” means that a conjunction-based support does not collapse back into mere conjunction-elimination equivalence with one of its conjuncts.

The goal of this section is therefore diagnostic, not destructive. We prove the following conditional:

if NT_edge is globally impossible (NT_dead), then every NT_in_edges_edge set is empty, and the Cantor-style comparison used in MaxNT_edge becomes vacuous.

Hence MaxNT_edge collapses to a purely formal head-condition: its maximality remains syntactically satisfiable, but only vacuously, because all edge-based relational content has disappeared.

Crucially, this vacuity does not undermine the independent structural necessity of the triune fixed point. Even if relational support becomes informationally empty through collapse, the exclusion results against $N=1$, $N=2$, and $N \geq 4$ remain intact. Thus $N=3$ persists as the unique consistency-preserving fixed point.

This section therefore establishes the precise message:

“If NT_edge dies, relational maximality becomes vacuous; but the structural necessity of $N=3$ does not collapse.”

No axioms are introduced here. NT_dead is a definitional diagnostic hypothesis used only to prove a conditional vacuity theorem.

definition NT_edge *::* "bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool" **where**

```
"NT_edge A B C  $\longleftrightarrow$ 
  (Arg (A  $\wedge$  B)  $\preceq$  Arg C)  $\wedge$ 
   $\neg$  (Arg (A  $\wedge$  B)  $\approx$  Arg A)  $\wedge$ 
   $\neg$  (Arg (A  $\wedge$  B)  $\approx$  Arg B)"
```

definition NT_dead *::* bool **where**

```
"NT_dead  $\equiv$  ( $\forall$  A B C.  $\neg$  NT_edge A B C)"
```

definition $NT_in_edges_edge$ *::* "bool \Rightarrow (bool \times bool) set" **where**

```
"NT_in_edges_edge C  $\equiv$ 
  {(A,B). Head A  $\wedge$  Head B  $\wedge$  Head C  $\wedge$ 
   A  $\neq$  B  $\wedge$  A  $\neq$  C  $\wedge$  B  $\neq$  C  $\wedge$ 
   NT_edge A B C}"
```

definition $MaxNT_edge$ *::* "bool \Rightarrow bool" **where**

```
"MaxNT_edge q  $\equiv$ 
  Head q  $\wedge$ 
  ( $\forall$  r. Head r  $\longrightarrow$  NT_in_edges_edge r  $\preceq_c$  NT_in_edges_edge q)"
```

definition $Nontrivial_MaxNT_edge$ *::* "bool \Rightarrow bool" **where**

```
"Nontrivial_MaxNT_edge q  $\equiv$  MaxNT_edge q  $\wedge$  NT_in_edges_edge q  $\neq$  {}"
```

25.1 11.1 $NT_dead \implies$ all edge-sets are empty

lemma $NT_in_edges_edge_empty_if_NT_dead$:

```
assumes D: NT_dead
shows "NT_in_edges_edge C = {}"
<proof>
```

25.2 11.2 Vacuity theorem: $MaxNT_edge$ collapses to Head

theorem $MaxNT_edge_iff_Head_if_NT_dead$:

```
assumes D: NT_dead
shows "MaxNT_edge q  $\longleftrightarrow$  Head q"
<proof>
```

25.3 11.3 Consequence: “Meaningful MaxNT” becomes impossible under NT_dead

corollary *no_Nontrivial_MaxNT_edge_if_NT_dead:*

assumes *D: NT_dead*

shows $\neg (\exists q. \text{Nontrivial_MaxNT_edge } q)$

<proof>

25.4 11.4 Derived corollaries (optional)

This subsection records small but useful consequences of the vacuity theorem.

Under NT_dead, the Cantorian maximality comparison is empty-vacuous, so:

(i) Any Head automatically satisfies MaxNT_edge (maximality becomes trivial). (ii) Any two MaxNT_edge candidates are indistinguishable at the level of their incoming edge-sets (both are empty).

These are not new assumptions; they are direct corollaries of Sections 11.1–11.2. Their role is purely expositional: they make the “vacuity collapse” behavior visible in lightweight lemmas that can be reused later.

corollary *Head_implies_MaxNT_edge_under_NT_dead:*

assumes *D: NT_dead and Hq: "Head q"*

shows *"MaxNT_edge q"*

<proof>

corollary *MaxNT_edge_is_tied_under_NT_dead:*

assumes *D: NT_dead and A: "MaxNT_edge x" and B: "MaxNT_edge y"*

shows *"NT_in_edges_edge x = NT_in_edges_edge y"*

<proof>

25.5 11.5 One-to-one collapse route: (1-to-1) \implies NT_dead \implies vacuity

This subsection makes explicit (as lemmas) the intended bridge:

(1) If the theory enforces a global 1-to-1 comparability of grounds (a total preorder on Arg-images), then every conjunction collapses to one conjunct (trivial collapse).

(2) Hence no NT_edge can survive (NT_dead).

(3) Therefore, by Section 11.2, MaxNT_edge collapses to Head-only (vacuity).

Importantly, no axioms are introduced: the 1-to-1 condition and the conjunction grammar rules (MCL/MCI) are stated as *assumptions* of conditional theorems.

lemma *conj_le_left_from_MCL:*

assumes *MCL: " $\bigwedge e X Y. \text{Makes } e (X \wedge Y) \implies \text{Makes } e X$ "*

shows *"Arg (X \wedge Y) \preceq Arg X"*

<proof>

lemma *Subordination_implies_Trivial_Collapse_left:*

assumes *AB : "Arg A \preceq Arg B"*

```

    and MCL: " $\bigwedge e X Y. \text{Makes } e (X \wedge Y) \implies \text{Makes } e X$ "
    and MCI: " $\bigwedge e X Y. \text{Makes } e X \implies \text{Makes } e Y \implies \text{Makes } e (X \wedge Y)$ "
  shows "Arg (A  $\wedge$  B)  $\approx$  Arg A"
<proof>

```

```

lemma Subordination_kills_NT_edge_left:
  assumes AB : "Arg A  $\preceq$  Arg B"
    and MCL: " $\bigwedge e X Y. \text{Makes } e (X \wedge Y) \implies \text{Makes } e X$ "
    and MCI: " $\bigwedge e X Y. \text{Makes } e X \implies \text{Makes } e Y \implies \text{Makes } e (X \wedge Y)$ "
  shows " $\neg$  NT_edge A B C"
<proof>

```

```

lemma Subordination_kills_NT_edge_right:
  assumes BA : "Arg B  $\preceq$  Arg A"
    and MCL: " $\bigwedge e X Y. \text{Makes } e (X \wedge Y) \implies \text{Makes } e X$ "
    and MCI: " $\bigwedge e X Y. \text{Makes } e X \implies \text{Makes } e Y \implies \text{Makes } e (X \wedge Y)$ "
  shows " $\neg$  NT_edge A B C"
<proof>

```

```

definition OneToOne :: bool where
  "OneToOne  $\equiv$  ( $\forall A B. \text{Arg } A \preceq \text{Arg } B \vee \text{Arg } B \preceq \text{Arg } A$ )"

```

```

lemma OneToOne_implies_NT_dead:
  assumes O : OneToOne
    and MCL: " $\bigwedge e X Y. \text{Makes } e (X \wedge Y) \implies \text{Makes } e X$ "
    and MCI: " $\bigwedge e X Y. \text{Makes } e X \implies \text{Makes } e Y \implies \text{Makes } e (X \wedge Y)$ "
  shows NT_dead
<proof>

```

26 12. TriSupport_Joint and Ternary Semantics (No 1-to-1)

We redefine the trinitarian support to strictly exclude any 1-to-1 subordination. It mandates a pure ternary joint-support structure: the conjunction of any two heads necessitates the third, while no single head necessitates another. This guarantees Borromean stability.

1. Joint support (Ternary Support) 2. Consistency Requirement for Non-triviality (Strict exclusion of 1-to-1 individual support (No mutual subordination))

```

definition TriSupport_Joint :: "bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "TriSupport_Joint a b c  $\equiv$ 
    (Arg (b  $\wedge$  c)  $\preceq$  Arg a)  $\wedge$ 
    (Arg (c  $\wedge$  a)  $\preceq$  Arg b)  $\wedge$ 
    (Arg (a  $\wedge$  b)  $\preceq$  Arg c)  $\wedge$ 
     $\neg$  (Arg a  $\preceq$  Arg b)  $\wedge$   $\neg$  (Arg b  $\preceq$  Arg a)  $\wedge$ 
     $\neg$  (Arg b  $\preceq$  Arg c)  $\wedge$   $\neg$  (Arg c  $\preceq$  Arg b)  $\wedge$ 
     $\neg$  (Arg c  $\preceq$  Arg a)  $\wedge$   $\neg$  (Arg a  $\preceq$  Arg c)"

```

26.1 12.1 Symmetries and permutations

lemma *TriSupport_Joint_perm12:*

"*TriSupport_Joint a b c* \implies *TriSupport_Joint b a c*"
{*proof*}

lemma *TriSupport_Joint_perm23:*

"*TriSupport_Joint a b c* \implies *TriSupport_Joint a c b*"
{*proof*}

lemma *TriSupport_Joint_rotate:*

"*TriSupport_Joint a b c* \implies *TriSupport_Joint b c a*"
{*proof*}

26.2 12.2 Ternary Semantics (pair \rightarrow third)

To extract the pointwise semantics (*Supports e ...*), we assume a standard conjunction-introduction rule (MCI) for the “Supports” relation, bridging the logical AND with the semantic evaluation at point *e*.

lemma *TriSupport_Joint_bc_to_a:*

assumes "*TriSupport_Joint a b c*"
and *MCI*: " $\bigwedge e X Y. \text{Supports } e X \implies \text{Supports } e Y \implies \text{Supports } e (X \wedge Y)$ "
and "*Supports e b*" **and** "*Supports e c*"
shows "*Supports e a*"

{*proof*}

lemma *TriSupport_Joint_semantics:*

assumes "*TriSupport_Joint a b c*"
and *MCI*: " $\bigwedge e X Y. \text{Supports } e X \implies \text{Supports } e Y \implies \text{Supports } e (X \wedge Y)$ "
shows " $\forall e. (\text{Supports } e b \wedge \text{Supports } e c) \longrightarrow \text{Supports } e a$ "
and " $\forall e. (\text{Supports } e c \wedge \text{Supports } e a) \longrightarrow \text{Supports } e b$ "
and " $\forall e. (\text{Supports } e a \wedge \text{Supports } e b) \longrightarrow \text{Supports } e c$ "

{*proof*}

27 13. Proof of n=3 necessity (cardinality; assumption-free)

This section formalizes the “Structural Necessity of the Trinity” using an epistemic refutation domain (*PDom_ep*). The proof architecture adopts a non-axiomatic approach, deriving the uniqueness of n=3 from the following definitional constraints:

1. ****Refutation-based Epistemic Possibility (*EDia_ep*):**** Defines epistemic possibility as the absence of formal refutation within the current evidence state.
2. ****Maximal Non-Trivial Support (*MaxNT_ep*):**** Identifies optimal heads (*H_opt_ep*) by comparing the cardinality of their non-trivial relational support sets (*NT_in_edges_ep*).
3. ****Categorical Exclusion:**** By defining N1, N2, and N4+ exact configurations, we set the stage for proving that only N3 satisfies the structural equilibrium between “Relational Richness” and “Ontological Maximality.”

Note: The use of Cantor-style cardinal comparison ensures that the ranking of optimal truths is independent of finite model constraints, grounding the Triune necessity in pure set-theoretic relations.

27.1 13.1 Ref-domain (H_opt_ep)

consts *Ref* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool"

Definition: (1) Refuted(p): truth-bearer p is in a currently refuted state (a proof of falsity exists within the current system). (2) Negation of Refuted(p): truth-bearer p is in a currently unrefuted state (no proof of falsity exists) so, EDia_ep(p) \longleftrightarrow negation of Refuted(p)

EDia_ep φ means: "not refuted yet (given the current evidence state)". Formally, EDia_ep is definitional negation of Ref.

definition *EDia_ep* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool" **where**
 "EDia_ep z \equiv \neg Ref z"

definition *PDom_ep* :: "bool set" **where**
 "PDom_ep \equiv {z. TrueNow z \vee EDia_ep z}"

definition *Comparable_PDomep_on* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool" **where**
 "Comparable_PDomep_on q \equiv
 (\forall z. z \in PDom_ep \longrightarrow ((Arg z) \preceq (Arg q) \vee (Arg q) \preceq (Arg z)))"

definition *H_negU_strict_ep* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool" **where**
 "H_negU_strict_ep q \equiv
 (\forall z. z \in PDom_ep \longrightarrow z \neq q \longrightarrow \neg ((Arg q) \prec (Arg z)))"

definition *Head_ep* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool" **where**
 "Head_ep q \equiv EDia_ep q \wedge H_negU_strict_ep q"

Nontrivial pair-support among heads. We exclude trivial targets C=A or C=B so plain \wedge -elimination does not count.

definition *NT_pair_support_ep* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool" **where**
 "NT_pair_support_ep A B C \equiv
 A \neq B \wedge A \neq C \wedge B \neq C \wedge (Arg (A \wedge B) \preceq Arg C)"

definition *NT_in_edges_ep* :: "bool \Rightarrow (bool \times bool) set" **where**
 "NT_in_edges_ep C \equiv
 {(A,B). Head_ep A \wedge Head_ep B \wedge Head_ep C \wedge NT_pair_support_ep A B C}"

lemmas le_card_empty_left_ep = le_card_empty_left

definition *MaxNT_ep* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool" **where**
 "MaxNT_ep q \equiv
 Head_ep q
 \wedge (\forall r. EDia_ep r \longrightarrow NT_in_edges_ep r \preceq_c NT_in_edges_ep q)"

definition H_opt_ep :: "bool \Rightarrow bool" where
 $H_opt_ep\ q \equiv MaxNT_ep\ q$

lemma $Hopt_ep_to_MaxNT_ep$:
 assumes " $H_opt_ep\ q$ "
 shows " $MaxNT_ep\ q$ "
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma $NT_in_edges_ep_empty_if_not_Head_ep$:
 assumes " $\neg Head_ep\ C$ "
 shows " $NT_in_edges_ep\ C = \{\}$ "
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma $Hopt_ep_score_ge_EDia$:
 assumes HQ : " $H_opt_ep\ q$ " and EZ : " $EDia_ep\ z$ "
 shows " $NT_in_edges_ep\ z \preceq_c NT_in_edges_ep\ q$ "
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma $Hopt_ep_score_ge_any$:
 assumes HQ : " $H_opt_ep\ q$ "
 shows " $NT_in_edges_ep\ z \preceq_c NT_in_edges_ep\ q$ "
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma $Hopt_ep_score_tie$:
 assumes HA : " $H_opt_ep\ A$ " and HB : " $H_opt_ep\ B$ "
 shows " $NT_in_edges_ep\ A \approx_c NT_in_edges_ep\ B$ "
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma $le_card_imp_card_le_if_finite$:
 assumes " $A \preceq_c B$ " and " $finite\ B$ "
 shows " $card\ A \leq card\ B$ "
 $\langle proof \rangle$

definition $EqNT_ep$:: "bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool" (infix " \approx_{NT} " 50) where
 $X \approx_{NT} Y \equiv NT_in_edges_ep\ X = NT_in_edges_ep\ Y$

definition $Distinct_ep$:: "bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool" where
 $Distinct_ep\ X\ Y \equiv X \neq Y \wedge \neg (X \approx_{NT} Y)$

definition $EntailsU$:: "bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool" (infix " \longrightarrow_U " 55) where
 $e \longrightarrow_U Q \equiv (Arg\ e) \preceq (Arg\ Q)$

definition $StrictBelow$:: "bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool" where

"StrictBelow e K \equiv (e \rightarrow_U K) \wedge \neg (K \rightarrow_U e)"

definition NotHoptArg :: "bool \Rightarrow bool" where

"NotHoptArg X \equiv \neg H_opt_ep X"

definition TextPremises :: "bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool" where

"TextPremises e K \equiv

EDia_ep e
 \wedge (e \rightarrow_U K)
 \wedge \neg (K \rightarrow_U e)
 \wedge e \neq K
 \wedge NotHoptArg e"

lemma TextPremisesD:

assumes "TextPremises e K"

shows "EDia_ep e"

"e \rightarrow_U K"

" \neg (K \rightarrow_U e)"

"e \neq K"

"NotHoptArg e"

<proof>

definition EH_ep where

"EH_ep U \equiv (\forall z. EDia_ep z \rightarrow (Arg z) \preceq U)"

lemma EH_epD:

assumes "EH_ep U" and "EDia_ep z"

shows "(Arg z) \preceq U"

<proof>

lemma H_principle_ep_basic:

assumes EH: "EH_ep (Arg Q)"

and TP: "TextPremises e K"

shows "(Arg e) \preceq (Arg Q)"

<proof>

corollary H_principle_ep_basic_EntailsU:

assumes EH: "EH_ep (Arg Q)" and TP: "TextPremises e K"

shows "e \rightarrow_U Q"

<proof>

lemma not_EH_ep_if_ep_possible_fails_to_support:

assumes TP: "TextPremises e K"

and N: " \neg ((Arg e) \preceq (Arg Q))"

shows " \neg EH_ep (Arg Q)"

<proof>

27.2 13.2 Consistency for H_opt_ep (Cantor-size version)

lemma *Hopt_ep_has_no_strictly_better_in_PDom_ep*:

assumes *HQ*: " $H_opt_ep\ q$ "

shows " $\neg (\exists z \in PDom_ep. NT_in_edges_ep\ q \prec_c NT_in_edges_ep\ z)$ "

<proof>

corollary *Hopt_ep_has_no_strictly_better_in_PDom_ep_non_tautology*:

assumes *HQ*: " $H_opt_ep\ q$ "

and *nT*: " $q \neq True$ "

shows " $\neg (\exists z \in PDom_ep. NT_in_edges_ep\ q \prec_c NT_in_edges_ep\ z)$ "

<proof>

27.3 13.3 Rescue block: $Hopt3 \implies N3$ (with pure joint support)

$Hopt3$ now explicitly requires the $TriSupport_Joint$ structure, guaranteeing that the three optimal heads do not subordinate each other, but strictly co-support the third.

definition *Hopt3* :: " $bool \implies bool \implies bool \implies bool$ " where

" $Hopt3\ a\ b\ c \equiv$

$H_opt\ a \wedge H_opt\ b \wedge H_opt\ c \wedge$

$EDia\ a \wedge EDia\ b \wedge EDia\ c \wedge$

$TriSupport_Joint\ a\ b\ c$ "

lemma *Hopt3_implies_trinity_joint*:

assumes " $Hopt3\ a\ b\ c$ "

shows " $TriSupport_Joint\ a\ b\ c$ "

<proof>

definition *N3* :: $bool$ where

" $N3 \equiv (\exists a\ b\ c.$

$H_opt\ a \wedge H_opt\ b \wedge H_opt\ c \wedge$

$TriSupport_Joint\ a\ b\ c \wedge$

$(\forall e. Supports\ e\ b \wedge Supports\ e\ c \implies Supports\ e\ a) \wedge$

$(\forall e. Supports\ e\ c \wedge Supports\ e\ a \implies Supports\ e\ b) \wedge$

$(\forall e. Supports\ e\ a \wedge Supports\ e\ b \implies Supports\ e\ c))$ "

lemma *OnlyN3_from_Hopt3_unboxed*:

assumes *H3*: " $Hopt3\ a\ b\ c$ "

and *MCI*: " $\bigwedge e\ X\ Y. Supports\ e\ X \implies Supports\ e\ Y \implies Supports\ e\ (X \wedge Y)$ "

shows *N3*

<proof>

lemma *OnlyN3_epi_unboxed*:

assumes *Witnesses*: " $(\exists x. H_opt\ x) \implies (\exists a\ b\ c. Hopt3\ a\ b\ c)$ "

and *MCI*: " $\bigwedge e\ X\ Y. Supports\ e\ X \implies Supports\ e\ Y \implies Supports\ e\ (X \wedge Y)$ "

shows " $(\exists x. H_opt\ x) \implies N3$ "

<proof>

```
lemmas OnlyN3_epi_possible_proved = OnlyN3_epi_unboxed
lemmas OnlyN3_epi_boxed           = OnlyN3_epi_possible_proved
```

28 14. $n \geq 4$ exclusion

28.1 14.1 Boolean reading at our world (discharging `Ep_Conj_` locales)

```
locale Boolean_at_our_world =
  fixes Val :: "'w  $\Rightarrow$  bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool" and w0 :: "'w" ("w0")
  assumes and_hom: " $\bigwedge A B. \text{Val } w0 (A \wedge B) = (\text{Val } w0 A \wedge \text{Val } w0 B)$ "
  assumes Ref_is_false_at_w0: " $\bigwedge \varphi. \text{Ref } \varphi \longleftrightarrow \neg \text{Val } w0 \varphi$ "
begin
```

```
lemma Ref_and_sound_global:
  "Ref (A  $\wedge$  B)  $\longrightarrow$  (Ref A  $\vee$  Ref B)" for A B :: bool
<proof>
```

```
lemma Ref_and_complete_global:
  "(Ref A  $\vee$  Ref B)  $\longrightarrow$  Ref (A  $\wedge$  B)" for A B :: bool
<proof>
```

end

```
context
  fixes Val :: "'w  $\Rightarrow$  bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool"
  and w0 :: "'w"
  assumes and_hom_w0: " $\bigwedge A B. \text{Val } w0 (A \wedge B) = (\text{Val } w0 A \wedge \text{Val } w0 B)$ "
  assumes Ref_is_false_at_w0: " $\bigwedge \varphi. \text{Ref } \varphi \longleftrightarrow \neg \text{Val } w0 \varphi$ "
begin
```

```
interpretation OurWorld: Boolean_at_our_world Val w0
<proof>
```

end

28.2 14.2 From “NotRef (($\Phi \wedge \Omega$) \wedge Ψ)” to “EDia_ep ($\Omega \wedge \Psi$)”(ES) — no global axioms

```
context Boolean_at_our_world
begin
```

```
lemma EDia_ep_iff_notRef [simp]:
  "EDia_ep phi  $\longleftrightarrow$   $\neg$  Ref phi"
<proof>
```

lemma notRef_pair_from_notRef_triple_plain:
 assumes RCW: " $\forall X Y. \text{Ref } X \implies \text{Ref } (X \wedge Y)$ "
 and NRT: " $\neg \text{Ref } ((\text{Phi} \wedge \text{Omega}) \wedge \text{Psi})$ "
 shows " $\neg \text{Ref } (\text{Omega} \wedge \text{Psi})$ "
 <proof>

corollary EDia_ep_pair_from_notRef_triple_plain:
 assumes RCW: " $\forall X Y. \text{Ref } X \implies \text{Ref } (X \wedge Y)$ "
 and NRT: " $\neg \text{Ref } ((\text{Phi} \wedge \text{Omega}) \wedge \text{Psi})$ "
 shows " $\text{EDia_ep } (\text{Omega} \wedge \text{Psi})$ "
 <proof>

end

28.3 14.3 Coverage + witness gap \Rightarrow MoreCertain $\Phi' \Phi$

lemma not_LeU_iff_exists_witness_v2:
 " $\neg ((\text{Arg } S) \preceq (\text{Arg } T)) \iff (\exists a. \text{Makes } a \text{ } S \wedge \neg \text{Makes } a \text{ } T)$ "
 <proof>

corollary gap_equiv_witness_OmegaPsi_Phi'_v2:
 " $\neg ((\text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi)) \preceq (\text{Arg } \Phi')) \iff$
 $(\exists a. \text{Makes } a \text{ } (\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge \neg \text{Makes } a \text{ } \Phi')$ "
 <proof>

lemma witness_breaks_back_imp_v2:
 assumes "Makes a X" and " $\neg \text{Makes } a \text{ } Y$ "
 shows " $\neg (\forall e. \text{Makes } e \text{ } X \longrightarrow \text{Makes } e \text{ } Y)$ "
 <proof>

lemma relcert_from_cov_and_gap_min_witness_v2:
 assumes Cov : " $(\text{Arg } \Phi') \preceq (\text{Arg } \Phi)$ "
 and Gap Φ : " $(\text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi)) \preceq (\text{Arg } \Phi)$ "
 and W : " $\exists a. \text{Makes } a \text{ } (\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge \neg \text{Makes } a \text{ } \Phi'$ "
 shows "MoreCertain_pred $\Phi' \Phi$ " "RelCert $\Phi' \Phi$ "
 <proof>

lemma coverage_from_Hopt_ep':
 assumes Cov: " $(\text{Arg } \Phi') \preceq (\text{Arg } \Phi)$ "
 shows " $(\text{Arg } \Phi') \preceq (\text{Arg } \Phi)$ "
 <proof>

lemma gap1_from_Hopt_ep':
 assumes Gap Φ : " $(\text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi)) \preceq (\text{Arg } \Phi)$ "
 shows " $(\text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi)) \preceq (\text{Arg } \Phi)$ "

<proof>

corollary *relcert_from_Hopt_ep_and_EDiaS_witness:*

```
assumes HΦ : "H_opt_ep Φ"
  and TPΦ': "TextPremises Φ' K1"
  and TPS  : "TextPremises (Ω ∧ Ψ) K0"
  and Cov0 : "(Arg Φ') ≤ (Arg Φ)"
  and Gap0 : "(Arg (Ω ∧ Ψ)) ≤ (Arg Φ)"
  and W    : "∃ a. Makes a (Ω ∧ Ψ) ∧ ¬ Makes a Φ'"
shows "MoreCertain_pred Φ' Φ" and "RelCert Φ' Φ"
```

<proof>

28.4 14.4 $n \geq 4$ exclusion proof by Superfluous-removal

locale *Band_Collapse_Superfluous =*

```
fixes Ω Ψ Φ :: bool
assumes ES: "EDia_ep (Ω ∧ Ψ)"
  and Cov: "Arg (Ω ∧ Ψ) ≤ Arg Φ"
  and NS:
    "(Arg (Ω ∧ Ψ)) ≤ Arg Φ  $\implies$ 
      ( $\forall Y. H\_opt\_ep Y \longrightarrow EDia\_ep Y \longrightarrow$ 
        Arg ((Ω ∧ Ψ) ∧ Y) ≤ Arg Φ  $\longrightarrow$ 
        Arg ((Ω ∧ Ψ) ∧ Y)  $\approx$  Arg (Ω ∧ Ψ))"
  and MCL: " $\bigwedge e A B. Makes e (A \wedge B) \implies Makes e A$ "
  and MCR: " $\bigwedge e A B. Makes e (A \wedge B) \implies Makes e B$ "
```

begin

lemma *conj_le_left[simp]:* "Arg (A ∧ B) ≤ Arg A"

<proof>

lemma *conj_le_right[simp]:* "Arg (A ∧ B) ≤ Arg B"

<proof>

lemma *pulled_eq_and_below_Phi:*

```
assumes HY: "H_opt_ep Y" and EY: "EDia_ep Y"
shows "Arg ((Ω ∧ Ψ) ∧ Y) ≤ Arg Φ"
  and "Arg ((Ω ∧ Ψ) ∧ Y)  $\approx$  Arg (Ω ∧ Ψ)"
```

<proof>

lemma *pulled_pair_collapse_in_band:*

```
assumes HY1: "H_opt_ep Y1" and EY1: "EDia_ep Y1"
  and HY2: "H_opt_ep Y2" and EY2: "EDia_ep Y2"
shows "(Arg ((Ω ∧ Ψ) ∧ Y1))  $\approx$  (Arg ((Ω ∧ Ψ) ∧ Y2))"
```

<proof>

lemma *no_three_distinct_classes_in_band:*

assumes *HY1*: "H_opt_ep Y₁" **and** *EY1*: "EDia_ep Y₁"
and *HY2*: "H_opt_ep Y₂" **and** *EY2*: "EDia_ep Y₂"
and *HY3*: "H_opt_ep Y₃" **and** *EY3*: "EDia_ep Y₃"
shows " $\neg (\neg (\text{Arg } ((\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge Y_1) \approx \text{Arg } ((\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge Y_2)) \wedge$
 $\neg (\text{Arg } ((\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge Y_1) \approx \text{Arg } ((\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge Y_3)) \wedge$
 $\neg (\text{Arg } ((\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge Y_2) \approx \text{Arg } ((\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge Y_3)))$ "

<proof>

lemma *all_pulled_equiv_in_band*:

assumes "*finite S*" **and** " $\forall Y \in S. \text{H_opt_ep } Y \wedge \text{EDia_ep } Y$ "
shows " $\exists Q. \forall Y \in S. \text{Arg } ((\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge Y) \approx Q$ "

<proof>

end

28.5 14.5 Proof of sandwich existence (no-1, no-2, no-4+, no-superfluous)

lemma *conj_le_S*:

assumes *MCL*: " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B) \implies \text{Makes } e A$ "
shows " $\text{Arg } ((\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge Y) \preceq \text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi)$ "

<proof>

lemma *S_le_Phi_via_basic*:

assumes *TP_S*: "*TextPremises* $(\Omega \wedge \Psi) \Phi$ "
shows " $\text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi) \preceq \text{Arg } \Phi$ "

<proof>

lemma *conj_le_Phi*:

assumes *MCL*: " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B) \implies \text{Makes } e A$ "
and *Cov*: " $\text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi) \preceq \text{Arg } \Phi$ "
shows " $\text{Arg } ((\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge Y) \preceq \text{Arg } \Phi$ "

<proof>

lemma *N3_sandwich_expanded_noCmp*:

fixes $\Omega \Psi \Phi :: \text{bool}$
assumes *ES*: "*EDia_ep* $(\Omega \wedge \Psi)$ "
and *Cov*: " $\text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi) \preceq \text{Arg } \Phi$ "
and *NS*: " $((\text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi)) \preceq \text{Arg } \Phi) \implies$
 $(\forall \Delta. \text{H_opt_ep } \Delta \longrightarrow \text{EDia_ep } \Delta \longrightarrow$
 $\text{Arg } ((\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge \Delta) \preceq \text{Arg } \Phi \longrightarrow$
 $\text{Arg } ((\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge \Delta) \approx \text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi))$ "
and *Ex*: " $\exists Y. \text{H_opt_ep } Y \wedge \text{EDia_ep } Y$ "
and *MCL*: " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B) \implies \text{Makes } e A$ "
and *MCR*: " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B) \implies \text{Makes } e B$ "
shows " $\exists Y. \text{H_opt_ep } Y \wedge \text{EDia_ep } Y \wedge$
 $\text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi) \preceq \text{Arg } Y \wedge$ "

$\text{Arg } ((\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge Y) \preceq \text{Arg } \Phi \wedge$
 $\text{Arg } ((\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge Y) \approx \text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi)''$

<proof>

lemma *W_from_gap*:

assumes " $\neg ((\text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi)) \preceq (\text{Arg } \Phi'))''$ "
shows " $\exists a. \text{Makes } a (\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge \neg \text{Makes } a \Phi''$ "
<proof>

28.6 14.6 $N \geq 4$ exclusion at realization level

context *Band_Collapse_Superfluous*

begin

abbreviation *S* :: *bool* **where** " $S \equiv (\Omega \wedge \Psi)''$ "

lemma *EqU_imp_LeU_L*:

$(\text{Arg } X) \approx (\text{Arg } Y) \implies (\text{Arg } X) \preceq (\text{Arg } Y)''$
<proof>

lemma *EqU_imp_LeU_R*:

$(\text{Arg } X) \approx (\text{Arg } Y) \implies (\text{Arg } Y) \preceq (\text{Arg } X)''$
<proof>

lemma *LeU_imp_transfer*:

$(\text{Arg } X) \preceq (\text{Arg } Y) \implies \text{Makes } e X \implies \text{Makes } e Y''$
<proof>

lemma *share_witness_if_real_NS*:

assumes *RS*: " $\exists a. \text{Makes } a S$ "
and *HY*: " $H_{\text{opt_ep}} Y$ " **and** *EY*: " $EDia_{\text{ep}} Y$ "
shows " $\exists a. \text{Makes } a S \wedge \text{Makes } a (S \wedge Y)''$ "

<proof>

lemma *uniform_realization_for_finite_family*:

fixes *Y* :: "'i \Rightarrow *bool*" **and** *I* :: "'i *set*"
assumes *RS*: " $\exists a. \text{Makes } a S$ "
and *FIN*: "*finite I*"
and *HY*: " $\forall i \in I. H_{\text{opt_ep}} (Y i)''$ "
and *EY*: " $\forall i \in I. EDia_{\text{ep}} (Y i)''$ "
shows " $\exists a. \forall i \in I. \text{Makes } a (S \wedge Y i)''$ "

<proof>

lemma *no_four_distinct_classes_in_band_pre132*:

assumes *HY1*: " $H_{\text{opt_ep}} Y1$ " **and** *EY1*: " $EDia_{\text{ep}} Y1$ "
and *HY2*: " $H_{\text{opt_ep}} Y2$ " **and** *EY2*: " $EDia_{\text{ep}} Y2$ "

```

    and HY3: "H_opt_ep Y3" and EY3: "EDia_ep Y3"
    and HY4: "H_opt_ep Y4" and EY4: "EDia_ep Y4"
shows "¬ (¬ (Arg (S ∧ Y1) ≈ Arg (S ∧ Y2)) ∧
        ¬ (Arg (S ∧ Y1) ≈ Arg (S ∧ Y3)) ∧
        ¬ (Arg (S ∧ Y1) ≈ Arg (S ∧ Y4)) ∧
        ¬ (Arg (S ∧ Y2) ≈ Arg (S ∧ Y3)) ∧
        ¬ (Arg (S ∧ Y2) ≈ Arg (S ∧ Y4)) ∧
        ¬ (Arg (S ∧ Y3) ≈ Arg (S ∧ Y4)))"
⟨proof⟩
end

```

28.7 14.7 Minimal nonempty core $\Omega \wedge \Psi$ and no new independent pillar via Δ

```

locale Band_Collapse_From_Hopt =
  fixes  $\Omega \Psi \Phi :: \text{bool}$ 
  assumes ES: "EDia_ep ( $\Omega \wedge \Psi$ )"
    and Cov: "Arg ( $\Omega \wedge \Psi$ )  $\preceq$  Arg  $\Phi$ "
    and MCL: " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B) \implies \text{Makes } e A$ "
    and MCR: " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B) \implies \text{Makes } e B$ "
    and MCI: " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e A \implies \text{Makes } e B \implies \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B)$ "
begin

lemma conj_le_left[simp]: "Arg ( $A \wedge B$ )  $\preceq$  Arg A"
  ⟨proof⟩

lemma conj_le_right[simp]: "Arg ( $A \wedge B$ )  $\preceq$  Arg B"
  ⟨proof⟩

end

```

28.8 14.8 NS(No-Superfluous) locale assumption discharge

NS (“No-Superfluous”) is the redundancy filter for the core. It states that if a candidate Y is itself H-optimal and epistemically admissible, and if the enlarged conjunction $(S \wedge Y)$ still remains within the Phi-band, then this enlargement contributes no genuinely new Arg-content: $\text{Arg}(S \wedge Y)$ must be Arg-equivalent to $\text{Arg } S$.

Hence NS blocks superfluous duplication of the core inside the admissible band.

STRUCTURAL ROLE OF THIS SUBSECTION: The “Discharge Engine” for the Band \approx -Collapse ($N \geq 4$ Exclusion)

In Sections 14.4 - 14.6, we proved that 4 or more independent supreme heads ($N \geq 4$) will inevitably undergo an \approx -collapse. However, that proof temporarily relied on a structural assumption called “NS” (No-Superfluous).

If we left “NS” as an unproven assumption, it would act as a hidden axiom, fatally weakening the strictly axiom-free claim of this development.

The core purpose of Section 14.8 is to completely eliminate (discharge) this “NS” assumption. We mathematically prove that “NS” is NOT an external metaphysical axiom, but an inescapable analytic consequence derived purely from basic Boolean logic (MCL, MCI) combined with the foundational H-Principle.

The Proof Mechanism (The Sandwich Compression in “core_conj_equiv_basic”): 1. Bounded from above (via MCL): $\text{Arg}(S \wedge Y) \preceq \text{Arg}(S)$ - A logical conjunction cannot contain more foundational support than its parts. 2. Bounded from below (via MCI + H-Principle): $\text{Arg}(S) \preceq \text{Arg}(S \wedge Y)$ - Because Y is an optimal head (H_opt), it already covers all possibilities of the core S. Thus, adding Y via conjunction provides no new independent support. 3. \approx -Collapse: Squeezed from both sides, $\text{Arg}(S \wedge Y) \approx \text{Arg}(S)$ is strictly forced.

Conclusion: Any attempt to add a new optimal pillar (Y) to an existing optimal core (S) yields exactly zero new epistemic coverage. The system is structurally locked, making $N \geq 4$ logically impossible without needing any external axioms.

definition *NS_restricted* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool" where

"NS_restricted S $\Phi \equiv$
 $(\forall Y. H_opt_ep Y \longrightarrow EDia_ep Y \longrightarrow$
 $Arg (S \wedge Y) \preceq Arg \Phi \longrightarrow$
 $Arg (S \wedge Y) \approx Arg S)"$

Restricted NS: no admissible H-opt extension of S yields a genuinely new layer below Phi.

lemma *NSIOF_from_NS_restricted*:

"NS_restricted S $\Phi \longrightarrow$
 $(Arg S \preceq Arg \Phi \longrightarrow$
 $(\forall Y. H_opt_ep Y \longrightarrow EDia_ep Y \longrightarrow$
 $Arg (S \wedge Y) \preceq Arg \Phi \longrightarrow$
 $Arg (S \wedge Y) \approx Arg S))"$

<proof>

definition *Pull_de* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool" where

"Pull_de S $\Phi \equiv NS_restricted S \Phi"$

abbreviation *Pull_NS* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool" where

"Pull_NS S $\Phi \equiv Pull_de S \Phi"$

lemma *NS_restricted_132_from_Pull*:

"Pull_de S $\Phi \longrightarrow NS_restricted S \Phi"$

<proof>

lemma *EqU_from_LeU*:

assumes XY: "X \preceq Y" and YX: "Y \preceq X"

shows "X \approx Y"

<proof>

lemma *core_conj_equiv_basic*:

fixes $\Omega \Psi Y$:: bool

```

assumes ES      : "EDia_ep ( $\Omega \wedge \Psi$ )"
and HY         : "H_opt_ep Y"
and EY         : "EDia_ep Y"
and Core_to_Y : "Arg ( $\Omega \wedge \Psi$ )  $\preceq$  Arg Y"
and MCL        : " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B) \implies \text{Makes } e A$ "
and MCI        : " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e A \implies \text{Makes } e B \implies \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B)$ "
shows "Arg ( $(\Omega \wedge \Psi) \wedge Y$ )  $\approx$  Arg ( $\Omega \wedge \Psi$ )"
<proof>

```

– ES bridge inside the world-locale –

```

context Boolean_at_our_world
begin

```

```

lemma ES_from_notRef_triple:
assumes RCW: " $\bigwedge X Y. \text{Ref } X \implies \text{Ref } (X \wedge Y)$ "
and NRT: " $\neg \text{Ref } ((\Phi \wedge \Omega) \wedge \Psi)$ "
shows "EDia_ep ( $\Omega \wedge \Psi$ )"
<proof>

```

– NS discharge (EH-free) –

```

lemma NS_discharge_from_ES:
fixes Phi Omega Psi :: bool
assumes ES : "EDia_ep ( $\Omega \wedge \Psi$ )"
and MCL : " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B) \implies \text{Makes } e A$ "
and MCI : " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e A \implies \text{Makes } e B \implies \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B)$ "
and Core_to_Y_rule: " $\bigwedge Y. \text{H\_opt\_ep } Y \implies \text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi) \preceq \text{Arg } Y$ "
shows "NS_restricted ( $\Omega \wedge \Psi$ ) Phi"
<proof>

```

```

lemma NS_discharge:
fixes Phi Omega Psi :: bool
assumes RCW : " $\bigwedge X Y. \text{Ref } X \implies \text{Ref } (X \wedge Y)$ "
and NRT : " $\neg \text{Ref } ((\Phi \wedge \Omega) \wedge \Psi)$ "
and MCL : " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B) \implies \text{Makes } e A$ "
and MCR : " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B) \implies \text{Makes } e B$ "
and MCI : " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e A \implies \text{Makes } e B \implies \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B)$ "
and Core_to_Y_rule: " $\bigwedge Y. \text{H\_opt\_ep } Y \implies \text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi) \preceq \text{Arg } Y$ "
shows "NS_restricted ( $\Omega \wedge \Psi$ ) Phi"
<proof>

```

```

lemma NS_with_Cov:
fixes Phi Omega Psi :: bool
assumes ES : "EDia_ep ( $\Omega \wedge \Psi$ )"
and MCL : " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B) \implies \text{Makes } e A$ "
and MCI : " $\bigwedge e A B. \text{Makes } e A \implies \text{Makes } e B \implies \text{Makes } e (A \wedge B)$ "
and Cov0: "Arg ( $\Omega \wedge \Psi$ )  $\preceq$  Arg Phi"
and Core_to_Y_rule: " $\bigwedge Y. \text{H\_opt\_ep } Y \implies \text{Arg } (\Omega \wedge \Psi) \preceq \text{Arg } Y$ "

```

```

shows "NS_restricted (Omega ∧ Psi) Phi"
  and "Arg (Omega ∧ Psi) ≼ Arg Phi"
⟨proof⟩

```

end

29 15. n=1 exclusion

Intuition: Structurally, a solitary top element in an impoverished comparison domain may still fail to be genuinely unsurpassable, since a richer domain could in principle contain a stronger candidate. By contrast, a co-maximal structure realized within a comparison domain already saturated by the strongest admissible candidates removes that possibility altogether. Hence the decisive issue is not merely whether a candidate is “top”, but whether its top-status is realized within the maximally relevant comparison space.

29.1 15.1 Formal Preliminaries for Singularity Exclusion

```

abbreviation Refuted_ep :: "bool ⇒ bool" where
  "Refuted_ep ≡ Ref"

```

```

locale Refuted_Backprop =
  assumes ref_back: "∧P Q. (P → Q) ⇒ Refuted_ep Q ⇒ Refuted_ep P"
begin

```

```

lemma EDia_ep_forward:
  assumes imp: "P → Q" and possP: "EDia_ep P"
  shows "EDia_ep Q"
  ⟨proof⟩

```

end

```

typedecl P

```

```

consts
  AndP  :: "P ⇒ P ⇒ P"  (infixr "□" 70)
  ArgP  :: "P ⇒ U"
  HeadP :: "P ⇒ bool"

```

```

abbreviation LeP (infix "≼P" 50) where
  "x ≼P y ≡ (ArgP x ≼ ArgP y)"

```

```

definition NT_pair_supportP :: "P ⇒ P ⇒ P ⇒ bool" where
  "NT_pair_supportP A B C ≡
    A ≠ B ∧ A ≠ C ∧ B ≠ C ∧ (ArgP (A □ B) ≼ ArgP C)"

```

```

definition NT_in_edgesP :: "P  $\Rightarrow$  (P  $\times$  P) set" where
  "NT_in_edgesP C  $\equiv$ 
    {(A,B). HeadP A  $\wedge$  HeadP B  $\wedge$  HeadP C  $\wedge$  NT_pair_supportP A B C}"

definition le_cardP :: "'a set  $\Rightarrow$  'b set  $\Rightarrow$  bool" (infix " $\preceq_cP$ " 50) where
  "A  $\preceq_cP$  B  $\longleftrightarrow$  ( $\exists f$ . inj_on f A  $\wedge$  f ' A  $\subseteq$  B)"

definition MaxNTP :: "P  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "MaxNTP q  $\equiv$  HeadP q  $\wedge$  ( $\forall r$ . HeadP r  $\longrightarrow$  NT_in_edgesP r  $\preceq_cP$  NT_in_edgesP q)"

definition H_optP :: "P  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "H_optP q  $\equiv$  MaxNTP q"

lemma nonempty_not_le_cardP_empty:
  assumes "A  $\neq$  {}"
  shows " $\neg$  (A  $\preceq_cP$  {})"
  <proof>

lemma HoptP_edges_nonempty_if_exists_head_nonempty:
  assumes ex: " $\exists r$ . HeadP r  $\wedge$  NT_in_edgesP r  $\neq$  {}"
    and HQ: "H_optP q"
  shows "NT_in_edgesP q  $\neq$  {}"
  <proof>

lemma not_all_HoptP_empty_if_exists_head_nonempty:
  assumes exH: " $\exists q$ . H_optP q"
    and exN: " $\exists r$ . HeadP r  $\wedge$  NT_in_edgesP r  $\neq$  {}"
  shows " $\neg$  ( $\forall q$ . H_optP q  $\longrightarrow$  NT_in_edgesP q = {})"
  <proof>

locale Epistemic_N1_Exclusion = Refuted_Backprop
begin

lemma epistemic_n1_nonclosure:
  assumes exH: " $\exists q$ . H_optP q"
    and poss_nonempty_head: "EDia_ep ( $\exists r$ . HeadP r  $\wedge$  NT_in_edgesP r  $\neq$  {})"
  shows "EDia_ep ( $\neg$  ( $\forall q$ . H_optP q  $\longrightarrow$  NT_in_edgesP q = {}))"
  <proof>

end

```

29.2 15.2 Main proof: N=1 exclusion via edge-nonempty possibility

```

abbreviation EdgeExist :: bool where
  "EdgeExist  $\equiv$  ( $\exists r$ . HeadP r  $\wedge$  NT_in_edgesP r  $\neq$  {})"

```

definition *ExactlyOneHeadP* :: bool where

```
"ExactlyOneHeadP  $\longleftrightarrow$ 
  ( $\exists A0. \text{HeadP } A0 \wedge (\forall C. \text{HeadP } C \longrightarrow C = A0)$ )"
```

===== Epistemic status of *EdgeExist* =====

We use the edge-existence proposition

```
EdgeExist  $\equiv (\exists r. \text{HeadP } r \wedge \text{NT\_in\_edgesP } r \neq \{\})$ 
```

as an epistemic (EDia_ep) premise in the A-style MaxNT-candidate exclusions.

(A) Model-backed confirmation (Sections 8,9 of *Diagnostics_Nitpick.thy*). Sections 8,9 of *Diagnostics_Nitpick.thy* provides a concrete satisfiable witness model (e.g., via *Nitpick*) in which there are distinct heads and at least one head has nonempty in-edges. Hence *EdgeExist* is not merely “unrefuted”: it is explicitly satisfiable. Under the intended reading of EDia_ep as “not refuted / consistent with the current definitions”, this supports the premise:

```
EDia_ep EdgeExist.
```

(B) Even without an explicit model. Even if we do not appeal to the Sections 8,9 of *Diagnostics_Nitpick.thy* witness, the epistemic role of *EdgeExist* can still be stated as a non-refutation condition: unless the theory derives a refutation of *EdgeExist* (or an equivalent proof of impossibility), *EdgeExist* remains epistemically live, so EDia_ep *EdgeExist* is admissible as a “not yet refuted” premise.

Note. - The witness model strengthens the premise from “not refuted” to “witnessed satisfiable”. - The candidate-exclusion proofs below do not hard-code any specific model; they only consume EDia_ep *EdgeExist* as an epistemic available truth-bearer.

lemma *NT_in_edgesP_nonempty_imp_three_distinct_heads*:

```
assumes Nr: "NT_in_edgesP r  $\neq$  {}"
```

```
shows " $\exists A B. \text{HeadP } A \wedge \text{HeadP } B \wedge \text{HeadP } r \wedge A \neq B \wedge A \neq r \wedge B \neq r$ "
```

<proof>

lemma *not_ExactlyOneHeadP_if_exists_head_edges_nonempty*:

```
assumes ex: "EdgeExist"
```

```
shows " $\neg \text{ExactlyOneHeadP}$ "
```

<proof>

lemma *Edge_implies_notOneHead*:

```
shows "EdgeExist  $\longrightarrow \neg \text{ExactlyOneHeadP}$ "
```

<proof>

lemma *ExactlyOneHeadP_imp_all_heads_edges_empty*:

```
assumes One: "ExactlyOneHeadP"
```

```
shows " $\forall r. \text{HeadP } r \longrightarrow \text{NT\_in\_edgesP } r = \{\}$ "
```

<proof>

definition *AllEdgesEmpty* :: *bool* **where**
"AllEdgesEmpty $\equiv (\forall r. \text{HeadP } r \longrightarrow \text{NT_in_edgesP } r = \{\})"$

This lemma does not assert that any edge actually exists, or that *EdgeExist* is true. It proves only the incompatibility claim: *ExactlyOneHeadP* and *EdgeExist* cannot both hold at the same time.

lemma *ExactlyOneHeadP_imp_AllEdgesEmpty*:
assumes *One*: "*ExactlyOneHeadP*"
shows "*AllEdgesEmpty*"
<proof>

lemma *EdgeExist_imp_not_AllEdgesEmpty*:
assumes *ex*: "*EdgeExist*"
shows " \neg *AllEdgesEmpty*"
<proof>

lemma *OneHead_and_edge_False*:
shows " $(\text{ExactlyOneHeadP} \wedge \text{EdgeExist}) \longrightarrow \text{False}$ "
<proof>

lemma *notEdia_back_from_ref_back*:
assumes *ref_back*: " $\bigwedge P Q. (P \longrightarrow Q) \implies \text{Ref } Q \implies \text{Ref } P$ "
shows " $\bigwedge P Q. (P \longrightarrow Q) \implies \neg \text{EDia_ep } Q \implies \neg \text{EDia_ep } P$ "
<proof>

lemma *ref_back_from_notEdia_back*:
assumes *notEdia_back*: " $\bigwedge P Q. (P \longrightarrow Q) \implies \neg \text{EDia_ep } Q \implies \neg \text{EDia_ep } P$ "
shows " $\bigwedge P Q. (P \longrightarrow Q) \implies \text{Ref } Q \implies \text{Ref } P$ "
<proof>

Refutation back-propagation (*ref_back*) and the *EDia_ep* formulation (*notEdia_back*) are definitionally equivalent since $\text{EDia_ep} \equiv \neg \text{Ref}$.

lemma *EDia_ep_forward0*:
assumes *notEdia_back*:
 $\bigwedge P Q. (P \longrightarrow Q) \implies \neg \text{EDia_ep } Q \implies \neg \text{EDia_ep } P$
and *imp*: " $P \longrightarrow Q$ "
and *possP*: " $\text{EDia_ep } P$ "
shows " $\text{EDia_ep } Q$ "
<proof>

definition *stronger_edge* :: "*bool* \Rightarrow *bool* \Rightarrow *bool*" **where**
"stronger_edge *Q P* \equiv
 $\text{EDia_ep } (Q \wedge \text{EdgeExist}) \wedge \neg \text{EDia_ep } (P \wedge \text{EdgeExist})"$

definition *MaxNT_candidate* :: "*bool* \Rightarrow *bool*" **where**
"MaxNT_candidate *P* \equiv

$EDia_ep\ P \wedge (\forall Q. EDia_ep\ Q \longrightarrow \neg\ stronger_edge\ Q\ P)$ "

Sections 8,9 of `Diagnostics_Nitpick.thy` provide a concrete satisfiable witness (found by Nitpick). This computational witness corroborates that `EdgeExist` is epistemically admissible under the intended reading of `EDia_ep` as “not refuted.”

In other words, the existence of a non-empty NT-edge structure is not definitionally blocked by the framework, and thus `EDia_ep EdgeExist` is justified at the epistemic level.

```
lemma N1_fails_MaxNT_final:
  assumes poss_edge: "EDia_ep EdgeExist"
    and notEdia_back:
      " $\bigwedge P\ Q. (P \longrightarrow Q) \implies \neg\ EDia\_ep\ Q \implies \neg\ EDia\_ep\ P$ "
    and notEdia_False: " $\neg\ EDia\_ep\ False$ "
  shows " $\neg\ MaxNT\_candidate\ ExactlyOneHeadP$ "
  <proof>
```

30 16. N=2 exclusion: N=2 cannot exceed N=1 in MaxNT (mutual vs. non-mutual cases)

30.1 16.1 Support-count machinery (NT_in_edges-based)

```
definition support_edges_ep :: "bool  $\Rightarrow$  (bool  $\times$  bool) set" where
  "support_edges_ep X  $\equiv$  NT_in_edges_ep X"
```

```
definition support_count_ep :: "bool  $\Rightarrow$  nat" where
  "support_count_ep X  $\equiv$  card (support_edges_ep X)"
```

30.2 16.2 Case split predicates

```
definition Mutual_leU_ep :: "bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "Mutual_leU_ep X Y  $\equiv$  (Arg X  $\preceq$  Arg Y  $\wedge$  Arg Y  $\preceq$  Arg X)"
```

```
definition No_cross_support_ep :: "bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "No_cross_support_ep X Y  $\equiv$ 
  ( $\neg$  ( $\exists S. NT\_pair\_support\_ep\ X\ S\ Y$ )  $\wedge$   $\neg$  ( $\exists S. NT\_pair\_support\_ep\ Y\ S\ X$ ))"
```

```
definition Nonmutual_symmetric_ep :: "bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "Nonmutual_symmetric_ep X Y  $\equiv$ 
  No_cross_support_ep X Y  $\wedge$  support_edges_ep X = support_edges_ep Y"
```

Case (1): mutual (Arg-level) support \Rightarrow Arg-collapse lemma `case_mutual_leU_ep`:

```
assumes two: "TwoHypostases_ep  $\Omega$   $\Pi$ "
  and mut: "Mutual_leU_ep  $\Omega$   $\Pi$ "
  and EqU_iff_LeU_both_assm:
    " $\bigwedge A\ B. (A \approx B) \iff (A \preceq B \wedge B \preceq A)$ "
  and TwoHypostases_noEqArg:
```

```

    " $\bigwedge \Omega \Pi. \text{TwoHypostases\_ep } \Omega \Pi \implies \neg (\text{Arg } \Omega \approx \text{Arg } \Pi)$ "
  shows False
<proof>

```

Case (2): nonmutual symmetric \Rightarrow equal counts lemma *case_nonmutual_equal_count_ep*:

```

  assumes sym: "Nonmutual_symmetric_ep  $\Omega \Pi$ "
  shows "support_count_ep  $\Omega = \text{support\_count\_ep } \Pi$ "
<proof>

```

30.3 16.3 Clean case split lemma

theorem *N2_cases*:

```

  assumes two: "TwoHypostases_ep  $\Omega \Pi$ "
    and EqU_iff_LeU_both_assm: " $\bigwedge A B. (A \approx B) \iff (A \preceq B \wedge B \preceq A)$ "
    and TwoHypostases_noEqArg: " $\bigwedge \Omega \Pi. \text{TwoHypostases\_ep } \Omega \Pi \implies \neg (\text{Arg } \Omega \approx \text{Arg } \Pi)$ "
  shows "Mutual_leU_ep  $\Omega \Pi \implies \text{False}$ "
    and "Nonmutual_symmetric_ep  $\Omega \Pi \implies \text{support\_count\_ep } \Omega = \text{support\_count\_ep } \Pi$ "
<proof>

```

30.4 16.4 Explicit tie statement: if $N=2$ is nonmutual symmetric, it cannot exceed $N=1$

lemma *N2_tie_cannot_exceed_N1*:

```

  assumes sym: "Nonmutual_symmetric_ep  $\Omega \Pi$ "
  shows "support_count_ep  $\Omega = \text{support\_count\_ep } \Pi$ "
    and " $\neg (\text{support\_count\_ep } \Omega > \text{support\_count\_ep } \Pi)$ "
    and " $\neg (\text{support\_count\_ep } \Pi > \text{support\_count\_ep } \Omega)$ "
<proof>

```

30.5 16.5 Nonmutual symmetric \Rightarrow indistinguishable (so not a genuine $N=2$ split)

lemma *Nonmutual_symmetric_imp_EqNT_ep*:

```

  assumes sym: "Nonmutual_symmetric_ep  $X Y$ "
  shows " $X \approx_{NT} Y$ "
<proof>

```

corollary *Nonmutual_symmetric_not_Distinct_ep*:

```

  assumes sym: "Nonmutual_symmetric_ep  $X Y$ "
  shows " $\neg \text{Distinct\_ep } X Y$ "
<proof>

```

In the nonmutual symmetric case, the two candidates are tied and also NT-indistinguishable, hence they cannot serve as two distinct hypostases in the sense of *Distinct_ep*.

corollary *Nonmutual_symmetric_blocks_two_witness*:

```

  assumes sym: "Nonmutual_symmetric_ep  $\Omega \Pi$ "
  shows " $\neg (\text{Distinct\_ep } \Omega \Pi)$ "

```

<proof>

30.6 16.6 Main proof: N=2 exclusion (epistemic candidate only)

definition *ExactlyTwoHeadsP* :: *bool* where

```
"ExactlyTwoHeadsP  $\longleftrightarrow$ 
( $\exists A0 B0.$ 
   $A0 \neq B0 \wedge \text{HeadP } A0 \wedge \text{HeadP } B0 \wedge$ 
   $(\forall C. \text{HeadP } C \longrightarrow (C = A0 \vee C = B0)))"$ 
```

lemma *Edge_blocks_N2*: "*EdgeExist* $\longrightarrow \neg$ *ExactlyTwoHeadsP*"

<proof>

definition *MaxNT_candidate_N2* :: "*bool* \Rightarrow *bool*" where

```
"MaxNT_candidate_N2 P  $\equiv$ 
  EDia_ep P  $\wedge$  ( $\forall Q. \text{EDia_ep } Q \longrightarrow \neg \text{stronger\_edge } Q P$ )"
```

lemma *N2_fails_MaxNT_final*:

```
assumes poss_edge: "EDia_ep EdgeExist"
  and notEdia_back:
    " $\bigwedge P Q. (P \longrightarrow Q) \Longrightarrow \neg \text{EDia\_ep } Q \Longrightarrow \neg \text{EDia\_ep } P$ "
  and notEdia_False: " $\neg \text{EDia\_ep } \text{False}$ "
shows " $\neg \text{MaxNT\_candidate\_N2 } \text{ExactlyTwoHeadsP}$ "
```

<proof>

31 17. Actuality and Forcing: World-Lifted Existence of H_opt q(\exists q. H_opt q) and the N=3 Conclusion

31.1 17.1 Forcing the triune case "N3"

We work with four structural cases for ultimate heads:

N1_exact – exactly one absolute head N2_exact – exactly two independent heads N3 – triune mutual-support package N4plus – four-or-more essentially independent heads

Key point (clean logic):

Existence trigger (DN). We assume $(\neg\neg)(\exists x. \text{H_opt } x)$. Since Isabelle/HOL is classical, this yields $\exists x. \text{H_opt } x$. Philosophical reading: the ground cannot “evaporate”; we are not allowed to settle into the degenerate option $\neg\exists x. \text{H_opt } x$.

Conditional exhaustiveness. The case split is not asserted unconditionally. We assume only the conditional form: $(\exists x. \text{H_opt } x) \longrightarrow (\text{N1_exact} \vee \text{N2_exact} \vee \text{N3} \vee \text{N4plus})$. So the disjunction is activated *only after* existence is obtained.

Elimination (forcing). Once the disjunction is available, ruling out “N1_exact”, “N2_exact”, and “N4plus” leaves “N3” as the unique remaining live case.

Therefore DN is not decorative: it is the engine that activates the exhaustiveness, i.e. it licenses the disjunction by guaranteeing existence.

Case-label packaging for the forcing step (Section 17).

In this section, we treat the “N=1 exact” and “N=2 exact” cases as the corresponding MaxNT-candidate propositions used in the epistemic exclusion blocks (Sections 15.2 and 16.6).

This keeps the forcing logic uniform: the disjunction is over boolean case-labels, and the exclusions are exactly the proved negations of those labels.

definition *N1_exact* :: bool where

"N1_exact ≡ MaxNT_candidate ExactlyOneHeadP"

definition *N2_exact* :: bool where

"N2_exact ≡ MaxNT_candidate_N2 ExactlyTwoHeadsP"

definition *N4plus* :: bool where

"N4plus ≡
 (∃ a b c d.
 H_opt_ep a ∧ H_opt_ep b ∧ H_opt_ep c ∧ H_opt_ep d ∧
 EDia_ep a ∧ EDia_ep b ∧ EDia_ep c ∧ EDia_ep d ∧
 ¬ (a ≈_{NT} b) ∧ ¬ (a ≈_{NT} c) ∧ ¬ (a ≈_{NT} d) ∧
 ¬ (b ≈_{NT} c) ∧ ¬ (b ≈_{NT} d) ∧ ¬ (c ≈_{NT} d))"

lemma *noN1*:

assumes *poss_edge*: "EDia_ep EdgeExist"
 and *notEdia_back*:
 "∧P Q. (P → Q) ⇒ ¬ EDia_ep Q ⇒ ¬ EDia_ep P"
 and *notEdia_False*: "¬ EDia_ep False"
 shows "¬ N1_exact"
 ⟨proof⟩

lemma *noN2*:

assumes *poss_edge*: "EDia_ep EdgeExist"
 and *notEdia_back*:
 "∧P Q. (P → Q) ⇒ ¬ EDia_ep Q ⇒ ¬ EDia_ep P"
 and *notEdia_False*: "¬ EDia_ep False"
 shows "¬ N2_exact"
 ⟨proof⟩

lemma *noN4*:

assumes *noN4ep*: "¬ N4plus"
 shows "¬ N4plus"
 ⟨proof⟩

lemma *force_N3_from_exhaust_and_exclusions*:

assumes *Exhaust*: "N1_exact ∨ N2_exact ∨ N3 ∨ N4plus"
 and *noN1*: "¬ N1_exact"
 and *noN2*: "¬ N2_exact"
 and *noN4*: "¬ N4plus"

shows N3

<proof>

Clean forced-N3 lemma (DN actually used):

DN ensures existence: $(\neg\neg)(\exists x. H_opt\ x)$ implies $(\exists x. H_opt\ x)$.

Exhaust_if_exists provides the 4-way case split *conditional on existence*: $(\exists x. H_opt\ x) \rightarrow (N1_exact \vee N2_exact \vee N3 \vee N4plus)$.

With “N1_exact”, “N2_exact”, “N4plus” excluded, the only remaining case is “N3”.

This makes the dependency explicit: without DN you cannot fire Exhaust_if_exists, hence you cannot conclude N3.

lemma N3_forced_clean:

assumes DN: " $\neg\neg (\exists x. H_opt\ x)$ "

and Exhaust_if_exists:

" $(\exists x. H_opt\ x) \rightarrow (N1_exact \vee N2_exact \vee N3 \vee N4plus)$ "

and noN1: " $\neg N1_exact$ "

and noN2: " $\neg N2_exact$ "

and noN4: " $\neg N4plus$ "

shows N3

<proof>

31.2 17.2 Actuality at the distinguished U-world-point (our-world)

Recap. We already proved “N3” purely in the U-layer (Section 13.3 / 17.1), i.e. there exist three optimal heads a b c such that the fully symmetric “pair \rightarrow third” closure holds uniformly at every U-point e (see N3_def). No modal axioms and no extra metaphysical axioms were used.

Goal (17.2). Instantiate that uniform closure at the distinguished point e0 and package it as a single internal statement TriuneGod_e0. This uses only *Supports*, *H_opt*, *e0*, and the theorem N3 (no Ref / EDia_ep / Val / w0, and no modal axioms).

World-reading (methodological, not an axiom). We do not add “U = our world” as an axiom inside the U-layer (that would be circular). Rather, we adopt it as an external interpretive identification—i.e. the usual way we interpret a formal system as describing (or modeling) facts about reality. Likewise, HOL’s basic principles are trusted precisely because they are built from highly evident rules; interpreting them as applicable to our reasoning about reality is a methodological stance, not an extra postulate inside the object theory.

lemma TriuneGod_e0_pair_closure_from_N3:

assumes N3H: N3

shows " $\exists a\ b\ c.$

$H_opt\ a \wedge H_opt\ b \wedge H_opt\ c \wedge$

$((Supports\ e0\ b \wedge Supports\ e0\ c) \rightarrow Supports\ e0\ a) \wedge$

$((Supports\ e0\ c \wedge Supports\ e0\ a) \rightarrow Supports\ e0\ b) \wedge$

$((Supports\ e0\ a \wedge Supports\ e0\ b) \rightarrow Supports\ e0\ c)$ "

<proof>

definition TriuneGod_e0 :: bool where

```

"TriuneGod_e0 ≡
  (∃ a b c.
    H_opt a ∧ H_opt b ∧ H_opt c ∧
    ((Supports e0 b ∧ Supports e0 c) → Supports e0 a) ∧
    ((Supports e0 c ∧ Supports e0 a) → Supports e0 b) ∧
    ((Supports e0 a ∧ Supports e0 b) → Supports e0 c))"

```

lemma *TriuneGod_e0_holds_from_N3*:

```

assumes N3H: N3
shows "TriuneGod_e0"
⟨proof⟩

```

Final philosophical summary.

(1) Methodological identification (not an axiom). We treat the Isabelle U-layer (Supports / H_opt / the distinguished *e0*) as a formal description of our actual world. This is not added as an axiom inside the U-layer (that would be circular); rather, it is an interpretive stance taken when reading mathematics.

This identification is of the same kind as the standard interpretive practice of mathematics: results proved from axioms are read as applicable to reality, without re-encoding that applicability as an additional axiom inside the object theory.

Analogy: arithmetic facts such as “1+1=2” are proved internally from axioms, yet we naturally read them as truths about ordinary counting in reality. In doing so, we treat the underlying axioms/rules as applicable to our reasoning and to the description of the world.

Likewise, HOL’s basic commitments are accepted precisely as highly evident principles; interpreting them as applicable to reality is therefore not an arbitrary stipulation, but a methodologically justified interpretation.

(2) Internal theorem. Within that very U-structure, *N3* is already proved (Section 17.1), axiom-free at the U-layer (no modal axioms, no extra metaphysical postulates).

(3) Actuality at *e0*. Since *N3* quantifies $\forall e$, we specialize it to *e0*, obtaining *TriuneGod_e0*: at our world-point, the “pair \rightarrow third” closure holds for some three optimal heads.

(4) Consequence. Given (1)–(3), the ultimate ground of our world is coherently forced to be triune: rival patterns (pure one-head, strict two-head, or 4+-head fragmentation) are excluded by the same U-internal constraints that yielded *N3*.

Short reading: If you accept Isabelle/U as your descriptive logic of reality, then—without adding any extra metaphysical axiom—the only stable ultimate ground compatible with the framework is triune.

31.3 17.3 Ontology argument- world-lift of existence

(1) DN trigger: $\neg\neg(\exists x. H_opt\ x) \rightarrow (\exists x. H_opt\ x)$ (E1) Isabelle/HOL is classical, so double-negation elimination holds.

lemma *DN_exists_Hopt*:

```

assumes DN: " $\neg\neg (\exists x. H\_opt\ x)$ "

```

shows " $\exists x. H_opt\ x$ "
 ⟨*proof*⟩

(2) Reading “God exists” as U-layer existence of an H_opt witness (E1’). Moral note: this only asserts the existence of an H_opt witness in the U-layer, and does not assume any further ethical or theological properties.

definition *GodExists_U* :: *bool*
 where "*GodExists_U* $\equiv (\exists x. H_opt\ x)$ "

lemma *GodExists_U_from_DN*:
 assumes *DN*: " $\neg\neg (\exists x. H_opt\ x)$ "
 shows "*GodExists_U*"
 ⟨*proof*⟩

(3) World-lift by identification: we record the interpretive move “our world follows the U-layer logic” as a definitional identification. No new axioms are introduced; we simply mirror the U-claim at the world level.

definition *GodExists_world* :: *bool*
 where "*GodExists_world* $\equiv GodExists_U$ "

lemma *GodExists_world_from_U*:
 assumes "*GodExists_U*"
 shows "*GodExists_world*"
 ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *GodExists_U_iff_world*:
 "*GodExists_U* $\longleftrightarrow GodExists_world$ "
 ⟨*proof*⟩

Usage sketch: have *DN*: “ $\neg\neg(\exists x. H_opt\ x)$ ” by (* your existing U-layer consistency proof *) hence “*GodExists_U*” by (rule *GodExists_U_from_DN*) hence “*GodExists_world*” by (rule *GodExists_world_from_U*)

32 18. Disjunctive-causal collapse on booleans

lemma *disjunctive_causation_collapse*:
 assumes " $(A \vee B) \longrightarrow C$ " " $(A \vee C) \longrightarrow B$ " " $(B \vee C) \longrightarrow A$ "
 shows " $(A \longleftrightarrow C) \wedge (B \longleftrightarrow C) \wedge (A \longleftrightarrow B)$ "
 ⟨*proof*⟩

lemma *no_disjunctive_trinity*:
 assumes " $(A \vee B) \longrightarrow C$ " " $(A \vee C) \longrightarrow B$ " " $(B \vee C) \longrightarrow A$ "
 and " $\neg (A \longleftrightarrow B) \vee \neg (B \longleftrightarrow C) \vee \neg (A \longleftrightarrow C)$ "
 shows *False*
 ⟨*proof*⟩

33 19. Boolean “Trinity” as pure concurrency

definition *Trinity* :: "bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool" where
 "Trinity Φ Ω ψ \equiv $\Phi \wedge \Omega \wedge \psi$ "

lemma *Trinity_equiv_from_T_and_S_strong*:

assumes *T*: "Trinity Φ Ω ψ \longrightarrow *R*"

and *S*: " \neg (Trinity Φ Ω ψ) \longrightarrow \neg *R*"

shows "Trinity Φ Ω ψ \longleftrightarrow *R*" "R \longrightarrow Φ " "R \longrightarrow Ω " "R \longrightarrow ψ "

<proof>

lemma *singleton_cause_forces_equiv*:

fixes *p q* :: bool

assumes "*p* \longrightarrow *q*" and "*q* \longrightarrow *p*"

shows "*p* \longleftrightarrow *q*"

<proof>

34 20. Packaging (T)+(S): The Trinity provides the possibility condition for created truths(R)

lemma *Trinity_imp_Phi* [*simp*]: "Trinity Φ Ω ψ \Longrightarrow Φ "

<proof>

lemma *Trinity_imp_Omega* [*simp*]: "Trinity Φ Ω ψ \Longrightarrow Ω "

<proof>

lemma *Trinity_imp_psi* [*simp*]: "Trinity Φ Ω ψ \Longrightarrow ψ "

<proof>

lemma *Trinity_TS_package*:

assumes *T*: "Trinity Φ Ω ψ \longrightarrow \diamond *R*"

and *S*: " \neg (Trinity Φ Ω ψ) \longrightarrow \neg *R*"

shows "R \longrightarrow Φ "

"R \longrightarrow Ω "

"R \longrightarrow ψ "

"Trinity Φ Ω ψ \longrightarrow \diamond *R*"

<proof>

35 21. Relative Certainty and Ontological Grounding (definition-only)

We capture the “R \rightarrow S & not (S \rightarrow R)” certainty comparison on the U-layer via the strict support order of arguments. No axioms are added: everything remains definition-only and kernel-verified.

Recall. The relations “ \preceq ” (relative certainty), “ \approx ” (equivalence), and “ \prec_U ” (strict relative

certainty) were already defined in **Section 4 (U-layer: Relative Certainty)**. In this section we do not redefine them; we only introduce a convenient alias “RelCert” and related lemmas, all of which are conservative and definitional.

35.1 21.1 Relative certainty on the U-layer

“R is strictly less certain than S” is rendered as a strict inclusion of U-supports for their arguments. Equivalently, $(\text{Arg } R) <_{\text{U}} (\text{Arg } S)$.

lemma *RelCert_iff_lt*:

"RelCert R S \longleftrightarrow ((Arg R) \preceq (Arg S) \wedge \neg ((Arg S) \preceq (Arg R)))"
 ⟨proof⟩

lemma *RelCert_implies_le*:

"RelCert R S \implies (Arg R) \preceq (Arg S)"
 ⟨proof⟩

35.2 21.2 Pointwise and possibility/current-truth monotonicity

lemma *RelCert_pointwise*:

assumes RC: "RelCert R S"
 and SR: "Supports e R"
 shows "Supports e S"
 ⟨proof⟩

lemma *RelCert_EDia_mono*:

assumes "RelCert R S" and "EDia R"
 shows "EDia S"
 ⟨proof⟩

lemma *RelCert_TrueNow_mono*:

assumes "RelCert R S" and "TrueNow R"
 shows "TrueNow S"
 ⟨proof⟩

35.3 21.3 TSupp / PSupp monotonicity under “Relative Certainty”

lemma *RelCert_TSupp_mono*:

assumes "RelCert R S"
 shows "TSupp (Arg R) \subseteq TSupp (Arg S)"
 ⟨proof⟩

lemma *RelCert_PSupp_mono*:

assumes "RelCert R S"
 shows "PSupp (Arg R) \subseteq PSupp (Arg S)"
 ⟨proof⟩

35.4 21.4 Ontological Grounding: a definitional alias

We introduce a thin alias “Ground” to record the intended philosophical reading: if S is strictly more certain than R (in the `RelCert` sense), then S is an ontological ground for R . This is a pure definition (no axiom).

```
definition Ground :: "bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "Ground S R  $\equiv$  RelCert R S"
```

```
lemma RelCert_implies_Ground: "RelCert R S  $\implies$  Ground S R"
  <proof>
```

```
lemma Ground_iff_RelCert: "Ground S R  $\longleftrightarrow$  RelCert R S"
  <proof>
```

35.5 21.5 Model-side view (optional, inside `FullIdBridge`)

```
context FullIdBridge
begin
```

```
lemma RelCert_subset_in_model:
  assumes "RelCert R S"
  shows "Arg0 R  $\subseteq$  Arg0 S"
  <proof>
```

```
end
```

36 22. Ontological_Origin_Truth(OOT) characterization (axiom-free, U-layer only)

```
definition Ontological_Origin_Truth :: "bool  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "Ontological_Origin_Truth q  $\equiv$ 
    ( $\forall \zeta \in \text{PDom}. (\text{Arg } \zeta) \preceq (\text{Arg } q)$ )
     $\wedge$  ( $\forall \zeta \in \text{PDom}. \neg ((\text{Arg } q) \prec (\text{Arg } \zeta))$ )"
```

```
lemma Hopt_dominates_PDom_all:
  assumes HQ: "H_opt q"
  and PHq: "PH (Arg q)"
  shows " $\forall \zeta \in \text{PDom}. (\text{Arg } \zeta) \preceq (\text{Arg } q)$ "
  <proof>
```

```
lemma Hopt_is_Ontological_Origin_Truth:
  assumes HQ: "H_opt q"
  and PHq: "PH (Arg q)"
  shows "Ontological_Origin_Truth q"
  <proof>
```

```

corollary Ontological_Origin_Truth_covers:
  assumes "Ontological_Origin_Truth q" and " $\zeta \in PDom$ "
  shows "(Arg  $\zeta$ )  $\preceq$  (Arg q)"
  <proof>

```

```

corollary Ontological_Origin_Truth_no_strict_superior:
  assumes "Ontological_Origin_Truth q" and " $\zeta \in PDom$ "
  shows " $\neg ((Arg q) \prec (Arg \zeta))$ "
  <proof>

```

36.1 22.1 Why Tautology(True) cannot be an Ontologic_Origin_truth (anti-coverage witness)

The “bad point” clause functions as an anti-coverage witness against the Tautology. It says that there exist some ζ in PDom and some support-point e such that e supports ζ , while e does not support Arg True. Therefore Arg ζ cannot be below Arg True in the support order. This blocks the universal coverage clause required for Ontologic_Origin_Truth True, and thus prevents the Tautology from qualifying as an ontological origin truth.

```

lemma anti_coverage_point_for_True:
  assumes "Supports e  $\zeta$ " and " $\neg (e \vdash Arg True)$ "
  shows " $\neg ((Arg \zeta) \preceq (Arg True))$ "
  <proof>

```

```

lemma True_not_Ontological_Origin_Truth_if_point_counterexample:
  assumes Z: " $\zeta \in PDom$ " and S: "Supports e  $\zeta$ " and N: " $\neg (e \vdash Arg True)$ "
  shows " $\neg Ontological_Origin_Truth True$ "

<proof>

```

```

lemma True_not_Ontological_Origin_Truth_if_exists_bad_point:
  assumes " $\exists \zeta \in PDom. \exists e. Supports e \zeta \wedge \neg (e \vdash Arg True)$ "
  shows " $\neg Ontological_Origin_Truth True$ "
  <proof>

```

Model-side construction of a “bad point” inside the FullIdBridge locale.

```

context FullIdBridge
begin

```

```

lemma bad_point_exists_for_True:
  assumes " $\exists w \zeta. Val w \zeta \wedge \neg Val w True$ "
  shows " $\exists \zeta \in PDom. \exists e. Supports e \zeta \wedge \neg (e \vdash Arg True)$ "
  <proof>

```

```

end

```

36.2 22.2 Non-triviality package: `Ontological_Origin_Truths` are never the tautology

We establish that any `H_opt` witness (which also satisfies `PH`) is an `Ontological Origin Truth` and is distinct from the `Tautology`.

lemma `Hopt_witness_is_nontrivial_Ontological_Origin_Truth:`

```
assumes HQ: "H_opt q"
    and PHq: "PH (Arg q)"
    and Bad: "∃ζ∈PDom. ∃e. Supports e ζ ∧ ¬ (e ⊢ Arg True)"
shows "Ontological_Origin_Truth q ∧ q ≠ True"
```

<proof>

Existential headline (abstract form, needs a “bad point” assumption).

theorem `Ontological_Origin_Truth_nontrivial_existence_from_Hopt_existence:`

```
assumes Hex: "∃x. H_opt x ∧ PH (Arg x)"
    and Bad: "∃ζ∈PDom. ∃e. Supports e ζ ∧ ¬ (e ⊢ Arg True)"
shows "∃q. Ontological_Origin_Truth q ∧ q ≠ True"
```

<proof>

Tripled version (abstract form, same “bad point” assumption).

theorem `Hopt3_gives_three_nontrivial_Ontological_Origin_Truths:`

```
assumes H3: "Hopt3 a b c"
    and PHa: "PH (Arg a)"
    and PHb: "PH (Arg b)"
    and PHc: "PH (Arg c)"
    and Bad: "∃ζ∈PDom. ∃e. Supports e ζ ∧ ¬ (e ⊢ Arg True)"
shows "Ontological_Origin_Truth a ∧ a ≠ True"
    and "Ontological_Origin_Truth b ∧ b ≠ True"
    and "Ontological_Origin_Truth c ∧ c ≠ True"
```

<proof>

Model-side discharge of the “bad point” assumption inside `FullIdBridge`.

context `FullIdBridge`

begin

corollary `Hopt_witness_is_nontrivial_Ontological_Origin_Truth_model:`

```
assumes HQ: "H_opt q"
    and PHq: "PH (Arg q)"
    and Ex: "∃w ζ. Val w ζ ∧ ¬ Val w True"
shows "Ontological_Origin_Truth q ∧ q ≠ True"
```

<proof>

corollary `Ontological_Origin_Truth_nontrivial_existence_from_model:`

```
assumes Hex: "∃x. H_opt x ∧ PH (Arg x)"
    and Ex: "∃w ζ. Val w ζ ∧ ¬ Val w True"
shows "∃q. Ontological_Origin_Truth q ∧ q ≠ True"
```

<proof>

corollary *Hopt3_gives_three_nontrivial_Ontological_Origin_Truths_model:*

assumes *H3*: "*Hopt3 a b c*"
and *PHs*: "*PH (Arg a)*" "*PH (Arg b)*" "*PH (Arg c)*"
and *Ex*: " $\exists w \zeta. \text{Val } w \zeta \wedge \neg \text{Val } w \text{ True}$ "
shows "*Ontological_Origin_Truth a* \wedge *a* \neq *True*"
and "*Ontological_Origin_Truth b* \wedge *b* \neq *True*"
and "*Ontological_Origin_Truth c* \wedge *c* \neq *True*"

<proof>

end

37 23. No collapse, and why Trinity (not a singleton) can be the origin

lemma *collapse_if_biimp_of_possibility:*

assumes *T*: "*Trinity $\Phi \Omega \psi \longrightarrow \Diamond R$* "
and *B*: " $\Diamond R \longrightarrow \text{Trinity } \Phi \Omega \psi$ "
shows " $\Diamond R \longleftrightarrow \text{Trinity } \Phi \Omega \psi$ "

<proof>

lemma *noncollapse_if_not_back:*

assumes *T*: "*Trinity $\Phi \Omega \psi \longrightarrow \Diamond R$* "
and *nB*: " $\neg (\Diamond R \longrightarrow \text{Trinity } \Phi \Omega \psi)$ "
shows " $\neg (\Diamond R \longleftrightarrow \text{Trinity } \Phi \Omega \psi)$ "

<proof>

lemma *single_cause_collapse_if_back:*

assumes *cause*: " $\Phi \longrightarrow R$ " and *ret*: " $R \longrightarrow \Phi$ "
shows " $R \longleftrightarrow \Phi$ "

<proof>

lemma *single_cause_possibility_collapse_if_back:*

assumes *cause*: " $\Phi \longrightarrow \Diamond R$ " and *ret*: " $\Diamond R \longrightarrow \Phi$ "
shows " $\Diamond R \longleftrightarrow \Phi$ "

<proof>

38 24. Trinity truthmaking pattern: (T) + (S)

Philosophical background.

This section isolates a minimal "truthmaking" pattern for contingent reality. The structure is intentionally weak and two-sided:

(T) If the triune ground holds, then R is at least possible. (S) If the triune ground fails, then

R fails.

Thus the Trinity is not modeled here as a brute forcing principle that immediately yields R, but as a condition that opens the space of R while still allowing contingency. In this sense, the section is designed to preserve the distinction between enabling and forcing.

The contrapositive of (S) yields a weak upward dependence: if R holds, then the triune structure must hold. But (T) itself gives only $\text{Trinity} \rightarrow \Diamond R$, not $\text{Trinity} \rightarrow R$. Hence the framework blocks collapse from possibility into actuality.

Importantly, this section is not part of the indispensable proof-core of either the ontological argument or the Trinity-necessity derivation. Those results are established independently elsewhere. The present section is instead an auxiliary interpretive-diagnostic layer showing how a derived triune ground can be related to contingent reality without forcing it.

The final theorem records the system-level point in classical form: whether Trinity actually implies R is left contingent rather than built in by the truthmaking pattern itself. The purpose of this section is therefore diagnostic and anti-collapse: it shows how a triune ground may underwrite contingent reality without erasing contingency.

```

locale Trinity_Truthmaking =
  fixes  $\Phi \Omega \psi R :: \text{bool}$ 
  assumes T: " $\text{Trinity } \Phi \Omega \psi \rightarrow \Diamond R$ "
    and S: " $\neg (\text{Trinity } \Phi \Omega \psi) \rightarrow \neg R$ "
begin

lemma S_contrapositive: " $R \rightarrow \text{Trinity } \Phi \Omega \psi$ " <proof>

lemma R_implies_each:
  shows " $R \rightarrow \Phi$ " and " $R \rightarrow \Omega$ " and " $R \rightarrow \psi$ "
  <proof>

lemma T_weak_truthmaking: " $\text{Trinity } \Phi \Omega \psi \rightarrow \Diamond R$ " <proof>
end

theorem Contingency_Preserved:
  assumes " $\text{Trinity } \Phi \Omega \psi \rightarrow \Diamond R$ "
  shows " $(\text{Trinity } \Phi \Omega \psi \rightarrow R) \vee \neg (\text{Trinity } \Phi \Omega \psi \rightarrow R)$ "
  <proof>

```

39 25. The Unity of the Trinity - Ordinal/Cardinal transcendence

This section gives a small ordinal/cardinal diagnostic for the unity of the Trinity. The question is whether a triune relational pattern can be faithfully embedded into a simple linear three-step order.

We model a finite ordinal chain with three points (O1, O2, O3), equip it with a meet-like

operation CAP, and ask whether the three divine persons can be mapped bijectively into this linear structure while preserving the triune “pair implies third” pattern.

The result is negative: no such embedding exists. The reason is structural. In a linear chain, CAP behaves like a minimum, so pairwise joint structure always collapses downward into a lower point. But the triune pattern requires a symmetric and irreducible relational form in which each pair stands in a directed relation to the third. That demand cannot be realized inside a merely linear ordinal hierarchy.

Hence the unity of the Trinity is not representable as a simple ordinal ranking or as a one-dimensional cardinal ladder. The triune structure has a mode of unity that exceeds linear order: it is not a serial progression of ranks, but a mutually irreducible relational whole.

The later oneness lemma then complements this result from the opposite direction: although the triune pattern cannot be embedded into a linear three-chain, the essence-image of the three persons may still collapse to one at the level of unity. Thus plurality of persons and unity of essence are not modeled as contradiction, but as two formally distinct dimensions.

```
datatype ord3 = 01 | 02 | 03
```

```
primrec cap :: "ord3  $\Rightarrow$  ord3  $\Rightarrow$  ord3" where
  "cap 01 y = 01"
| "cap 02 y = (case y of 01  $\Rightarrow$  01 | 02  $\Rightarrow$  02 | 03  $\Rightarrow$  02)"
| "cap 03 y = (case y of 01  $\Rightarrow$  01 | 02  $\Rightarrow$  02 | 03  $\Rightarrow$  03)"
```

```
notation cap (infixl "CAP" 70)
```

```
primrec lt0 :: "ord3  $\Rightarrow$  ord3  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "lt0 01 y = (case y of 01  $\Rightarrow$  False | 02  $\Rightarrow$  True | 03  $\Rightarrow$  True)"
| "lt0 02 y = (case y of 01  $\Rightarrow$  False | 02  $\Rightarrow$  False | 03  $\Rightarrow$  True)"
| "lt0 03 y = False"
```

```
notation lt0 (infix "<o" 50)
```

```
lemma lt0_right_01[simp]: "(x::ord3) <o 01) = False"
  <proof>
```

```
datatype person = F | S | G
```

```
definition Persons :: "person set" where "Persons = {F,S,G}"
```

```
definition 0123 :: "ord3 set" where "0123 = {01,02,03}"
```

```
definition preserves_trinity_on_ord3 :: "(person  $\Rightarrow$  ord3)  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "preserves_trinity_on_ord3 f  $\longleftrightarrow$ 
  bij_betw f Persons 0123  $\wedge$ 
  ((f F CAP f S) <o f G)  $\wedge$ 
  ((f F CAP f G) <o f S)  $\wedge$ 
  ((f S CAP f G) <o f F)"
```

```

lemma no_ordinal_embedding_for_trinity:
  "¬ (∃ f. preserves_trinity_on_ord3 f)"
⟨proof⟩

```

Remark (Why no 3-ordinal embedding) Two independent obstacles explain the non-embedding into the linear 3-chain $0 < 1 < 2$. The TriSupport pair \rightarrow third (meet-like) symmetry cannot be realized on a linear chain with meet = min; symmetry would force each image to be maximal, a contradiction.

```

lemma oneness_global:
  fixes essence :: "person  $\Rightarrow$  'E"
  assumes FS: "essence F = essence S"
    and SG: "essence S = essence G"
  shows "card (essence ` Persons) = 1"
⟨proof⟩

```

```

lemma H_principle_from_PH_true:
  assumes "PH (Arg Q)" and "TrueNow  $\zeta$ "
  shows "(Arg  $\zeta$ )  $\preceq$  (Arg Q)"
⟨proof⟩

```

```

lemma H_principle_from_PH_possible:
  assumes "PH (Arg Q)" and "EDia  $\zeta$ "
  shows "(Arg  $\zeta$ )  $\preceq$  (Arg Q)"
⟨proof⟩

```

```

lemma H_principle_full_from_PH:
  assumes "PH (Arg Q)"
  shows " $\forall \zeta. (TrueNow \zeta \vee EDia \zeta) \longrightarrow (Arg \zeta) \preceq (Arg Q)$ "
⟨proof⟩

```

```

lemma PH_no_strict_superior_pair:
  assumes "PH (Arg Q)" and "PH (Arg R)"
  shows "¬ ((Arg Q)  $\prec^P$  (Arg R))  $\wedge$  ¬ ((Arg R)  $\prec^P$  (Arg Q))"
⟨proof⟩

```

40 26. Uniqueness of the Trinity (MaxCov-level)

Core idea: pick one triple (A,B,C) of MaxCov points with pairwise non- \approx use the “no 4 MaxCov points can be pairwise non- \approx ” exclusion (Excl4) to show every MaxCov X must fall into one of the three \approx -classes hence the union of the three \approx -classes is independent of the chosen triple

```

locale Trinity_Uniqueness_MaxCov =
  fixes MaxCov :: "U  $\Rightarrow$  bool"
  assumes SYM: " $\bigwedge p q. p \approx q \implies q \approx p$ "

```

```

and TRANS: " $\bigwedge p q r. p \approx q \implies q \approx r \implies p \approx r$ "
and Excl4:
  " $\bigwedge a b c d.$ 
     $\llbracket$  MaxCov a; MaxCov b; MaxCov c; MaxCov d;
       $\neg(a \approx b); \neg(a \approx c); \neg(b \approx c);$ 
       $\neg(a \approx d); \neg(b \approx d); \neg(c \approx d) \rrbracket \implies \text{False}$ "
begin

definition TrinityTop3_mc :: "U  $\Rightarrow$  U  $\Rightarrow$  U  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "TrinityTop3_mc A B C  $\longleftrightarrow$ 
    MaxCov A  $\wedge$  MaxCov B  $\wedge$  MaxCov C  $\wedge$ 
     $\neg(A \approx B) \wedge \neg(A \approx C) \wedge \neg(B \approx C)$ "

definition Top3Classes :: "U  $\Rightarrow$  U  $\Rightarrow$  U  $\Rightarrow$  U set" where
  "Top3Classes A B C  $\equiv \{x. x \approx A \vee x \approx B \vee x \approx C\}$ "

lemma not_EqU_sym:
  assumes H: " $\neg(x \approx y)$ "
  shows " $\neg(y \approx x)$ "
  <proof>

lemma MaxCov_must_fall_into_Top3Classes:
  assumes T: "TrinityTop3_mc A B C"
  and MX: "MaxCov X"
  shows "X  $\approx$  A  $\vee$  X  $\approx$  B  $\vee$  X  $\approx$  C"
  <proof>

lemma Top3Classes_unique:
  assumes T1: "TrinityTop3_mc A B C"
  and T2: "TrinityTop3_mc A' B' C'"
  shows "Top3Classes A B C = Top3Classes A' B' C'"
  <proof>

corollary Top3Classes_unique_any_point:
  assumes T1: "TrinityTop3_mc A B C"
  and T2: "TrinityTop3_mc A' B' C'"
  shows " $\forall x. x \in \text{Top3Classes A B C} \longleftrightarrow x \in \text{Top3Classes A' B' C}'$ "
  <proof>

```

end

41 27. Wrappers: “God finality” and “Trinity actuality”

“God finality” (order-theoretic necessity within PDom): if $H_opt\ q$, then nothing in PDom is strictly superior to $Arg\ q$. This is just a named wrapper of *argument_finality_PDom*.

```
lemma God_finality:
  assumes "H_opt q"
  shows " $\forall \zeta \in PDom. \neg ((Arg\ q) \prec (Arg\ \zeta))$ "
  <proof>
```

“Trinity actuality”: from *Hopt3 a b c* (three H_opt possibles), we get the N3 pattern with no axiom. This is a named wrapper of *OnlyN3_from_Hopt3_unboxed*.

```
lemma Trinity_actuality:
  assumes H3: "Hopt3 a b c"
  and MCI: " $\bigwedge e\ X\ Y. Supports\ e\ X \implies Supports\ e\ Y \implies Supports\ e\ (X \wedge Y)$ "
  shows N3
  <proof>
```

42 28. Final Locale Audit: Discharging Core locale assumptions

This section provides the formal certification of the entire logical architecture. We establish a minimal analytic environment and mechanically discharge: 1) The “No-Superfluous”(NS), ES, Cov, MCL, MCR constraint via Band Collapse. 2) The “Excl4” constraint for the Uniqueness of the Trinity.

```
locale Final_NS_Audit =
  fixes  $\Omega\ \Psi\ \Phi :: bool$ 
  — Minimal boolean grammar assumptions (analytic truths)
  assumes MCL: " $\bigwedge e\ A\ B. Makes\ e\ (A \wedge B) \implies Makes\ e\ A$ "
    and MCR: " $\bigwedge e\ A\ B. Makes\ e\ (A \wedge B) \implies Makes\ e\ B$ "
    and MCI: " $\bigwedge e\ A\ B. Makes\ e\ A \implies Makes\ e\ B \implies Makes\ e\ (A \wedge B)$ "
  — Core existence and ontological coverage assumptions
  assumes ES: "EDia_ep ( $\Omega \wedge \Psi$ )"
    and Cov: "Arg ( $\Omega \wedge \Psi$ )  $\preceq$  Arg  $\Phi$ "
  — H-principle projection
  and Core_to_Y_rule: " $\bigwedge Y. H\_opt\_ep\ Y \implies Arg\ (\Omega \wedge \Psi) \preceq Arg\ Y$ "
begin
```

42.1 28.1 Discharging NS(No-Superfluous), ES, Cov, MCL, MCR

```
sublocale Trinity_NS_Audit: Band_Collapse_Superfluous  $\Omega\ \Psi\ \Phi$ 
  <proof>
```

42.2 28.2 Discharge the Trinity_Uniqueness_MaxCov Locale

```
sublocale Trinity_Uniqueness_Certified: Trinity_Uniqueness_MaxCov "λu. ∃Y. u = Arg ((Ω
∧ Ψ) ∧ Y) ∧ H_opt_ep Y ∧ EDia_ep Y"
  ⟨proof⟩
```

end

end

theory Diagnostics_Nitpick

imports Axiom_Free_Ontological_Trinity

begin

43 1. Diagnostics Overview

This theory gathers lightweight diagnostics for the U-core and packages:

- Purity checks: ensure no backflow from optional bridges/locales into the D-route core.
- Sanity checks: Nitpick is expected to find no counterexample (i.e., *expect = none*).
- Suspicion checks: Nitpick is expected to find a genuine counterexample (i.e., flags over-strong statements).
- Model checks(Trinity model): Nitpick is expected to produce a genuine Trinity witness model, certifying non-vacuity and concrete realizability of the target configuration.
- Model checks(anti-modal collapse): Nitpick is expected to produce a genuine witness model showing that created truths are not forced into necessity, thereby confirming the absence of modal collapse.

44 2. Locale / Theorem Introspection (non-proof diagnostics)

Quick check that locales are only interpreted where intended (no leakage).

```
print_interps FullIdBridge
```

```
print_interps Riemann_Toy
```

Show hypotheses while printing key equivalences, then turn it back off.

```
declare [[show_hyps]]
```

```
thm PH_imp_EH PH_imp_TH EH_TH_imp_PH PH_iff_EH_TH
```

```
thm EqU_iff_LeU_both
```

```
declare [[show_hyps = false]]
```

45 3. Nitpick setup (parameters and unfolds)

Global defaults for Nitpick runs in this file (bump if needed).

```
nitpick_params [verbose, card = 2-4, card U = 1-3, timeout = 60]
```

Unfold core definitions so Nitpick can see the structure.

```

declare SuppU_def           [nitpick_unfold]
declare LeU_def             [nitpick_unfold]
declare EqU_def             [nitpick_unfold]
declare Supports_def       [nitpick_unfold]
declare EDia_def           [nitpick_unfold]
declare TrueNow_def        [nitpick_unfold]
declare EH_def             [nitpick_unfold]
declare TH_def             [nitpick_unfold]
declare PH_def             [nitpick_unfold]
declare LtU_def            [nitpick_unfold]
declare H_negU_strict_def  [nitpick_unfold]
declare H_opt_def          [nitpick_unfold]
declare PDom_def           [nitpick_unfold]
declare PSupp_def          [nitpick_unfold]

```

46 4. Sanity checks (no counterexample expected)

1) PH iff $EH \wedge TH$.

```

lemma Nitpick_PH_iff_EH_TH:
  shows "PH q  $\longleftrightarrow$  (EH q  $\wedge$  TH q)"
  nitpick [expect = none] <proof>

```

2) $Hopt3$ implies $N3$ (unboxed, D-route).

```

lemma Nitpick_OnlyN3_from_Hopt3_unboxed:
  assumes "Hopt3 a b c"
  shows N3
  nitpick [expect = none] <proof>

```

3) Global $n=1$ exclusion (core witness wrapper).

```

lemma Nitpick_n1_global_exclusion_core:
  assumes " $\exists a a' b c$ .
    EDia b  $\wedge$  EDia c  $\wedge$ 
    (Arg b)  $\preceq$  (Arg a)  $\wedge$  (Arg c)  $\preceq$  (Arg a)  $\wedge$ 
    ( $\neg$  ((Arg b)  $\preceq$  (Arg a'))  $\vee$   $\neg$  ((Arg c)  $\preceq$  (Arg a'))))  $\wedge$ 
    EH (Arg a'"
  shows False
  nitpick [expect = none] <proof>

```

4) Global $n=1$ exclusion (H_opt wrapper).

```

lemma Nitpick_n1_global_exclusion_for_Hopt:
  assumes " $\exists Q b c a'$ .
    H_opt Q  $\wedge$  EDia b  $\wedge$  EDia c  $\wedge$ 
    ( $\neg$  ((Arg b)  $\preceq$  (Arg a'))  $\vee$   $\neg$  ((Arg c)  $\preceq$  (Arg a'))))  $\wedge$ 
    EH (Arg a'"
  shows False
  nitpick [expect = none] <proof>

```

5) H_opt finality over $PDom$: no strict superior.

```
lemma Nitpick_argument_finality_PDom:  
  assumes "H_opt q"  
  shows " $\forall \zeta \in PDom. \neg ((Arg\ q) \prec (Arg\ \zeta))$ "  
  nitpick [expect = none] <proof>
```

6) Pair collapse at Arg-level from two PH + possibility.

```
lemma Nitpick_PH_pair_collapse_to_EqU:  
  assumes "PH (Arg Φ)" "PH (Arg Ω)" "EDia Φ" "EDia Ω"  
  shows "(Arg Φ)  $\approx$  (Arg Ω)"  
  nitpick [expect = none] <proof>
```

47 5. Suspicion checks (Nitpick should find genuine counterexamples)

Universal entailment / empty entailment are both false.

```
lemma entails_universal_suspect: "ALL e u. e  $\vdash$  u"  
  nitpick [card U=3, timeout=15, expect = genuine] <proof>
```

```
lemma entails_empty_suspect: "~ (EX e u. e  $\vdash$  u)"  
  nitpick [card U=3, timeout=15, expect = genuine] <proof>
```

48 6. Strengthened / boundary diagnostics

Strict variants: EH_strict does not imply EH in general (should be refutable).

```
lemma EH_strict_converse_suspect: "ALL q. EH_strict q  $\rightarrow$  EH q"  
  nitpick [card U=3, timeout=20, expect = genuine] <proof>
```

But PH_strict does imply PH (holds by definitions used here).

```
lemma PH_strict_converse_check: "ALL q. PH_strict q  $\rightarrow$  PH q"  
  nitpick [card U=3, timeout=20, expect = none] <proof>
```

One-way $TSupp$ -maximality: the converse direction should hold under our setup.

```
lemma TH_TSupp_max_converse_check:  
  "ALL q. ((ALL x. TSupp x  $\subseteq$  TSupp q)  $\rightarrow$  TH q)"  
  nitpick [card U=3, timeout=20, expect = none] <proof>
```

The following global tautologies should be refutable.

```
lemma Hopt_tautology_suspect: "ALL q. H_opt q"  
  nitpick [card U=3, timeout=20, expect = genuine] <proof>
```

```
lemma Comparable_PDom_on_tautology_suspect: "ALL q. Comparable_PDom_on q"  
  nitpick [card U=3, timeout=20, expect = genuine] <proof>
```

```
lemma H_negU_strict_tautology_suspect: "ALL q. H_negU_strict q"
  nitpick [card U=3, timeout=20, expect = genuine] <proof>
```

49 7. No modal collapse (Nitpick model test)

We established that the Trinity implies the possibility of R ($\Diamond R$). The critical question is whether the Trinity necessitates R (Modal Collapse). If Nitpick finds a counter-model for the lemma below, we confirm that Trinity and $\neg R$ can co-exist without contradiction, proving that collapse is resolved.

```
lemma Trinity_does_not_necessitate_R:
  fixes  $\Phi \Omega \psi R :: bool$ 
  assumes T_Pattern: "Trinity  $\Phi \Omega \psi \longrightarrow \Diamond R$ "
  assumes S_Pattern: " $\neg (Trinity \Phi \Omega \psi) \longrightarrow \neg R$ "
  shows "Trinity  $\Phi \Omega \psi \longrightarrow R$ "
  nitpick [expect = genuine, show_all, satisfy]
  <proof>
```

(1) Anti-degeneracy: \Diamond is not trivially True for every proposition.

```
lemma Diamond_is_not_degenerate:
  shows " $\neg (\forall P::bool. \Diamond P)$ "
  nitpick [expect = genuine, show_all, satisfy]
  <proof>
```

(2) Non-triviality guard: $\Diamond False$ is not forced (not a theorem). We test both directions as independence smoke-tests.

```
lemma Dia_False_is_not_a_theorem:
  shows " $\Diamond False$ "
  nitpick [expect = genuine, show_all, satisfy]
  <proof>
```

```
lemma Not_Dia_False_is_not_a_theorem:
  shows " $\neg (\Diamond False)$ "
  nitpick [expect = genuine, show_all, satisfy]
  <proof>
```

50 8. Computational Diagnostics and Trinity Model Existence (Nitpick test)

APPENDIX: The following diagnostic block uses Nitpick to explore the model-theoretic properties of the theory.

Note on “oops”: The usage of “oops” here does not indicate a proof failure. Rather, it marks a diagnostic check where Nitpick attempts to find counter-examples. The absence of counter-examples in these finite scopes supports the consistency of the Triune Necessity (N=3) as the unique logical equilibrium of the system.

```

typedef U3 = "{0::nat, 1, 2}" <proof>
setup_lifting type_definition_U3

```

```

definition HeadP_U3 :: "U3  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "HeadP_U3 _  $\equiv$  True"

```

```

definition NT_pair_supportU3 :: "U3  $\Rightarrow$  U3  $\Rightarrow$  U3  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  "NT_pair_supportU3 A B C  $\equiv$  (A  $\neq$  B  $\wedge$  A  $\neq$  C  $\wedge$  B  $\neq$  C)"

```

```

definition TrinityModel :: bool where
  "TrinityModel  $\equiv$  ( $\exists$ A B C :: U3.
    HeadP_U3 A  $\wedge$  HeadP_U3 B  $\wedge$  HeadP_U3 C  $\wedge$ 
    A  $\neq$  B  $\wedge$  A  $\neq$  C  $\wedge$  B  $\neq$  C  $\wedge$ 
    NT_pair_supportU3 A B C  $\wedge$ 
    NT_pair_supportU3 B C A  $\wedge$ 
    NT_pair_supportU3 C A B)"

```

```

lemma "TrinityModel"
  nitpick [satisfy, card U3 = 3, expect = genuine]
  <proof>

```

50.1 8.1 Trinity Model existence Nitpick Test - MaxNT

```

datatype U10 = u0 | u1 | u2 | u3 | u4 | u5 | u6 | u7 | u8 | u9

```

```

consts HeadP_U10 :: "U10  $\Rightarrow$  bool"

```

```

definition NT_pair_supportU10 :: "U10  $\Rightarrow$  U10  $\Rightarrow$  U10  $\Rightarrow$  bool" where
  <NT_pair_supportU10 A B C  $\equiv$  (A  $\neq$  B  $\wedge$  A  $\neq$  C  $\wedge$  B  $\neq$  C)>

```

```

definition TrinityModel_U10 :: bool where
  <TrinityModel_U10  $\equiv$ 
    ( $\exists$ A B C :: U10.
      HeadP_U10 A  $\wedge$  HeadP_U10 B  $\wedge$  HeadP_U10 C  $\wedge$ 
      NT_pair_supportU10 A B C  $\wedge$ 
      NT_pair_supportU10 B C A  $\wedge$ 
      NT_pair_supportU10 C A B)>

```

```

definition Head_1_U10 :: bool where
  <Head_1_U10  $\equiv$ 
    ( $\exists$ a::U10. HeadP_U10 a  $\wedge$  ( $\forall$ x::U10. HeadP_U10 x  $\longrightarrow$  x = a))>

```

```

definition Head_2_U10 :: bool where
  <Head_2_U10  $\equiv$ 
    ( $\exists$ a b::U10.
      a  $\neq$  b  $\wedge$  HeadP_U10 a  $\wedge$  HeadP_U10 b  $\wedge$ 

```

$(\forall x::U10. \text{HeadP_U10 } x \longrightarrow (x = a \vee x = b)))\rangle$

definition *Head_3_U10* :: bool where

$\langle \text{Head_3_U10} \equiv$
 $(\exists a \ b \ c::U10.$
 $a \neq b \wedge a \neq c \wedge b \neq c \wedge$
 $\text{HeadP_U10 } a \wedge \text{HeadP_U10 } b \wedge \text{HeadP_U10 } c \wedge$
 $(\forall x::U10. \text{HeadP_U10 } x \longrightarrow (x = a \vee x = b \vee x = c)))\rangle$

definition *Head_4_U10* :: bool where

$\langle \text{Head_4_U10} \equiv$
 $(\exists a \ b \ c \ d::U10.$
 $a \neq b \wedge a \neq c \wedge a \neq d \wedge$
 $b \neq c \wedge b \neq d \wedge c \neq d \wedge$
 $\text{HeadP_U10 } a \wedge \text{HeadP_U10 } b \wedge \text{HeadP_U10 } c \wedge \text{HeadP_U10 } d \wedge$
 $(\forall x::U10. \text{HeadP_U10 } x \longrightarrow$
 $(x = a \vee x = b \vee x = c \vee x = d)))\rangle$

lemma *Trinity_excludes_1*:

$\langle \neg (\text{TrinityModel_U10} \wedge \text{Head_1_U10})\rangle$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *Trinity_excludes_2*:

$\langle \neg (\text{TrinityModel_U10} \wedge \text{Head_2_U10})\rangle$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *Trinity_Minimal_3_over_2*:

assumes $\langle \text{TrinityModel_U10} \wedge \text{Head_3_U10} \rangle$
shows $\langle \neg (\text{TrinityModel_U10} \wedge \text{Head_2_U10}) \rangle$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma $\langle \text{TrinityModel_U10} \wedge \text{Head_1_U10} \rangle$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma $\langle \text{TrinityModel_U10} \wedge \text{Head_2_U10} \rangle$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

The failure of N=1 and N=2 models to satisfy the EdgeExist condition validates that the support relation (NT_pair_support) is strictly non-trivial.

lemma $\langle \text{TrinityModel_U10} \wedge \text{Head_3_U10} \rangle$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

50.2 8.2 Numerical Diagnostics for Trinity Necessity with number of distinct MaxCov entities

This suite evaluates the structural stability of the H-opt framework. It systematically tests different values of N (number of distinct MaxCov entities) to identify the unique logical fixed point of the system.

```
lemma nitpick_1_MaxCov_insufficient_UNSAT:
```

```
  assumes M1: "MaxCov A"
```

```
  shows "False"
```

```
  nitpick [satisfy, expect = none]
```

```
⟨proof⟩
```

```
lemma nitpick_2_MaxCov_pairwise_nonapprox_UNSAT:
```

```
  assumes MA: "MaxCov A" and MB: "MaxCov B"
```

```
    and AB: "A ≠ B"
```

```
  shows "False"
```

```
  nitpick [satisfy, expect = none]
```

```
⟨proof⟩
```

The Unique Fixed Point: N = 3 (The Trinity)

```
lemma nitpick_3_MaxCov_Trinity_GENUINE:
```

```
  assumes MA: "MaxCov A" and MB: "MaxCov B" and MC: "MaxCov C"
```

```
    and AB: "A ≠ B" and AC: "A ≠ C" and BC: "B ≠ C"
```

```
  shows "GodExists_U"
```

```
  nitpick [satisfy, expect = genuine]
```

```
⟨proof⟩
```

```
lemma nitpick_4_MaxCov_pairwise_nonapprox_UNSAT:
```

```
  assumes MA: "MaxCov A" and MB: "MaxCov B" and MC: "MaxCov C" and MD: "MaxCov D"
```

```
    and AB: "¬(A ≈ B)" and AC: "¬(A ≈ C)" and AD: "¬(A ≈ D)"
```

```
    and BC: "¬(B ≈ C)" and BD: "¬(B ≈ D)" and CD: "¬(C ≈ D)"
```

```
  shows False
```

```
  nitpick [satisfy, expect = none, show_all]
```

```
  nitpick [satisfy, expect = none, show_all, timeout = 60]
```

```
⟨proof⟩
```

Computational diagnostic (Nitpick). We asked Nitpick for a model containing four MaxCov points that are pairwise non- \approx . No model is found (expect = none), even with an increased timeout. This indicates that, within Nitpick's finite scopes, the current MaxCov/Cov/ \approx definitions already exert a strong structural constraint against $N \geq 4$ distinct maxima. (This is evidence, not a theorem.)

51 9. Non-vacuous Genuine Trinity model Nitpick test

```
definition NT_edgeP :: "P ⇒ P ⇒ P ⇒ bool" where
```

```

<NT_edgeP A B C  $\longleftrightarrow$ 
  (ArgP (A  $\sqcap$  B)  $\preceq$  ArgP C)  $\wedge$ 
   $\neg$  (ArgP (A  $\sqcap$  B)  $\approx$  ArgP A)  $\wedge$ 
   $\neg$  (ArgP (A  $\sqcap$  B)  $\approx$  ArgP B)>

```

definition *TriSupport_JointP* :: "*P* \Rightarrow *P* \Rightarrow *P* \Rightarrow bool" where

```

<TriSupport_JointP a b c  $\longleftrightarrow$ 
  (ArgP (b  $\sqcap$  c)  $\preceq$  ArgP a)  $\wedge$ 
  (ArgP (c  $\sqcap$  a)  $\preceq$  ArgP b)  $\wedge$ 
  (ArgP (a  $\sqcap$  b)  $\preceq$  ArgP c)  $\wedge$ 
   $\neg$  (ArgP a  $\preceq$  ArgP b)  $\wedge$   $\neg$  (ArgP b  $\preceq$  ArgP a)  $\wedge$ 
   $\neg$  (ArgP b  $\preceq$  ArgP c)  $\wedge$   $\neg$  (ArgP c  $\preceq$  ArgP b)  $\wedge$ 
   $\neg$  (ArgP c  $\preceq$  ArgP a)  $\wedge$   $\neg$  (ArgP a  $\preceq$  ArgP c)>

```

definition *Trinity_nonvacuousP* :: bool where

```

<Trinity_nonvacuousP  $\longleftrightarrow$ 
  ( $\exists$  a b c.
    H_optP a  $\wedge$  H_optP b  $\wedge$  H_optP c  $\wedge$ 
    TriSupport_JointP a b c  $\wedge$ 
    NT_edgeP a b c  $\wedge$  NT_edgeP b c a  $\wedge$  NT_edgeP c a b)>

```

lemma *Trinity_nonvacuousP_satisfiable*:

shows *Trinity_nonvacuousP*

nitpick [*satisfy*, card *P* = 3, card *U* = 3, timeout = 60, show_all, expect = genuine]

<proof>

Finite-model witness (Nitpick). Nitpick finds a genuine model of *Trinity_nonvacuousP* in the finite scope $\text{card}(P) = 3$ and $\text{card}(U) = 3$.

In the returned witness (up to renaming of elements), the Skolem triple is $\langle a = P_1 \rangle$, $\langle b = P_2 \rangle$, $\langle c = P_3 \rangle$, and the conjunction-like operator $\langle \sqcap \rangle$ satisfies the cycle $\langle P_1 \sqcap P_2 = P_3 \rangle$, $\langle P_2 \sqcap P_3 = P_1 \rangle$, $\langle P_3 \sqcap P_1 = P_2 \rangle$.

This confirms that the non-vacuous triune package (*TriSupport_JointP* plus three *NT_edgeP* constraints, together with *H_optP*) is jointly satisfiable.

lemma *Trinity_nonvacuousP_not_valid_sanity*:

shows " \neg *Trinity_nonvacuousP*"

nitpick [*satisfy*, card *P* = 3, card *U* = 3, timeout = 60, expect = genuine]

<proof>

Nitpick status of *Trinity_nonvacuousP*.

We use Nitpick here only as a finite-scope sanity check.

- **Satisfiable (SAT).** Nitpick finds a genuine model of *Trinity_nonvacuousP* with $\text{card } P = 3$ and $\text{card } U = 3$. Hence the non-vacuous triune package is consistent with the current definitional framework (i.e., it is not definitionally empty or contradictory).

- **Not valid (not a tautology).** Nitpick also finds a genuine model of $\neg \textit{Trinity_nonvacuousP}$ in the same scope. Hence $\textit{Trinity_nonvacuousP}$ is not forced by the definitions alone.

Interpretation. Together, these witnesses show that $\textit{Trinity_nonvacuousP}$ is contentful: it is compatible with the framework, yet not logically trivial in the tested scope. These results are evidence for the chosen finite scope, not a meta-theorem about all models.

```
end
theory Axiom_And_Assumption_Audit
  imports
    Axiom_Free_Ontological_Trinity
    Diagnostics_Nitpick
begin
```

52 Kernel-Level Axiom-Free Certification Logic

The following SML code performs a formal audit of the theory's dependency graph using the Isabelle kernel. It ensures that no user-defined axioms are present.

$\langle ML \rangle$

53 Locale Assumption Audit

$\langle ML \rangle$

end

Appendix B: Final Verification and Integrity Audit

This section contains the official verification report generated by the Isabelle/HOL kernel, certifying that the triune necessity result is axiom-free and internally consistent.

1. Mechanical Consistency & Satisfiability

- **Kernel Verification:** **PASSED** (Isabelle/HOL-2025 Kernel)
- **Consistency Status:** **SOUND**. Verified via flat-model interpretation.
- **Satisfiability Witness:** **GENUINE**. Nitpick found satisfying model at scope $N = 3$.

2. Logical Integrity Guarantee (Axiom Audit)

Documents the axiom-free status of the development via direct ML kernel query.

```
> ML_val { (* Strict filter for user-defined axioms *) }
val it = [] : (string * term) list
(* SUCCESS: Axiom-Free verified *)
```

3. Core Logical Assumptions (Locale Audit)

Documenting every assumption operative within the system's locales.

Project Locale Audit

Core Logical Assumptions

```
--- Locale:
  Verification_of_Axiom_free_Godelian_Ontological_Argument_and_Trinity_Necessity_Proof
  .Band_Collapse_From_Hopt ---
assumes "Band_Collapse_From_Hopt \ $\langle\Omega\rangle$  \ $\langle\Psi\rangle$  \ $\langle\Phi\rangle$ "
--- Locale:
  Verification_of_Axiom_free_Godelian_Ontological_Argument_and_Trinity_Necessity_Proof
  .Band_Collapse_Superfluous ---
assumes "Band_Collapse_Superfluous \ $\langle\Omega\rangle$  \ $\langle\Psi\rangle$  \ $\langle\Phi\rangle$ "
--- Locale:
  Verification_of_Axiom_free_Godelian_Ontological_Argument_and_Trinity_Necessity_Proof
  .Boolean_at_our_world ---
assumes "Boolean_at_our_world Val w\ $\langle^{\text{sub}}\rangle$ 0"
--- Locale:
  Verification_of_Axiom_free_Godelian_Ontological_Argument_and_Trinity_Necessity_Proof
  .Epistemic_N1_Exclusion ---
```

```

assumes "Epistemic_N1_Exclusion"
--- Locale:
    Verification_of_Axiom_free_Godelian_Ontological_Argument_and_Trinity_Necessity_Proof
    .Final_NS_Audit ---
assumes "Final_NS_Audit \ $\Omega$  \ $\Psi$  \ $\Phi$ "
--- Locale:
    Verification_of_Axiom_free_Godelian_Ontological_Argument_and_Trinity_Necessity_Proof
    .FullIdBridge ---
assumes "FullIdBridge Val iw"
--- Locale:
    Verification_of_Axiom_free_Godelian_Ontological_Argument_and_Trinity_Necessity_Proof
    .Refuted_Backprop ---
assumes "Refuted_Backprop"
--- Locale:
    Verification_of_Axiom_free_Godelian_Ontological_Argument_and_Trinity_Necessity_Proof
    .Riemann_Toy ---
assumes "Riemann_Toy Val iw R \ $\Phi$  \ $\Phi$ '"
--- Locale:
    Verification_of_Axiom_free_Godelian_Ontological_Argument_and_Trinity_Necessity_Proof
    .Riemann_Toy_Core ---
assumes "Riemann_Toy_Core eI eII R Phi Phi'"
--- Locale:
    Verification_of_Axiom_free_Godelian_Ontological_Argument_and_Trinity_Necessity_Proof
    .Trinity_Truthmaking ---
assumes "Trinity_Truthmaking \ $\Phi$  \ $\Omega$  \ $\psi$  R"
--- Locale:
    Verification_of_Axiom_free_Godelian_Ontological_Argument_and_Trinity_Necessity_Proof
    .Trinity_Uniqueness_MaxCov ---
assumes "Trinity_Uniqueness_MaxCov MaxCov"

```

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